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84-11-04: 84-11-04 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-4879. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-10, -10F, -15, -30, -30F, -40, and KC-10A (Military) series airplanes, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated in the body of this AD unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo preclude the potential of dual hydraulic system failure as a consequence of loose or broken inboard aileron actuator cylinder tie bolts, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tOn inboard aileron actuator control assemblies, Parker Bertea Part Numbers 200900-5007, -5009, -5011, and -5013, and 217300-5005: \n\n\t\t1.\tPrior to the accumulation of 5,000 flight hours since new or overhauled or within the next 1,000 flight-hours whichever occurs later, after the effective date of this AD; and at 1,000 flight-hour intervals thereafter, until the accomplishment of paragraph A.2., below, perform the inspection outlined in the Accomplishment Instructions, Phase I, of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin A27-196, dated December 7, 1983, and Parker Bertea Service Bulletin 200900/217300-27-102, dated November 15, 1983, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\t\t2.\tWithin the next 7,500 flight-hours after the effective date of this AD, perform the torque check outlined in the Accomplishment Instructions, Phase II, of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin A27-196, dated December 7, 1983, and Parker Bertea Service Bulletin 200900/217300-27-102, dated November 15, 1983, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tB.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: Aircraft which have been inspected in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph A.1., above, or according to equivalent inspection procedures approved by the FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI) since March 1, 1983, are considered to have complied with the initial inspection requirements of this AD. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). These documents also may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective July 16, 1984.
88-02-03: 88-02-03 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC. (BHTI): Amendment 39-6379. Final Rule of Priority Letter AD. Docket No. 88-ASW-1. \n\n\tApplicability: All BHTI Model 222, 222B, and 222U helicopters certificated in any category, with main rotor (M/R) yoke, part number (P/N 222-011-102-101, installed. \n\n\tCompliance: Required prior to further flight after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent failure of the M/R yoke which could result in loss of a M/R blade and subsequent loss of the helicopter, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tVisually inspect before the first flight of each day, the main rotor yoke for crack indications in the four (4) areas around the Flapping Bearing attachment bushings as shown in Figure 1. If a crack is detected, replace the M/R yoke prior to further flight. \n\n\tNOTE: BHTI Service Bulletin Numbers 222U-88-20 or 222-88-46, dated January 14, 1988, pertain to these inspections. \n\n\t(b)\tAn alternate method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an equivalent level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, ASW-170, FAA, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0170. \n\n\t(c)\tIn accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199, the helicopter may be flown to a base where the inspection may be accomplished. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6379, AD 88-02-03) becomes effective on November 28, 1989, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by Priority Letter AD 88-02-03, issued on January 21, 1988, which contained this amendment.
79-11-02: 79-11-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-3482. Applies to the Model 727 airplanes that have the following serial numbers: \n\t\nGroup I: These airplanes were delivered with auto-speedbrakes operative: \n\n\n727-2F2\t\t\n21603 \n727-222\t\t \n21398 through 21425 \n21557 through 21574\n727-225\t\t\n21449 through 21453 \n21578 through 21581 \n727-2R1\n21636 \n727-2A1\n21341 through 21344 \n727-2F9\t\t\t\t\t\n21426 and 21427 \n727-287\n21688 and 21689 \n727-290\t\t \t\t \n21510 and 21511\n727-243\t\n21661 through 21664 \n727-256\n21609 through 21611\n727-2K3\t\n21494 and 21495\n727-2L5\t\n\t\t\t\n21332 and 21333 \n21539 and 21540 \n727-2J4\t\n21676 \n727-281\n21455 through 21456 \n21474 \n727-251 \n21503 through 21506 \n727-2P1\n21595\n727-2M7\t\n21457 and 21502 \n21655 \n727-212\n21347 through 21349 \n21458 through 21460 \n\n\t\nGroup II: These airplanes were delivered without auto-speedbrakes: \n\n\n\n727-277\t\t\n\t\t\t\n21480 and 21647 \n727-227\n21363 through 21366 \n21394 and 21395 \n21461 through 21466 \n21488 through 21493 \n21529 through 21531 \n727-232\t\t\n21303 through 21315 \n21430 through 21433 \n21469 through 21472 \n21582 and 21583\n727-230\t\t\n21442 \n21618 through 21623\n727-264\t\t\n\t\t\t \n21577 and 21617 \n21637 \n727-276\n21479 and 21646\n727-2H3\t \t\t\t \n21318 through 21320\n727-247\n21329 through 21331 \n21392 and 21393 \n21481 through 21485\n727-243\t\t \n21320\n\t\nGroup III: These airplanes were delivered with auto-speedbrakes deactivated: \n\n\n\n727-214\t\n21512 and 21513\n727-2Q8\n21608\n\n\n\tCompliance required as indicated: \n\tA.