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55-16-02: 55-16-02 MARTIN: Applies to Models 202, 202A, and 404 Aircraft Equipped With Hamilton Standard Propellers. Compliance required by first scheduled engine change after November 1, 1955, but not later than November 1, 1956. To increase the fire-resistance integrity of the propeller feathering system against damage by a powerplant fire, all flexible hose components of propeller feathering lines forward of the firewall must be replaced with lines and fittings which will meet current fire-resistant requirements. The following hose assemblies are considered acceptable for this application: (a) Aeroquip 680-12S hose assemblies with Aeroquip 304 protective sleeves over end fittings (Aeroquip assembly P/N 304000-12S). (b) Resistoflex SSFR-3800-10 hose assemblies utilizing -12 connections. (c) Aeroquip 309009-12S hose assemblies.
99-26-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) applicable to Agusta S.p.A. Model AB412 helicopters. This action requires removing and replacing certain main rotor yokes with airworthy main rotor yokes before further flight. This amendment is prompted by the fatigue failure of a main rotor yoke (yoke). Fatigue analysis indicates that certain yokes are on the low end of the manufacturer s tolerance for thickness and do not have the desired margin of safety. This condition, if not corrected, could result in fatigue failure of the yoke, loss of a main rotor blade, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2000-08-51: 2000-08-51 TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL MOTORS: Docket No. 2000-NE-16-AD. Applicability: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is applicable to Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) IO-360, TSIO-360, LTSIO-360, O-470, IO-470, TSIO-470, IO-520, TSIO-520, LTSIO-520, IO-550, TSIO-550 and TSIOL-550 series engines that were assembled, rebuilt, or overhauled using a crankshaft that was manufactured between April 1, 1998, and March 31, 2000, listed by engine and crankshaft serial number (SN) in TCM Mandatory Service Bulletin (MSB) 00-5A, dated April 28, 2000. NOTE 1: The engines and crankshafts that are the subject of this AD were manufactured by TCM from April 1, 1998 through March 31, 2000. However the dates that the engines and crankshafts were delivered may not coincide with their dates of manufacture. For crankshafts identified in paragraph (a) of this AD, TCM has already determined which engines have a new suspect crankshaft installed and have identified those engines by engine SN. The crankshaft SN is only used to determine the need for taking a core sample for those crankshafts identified in paragraph (a) and (b) of this AD. NOTE 2: The engine SN can be found in logbooks or other maintenance records. For those engines that were overhauled in the field with factory new crankshafts, the crankshaft SN should be shown in work orders, log books or other maintenance records. If the engine was assembled new, rebuilt, or overhauled on or before March 31, 1998, or on or after April 1, 2000, no action is required. NOTE 3: This AD applies to each engine identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For engines that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must request approval for an alternative method of compliance in accordance with paragraph (d) ofthis AD. The request should include an assessment of the effect of the modification, alteration, or repair on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD; and, if the unsafe condition has not been eliminated, the request should include specific proposed actions to address it. Compliance: Compliance with the following instructions is required within the next 10 hours time-in-service from the receipt of this Emergency AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent crankshaft failure due to crankshaft connecting rod journal fracture, which could result in total engine power loss, in-flight engine failure and possible forced landing, do the following: NOTE 4: TCM supplies an instructional video in the tool kit for MSB 00-5A. It is recommended that the technician views and understands "Instructional Video for Compliance with Teledyne Continental Motors Mandatory Service Bulletin MSB 00-5A" before performing these procedures. Crankshaft Material Inspection (a) For thoseengines and crankshafts listed by SN in TCM MSB 00-5A, dated April 28, 2000, perform the crankshaft material inspection (crankshaft propeller flange core sample) as follows: NOTE 5: The engine SN's listed in TCM MSB 00-5A contain only the numerical portion of the SN. Engines that have been rebuilt by TCM will have a letter "R" at the end of the six digit numerical portion. Disregard the letter "R." (1) Perform the crankshaft material inspection (crankshaft propeller flange core sample) in accordance with sections A through J of TCM MSB 00-5A, dated April 28, 2000, as follows: (i) Use the specialized tools and equipment provided by TCM as listed in section A of TCM MSB 00-5A, dated April 28, 2000. (ii) You may use each rotobroach bit to obtain up to six core samples. Replace the rotobroach after the sixth core sample, or before if the rotobroach does not cut with