Results
83-13-08: 83-13-08 BOEING: Amendment 39-4678. Applies to all model 747 airplanes, except the 747SP, certificated in all categories equipped with either the Landing Control Logic Unit (LCLU) or Landing Rollout Control Unit (LRCU) automatic landing systems and either Collins Low Range Radio Altimeter (LRRA), Model 860F-4, or Bendix Low Range Radio Altimeter, Model ALA 51A. To prevent hard landing due to false altitude information from the LRRA to the autopilot, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 15 days after the effective date of this AD, install a placard on the autopilot P10 mode control panel which reads as follows: "DO NOT USE AUTOPILOT BELOW 50 FT. ON WET RUNWAYS." The placard may be removed when either paragraph B, C, or D below is accomplished. \n\n\tB.\tRemove Collins Model 860F-4 LRRA (P/N 622-3890-0XX), if installed, and perform Collins Service Bulletin 860F-4, Service Bulletin #8. Modified units become P/N 622- 3890-1XX. Install modified, orproduction equivalents, according to the Boeing Service Bulletin 747-34A2225. \n\n\tC.\tRemove Bendix Series ALA 51A LRRA (P/N 2067631-05XX or -51XX), if installed, and perform Bendix Service Bulletin M-1632-(ALA-51A-34-56). Modified units become P/N 2067631-53XX. Install modified, or production equivalents, according to Boeing Service Bulletin 747-34A2226. \n\n\tD.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this proposal who have not already received the Service Bulletins may obtain copies upon request to Boeing, Collins Air Transport Division, or Bendix Corporation as appropriate. These documents may also be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective July 18, 1983.
2007-23-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Recently, a double in-flight engine shut down incident occurred on a DA42 aircraft equipped with TAE125-01 engines. The BFU (German Accident Investigation Body) found the root cause to be a violation of the Airplane Flight Manual procedures (taking-off with an insufficiently charged main aircraft battery) and momentary low voltage in the electrical system of the aircraft when retracting the main landing gear. This has been the subject of Diamond Service Information (SI) 42-040 and a subsequent EASA Safety Information Notice, SIN 2007-08, issued on 18 April 2007. The TAE125-01 and TAE125-02-99 engines, approved for installation on the DA42, are FADEC (Full Authority Digital Engine Control) controlled and are not totally independent from the aircraft electrical power supply. A significant drop of the voltage causes simultaneously a reset of the FADEC on both engines with subsequent feathering of the propeller blades. In the case of an empty battery this scenario may be considered as catastrophic at the aircraft level. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
80-02-12: 80-02-12 MOONEY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-3670. Applies to Models M20K airplanes, Serial Numbers 25-0001 through 25-0247, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent possible failure of the fuselage tubular structure, accomplish the following: 1. Within the next 90 days after the effective date of the AD, reinforce the lower right fuselage tubular structure with a split-sleeve and clamps in accordance with Mooney Service Bulletin No. M20-220 dated November 16, 1979, or equivalent methods approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Southwest Region. 2. Aircraft may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197(a)(1) to a location where the modification required by this AD may be accomplished. This amendment becomes effective February 1, 1980.
2007-21-17: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: There has been a report of landing gear radius rods suffering cracks starting in the flashline near the microswitch boss. Such cracks can result in loss of the normal hydraulic system and may lead to a landing gear collapse. Main landing gear collapse is considered as potentially hazardous/ catastrophic. This AD mandates additional inspections considered necessary to address the identified unsafe condition. Note: The cause of this cracking is not related to previous cracking of the radius rod cylinder addressed by BAE Systems SB 32- JA040945 (CAA AD G-2005-0010), however, the consequences of a failure are the same. We are issuing this AD to requireactions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
75-20-03: 75-20-03 PIPER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-2364. Applies to Model PA-34-200 airplanes, serial numbers 34-7250001 through 34-7450220 and Model PA-34-200T airplanes, serial numbers 34-7570001 through 34-7570308, certificated in all categories. Compliance required within the next 50 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To provide revised usable fuel data, accomplish the following: Replace the existing fuel quantity placards and revise the fuel system data in Airplane Flight Manual in accordance with Piper Service Bulletin Number 438 or in an equivalent manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, P.O. Box 20636, Atlanta, Georgia 30320. This amendment becomes effective October 10, 1975.
80-02-07: 80-02-07 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-3657. Applies to British Aerospace Model HS 125 Series 700 airplanes with pressure refuel/defuel system installed, certificated in any category. Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent the failure of the aluminum HTE "V" clamps installed in the pressure refuel and defuel system, within the next 50 hours time in service or within the next 28 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs sooner, incorporate British Aerospace modification 252694, or an equivalent modification approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU- 100, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region, Federal Aviation Administration, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium. NOTE: British Aerospace Service Bulletin 28-67 revision 1 dated December 19, 1978 and Service Bulletin 28-A66 dated October 3, 1978 refer to this same subject. This amendment becomes effective January 24, 1980.
