Results
89-21-05: 89-21-05 BOEING: Amendment 39-6329. Docket No. 89-NM-172-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747-400 series airplanes, with Integrated Display System (IDS) software installed as identified in Boeing Telegraphic Maintenance Tip (M-7201-89-1141), dated July 27, 1989, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within 10 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo preclude the possibility of airplane status messages not being properly latched into memory which may prevent maintenance from properly dispatching the airplane, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tChange the FAA-approved maintenance program, with concurrence of the assigned FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, to include the following special procedures, as described in Boeing Telegraphic Maintenance Tip 747-400 MT 31-12 (transmitted by Boeing message M-7201-89-1141, dated July 27, 1989): \n\n\t\t1.\tIf preparation of the airplane involved erasing any EICAS messages, as the final maintenance action prior to dispatch, simultaneously cycle power to the three electronic interface units (EIU). \n\n\t\t2.\tPull the following circuit breakers: \n\n\t\t\tLOCATION\t\t\tNOMENCLATURE \n\t\t\tP7-1 F09\t\t\tEIU L \n\t\t\tP7-1 F10\t\t\tEIU C \n\t\t\tP7-2 F15\t\t\tEIU R \n\n\t\t3.\tAfter three seconds, restore all three circuit breakers to the power-on position. \n\n\tB.\tAdd the following to the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. \n\n\t\t\t"Due to an IDS anomaly, information necessary for dispatch of subsequent flights may be lost if EICAS status messages are erased. To preclude this possibility, do not erase any EICAS status messages." \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment, and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6329, AD 89-21-05) becomes effective on October 17, 1989.
2009-01-06 R1: The FAA is revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain 328 Support Services GmbH Dornier Model 328- 300 airplanes. That AD currently requires modifying the electrical wiring of the fuel pumps; installing insulation at the flow control and shut-off valves, and other components of the environmental control system; installing markings at fuel wiring harnesses; replacing the wiring harness of the auxiliary fuel system with a new wiring harness; and installing insulated couplings in the fuel system; as applicable. That AD also currently requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate new inspections of the fuel tank system. This AD clarifies the intended effect of the AD on spare and on-airplane fuel tank system components. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane. DATES: This AD is effective November 23, 2009. On April 3, 2009 (74 FR 8853, February 27, 2009), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD. On September 6, 2005 (70 FR 44046, August 1, 2005), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain other publications listed in the AD. We must receive any comments on this AD by December 21, 2009.
75-17-31: 75-17-31 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-2319. Applies to all DC-8 Series airplanes as listed on McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Service Bulletin 32-168, Rev. 2 dated July 25, 1975, or later FAA-approved revisions, and certificated in all categories. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tTo prevent failure of the Nose Landing Gear (NLG) orifice support tube from fatigue and possible nose gear collapse, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 1000 landings after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, remove the NLG orifice support tube P/N 5598184 or 5717019 and perform a penetrant inspection of the upper O-ring groove in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Service Bulletin 32-168, Rev. 2 dated July 25, 1975, or later FAA-approved revisions, or by an equivalent inspection procedure approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t\t(1)\tIf cracks are found, discard the support tube and either replace with a reworked orifice support tube, P/N 5598184-SC2465 or 5717019-SC2465 or replace with a new orifice support tube, P/N 5598184-503 or 5717019-503, in accordance with DC-8 Service Bulletin 32-168, Rev. 2 dated July 25, 1975, or later FAA approved revision, or an equivalent rework approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t\t(2)\tAll tubes found to be free of cracks must either be reworked and replaced in accordance with DC-8 Service Bulletin 32-168 Rev. 2 dated July 25, 1975, or later FAA-approved revisions, or an equivalent rework procedure approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, or they must be replaced by new orifice support tubes, P/N 5598185-503 or 5717019-503. \n\n\t(b)\tUnless already accomplished by (a)(1) or (a)(2), above, within the next 8000 landings after the installation of reworked orifice support tube, replace with a newly reworked tube, P/N 5598184-SC2465 or 5717019-SC2465, or with a new orifice support tube, P/N 5598184-503 or 5717019-503, in accordance with DC-8 Service Bulletin 32-168, Rev. 2 dated July 25, 1975, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\n\tUpon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the initial inspection compliance time specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective August 20, 1975.