the maximum torque applied. (iii) Maintain a record of each core sample obtained with eachrotobroach bit used. Contact TCM to obtain additional rotobroach bits. (iv) Do not exceed the torque limits specified in TCM MSB 00-5A, dated April 28, 2000, when obtaining the core sample. (2) After obtaining the core sample, disposition the crankshaft as follows: (i) If TCM notifies you that the crankshaft is not serviceable, replace the crankshaft with a serviceable crankshaft of the same part number prior to further flight. (ii) If TCM notifies you that the crankshaft is serviceable, the propeller assembly may be reinstalled. Installation of Crankshafts (b) After the effective date of this AD, installation of a crankshaft with a SN that is listed in MSB 00-5A, dated April 28, 2000, is prohibited, unless core samples have been taken and TCM approval for return to service has been received. (c) Crankshaft material inspections (crankshaft propeller flange core samples) performed in accordance with TCM MSB 00-5, dated April 14, 2000, comply with this AD and must not be repeated. Alternative Methods of Compliance (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office (ACO). Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Atlanta ACO. NOTE 6: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this airworthiness directive, if any, may be obtained from the Atlanta ACO. (e) Copies of the applicable service information may be obtained from Teledyne Continental Motors, PO Box 90, Mobile, AL 36601; telephone toll free 1-888-200-7565, or on the TCM internet site "www.tcmlink.com." This information may also be examined at the FAA, New England Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803. (f) Emergency AD 2000-08-51, issued April 28, 2000, becomes effective upon receipt.
99-23-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 430 helicopters. This action requires verifying the torque on each vertical fin attachment bolt (bolt); modifying the vertical fin and tailboom and replacing the attachment hardware; and re-verifying the torque on the bolts after inspecting the fittings. This amendment is prompted by a report of a loose vertical fin, which was discovered during a post-flight inspection. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent loss of torque of the bolts, which could lead to fracture of the bolts, separation of the vertical fin from the helicopter, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
90-11-05: 90-11-05 AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: Amendment 39-6603. Docket No. 89-NM-223-AD. Applicability: Model A300 series airplanes, as listed in Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A300-57-142, dated December 17, 1986, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent failure of the outer shroud box aft hinge brackets, accomplish the following: A. Prior to the accumulation of 5,000 landings, or within the next 300 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, perform a detailed visual inspection to detect cracks in the outer shroud box aft hinge brackets, in accordance with Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A300-57-142, dated December 17, 1986. B. If no cracks are found, repeat the inspection required by paragraph A., above, at intervals not to exceed 1,000 landings. C. If cracks are found, prior to further flight, perform a detailed visual inspection to detect cracks or damage in the remaining supports (shroud box forward hinge brackets, inner shroud box forward attachments, and the attachment brackets at the inboard end of the inner box shroud box), in the inner and outer shroud box structure in the vicinity of the failed bracket, and the top skin of the inboard flap, in accordance with the Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A300-57- 142, dated December 17, 1986. 1. If cracks or damage is found in the remaining supports, the inner and outer shroud box structure, or top skin of the inboard flap, repair prior to further flight in a manner approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. 2. If any bracket is found to be cracked, damaged, or otherwise failed, replace the bracket with a serviceable part prior to further flight. a. If the bracket is replaced with an improved steel bracket (Modification 6661H1033), in accordance with Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A300-57-142, dated December 17, 1986, or AirbusIndustrie Service Bulletin A300-57-143, Revision 2, dated July 10, 1989, the repetitive inspection of that bracket, as required by paragraph A., above, may be terminated. b. If the bracket is replaced with other than an improved steel bracket, repeat the inspection required by paragraph A. above, prior to the accumulation of 5,000 landings on the new bracket, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,000 landings. D. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with therequirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Airbus Industrie, Airbus Support Division, Avenue Didier Daurat, 31700 Blagnac, France. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Standardization Branch, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment (39-6603, AD 90-11-05) becomes effective on June 19, 1990.