93-18-03: 93-18-03 PRECISION AIRMOTIVE CORPORATION: Amendment 39-8688. Docket 92-ANE-07. Applicability: Precision Airmotive (formerly Facet Aerospace Products and Marvel-Schebler) Model MA-3A, MA-3PA, MA-3SPA, and MA-4SPA carburetors installed on but not limited to Textron Lycoming Model O-235, O-290, and O-320 series engines, and Teledyne Continental A-65, A-75, C-75, C-85, C-90, C-115, C-125, C-145, O-200, and O-300 series engines installed on but not limited to normally aspirated piston engine powered aircraft manufactured by Cessna, Piper, Beechcraft, and Mooney. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent disruption of fuel flow to the engine resulting in engine power loss, or engine failure, accomplish the following: (a) At the next annual inspection after the effective date of this AD, inspect the carburetor to determine if a two-piece venturi is installed. Carburetors that have the letter "V" stamped or etched on the lower portion of the data plate, or that have a black Precision Airmotive data plate, already contain a one-piece venturi and do not require further action. (1) If a two-piece venturi is installed, at each annual inspection after the effective date of this AD, inspect the carburetor to determine if the primary venturi is loose or missing. If either of these conditions is found, prior to further flight, repair the carburetor by installing a one-piece venturi in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Precision Airmotive Service Bulletin (SB) No. MSA-2, Revision 1, dated November 11, 1991. (2) At the next carburetor removal for overhaul or repair, but not later than 48 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, if a two-piece venturi is installed, replace with a one-piece venturi in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Precision Airmotive SB No. MSA-2, Revision 1, dated November 11, 1991. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. The request should be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this airworthiness directive, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) The inspection and replacement shall be done in accordance with the following service bulletin: Document No. Pages Revision Date Precision Airmotive SB No. MSA-2 1-3 1 November 11, 1991 Total Pages: 3. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Precision Airmotive Corporation, 3220 100th St. SW, Bldg E, Everett, WA 98204. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, New England Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (e) This amendment becomes effective on October 29, 1993.
75-10-03: 75-10-03 PIPER: Amendment 39-2195. Applies to Model PA-32-260, serial numbers 32-01 through 32-7500039 and Model PA-32-300, serial numbers 32-40001 through 32-7540147 certificated in all categories. Compliance required before further flight after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last ten hours in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed ten hours time in service from the last examination. To detect delamination of the forward baggage door, accomplish the following: (a) Examine the inside and outside of the forward baggage door along the hinge, along the leading edge, and along all inner stiffening sections for evidence of cracks or delamination of the fiberglass. (b) If the examination in paragraph (a) does not reveal any evidence of the noted conditions, no further action is necessary. (c) If the examination in paragraph (a) reveals evidence of cracks or delaminations, modify the baggage door by installing Piper Kit # 760-972V or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, ASO-210, FAA, Southern Region, before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the modification can be performed. After modification per paragraph (c) this AD is no longer applicable. The examination required by paragraph (a) may be performed by the pilot. Piper Service Bulletin No. 463 pertains to this subject. NOTE: For the requirements regarding the listing of compliance and method of compliance with this AD in the airplane's permanent maintenance record, see FAR 91.173. This amendment becomes effective May 12, 1975.
2007-22-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for GE CF6-80C2D1F turbofan engines, installed on, but not limited to, McDonnell Douglas Corporation MD-11 series airplanes. This AD requires removing previous software versions from the engine electronic control unit (ECU). Engines with new version software will have increased margin to flameout. This AD results from reports of engine flameout events during flight, including reports of events where all engines simultaneously experienced a flameout or other adverse operation. Although the root cause investigation is not yet complete, we believe that exposure to ice crystals during flight is associated with these flameout events. We are issuing this AD to minimize engine flameout caused by ice accretion and shedding during flight.
75-09-10: 75-09-10 PIPER: Amendment 39-2183. Applies to Models PA-31P, Serial Nos. 31P-1 through 31P-7400213, PA-31 and PA-31-300, Serial Nos. 31-1 through 31-7401248, and PA-31- 350, Serial Nos. 31-5001 through 31-7405242 and 31-7405400 through 31-7405462 aircraft certificated in all categories. To prevent possible hazards in flight associated with loose elevator push-pull tube end fittings, accomplish the following: 1. Within the next 100 hours in service from the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished, inspect the elevator push-pull tube P/N 40847-04 for looseness in its attachment to the end fittings in accordance with the instructions contained in Piper Service Bulletin No. 409 dated June 7, 1974, for Model PA-31P or Piper Service Bulletin No. 433 dated December 17, 1974, for Models PA-31, PA-31-300, and PA-31-350 or an equivalent inspection. 2. If looseness is detected, replace with an acceptable elevator torque tube assembly P/N 40847-04 on Model PA-31Por P/N 40847-00 on Models PA-31, PA-31-300 and PA31-350. 3. Equivalent inspections must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. This amendment is effective April 28, 1975.