\tWithin 50 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless Service Bulletin 727-31-A44, revision 1, or later FAA approved revisions, have already been accomplished, accomplish the following: \n\t\tFor Group I airplanes delivered with the auto-speedbrake system operative: Prior to conducting operations when the outside air temperature is below 25 degrees F the auto- speedbrake system must be deactivated by pulling and collaring the circuit breakers and placarding handle inoperative and the crew advised that the takeoff warning system may not function. \n\t\tFor Group II airplanes delivered without the auto-speedbrake system, and for Group III airplanes that were delivered with the auto-speedbrake system deactivated: Prior to conducting operations when the outside air temperature is below 25 degrees F advise the flight crew that the takeoff warning system may not function. \n\tB.\tWithin 1,000 hours time-in-service or 6 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever comes first, and unless already accomplished, perform a one-time check of the throttle lever auto-speedbrake/takeoff warning switch setting and adjust these switches, if necessary, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-31-A44, Revision 1, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective June 11, 1979.
60-23-01: 60-23-01\tBOEING: Amdt. 216 Part 507 Federal Register November 4, 1960. Applies to the following 707-100 Series aircraft: Serial Numbers 17586 through 17591, 17628 through 17651, 17658 through 17672, 17696 through 17702, and 17925 through 17927. \n\n\tCompliance required within 2,500 hours' time in service after effective date.\n \n\tIncidents have occurred of the engine start lever slipping toward the "OFF" position causing engine flame-out. One such incident occurred during takeoff. These incidents were caused by insecure placement of the start lever in the "idle" position. In addition, inspections have disclosed the presence of incorrect parts and improper installations on some airplanes.\n \n\tAlso, in the present starting ignition system, on some airplanes, the igniter plug fires during initial engine rotation. This has caused combustion chamber explosions when fuel vapors were present. \n\n\tTo correct the above unsatisfactory conditions, the following modifications or FAA approved equivalents and inspections are required: \n\n\tI.\tModify and inspect the start lever system as follows: \n\n\t\ta.\tMachine an additional slot at the start position of the start lever latch in each of the start lever guides as shown in Fig. 1 of Boeing Service Bulletin 369 dated April 15, 1959. \n\n\t\tb.\tAscertain that the control stand start lever spacers, P/N 66-19067-1 and -2, and lever guide fillers P/N 66-9256-3, are correctly installed as follows:\n\n\t\t\t(1)\tThe two outboard spacers must be P/N 66-19067-1 and -2 and installed in accordance with Boeing Drawing 65-1795. (Boeing 707 Parts Catalog Fig. 25-2-11 is in error in calling for P/N 66-9256-1 and -2 for Items 28 and 33. Correct P/N's are 19067-1 and -2 as indicated above.)\n\n\t\t\t(2)\tThe middle lever guide filler, P/N 66-9256-3, must be installed with the wide section at the top and not at the bottom. (Item 17 in Fig. 75-2-11 of Boeing 707 Parts Catalog is incorrect in that it shows the wide section at the bottom.)\n \n\t\tc.Ascertain that the start lever detents have a minimum distance of 0.53 inch between the stop strap and the idle detents in accordance with Bulletin 369.\n \n\t\td.\tAfter reinstallation of the start levers, ascertain that the start lever system is properly rigged as covered in Chapter 76 Boeing 707-100 Series Maintenance Manual. This applies only to airplanes which require removal of the start lever detents for machining the slot. \n\n\tII.\tModify the starting ignition system as follows: \n\n\t\ta.\tRemove the jumper wire between the "COMMON" terminal and "NO" terminal of each engine start lever switch (S192, S193, S194, S195).\n \n\t\tb.\tInstall a wire from the "ON" contact flight start and control switches (S188, S189, S190 and S191) on the pilot's overhead panel to the corresponding engine ignition circuit breaker bus on the P6 circuit breaker panel. Remove the No. 18 jumper wire between the flight start and ground start terminals of the engine start and control switch. Boeing Service Bulletin No. 195 (R-1) dated July 8, 1959, and Supplement No. 195 (R-1)A dated August 4, 1959, covers these changes.\n \n\tThis directive shall become effective December 6, 1960.