99-23-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes, that requires modification of the electro-distributor for the nose wheel steering servo-control. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent uncommanded nose landing gear wheel rotation, due to defective seals in the wheel steering selector valve of the hydraulic control unit for the nose landing gear, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
93-05-01: 93-05-01 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC. (BHTI): Amendment 39-8507. Docket Number 92-ASW-13. Applicability: BHTI Model 212 helicopters, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent possible fatigue failure of the main rotor yoke assembly, accomplish the following: (a) For main rotor hub assemblies with main rotor yokes, part number (P/N) 204- 011-102 (all dash numbers), having 1,100 or more hours time in service since new or the last overhaul on the effective date of this AD, perform the following within the next 100 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,200 hours time in service: (1) Remove the main rotor yoke from the hub assembly. Visually inspect the pillow block bushing holes for corrosion and mechanical damage. Inspect the yoke for cracks using the magnetic particle method as specified in the BHTI component repair and overhaul manual. (2) If cracks are found, or if corrosion or mechanical damage is present that cannot be removed within the rework limits of the BHTI component repair and overhaul manual, replace the main rotor yoke with an airworthy part. (b) For main rotor hub assemblies with main rotor yokes, P/N 204-011-102 (all dash numbers), having less than 1,100 hours time in service since new or the last overhaul on the effective date of this AD, comply with paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of this AD prior to attaining 1,200 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,200 hours time in service from the last inspection. (c) If no cracks are found and the yoke is airworthy, reinstall it in accordance with the BHTI component repair and overhaul manual. (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, ASW-170, FAA, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas 76106. Operators shall submit their requests through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office. (e) The visual and magnetic particle inspection specified in BHTI, Alert Service Bulletin 212-90-60, Part III, dated March 23, 1990, is an equivalent means of compliance with this AD. (f) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the helicopter to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (g) This amendment becomes effective on April 19, 1993.
2013-21-05R1: We are revising Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2013-21-05 for Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH (now Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH) (Airbus Helicopters) Model EC135 P1, P2, P2+, T1, T2, and T2+ helicopters. AD 2013-21-05 required an initial and repetitive inspections of certain bearings and modifying the floor and a rod. Since we issued AD 2013-21-05, we have determined that modifying the floor and rod removes the unsafe condition. This AD retains the requirements of AD 2013-21-05 but removes the repetitive inspections. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent an unsafe condition on these products.
99-19-36: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Dornier Model 328-100 series airplanes, that requires a one-time inspection to measure the offset of the de-icing tubing adjacent to the refueling panel on the right-hand wing, and replacement with new improved tubing, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a blockage in the de-icing tubing which could result in a malfunction of the de-icing boot. This malfunction would be unknown to the flight crew, and could lead to reduced controllability of the airplane during flight in icing conditions.
2006-03-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Rolls-Royce plc (RR) RB211 Trent 553-61, 553A2-61, 556-61, 556A2-61, 556B-61, 556B2-61, 560-61, and 560A2-61 turbofan engines. This AD requires initial and repetitive borescope inspections for missing HPT rear seal plate locking plugs and damaged locking plug retaining wires, and removal of the engine from service if necessary, based on inspection results. This AD results from two reports of missing HPT rear seal plate locking plugs, damage to the HPT disc, and damage to the remaining locking plug retaining wires. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncontained release of the HPT rear side plate and HPT disc, resulting in damage to the airplane.