90-08-13: 90-08-13 BOEING: Amendment 39-6571. Docket No. 89-NM-169-AD.\n \n\tApplicability: Model 767 series airplanes as listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767- 21A0074, dated July 13, 1989, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within the next 12 months after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent inadvertent damage to aft equipment/lavatory/galley ventilation fan wire bundles and the potential for a fire behind the aft cargo compartment wall, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tReroute the aft equipment/lavatory/galley ventilation fan wire bundles along the frame assembly at station 1540 in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-21A0074, dated July 13, 1989, or Revision 1, dated January 25, 1990. \n\n\tB.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6571, AD 90-08-13) becomes effective on May 14, 1990.
2009-23-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Hawker Beechcraft Corporation Models 1900, 1900C, and 1900D airplanes. This AD requires a one-time visual inspection and repetitive ultrasonic inspections of the left and right main landing gear (MLG) actuators for leaking and/or cracks with replacement of the actuator if leaking and/ or cracks are found. This AD results from reports of leaking and cracked actuators. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct leaking and cracks in the MLG actuators, which could result in loss of hydraulic fluid. This condition could lead to an inability to extend or lock down the landing gear, which could result in a gear up landing or a gear collapse on landing.
2009-12-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-300, -400, -500, -600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes. This AD requires installing a new circuit breaker, relays, and wiring to allow the flightcrew to turn off electrical power to the in-flight entertainment (IFE) systems and other non-essential electrical systems through a switch in the flight compartment, and doing other specified actions. This AD results from an IFE systems review. We are issuing this AD to ensure that the flightcrew is able to turn off electrical power to IFE systems and other non-essential electrical systems through a switch in the flight compartment. The flightcrew's inability to turn off power to IFE systems and other non- essential electrical systems during a non-normal or emergency situation could result in the inability to control smoke or fumes in the airplane flight deck or cabin.
2009-22-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (Bell) Model 407 and 427 helicopters. This AD results from a mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) AD issued by the aviation authority of Canada. The MCAI AD states that, during a preflight check, it was observed that the swashplate link assembly bearing had moved in the lever race, making contact with the swashplate support. The MCAI also states that further investigation revealed that the bearing had not been staked correctly during manufacture. That condition, if not detected, could result in failure of a bearing, failure of the swashplate link assembly, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
88-03-08: 88-03-08 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-5838. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-10, -10F, -15, -30, -30F, -40, and KC-10A (Military) series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent failure of a horizontal stabilizer skin panel or a spar cap bolt due to stress corrosion, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 6 months after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished since May 8, 1987, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2 years, inspect the horizontal stabilizer constant and outer section upper and lower skin panels and apply LPS-3 (or equivalent) corrosion-inhibiting compound in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A55-16, dated May 8, 1987, or later FAA-approved revision. \n\n\tB.\tWithin the next 6 months after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished since May 8, 1987, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed one year, inspect the horizontal stabilizer spar cap bolts made from H-11 material in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A55-17, dated May 8, 1987, or later FAA-approved revision. \n\n\tC.\tIf a broken bolt is found, prior to further flight, replace the broken bolt with a new bolt in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A55-17, dated May 8, 1987, or later FAA-approved revision. \n\n\tD.\tIf a crack is found in a skin panel: \n\n\t\t1.\tPrior to further flight, repair or replace in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A55-16, dated May 8, 1987, or later FAA-approved revision; or \n\n\t\t2.\tIf the crack is within limits defined in McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A55-16, dated May 8, 1987, or later FAA-approved revision, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tPrior to further flight, apply LPS-3 (or equivalent corrosion inhibiting compound in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A55-16, dated May 8, 1987, or later FAA-approved revision; and \n\n\t\t\tb.\tPrior to further flight, inspect the horizontal stabilizer spar cap bolts nearest to the cracked panel(s) and, if necessary, replace broken attachment bolts in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A55-17, dated May 8, 1987, or later FAA-approved revision; and \n\n\t\t\tc.\tAt intervals not to exceed 3 months from the last inspection, reinspect the cracked skin panel(s) and the adjacent panels (forward and aft and inboard or outboard) and horizontal stabilizer spar cap bolts nearest to the cracked panel(s) in accordance with paragraphs A. and B., above. \n\n\tE.\tIf, at any inspection, a crack is found in the skin panel which is outside acceptable limits defined in paragraph D.2., above, prior to further flight, repair or replace in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A55-16, dated May 8, 1987, or later FAA-approved revision. \n\n\tF.\tInstallation of a new inconel or multiphase bolt, as applicable, to replace an H-11material bolt constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by this AD for that bolt. \n\n\tG.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tH.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director of Publications, C1-L00 (54-60). These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis Amendment becomes effective March 11, 1988.
