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2000-02-12: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2000-02-12, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 407 helicopters by individual letters. This AD requires inspecting engine oil cooler blower shaft bearings (bearings) for roughness at specified time intervals and replacing any rough bearings before further flight. This amendment is prompted by several bearing failures. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent bearing failure, loss of tail rotor drive, and a subsequent forced landing.
92-06-07: 92-06-07 BOEING: Amendment 39-8187. Docket No. 91-NM-210-AD. \n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747- 52A2237, dated July 11, 1991, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo ensure operation of the emergency door power assist system and door opening when required for emergency evacuation, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 60 days after the effective date of this AD, perform a visual inspection and test of the guide arm assembly and associated hardware for the main entry doors, numbers 1 through 5, left and right sides, in accordance with Section III. of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2237, dated July 11, 1991. \n\n\t\t(1)\tIf all the conditions specified in subparagraphs a. through g., paragraph 4., Section III., of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2237, dated July 11, 1991, are found to exist, no further action is required. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIfany of the conditions specified in subparagraphs a. through f., paragraph 4., Section III., of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2237, dated July 11, 1991, do not exist, repair or replace before further flight, in accordance with Section III. of the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t(3)\tIf the condition specified in subparagraph g., paragraph 4., Section III., of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2237, dated July 11, 1991, does not exist, repair in a manner approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\t(b)\tWithin 7 days after the completion of the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, submit to the FAA a report specifying the number of bearings in the guide arm assemblies of each airplane on which any of the condition specified in subparagraphs a., b., or c., paragraph 4., Section III., of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2237, dated July 11, 1991, were not found to exist. The report must be submitted to the Manager, Seattle Manufacturing Inspection District Office, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. (Facsimile messages may be sent via telephone: (206) 227- 1181.) A copy of the report should also be submitted to the FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI). A report is not necessary for those airplanes on which all of the specified conditions are found to exist. Information collection requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq) and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. The request shall be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tThe inspection, test, repair, and replacement shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2237, dated July 11, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on April 21, 1992.
90-09-06: 90-09-06 BOEING: Amendment 39-6581. Docket No. 89-NM-148-AD. \n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes, line number 001 and subsequent, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent inadvertent opening of lower lobe forward and aft cargo doors and the main deck side cargo door, if installed, accomplish the following, (paragraphs A. through D. apply to lower lobe cargo doors only):\n \n\tA.\tWithin the next 10 days after April 3, 1989 (the effective date of Amendment 39-6166, AD 89-05-54), install Boeing placards, P/N 27EBY115 for hook operation, and P/N 27EBY114 for latch operation, or equivalent, adjacent to the respective drive ports. \n\n\tB.\tExcept for airplanes that have been modified in accordance with Boeing service bulletins specified in paragraph D., below, or on which a production equivalent has been installed, within the next 10 days after April 3, 1989, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tVisuallyinspect for broken, bent, or otherwise damaged lock sectors which could affect the integrity of the door locking mechanism, and repair or replace damaged sectors prior to further flight, in accordance with FAA-approved procedures. This inspection must be repeated at intervals not to exceed 30 days, and after the next door opening following each manual operation of the door. \n\n\t\t2.\tConduct the mechanical and electrical system tests specified in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-52A2206, Revision 3, Revision 4, or Revision 5, paragraphs III.A. and B. Airplanes which fail mechanical and/or electrical tests must be repaired prior to further flight, in accordance with FAA-approved procedures. Repeat these tests at intervals not to exceed 30 days and repeat the electrical test after restoration of electrical power following manual operation. \n\n\tC.\tWithin the next 14 days after April 3, 1989, change the operating procedures for the lower lobe cargo door to include the requirements specifiedbelow, and thereafter comply with those revised procedures. The procedures required by this paragraph must be accomplished by qualified and trained mechanics, and the training program must be approved by the FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI). Methods for documentation of compliance with the following procedures must be approved by the FAA PMI. \n\n\t\t1.\tPrior to takeoff following each operation of the door, conduct a visual verification, through the external viewports, to ensure proper engagement of the latching cams to ensure the door is fully latched closed. This information must be relayed to and acknowledged by the flight crew. \n\n\t\t2.\tWhen operating the door manually, the cranking torque shall not exceed 70 inch-pounds, and power tools shall not be used to operate latch and hook mechanisms in the manual mode. \n\n\tD.\tWithin the next 30 days after April 3, 1989, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tFor those airplanes specified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2206,Revision 3, dated August 27, 1987, Revision 4, dated April 14, 1988, or Revision 5, dated March 30, 1989: Modify the doors in accordance with paragraphs III.H. through III.O. of the applicable revision of the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t2.\tFor those airplanes specified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-52A2209, dated August 27, 1987, Revision 1, dated April 14, 1988, or Revision 2, dated March 30, 1989: Modify the doors in accordance with paragraphs III.E. through III.L. of the applicable revision of the service bulletin. \n\n\tAccomplishment of these modifications constitutes terminating action for the repetitive requirements of paragraph B., above. \n\n\tE.\tWithin the next 18 months after the effective date of this Amendment, install a system which provides visual warning signals to alert flight crewmembers and ground crew personnel when forward and aft lower lobe cargo doors, and side main deck cargo door, if installed, are not fully closed, the latch cams are not rotated to the closed position, or the locks are not in the locked position. The warning system must monitor the door closed, latched, and locked condition directly. An amber visual warning signal for flight crewmembers must be located on a forward cockpit panel. Incorrect indication, either open or closed, must be improbable. The modification must be approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. Accomplishment of this modification constitutes terminating action for the special operating procedure required by paragraph C.1., above. \n\n\tF.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tG.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment supersedes Amendment 39-6166, AD 89-05-54. \n\tThis amendment (39-6581, AD 90-09-06) becomes effective on May 29, 1990.
