Results
98-26-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Rolls-Royce Limited, Bristol Engines Division,(R-R) Viper Models Mk.521 and Mk.522 turbojet engines, that requires replacement of certain high pressure (HP) fuel pumps with an improved design which is more tolerant of reduced lubricity fuel caused by water contamination. This amendment is prompted by reports of HP fuel pump drive shaft failures resulting in in-flight engine shutdowns. These failures have been attributed to the reduced lubricity properties of fuel which is contaminated by water. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent HP fuel pump failures, which can result in an in-flight engine shutdown. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of February 16, 1999.
2019-11-02: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2017-16- 10, which applied to all The Boeing Company Model 777 airplanes. AD 2017-16-10 required repetitive inspections of the left and right side underwing longerons for any crack, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD retains the requirements of AD 2017-16-10, reduces certain compliance times for certain airplanes, and removes airplanes from the applicability. This AD was prompted by reports of cracks on the underwing longerons. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-17-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A nose landing gear leg failed in area of the nose gear leg pivot axle. This airplane was mostly operated on grass runways and training operations. This failure was based on a fatigue crack developed in the pivot axle. Material inspections figured out that this cracks may also develop on other serial No. pending the type of operation. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2019-12-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain CFM International S.A. (CFM) LEAP-1B21, -1B23, -1B25, -1B27, - 1B28, -1B28B1, -1B28B2, -1B28B3, -1B28B2C, -1B28BBJ1, and -1B28BBJ2 model turbofan engines. This AD requires initial and repetitive inspections of the transfer gearbox (TGB) scavenge screens and, depending on the results of the inspection, possible removal of the engine from service. This AD was prompted by multiple reports of in- flight shutdowns (IFSDs) due to radial drive shaft (RDS) bearing failure. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2001-24-31: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, that requires performing a one-time inspection for chafing of certain electrical wire bundles behind the flight engineer's panel in the cockpit; repairing any chafed wire bundles, if necessary; and installing Teflon sleeving over the inspected wire bundles and rerouting them. This action is necessary to prevent burning of electrical wires, which could result in smoke in the cockpit and loss of function of several airplane systems. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
79-22-05: 79-22-05 LOCKHEED CALIFORNIA: Amendment 39-3602. Applies to Model L- 1011-385 series airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent rapid loss of cabin pressurization in flight, accomplish the following: (a) Within 800 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 800 hours' time in service until modified in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD, inspect forward and aft outflow valve gates for delamination in accordance with the instructions contained in Lockheed Service Bulletin No. 093-21-157 dated May 1, 1979, Section 2B ("Full inspection of outflow valves"). Gates found defective must be removed and replaced with a part free from bond joint separation prior to further flight. (b) Within 2400 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, modify the outflow valve assemblies in accordance with Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin 21-1141 dated March 28, 1979. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes in pressurized flight to a base for the accomplishment of inspections or modifications required by this AD. No special flight permit is required to operate the airplane unpressurized to a base for the accomplishment of inspections or modifications required by this AD. (d) Alternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. This amendment becomes effective December 6, 1979.
85-24-03: 85-24-03 MOONEY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-5173. Applies to Models M20B, M20C, M20D, M20E, M20F, M20G, M20J, M20K, and M22 (all Serial Numbers (S/N)) airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance: Within 100 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD or at the next annual inspection, whichever occurs first, unless already accomplished. To preclude fuel contamination and water entrapment in the fuel tanks accomplish the following: (a) For Models M20B, M20C, M20D, M20E, M20F, M20G (all S/N), M20J (S/N 24-0001 through 24-1498), M20K (S/N 25-0001 through 25-0854) and M22 (all S/N) airplanes, visually inspect all fuel tank bays and rib stations in accordance with the instructions contained in Mooney S/B M20-230, dated April 10, 1985. Repair all discrepancies found prior to further flight. (b) For Models M20C (S/N 2623 through 20-1258), M20D (S/N 201 through 260), M20E, M20F, M20G, M20J, M20K and M22 (all S/N) airplanes, visually inspect the fueltank filler cap assemblies in accordance with the instructions contained in Mooney S/B M20-229, dated April 10, 1985. Repair all discrepancies found prior to further flight. (c) For Models M20J (S/N 24-1499 and on) and 20K (S/N 20-0855 and on) airplanes that have had any fuel tank resealed after initial installation at the factory, visually inspect all fuel tank bays and rib stations in accordance with the instructions contained in Mooney S/B M20-230 dated April 10, 1985. Repair all discrepancies found prior to further flight. (d) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. (e) An equivalent method of compliance with this AD, if used, must be approved by the Manager, Airplane Certification Branch, ASW-150, Federal Aviation Administration, Southwest Region, Post Office Box 1689, Fort Worth, Texas 76101. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request toMooney Aircraft Corporation, Post Office Box 72, Kerrville, Texas 78028-0072 or FAA, Office of Regional Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This amendment becomes effective on January 6, 1986.
2011-17-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During a Back-up Control Module (BCM) retrofit campaign * * *, some BCMs have been found with loose gyrometer screws. * * * When the aeroplane is in control back up configuration (considered to be an extremely remote case), an oscillation of the BCM output order may cause degradation of the BCM piloting laws, potentially leading to erratic motion of the rudder and possible subsequent impact on the Dutch Roll, which constitutes an unsafe condition. * * * * * * * * [S]everal Pedal Feel Trim Units (PFTU) have been found with loose or broken screws during the accomplishment of maintenance tasks on A330 fitted with electrical rudder and A340-600. The loose or failed screws could lead to the loss of the coupling between the Rotary Variable Differential Transducer (RVDT) shaft and the PFTU shaft, and consequently to a potential rudder runaway when the BCM is activated. * * * * * The unsafe condition is loss of control of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2005-25-24: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 777-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections of the forward lugs of the power control unit (PCU), yoke assembly, and forward attachment hardware of the left inboard, left outboard, right inboard, and right outboard flaperon PCUs; and other specified/corrective actions if necessary. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires other related concurrent actions. This AD results from reports indicating that operators have found worn, fretted, and fractured bolts that attach the yoke assembly to the flaperon PCU. We are issuing this AD to prevent damage and eventual fracture of the yoke assembly, pin assembly, and attachment bolts that connect the inboard and outboard PCUs to a flaperon, which could lead to the flaperon becoming unrestrained and consequently departing from the airplane. Loss of a flaperon could result in asymmetric lift and reduced roll control ofan airplane. A departing flaperon could also cause damage to the horizontal and vertical stabilizers, which could result in loss of control of the airplane if damage is significant.
98-26-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Saab Model SAAB 2000 series airplanes, that requires replacement of the end-pieces of the expansion chamber attenuator (ECA) for the standby pump of the Number 2 hydraulic system with new, improved end-pieces. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent leakage of hydraulic fluid from the Number 2 hydraulic system due to failure of the end-pieces of the ECA, which could result in loss of nose wheel steering, flap operation, normal landing gear operation, and reduced redundancy in the brake and flight controls systems.