92-14-07: 92-14-07 BOEING: Amendment 39-8289. Docket No. 92-NM-29-AD. Supersedes AD 91-08-06, Amendment 39-6960.\n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes equipped with General Electric CF6-80C2 engines; as listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-26A2179, dated February 28, 1991, and Revision 2, dated December 18, 1991; certificated in any category.\n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.\n\n\tTo prevent inadequate fire extinguishing agent concentration levels within the engine fire zone following engine fire system discharge, accomplish the following:\n\n\t(a)\tFor airplanes listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-26A2179, dated February 28, 1991: Within 10 days after April 19, 1991 (the effective date of AD 91-08-06, Amendment 39-6960), accomplish the procedures specified in subparagraphs (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3) of this AD in accordance with that service bulletin; or Revision 1, dated August 6, 1991; or Revision 2, dated December 18, 1991.(1)\tVisually inspect the engine number two and number three fire extinguishing tubes and specified tube clamps within the engine strut.\n\n\t\t(2)\tIf damage is detected, prior to further flight, replace or repair the damaged engine fire extinguishing tubes, as applicable, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-26A2179, dated February 28, 1991; or Revision 1, dated August 6, 1991; or Revision 2, dated December 18, 1991. (The service bulletins specify three repair procedures, depending upon the amount of chafing damage to the tube.)\n\n\t\t(3)\tRemove the specified tube clamp from the fixed strut structure (the clamp should remain attached to the tube), and reinstall the tube clamp to orient the legs away from any structure.\n\n\t(b)\tFor airplanes listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-26A2179, Revision 2, dated December 18, 1991, and not subject to paragraph (a) of this AD: Within 20 days after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the procedures specified in subparagraphs (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of this AD in accordance with "Part I - Inspection" of that service bulletin.\n\n\t\t(1)\tVisually inspect the engine number two and number three fire extinguishing tubes and specified tube clamps within the engine strut.\n\n\t\t(2)\tIf damage is detected, prior to further flight, replace or repair the damaged engine fire extinguishing tubes, as applicable, in accordance with the Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-26A2179, Revision 2, dated December 18, 1991. (The service bulletin specifies three repair procedures, depending upon the amount of chafing damage to the tube.)\n\n\t\t(3)\tRemove the specified tube clamp from the fixed strut structure (the clamp should remain attached to the tube), and reinstall the tube clamp to orient the legs away from any structure.\n\n\t(c)\tRepeat the inspection required by paragraphs (a) or (b) of this AD at the interval specified in subparagraph (c)(1) or (c)(2) below, as applicable:\n\n\t\t(1)\tFor airplanes that have not used the extinguishing tube patch repair procedures to repair the tube in accordance with paragraph (a) or (b) of this AD: Repeat the inspection at intervals not to exceed 100 flight cycles or 400 hours time-in-service, whichever occurs first.\n\n\t\t(2)\tFor airplanes that have used the extinguishing tube patch repair procedures to repair the tube in accordance with paragraphs (a) or (b) of this AD: Repeat the inspection at intervals not to exceed 50 flight cycles or 175 hours time-in-service, whichever occurs first.\n\n\t(d)\tFor airplanes listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-26A2179, Revision 2, dated December 18, 1991: Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the modification specified in "Part II - Terminating Action" of the service bulletin. Accomplishment of this modification constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by paragraphs (c) of this AD.\n\n\t(e)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time,which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. The request shall be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.\n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this airworthiness directive, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO.\n\n\t(f)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.\n\n\t(g)\tThe inspections, repairs, replacement, and modification shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-26A2179, dated February 28, 1991 (the date of this document appears only on page 1 of the document); or Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-26A2179, Revision 1, dated August 6, 1991 (the revisionlevel and date of this document appear only on page 1 of the document); or Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-26A2179, Revision 2, dated December 18, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, DC.\n\n\t(h)\tThis amendment becomes effective on August 20, 1992.