80-07-02: 80-07-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-3721 as amended by Amendment 39-3742. Applies to all Model 707/720/727/737/747 series airplanes that contain the hydraulic components, listed below, that have been repaired or parts produced by FORTNER ENGINEERING AND MANUFACTURING, INC., OF GLENDALE, CALIFORNIA under FAA Repair Station Certificate No. 417-5. Accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tTo detect a control valve which could cause control surface reversal, within three days from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 14 days, conduct a one time manual input hardover test on the flight control systems containing parts listed in paragraph B below, as follows: \n\n\t\tRudder (yaw damper off), elevator (autopilot off) and aileron (autopilot off) and all associated hydraulic systems on. Run the hydraulic systems for approximately ten minutes or until the system is at normal operating temperatures prior to conducting the hardover tests. Apply an abrupt hardover command one way, stop to stop, until the flight surface reaches full travel. The commanded rate must be rapid enough to saturate the control valve, as evidenced by a noticeable resistance in the control input. The flight control shall be held hardover in that position for five seconds. Repeat this procedure applying an abrupt command in the opposite direction. \n\n\t\t1.\tOn the 737, use of single hydraulic systems during the test can be an aid in isolation of individual actuators. \n\n\t\t\ta.\tUse the "B" system electric pumps or an external hydraulic source to pressurize the "B" hydraulic system (ground interconnect closed). \n\n\t\t\tb.\tTurn on the "B" Flight Control hydraulics circuit breaker. \n\n\t\t\tc.\tConduct the elevator and aileron control checks. Failure of the test indicates that the right hand elevator actuator (as viewed from the airplane tail) or the upper aileron actuator is faulty. \n\n\t\t\td.\tOpen the ground interconnect or use an external hydraulic source to pressurize the "A" hydraulic system. \n\n\t\t\te.\tTurn "off" the "B" Flight Control hydraulic circuit breaker and turn "on" the "A" Flight Control hydraulic circuit breaker. \n\n\t\t\tf.\tConduct the elevator and aileron control checks (failure of the test indicates that the left hand elevator actuator or lower aileron actuator is faulty). \n\n\t\t2.\tOn the 727 elevator, conduct the hardover tests using hydraulic system A and then hydraulic system B. If a surface reversal occurs, isolation should be accomplished by removal of an actuator and the use of a bench functional test with a maximum rate input to confirm the fault. If the fault cannot be confirmed, the other actuator should be checked. \n\n\t\t3.\tOn the 707 Rudder package with the series yaw damper, it is recommended that only pedal inputs be made, since this is adequate to provide the necessary valve overtravel (up to 200% of active travel). \n\n\t\t4.\tThe 747 inboard elevator test procedure is as follows: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tTurn on all four ADP's and pressurize #1 hydraulic system only. \n\n\t\t\tb.\tPull column full aft into stops at maximum rate and hold for 3 to 5 seconds. Check for signs of abnormality such as column reversal. Repeat for full forward column.\n \n\t\t\tc.\tTurn off #1 hydraulic system and repeat max rate test with hydraulic systems #2, #3 and #4 individually. \n\n\t\t\td.\tA malfunction in System #1 or #2 indicates a problem with the right hand inboard elevator: System #3 or #4 indicates the left hand inboard elevator. \n\n\t\tDuring these tests, observe the appropriate aileron, elevator or rudder positions or their cockpit indicators. If the flight surface reverses direction or if the rudder pedals or flight control wheel back drive in the opposite direction of command, immediately notify the FAA Northwest Region (telephone (206) 767-2600) and remove the associated power control unit from service. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 30 days from the effective date of this airworthiness directive, remove from service any of the following valve assemblies, andtheir detail subassemblies, that have been overhauled or produced by Fortner Engineering and Manufacturing, Inc., and replace with units which are either new manufacture or have been overhauled in accordance with FAA approved data: \n\n\n\nPCU UNIT (Used on)\nValve Assy. P/N*\nLap Assy. P/N**\t\nSupplier \n707/720 Series\t\nYaw Damper rudder\nPCU P/N 60000( )\n60010-1/-9/\t\t-5005, -5007\n60010-1/-9/-13\nBertea\n \n727 Elevator PCU\nP/N 68000-( ) \n68010-5001\n68010-1\nBertea\n737 Aileron/\tElevator PCU\nP/N 65-44761-( ) \n65-44828-2/-4\n65-44671-1, -3\nBoeing/Bertea \n737 Rudder PCU\nP/N 65-44861-( )\t\n68010-5003\nThis part has been covered by FAA telegraphic AD T80NW-4 dated 1-29-80. \n68010-11\nBertea\n747 Inboard\tElevator PCU\nP/N 93600-( ) \n93610-5003\n93610-11\nBertea \n\n\t*Component part numbers to be removed. Note: Some operators refer to the valve assembly as the lap assembly. \n\t**These part numbers are the original Bertea or Bertea/Boeing detail subassembly part numbers. These lap subassemblies may have been replaced with Fortner assemblies by the repair station or operator. The Fortner Engineering and Manufacturing parts are to be removed from service. \n\n\tC.