63-16-01: 63-16-01 BOEING: Amdt. 596 Part 507 Federal Register August 3, 1963. Applies to All Models 707 and 720 Series Aircraft Equipped with Pratt & Whitney JT3D-1 or -3 engines. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tTo prevent inadvertent aft thrust reverser sleeve actuation, compliance with the following is required: \n\n\t(a) Within 300 hours' time in service after the effective date of this airworthiness directive, unless already accomplished within the last 200 hours' time in service, and within each 500 hours' time in service thereafter until compliance with (d), inspect the upper latch lock hook for evidence of interference with the latch roller support structure. This inspection shall be done as follows or in accordance with an FAA-approved equivalent procedure: \n\n\t\t(1) Remove the access panel in the aft reverser sleeve to gain access to the upper latch lock (P/N 65-10567). \n\n\t\t(2) Disengage the upper and lower latch locks and move the sleeve 5 inches aft from the fullyclosed position. \n\n\t\t(3) Force the aft end of the upper latch lock horizontally to the limit of its travel and hold it in that position. \n\n\t\t(4) Move the sleeve forward and determine by using a feeler gauge, if the hook end of the latch clears the roller support structure by 0.05 inch minimum while the hook is in position (3). \n\n\t\t(5) Repeat (3) and (4) with the hook displaced to its limit in the opposite direction. \n\n\t\t(6) If the hook end of the latch clears the roller support structure on either side by less than 0.05 inch the latch installation must be reworked in accordance with (b) before further flight. \n\n\t(b) Rework the latch installation by replacing the latch pivot bearing with a new bearing, BAC-B10A-649 or BAC-B10A-649A, roller swaged in place per BAC Process Specification 5435 or secured by an FAA approved equivalent means, or by replacing the latch assembly, P/N 65-10567, with a new or reworked assembly. When replacing the latch bearing or latch assembly install an AN 960C616L washer on each side of the latch pivot bearing to provide additional support. After rework, the latch hook must clear the roller support structure by 0.05 inch minimum. \n\n\t(c) Unless already accomplished, within 500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, provide an indexing stripe in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1799, or equivalent, to the inboard surface of the strut and sleeve to give visual indication of the aft reverser sleeve position both on the ground and inflight. To insure alignment of the stripe following replacement, removal, or rework of either the aft sleeve or strut, remove the old stripe and apply a new one in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1799, or equivalent. Approval of any equivalent means shall be processed through Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Western Region, Los Angeles, California. \n\n\t(d) Within 2,400 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t(1) Install a new latch pivot bearing (BAC-B10A-649A) in the upper latch assembly in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1787, or replace the latch assembly with a new or reworked assembly (P/N 65-10567-A) which incorporates the new bearing (BAC- B10A-649A). \n\n\t\t(2) Provide a means of preventing the upper latch hook from jamming into the latch roller support structure in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1809 or equivalent. Approval of any equivalent means shall be processed through Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Western Region, Los Angeles, California. \n\n\t(e) At each engine replacement after incorporation of (d)(1) and (2), determine if the upper latch lock pivot bearing is in serviceable condition and if it is properly retained in its housing. If necessary, rework the upper latch assembly as required to return it to a serviceable condition in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1787. \n\n\t(f) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. \n\n\t(g) The aft thrust reverser position indicating switch may be relocated in accordance approved equivalent. Approval of any equivalent means shall be processed through the Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Western Region, Los Angeles, California. When the approved switch relocation is incorporated, compliance with the provisions of paragraphs (a) through (e) of this AD is no longer required. (Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1896 pertains to this subject.) \n\n\t(Boeing Service Bulletin Nos. 1787, 1799 and 1809 pertain to this subject.) \n\n\tThis directive effective September 6, 1963. \n\n\tRevised March4, 1964.
