Results
2003-23-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Cessna Model 560 airplanes. This action requires disengaging and tie-strapping the pitch trim and autopilot servo (servo 1) circuit breakers. This action also provides an optional inspection and follow-on actions that, if accomplished, terminates the requirement to disengage and tie-strap those circuit breakers. This action is necessary to prevent a single-point failure in the trim system from causing a runaway trim condition that the pilot may be unable to stop by using the autopilot-disconnect switch. This condition could result in loss of control of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2003-22-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Bombardier Model CL-600-1A11 (CL-600), CL-600- 2A12 (CL-601), and CL-600-2B16 (CL-601-3A, CL-601-3R, and CL-604) series airplanes. This amendment requires revising the airplane flight manual to provide the flightcrew with procedures and limitations for operating the airplane with out-of-tolerance angle of attack (AOA) transducers. This amendment also requires, among other actions, measuring the vane angles and voltage of the AOA transducers; reworking the AOA transducer assemblies; repetitive measurements of the resistance of both AOA transducers; and follow-on and corrective actions, as applicable. This action is necessary to prevent flat spots on the potentiometers of the AOA transducers due to wear, which may cause a delay in the commands for stall warning, stick shaker, and stick pusher operation. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
68-20-07: 68-20-07 DOWTY ROTOL: Amendment 39-664. Applies to Dowty Rotol Propellers (c) R.193/4-30-4/50 installed on Fairchild F. 27A-F-G-J, FH.227 and Fokker F.27 Mk 400, (c) R.257/4-30-4/60 installed on Fairchild FH.227B, FH.227C, FH.227D and FH.227E, and (c) R.184/4-30-4/50 installed on Grumman G-159. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the propeller hub driving center, P/N RA 57500, accomplish the following: (a) For all propellers except the (c) R.184/4-30-4/50 propeller, incorporate Dowty Rotol Modification (c) VP.2486, in accordance with Dowty Rotol Service Bulletin No. 61.573B dated June, 1968, or later ARB approved issue, or FAA approved equivalent at the next scheduled overhaul or within the next 4500 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first. (b) For (c) R.184/4-30-4/50 propellers accomplish the following: (1) For propeller hubs having 2500 or more hours time in service on the effective date of this AD and that have not been modified in accordance with paragraph (5), inspect the hub in accordance with paragraph (3) within the next 50 hours time in service and incorporate the modification specified in paragraph (5) at the next scheduled overhaul or prior to the accumulation of 400 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first. (2) For propeller hubs having less than 2500 hours time in service on the effective date of this AD and that have not been modified in accordance with paragraph (5), inspect the hub in accordance with paragraph (3) prior to the accumulation of 2550 hours time in service and incorporate the modification specified in paragraph (5) within the next 400 hours time in service or prior to the accumulation of 2500 hours time in service, whichever occurs later. (3) Inspect the rear face of the hub driving center flange with a magnifying glass and by the magnetic particle fluid method in accordance with Dowty Rotol Service Bulletin 61-633 dated June 1968, or later approved ARB issue, or an FAA approved equivalent. (4) If cracked hub driving centers are detected during any inspection, before further flight replace the propeller hub driving center with a serviceable part of the same part number having no cracks. (5) Incorporate Dowty Rotol Modification No. (c) VP.2486 in accordance with Dowty Rotol Service Bulletin No. 61-573A dated June 1968, or later ARB approved issue, or an FAA approved equivalent. The inspection specified in paragraph (3) is not required in hubs modified in accordance with this paragraph. This supersedes Amendment 39-587 (33 F.R. 5866), AD 68-08-05. This amendment becomes effective October 8, 1968.
2020-22-20: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B, AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350BA, AS350D, AS350D1, AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, AS355F2, AS355N, AS355NP, EC130B4, and EC130T2 helicopters. This AD requires visually inspecting each main rotor gearbox (MGB) suspension bar attachment bracket bolt for missing bolt heads. Depending on the outcome of the visual inspection, measuring the tightening torque, removing certain parts, sending photos and reporting information to Airbus Helicopters, and completing an FAA-approved repair is required. This AD was prompted by a report of a missing MGB suspension bar attachment bolt head. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
70-10-07: 70-10-07 HAWKER SIDDELEY: Amdt. 39-991. Applies to "Heron" Model DH.114 series 2 airplanes which have not incorporated HSA Modification 1093. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent failure of the nose landing gear locking lever and jack attachment lever, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 150 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished within the last 150 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 hours' time in service since the last inspection, visually inspect the nose landing gear locking lever (P/N 4UN.41A) and jack attachment lever (P/N 4UN.323A) for cracks. (b) If cracks are found during the inspections required by paragraph (a), before further flight, either replace the cracked lever with a serviceable lever of the same part number or comply with paragraph (c). (c) Unless already accomplished in accordance with paragraph (b), on or before March 1, 1971, replacethe nose landing gear locking lever (P/N 4UN.41A) and jack attachment lever (P/N 4UN.323A) with HSA Modification 1093 levers in accordance with Hawker Siddeley Aviation Ltd. Technical News Sheet Heron (114) No. U.13 dated December 8, 1969, or an FAA- approved equivalent. (d) The inspections required by paragraph (a) may be discontinued following compliance with paragraph (c). (e) Upon request by the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. Amendment 39-991 effective June 14, 1970. This Amendment (39-1062) becomes effective August 11, 1970.