\tAirplanes may be flown, in accordance with FAR 21.199 to a maintenance base, for the purpose of complying with this AD.\n \n\t\tNOTE: These parts, repaired or produced by Fortner Engineering and Manufacturing, Inc. of Glendale, California, referenced herein were not installed on new production airplanes delivered by Boeing nor were they overhauled or produced by Fortner Accessory Service Corporation, a subsidiary of Parker Haniffin Corporation. \n\n\tAmendment 39-3721 became effective April 3, 1980. \n\tThis amendment 39-3742 becomes effective April 21, 1980.
2000-03-13: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that requires a one-time detailed visual inspection of the wire bundle installation behind the first observer's station to detect damaged or chafed wires; and corrective action, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that the wire bundle contained in the feedthrough behind the first observer's station was contacting the bottom portion of the feedthrough. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such contact, which could cause cable chafing, electrical arcing, smoke, or fire in the cockpit.
2000-03-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that requires modification of the battery ground cable installation in the center accessory compartment. This amendment is prompted by reports of battery ground studs that had arced due to loose ground stud attachments. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such arcing, which could cause smoke and/or fire in the center accessory compartment.
2014-17-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. (P&WC) PT6A-114 and PT6A-114A turboprop engines. This AD requires initial and repetitive borescope inspection (BSI) of compressor turbine (CT) blades, and the removal from service of blades that fail inspection. This AD was prompted by several incidents of CT blade failure, causing power loss, and engine failure. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of CT blades, which could result in damage to the engine and damage to the airplane.
91-11-02: 91-11-02 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-6998. Docket No. 90-NM-263-AD. Supersedes AD 90-12-51. \n\n\tApplicability: Model DC-9-81, -82, -83 and -87 (MD-81, -82, -83 and -87) series airplanes and Model MD-88 airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent damage to the engine, cone bolts, and pylon, or separation of an engine from the airplane, as a result of the loss of a through-bolt, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin seven days after August 29, 1990 (the effective date of Amendment 39-6684, AD 90-12-51), inspect the through-bolt nut, P/N SPS83978-1216, for proper torque and conditions in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD-80 Alert Service Bulletin A71-51, dated May 23, 1990. If any of the following discrepancies are found, take corrective action as required below: \n\n\tCONDITION A: If the torque stripe is misaligned, prior to further flight, accomplish the following: \n\n\tI.\tRemove andreplace the nut in accordance with paragraph C. of this AD, and \n\n\tII.\tApply a new torque stripe. \n\n\tCONDITION B: If the torque stripe is aligned properly, within 10 calendar days, verify that the torque on the nut is 250 inch-pounds (in-lb) or more. \n\n\tI.\tIf the torque is 250 in-lb or more, remove and replace the torque stripe. \n\n\tII.\tIf the torque is less than 250 in-lb, reinstall the nut in accordance with paragraph C. of this AD and apply a new torque stripe. \n\n\tCONDITION C: If the torque stripe is missing, and the nut is seated, and the through-bolt head is seated and positioned properly (there is no gap between the nut base and washer, or the washer and engine mount flange bushing, or the through-bolt head and retainer, or the retainer and engine mount flange bushing), within 10 calendar days, apply 30 in-lb of torque: \n\n\tI.\tIf the nut turns remove and replace the nut in accordance with paragraph C. of this AD and apply a new torque stripe. \n\n\tII.\tIf the nut doesnot turn, torque to the required range of 250 in-lb to 300 in-lb, and apply a new torque stripe. \n\n\tCONDITION D: If the torque stripe is missing and there is a gap between the nut base and washer, or the washer and engine mount flange bushing, or the through-bolt head and retainer, or the retainer and engine mount flange bushing; prior to further flight, apply 30 in-lb of torque: \n\n\tI.\tIf the nut turns, remove and replace the nut in accordance with paragraph C. of this AD and apply a new torque stripe. \n\n\tII.