78-13-04: 78-13-04 GRUMMAN AMERICAN AVIATION CORPORATION: Amendment 39- 3247. Applies to airplanes Models AA-1, AA-1A, all serial numbers, and AA-1B Serial Number AA-1B 0001 through AA-1B 0542, certificated in all categories. \n\n\tCompliance required within next 200 hours in service after the effective date of this A. D. unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo provide increased visibility and readability of the fuel measurement gauge and thereby to minimize the occurrence of unintentional fuel exhaustion in flight, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tDefuel both fuel tanks and gain access to the fuel measurement gauges by removing interior side panels and access panels on the underside of the wing root. Caution: Installation of the float involves opening of the fuel system within the cockpit. Observe appropriate safety practices concerning defueling and fuel system maintenance. \n\n\t\t(1)\tDisconnect the line fittings from the top of the gauges, and from inside the wing root, disconnect the measurement gauge fuel supply lines. Also, disconnect primer line on the right gauge. \n\n\t\t(2)\tRemove the two (2) screws in each of the four (4) clamps which mount the measurement gauges to the side panels. \n\n\t\t(3)\tThe measurement gauges may now be disassembled on the bench and each component individually inspected. Figure 1 shows details of the gauge in an exploded view. \n\n\t\t(4)\tPlace one (1) Grumman Part Number 401129-5 Fuel Float in each gauge, install two (2) new Part Number 14.2 "U" Cup Packings and reassemble in the reverse order. \n\n\tNOTE: To prevent damage from over-tightening, assemble packings to caps and press assemblies onto glass tube until they bottom. Run nuts up equally on both ends until contact is made with caps. Complete assembly by turning each nut 1/4 turn tighter. \n\n\t\t(5)\tInstall fuel measurement gauges in aircraft and check for leaks. Install interior side panels and access panels on the underside of the wing root. \n\n\t(b)\tFor the purpose of this A. D.this float fuel gauge is not considered an instrument as defined in FAR 1. Therefore, this modification may be accomplished by an appropriately certificated mechanic or repair station notwithstanding the limitations of FAR 65.81(a) and FAR 145.53. \n\n\t(c)\tAn equivalent method of complying with this A. D. is provided by complying with Grumman American Aviation Corporation Service Letter 75-7 dated November 17, 1975. Alternate methods of complying with this A. D. may be used if approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Southern Region, Atlanta, Georgia. \n\n\t(d)\tAn airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base for the accomplishment of the modifications required by this A. D. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective June 30, 1978.
2010-06-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Cracks have been found on pylon side panels (upper section) at rib 8 on Airbus A300, A310 and A300-600 aircraft equipped with General Electric engines. Investigation of these findings indicates that this problem is likely to affect aircraft of this type design with other engine installations. This condition, if not corrected, can lead to reduced strength [structural integrity] of the pylon primary structure. * * * * * The unsafe condition is reduced structural integrity of the pylon primary structure, which could cause detachment of the engine from the fuselage. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2002-23-20: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Dassault Model Falcon 900EX and Mystere Falcon 900 series airplanes, that requires repetitive operational tests of the flap asymmetry detection system to verify proper functioning, and repair, if necessary; repetitive replacement of the inboard flap jackscrews with new or reconditioned jackscrews; and repetitive measurement of the screw/nut play of the jackscrews on the inboard and outboard flaps to detect discrepancies, and corrective action, if necessary. This amendment also requires revision of the Airplane Flight Manual. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent jamming of the flap jackscrews during the approach to landing, which could result in inability to move the flaps or an asymmetric flap condition, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane. DATES: This correction is effective May 4, 2010. The effective date of AD 2002-23-20 remains January 3, 2003.