95-03-14: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) IO-346, IO-520, and IO-550 series reciprocating engines, that currently requires initial and repetitive inspections of the engine mount brackets for cracks, and if found cracked, replacement with improved design engine mount brackets. All engine mount brackets require replacement with improved design engine mount brackets at the next engine removal after the effective date of that airworthiness directive (AD). This amendment clarifies the identification procedures to determine which engine mount brackets must be inspected. This amendment is prompted by reports that the engine mount bracket part numbers, which are ink stamped, can be easily obliterated. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent engine separation from the aircraft due to cracks in the engine mount brackets.
55-09-04: 55-09-04 HAMILTON STANDARD: Applies to All 24260 Propeller Hub Barrels Used on Boeing 377 Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. As a result of cracks occurring in several 24260 hubs when installed as noted, it is considered desirable to improve the strength characteristics of the hub by reworking and shotpeening the areas subject to such failures. Therefore, in order to minimize the possibility of failures of the nature indicated, accomplish the following: Inspection. Inspect at every overhaul Rework. Rework hubs at the earliest opportunity, but not later than at the next overhaul following June 15, 1955, for hubs with 6,000 or more hours of total operating time. (Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin No. 327 dated November 18, 1954, outlines the required rework.)
96-05-09: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), that is applicable to all Airbus Model A300, A300-600, A310, A330, and A340 series airplanes. The existing AD currently requires an inspection of the sliding side windows in the cockpit to identify suspect windows; and either deactivation of the sliding window defogging system; installation of thermo-sensitive indicators; or replacement of the window. This amendment adds a requirement to replace suspect windows with serviceable windows, which, when accomplished, terminates the requirements of the AD. The actions specified by this amendment are intended to prevent rupture of a cockpit sliding window and subsequent rapid decompression of the fuselage due to fracture of the window as a result of thermal stress created by overheating of the wires of the heating element in a localized area.
50-47-02: 50-47-02 CULVER: Applies to All Models V and V2 Aircraft Equipped With Sensenich Models C2FB3 or C2FB1 Propeller With C276A2, PC276A6, PC276A7 and C276A6 Blades. Compliance required as indicated. (1) Replacement required prior to January 31, 1951. In order to eliminate the continued occurrence of broken blade lag screws and/or cracked blade shanks and ferrules, all C276A2 blades must be retired from service and replaced with blade Model PC276A6, PC276A7 or C276A6. (2) Inspection required every 500 hours of operation after installation of blade Models PC276A6, PC276A7 and C276A6. The propeller blades should be removed from the hub, and the wood blade shank and the split retaining ring groove in the blade ferrule should be carefully inspected for cracks. The lag screws should be check-tightened to 160 inch-pounds torque. Blade with broken lag screws or cracked wood shank or ferrule must be removed from service. The ferrule and all ferrous metallic parts of the hubshould be magnetically inspected. The blades are subjected to excessive vibratory stresses when operation beyond the allowable engine r.p.m. ratings inadvertently occurs. It is recommended, therefore, that the accuracy of the tachometer be checked in order to preclude such operation. Operation between 1,800-2,000 r.p.m. is to be avoided when the nose landing gear is extended. (Sensenich Service Bulletins Nos. 133, 134 and 135 cover these same subjects.) This supersedes AD 47-47-09.
2020-22-06: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 99-01-19 and AD 2004-25-02, which applied to certain Airbus SAS Model A320 series airplanes. AD 99-01-19 and AD 2004-25-02 required repetitive inspections to detect fatigue cracking in certain areas of the fuselage, and corrective action if necessary. AD 2004-25-02 also provided an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This AD continues to require, for certain airplanes, repetitive inspections of the fastener holes for any cracking, and repair if necessary, and provides an optional terminating action for the fastener hole inspections. This AD also revises the applicability to include additional airplanes and requires, for all airplanes, inspections of the emergency exit door structure for any cracking and repair if necessary; as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD was prompted by a report that during full scale tests to support the Model A320 structure extended service goal (ESG) exercise, \n\n((Page 71241)) \n\nseveral cracks were found on both sides of the overwing emergency exit door cut-outs at fuselage section 15. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.