93-11-01: 93-11-01 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8593. Docket 92-NM-48-AD. Supersedes AD 92-03-01, Amendment 39-8155. \n\n\tApplicability: Model DC-9-11, -12, -13, -14, -15, and -15F series airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent degradation of lift due to ice accumulation on the wing leading edge, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tExcept as provided by paragraph (b) of this AD, within 10 days after January 17, 1992 (the effective date of AD 92-03-01, Amendment 39-8155), revise the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include the following. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. \n\n\t"Wing De-icing Prior to Takeoff \n\nCAUTION \n\nThe Model DC-9-10 series airplane has a wing design with no leading edge high lift devices, such as slats. Wings without leading edge devices are particularly susceptible to loss of lift due to wing icing. Minute amounts of ice or other contamination (equivalent to medium grit sandpaper) on the leading edges or wing upper surfaces can cause a significant reduction in the stall angle-of-attack. This can increase the stall speed up to 30 knots. The increased stall speed can be well above the stall warning (stick shaker) activation speed. (END OF CAUTIONARY NOTE) \n\nThe leading edge and upper wing surfaces must be physically checked for ice/frost when the airplane has been exposed to conditions conducive to ice/frost formation. Takeoff may not be initiated unless the flight crew verifies that a visual check and a physical (hands-on) check of the leading edge and upper wing surfaces have been accomplished, and that the wing is clear of ice/frost/snow accumulation. Icing/frost/snow conditions exist when the Outside Air Temperature (OAT) is below 6 degrees C (42 degrees F); and either the difference between the dew point temperature and OAT is less than 3 degrees C (5 degrees F), or visible moisture (rain, drizzle, sleet, snow, fog, etc.) is present.\n\n NOTE \n\nThis limitation does not relieve the requirement that aircraft surfaces are free of ice, frost, and snow accumulation as required by Federal Aviation Regulations Sections 91.527 and 121.629. (END OF NOTE)" \n\n\t(b)\tParagraph (a) of this AD does not apply to any airplane that is both operated in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 121.629(c), Amendment 121-231, and modified in accordance with either paragraph (c)(1) or (c)(2) of this AD. \n\n\t(c)\tWithin 9 months after the effective date of this amendment, accomplish the procedures specified in either paragraph (c)(1) or (c)(2) of this AD: \n\n\t\t(1)\tModify the bleed air anti-ice system so that it can operate on the ground to prevent ice reformation on the wing leading edges after ground equipment has been utilized to properly deice the airplane, and to minimize the effect of undetected ice/frost/snow contamination. Accomplish the modification inaccordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Or \n\n\t\t(2)\tInstall a supplemental on-ground wing leading edge ice protection system in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Service Bulletin 30-65, dated October 8, 1992. \n\n\t(d)\tUpon the accomplishment of the modification required by paragraph (c) of this AD, revise the AFM in accordance with either paragraph (d)(1) or (d)(2) of this AD: \n\n\t\t(1)\tRevise the Limitations section to include appropriate operating procedures relative to operation of the modification required by paragraph (c) of this AD. These operating procedures must be approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Or \n\n\t\t(2)\tRevise the Limitations section to include the following operating procedures relative to the operation of the modification required by paragraph (c) of this AD. This may be accomplished by inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM. \n\n\t"Use of Bleed Air Anti-Ice System\n\nCAUTION \n\nThe Model DC-9-10 series airplane has a wing design with no leading edge high lift devices, such as slats. Wings without leading edge devices are particularly susceptible to loss of lift due to wing icing. Minute amounts of ice or other contamination (equivalent to medium grit sandpaper) on the leading edges or wing upper surfaces can cause a significant reduction in the stall angle-of-attack. This can increase the stall speed up to 30 knots. The increased stall speed can be well above the stall warning (stick shaker) activation speed. (END OF CAUTIONARY NOTE) \n\nThe bleed air anti-ice system must be on whenever icing conditions exist or are anticipated, when on the ground, until immediately prior to commencement of takeoff roll." \n\n\t(e)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(f)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(g)\tThe installation of a supplemental on-ground wing leading edge ice protection system shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Service Bulletin 30-65, dated October 8, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51, as of July 22, 1993 (58 FR 33898, June 22, 1993). Copies maybe obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90846-1771, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Administrative Support, Dept. L51, Mail Code 2-98. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(h)\tThis amendment becomes effective on July 22, 1993.