89-04-05: 89-04-05 BOEING: Amendment 39-6132. Applicability: Model 747 series airplanes, Groups 1, 2, and 3 as listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53- 2112, Revision 4, dated February 25, 1988, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent failure of the body skin and the canted pressure bulkhead structure, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tFor Group 1 airplanes on which the initial inspection requirements of Airworthiness Directive (AD) 84-18-02 have not been conducted as of the effective date of this AD, and which have not been modified by incorporation of a doubler in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112. \n\n\t\t1.\tPrior to the accumulation of 4,000 landings or within the next 100 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,000 landings, perform a detailed visual inspection of the nose gear wheel well forward lower corners, exterior and interior area, for cracks, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112, Revisions 3 or 4. Additionally, perform a high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspection of the chord and doubler for cracks at the two forward hinge fairing attach bolt locations, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112, Revisions 3 or 4. \n\n\t\t2.\tCracks found while conducting the inspections required by paragraph A.1., above, must be repaired as follows: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tIf the crack is visible on an interior surface, or exceeds any of the limits defined in paragraph A.2.b., below, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, prior to further flight. \n\n\t\t\tb.\tIf the crack is visible from an exterior surface only and has not progressed into the vertical leg of the nose wheel well forward bulkhead lower chord and does not extend forward of the first row of skin fasteners, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, prior to the accumulation of 500 additional landings, provided that a detailed visual inspection is performed at intervals not to exceed 100 landings. \n\n\t\t3.\tInspections are to continue after repair. If additional cracks are found, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, prior to further flight. \n\n\tB.\tFor Group 1 airplanes on which the initial inspection requirements of AD 84-18-02 have been conducted as of the effective date of this AD, and which have not been modified by incorporation of a doubler in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112: Continue to perform the repetitive inspections, and to make repairs, if necessary, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph A., above. \n\n\tC.\tFor Group 1 airplanes on which the initial inspection requirements of AD 84-18-02 have notbeen conducted as of the effective date of this AD, and which have been modified by incorporation of a doubler, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112: \n\n\t\t1.\tInspect the nose gear wheel well forward lower corners at the times and using the methods specified in either paragraph C.1.a. or C.1.b., below. \n\n\t\t\ta.\tOption I: External inspection. \n\n\t\t\t\tWithin 1,500 landings after modification or within the next 100 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, perform an external detailed visual inspection of the nose gear wheel well forward lower corner structure for cracks in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112, Revision 4, dated February 25, 1988. After the initial inspection, continue to inspect as follows: perform external general visual inspections at intervals not to exceed 100 landings, and external detailed visual inspections at intervals not to exceed 1,000 landings, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112, Revision 4, dated February 25, 1988. \n\n\t\t\tb.\tOption II: External and internal inspection. \n\t\t\t\tWithin 1,500 landings after modification or within the next 100 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, perform an external and internal detailed visual inspection of the nose gear wheel well forward lower corner structure for cracks, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747- 53-2112, Revision 4, dated February 25, 1988. Repeat external and internal detailed visual inspections at intervals not to exceed 1,500 landings. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf cracks are found, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, prior to further flight. \n\n\t\t3.\tInspections are to continue after repair. If cracks are found, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, prior to further flight. \n\n\tD.\tFor Group 1airplanes on which the initial inspection requirements of AD 84-18-02 have been conducted as of the effective date of this AD, and which have been modified by incorporation of a doubler, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112: Continue to perform the repetitive inspections, and to make repairs, if necessary, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph C. of this AD. \n\n\tE.\tFor Group 2 airplanes on which the initial inspection requirements of AD 84-18-02 have not been conducted as of the effective date of this AD, and which have not been modified by incorporation of the hinge fairing rework or modification doublers in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112: Perform the inspections and repairs, if necessary, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph A. of this AD, except that repetitive inspection intervals shall not exceed 2,000 landings. Inspections are to continue after repair. If cracks are found, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, prior to further flight. \n\n\tF.\tFor Group 2 airplanes on which the initial inspection requirements of AD 84-18-02 have been conducted as of the effective date of this AD, and which have not been modified by incorporation of the hinge fairing rework or modification doublers in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112: Continue to perform the repetitive inspections, and to make repairs, if necessary, as described in paragraph A. of this AD, except that repetitive inspection intervals shall not exceed 2,000 landings. \n\n\t\tInspections are to continue after repair. If cracks are found, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, prior to further flight. \n\n\tG.\tFor Group 2 airplanes on which the initial inspection requirements of AD 84-18-02 have not been conducted as of the effective date of this AD,and which have been modified by incorporation of the hinge fairing rework in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112: \n\n\t\t1.\tPrior to the accumulation of 6,000 landings after modification or within the next 100 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, perform a low frequency eddy current (LFEC) inspection for cracks in the underskin doubler at the nose gear wheel well forward lower corners, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112, Revision 4, dated February 25, 1988. Repeat low frequency eddy current inspections in the underskin doubler at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf a crack is found that is visible on an interior surface or exceeds any of the limits in paragraph G.3., below, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, prior to further flight. \n\n\t\t3.