Results
2000-07-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that requires a one-time detailed visual inspection of a certain passenger seat wire assembly to detect chafed or damaged wires; repair, if necessary; and installation of protective sleeving. This amendment is prompted by a report of arcing emanating from a certain passenger seat wire assembly. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent chafing of the passenger seat wire assembly against a bracket at the lower sidewall panel due to insufficient clearance between the bracket and seat wire assembly, which could result in arcing damage to the passenger seat wire assembly and consequent smoke and fire in the main cabin.
69-20-01: 69-20-01 PILATUS AIRCRAFT WORKS, INC: Amdt. 39-853. Applies to Model PC- 6 Series Aircraft Serial Numbers 1 through 723 and 2001 through 2050. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent the rudder trim control cable from coming off the pulleys aft of bulkhead 6 (rear cabin wall), accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 100 hours' time in service, inspect the clearance between the cable keeper and the cable pulleys aft of bulkhead 6 in accordance with Pilatus Service Bulletin No. 92, dated March 1969, or later Swiss Federal Air office approved revision or an FAA approved equivalent. (b) If the clearance between the keeper and the cable pulleys is found to be greater than .040 inch, replace the old cable keeper, P/N 6201.16, with a redesigned cable keeper, P/N 916.96.06.244 in accordance with Pilatus Service Bulletin No. 92, dated March 1969, or later Swiss Federal Air Office approved revision or an FAA approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective October 27, 1969.
2006-16-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81 (MD-81), DC-9-82 (MD-82), DC-9- 83 (MD-83), DC-9-87 (MD-87), and MD-88 airplanes. This AD requires installing a clamp, a bonding jumper assembly, and attaching hardware to the refueling manifold in the right wing refueling station area. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent arcing on the in-tank side of the fueling valve during a lightning strike, which could result in an ignition source that could ignite fuel vapor and cause a fuel tank explosion.
2018-16-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by report indicating that cracks were found on the fuselage frame webs at stations forward and aft of the overwing emergency exits between stringer-7 (S-7) and S-8. This AD requires repetitive high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspections for cracking of the fuselage frame webs at certain stations between S-7 and S-8 and applicable on-condition actions. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-07-19: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that requires a detailed visual inspection of the external power feeder cables in the forward cargo compartment between certain stations to detect chafing or damage; repair, if necessary; and installation of spiral wrap. This amendment is prompted by reports of failure of the external power feeder cable due to being chafed during maintenance. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent chafing and damage to external ground power feeder cables, which could result in electrical arcing and consequent structural damage and smoke and fire in the forward cargo compartment.
56-20-04: 56-20-04 CONVAIR: Applies to All 240, 340 and 440 Aircraft. Compliance recommended at the next engine change or airplane overhaul but required not later than December 31, 1957. Several recent accidents involving nacelle fires have indicated certain deficiencies in the construction of the fire seals between zone 1 and zone 2. To correct this condition the following rework of the present cowling and zone seals is required. 1. Incorporate an additional fireproof seal at the zone 1 to zone 2 shroud-to-cowl seal around the periphery of the diaphragm where the bottom and side cowl meet. 2. Improve the present nacelle seals by incorporating a fireproof seal along the longitudinal juncture of the cowl segments and also improve the present cowl hinge point seals. 3. Replace any existing aluminum material in the zone 2 chimney vent with steel material. (Applicable to CV-240 aircraft only.) The following Convair Service Bulletins cover acceptable methods of compliance with these modifications: Nos. 240-472 and 340-177 cover item No. 1; Nos. 240-474, 240-481A, 340- 209, 340-210A, 440-30 and 440-32A cover item No. 2; Nos. 240-470 and Revision 1 cover item No. 3. (Compliance with Revision 2 to 240-470 is not required.)
2006-16-04: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for RRC 250-B and 250-C series turboshaft and turboprop engines. That AD currently requires a onetime inspection of the fuel nozzle screen for contamination, and if contamination is found, inspection and cleaning of the entire aircraft fuel system before further flight. That AD also requires replacing the fuel nozzle with a new design fuel nozzle, at the next fuel nozzle overhaul or by June 30, 2006, whichever occurs first. This AD requires the same actions, but would add additional part numbers (P/Ns) to the list of affected fuel nozzles. This AD would also explain that the existing AD, as worded, allows certain part number (P/N) fuel nozzles back into service. Those fuel nozzles must not be allowed back into service. This AD is prompted by the discovery that several P/Ns of fuel nozzles were inadvertently left out of AD 2004-24-09. We are issuing this AD to minimize the risk of sudden loss of engine power and uncommanded shutdown of the engine due to fuel contamination and collapse of the screen in the fuel nozzle.
2006-15-18: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-300, -400, -500, -600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes. This AD requires modifying the wiring for the master dim and test system. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires related concurrent actions as necessary. This AD results from a report that the master dim and test system circuit does not have wiring separation of the test ground signal for redundant equipment in the flight compartment. We are issuing this AD to prevent a single fault failure in flight from simulating a test condition and showing test patterns instead of the selected radio frequencies on the communications panels, which could inhibit communication between the flightcrew and the control tower, affecting the continued safe flight of the airplane.
2018-07-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model DC-9-81 (MD-81), DC-9-82 (MD-82), DC-9-83 (MD-83), and DC-9-87 (MD-87) airplanes, Model MD-88 airplanes, and Model MD-90- 30 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of loss of airspeed indication due to icing. This AD requires modifying the air data heat (ADH) system. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
66-13-04: 66-13-04 LEARJET: Amdt. 39-237 Part 39 Federal Register May 17, 1966. Applies to Models 23 and 24 Airplanes. Compliance required before further flight, unless already accomplished, except that the airplane may be flown to a base where the repair can be performed, provided the following restrictions are contained on a placard in clear view of the pilot: "(a) No passengers may be carried. "(b) Monitor the cabin pressure indicator for proper pressurization control. If automatic and/or manual control of the cabin pressure is not properly effective: "(1) Turn air bleed off to shutoff bleed air. "(2) Reduce power to reduce bleed air pressure as necessary. "(3) Don oxygen masks. "(4) Expedite descent to a safe altitude." Modify the pressure control static air system in accordance with Lear Service Kit SK23/24-230 or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Central Region. This directive effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated May 10, 1966.