\tIf the nut does not turn, torque to the required range of 250 in-lb to 300 in-lb, and apply a new torque stripe. \n\n\tCONDITION E: If the nut is missing and the through-bolt has not migrated, prior to further flight, install a new nut in accordance with paragraph C. of this AD and apply a new torque stripe. \n\n\tCONDITION F: If the nut is missing and the through-bolt is missing or partially backed-out, prior to further flight, repair in accordance with a method approvedby the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tB.\tRepeat the inspections required by paragraph A. of this AD at intervals not to exceed 30 calendar days; except that, if the torque stripe is aligned properly, the corrective action identified in Condition B, above, is not required. \n\n\tC.\tNut installation method and requirements: \n\n\t\t1.\tRemove and replace the nut. \n\n\t\t2.\tRemove the existing torque stripe. \n\n\t\t3.\tEnsure that the through-bolt head is properly positioned and in place. \n\n\t\t4.\tMeasure the running torque of the nut on the through-bolt. If the running torque is less than 30 in-lb or more than 100 in-lb, discard the nut and replace it with a new nut. If the running torque is 30 in-lb or more but less than 100 in-lb, continue with the installation procedure. \n\n\t\t5.\tEnsure that the final installation torque is at least 250 in-lb but less than 300 in-lb. \n\n\tD.\tWithin 10 days after performing the initial inspection required by paragraph A. of this AD, submit a report of any discrepancies to the Manager, Los Angeles Manufacturing Inspection District Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California 90806-2425. The report must include the airplane's serial number. \n\n\tE.\tWithin 18 months after the effective date of this AD, install castellated nuts and cotter pins in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD-80 Service Bulletin 71-51, dated September 28, 1990. Accomplishment of this modification constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspection requirements of this AD. \n\n\tF.\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager of the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los AngelesACO. \n\n\tG.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Business Unit Manager of Publications, C1-HCO (54-60). These documents may be examined at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington; or at the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment supersedes Amendment 39-6684, AD 90-12-51 which superseded AD T90-11-52, issued on May 24, 1990. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6998, AD 91-11-02) becomes effective on June 24, 1991.
71-25-09: 71-25-09 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-1358 as amended by Amendment 39-1384. Applies to all Model DC-8 Series Airplanes. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 3,000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 17,000 hours' time in service, and thereafter at each FAA approved normal gear overhaul period, but not to exceed 20,000 hours' time in service from the last inspection. \n\n\tTo prevent failures of the main landing gear retract cylinder attach pin, accomplish the following in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Service Bulletin No. 32-102, Revision 4, dated 4 May 1970, or later FAA approved revisions, or an equivalent procedure approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(a)\tRemove the retract pin and inspect the retract pin lock bolt hole, the surface of retract pin, and the inner surface of the retract pin boss for corrosion and cracks. \n\n\t(b)\tIf corrosion is found, rework the affected areas to remove all traces of corrosion. If no more than .003 inches on the diameter is removed from the boss hole during rework, further shot peening of the reworked area is not required. If cracks or corrosion are found in the retract pin, discard the pin. \n\n\t(c)\tReinstall uncracked and uncorroded pins, with particular care being used in obtaining a moisture proof seal around the retract pin lock bolt. It is recommended that a beak of PR 1436G sealant or equivalent be applied around the boss lip, where the retract pin protrudes, to seal out moisture. If the boss is heated to facilitate installation of the retract pin, Parker-O-Lube or equivalent should be substituted for the 463-6-1 Cat-A-Lac primer. \n\n\tUpon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. \n\n\tAmendment 39-1358 became effective January 11, 1972. \n\n\tThis Amendment 39-1384 becomes effective January 29, 1972.
2000-03-16: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that requires a one-time visual inspection of the 90 percent brake pedal position switch to determine if certain date codes are present; and corrective action, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating that the threaded insert connectors pulled free from the casing of the 90 percent brake pedal position switch, which allowed the insert connector contact to burn through the nose wheel steering cable. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the threaded insert connector from pulling free from the casing of the 90 percent brake pedal position switch and burning through the nose wheel steering cable, which could result in reduced aircraft directional control while on the ground.