\tIf an underskin doubler crack is found that is not visible from the interior and has not progressed into the vertical leg of the nose wheel well forward bulkhead lower chord and does not extend forward of the first row of fasteners, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, prior to the accumulation of 500 additional landings, provided that a detailed visual inspection of the nose gear wheel well forward corner structure is performed at intervals not to exceed 100 landings. \n\n\t\t4.\tInspections are to continue after repair. If cracks are found, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, prior to further flight. \n\n\tH.\tFor Group 2 airplanes on which the initial inspection requirements of AD 84-18-02 have been conducted as of the effective date of this AD, and which have been modified by incorporation of hinge fairing rework only in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112: Continue to perform the repetitive inspections, and to make repairs, if necessary, in accordance with the requirements of paragraph G. of this AD. \n\n\tI.\tFor Group 2 airplanes on which the initial inspection requirements of AD 84-18-02 have been conducted as of the effective date of this AD, and which have been modified by incorporation of the hinge fairing rework and modification doublers in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112: \n\n\t\t1.\tIf the underskin doubler was not cracked at the time of modification, within 10,000 landings after the modification or within 1,000 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, perform an internal and external detailed visual inspection for cracks, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112, Revision 4, dated February 25, 1988. Repeat internal and external detailed visual inspections at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf the underskin doubler was cracked at time ofmodification, within 2,000 landings after modification or within 1,000 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, perform an internal and external detailed visual inspection for cracks, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112, Revision 4, dated February 25, 1988. Repeat internal and external detailed visual inspection at intervals not to \nexceed 2,000 landings. \n\n\t\t3.\tIf cracks are found, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, prior to further flight. \n\n\t\t4.\tInspections are to continue after repair. If cracks are found, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, prior to further flight.\n \n\tJ.\tFor Group 3 airplanes which have not been modified by incorporation of the external doubler in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112: \n\n\t\t1.\tPrior to theaccumulation of 6,000 landings after hinge fairing modification or within 1,000 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, perform a low frequency eddy current inspection for cracks in the underskin doubler at the nose gear wheel well forward lower corners, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112, Revision 4, dated February 25, 1988. Repeat low frequency eddy current inspections in the underskin doubler at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf a crack is found that is visible on an interior surface or exceeds the limits defined in paragraph J.3., below, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, Northwest Mountain Region, prior to further flight. \n\n\t\t3.\tIf an underskin doubler crack is found that is not visible from the interior and has not progressed into the vertical leg of the nose wheel well forward bulkhead lower chord and does not extend forward of the first row offasteners, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, prior to the accumulation of 500 additional landings, provided that a detailed visual inspection of the nose gear wheel well forward corner structure is performed at intervals not to exceed 100 landings. \n\n\t\t4.\tInspections are to continue after repair. If additional cracks are found, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, prior to further flight. \n\n\tK.\tFor Group 3 airplanes which have been modified by incorporation of the external doubler in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112: \n\n\t\t1.\tIf the underskin doubler was not cracked at time of modification, within 10,000 landings after modification or within 1,000 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, perform an internal and external detailed visual inspection for cracks, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53- 2112, Revision 4, dated February 25, 1988. Repeat internal and external detailed visual inspections at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf the underskin doubler was cracked at the time of modification, within 2,000 landings after modification or within 1,000 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, perform an internal and external detailed visual inspection, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2112, Revision 4, dated February 25, 1988. Repeat internal and external detailed visual inspections at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings. \n\n\t\t3.\tIf cracks are found, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, prior to further flight. \n\n\t\t4.\tInspections are to continue after repair. If cracks are found, repair in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, prior to further flight. \n\n\tL.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tM.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P. O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment supersedes AD 84-18-02, Amendment 39-4906, which was effective October 8, 1984. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6132, AD 89-04-05) becomes effective March 15, 1989.
86-10-09: 86-10-09 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-5319. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, MD-80, and C-9 (Military) series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent inability to discharge the emergency engine fire extinguishing agent when necessary, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 30 calendar days after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive, conduct a one time visual inspection of the emergency engine fire shutoff switch cams for proper installation position, and reposition the cams, if necessary, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Corporation Alert Service Bulletin A76-43, dated April 14, 1986, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\n\tB.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the inspection or repositioning requirements of this AD. \n\n\tC.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tD.\tUpon the request of an operator, an FAA Maintenance Inspector, subject to prior approval by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, may adjust the inspection times specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of that operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the change for that operator. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). These documents also may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective June 9, 1986.