Results
96-25-19: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that currently requires either the application of a vapor sealant on the back of the receptacle of the auxiliary power unit (APU) power feeder cable; or a one-time visual inspection for gold-plating and evidence of damage of the connector contacts of the power feeder cable of the APU generator, and various follow-on actions. This amendment adds a requirement for replacement of certain connector contacts (pins/sockets) with gold-plated contacts. This amendment is prompted by reports of burning and arcing of the connector contacts of the power feeder cable of the APU generator. The actions specified by this AD are intended to reduce the potential for a fire hazard as a result of such burning or arcing.
92-25-01: 92-25-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-8416. Docket No. 92-NM-85-AD. Supersedes AD 90-08- 16, Amendment 39-6574. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 757 series airplanes; line numbers 1 through 411, inclusive, and 413 through 432, inclusive; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent damage caused by skewed flaps resulting from excessive wear of the splines of the trailing edge flap drive torque tube coupling, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tPrior to the accumulation of 2,000 flight cycles, or within the next 200 flight cycles after April 30, 1990, (the effective date of AD 90-08-16), whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 flight cycles, perform an inspection of the torque tube coupling splines, in accordance with Boeing Service Letter 757-SL-27-52-B, dated April 30, 1990. \n\n\tNOTE: Operators who have conducted inspections of the torque tube coupling splines prior to the effective dateof this AD, in accordance with Boeing Service Letter 757-SL-27-52, dated January 31, 1990, or Boeing Service Letter 757-SL-27-52-A, dated March 21, 1990, are considered to be in compliance with paragraph (a) of this AD. \n\n\t\t(1)\tIf the measurement over the pin, as detailed in the service letter, is less than 1.8605 inches but equal to or greater than 1.8533 inches, repeat the inspection prior to the accumulation of 1,000 additional flight cycles. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIf the measurement over the pin, as detailed in the service letter, is less than 1.8533 inches, replace the coupling prior to further flight, in accordance with the service letter. \n\n\t(b)\tReplacement of the torque tube assemblies with improved torque tube assemblies, part number 251N4281-20 (one on each wing), and installation of a sealant plug in the shafts of the four gearboxes, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 757-27-0099, dated March 12, 1992, constitutes terminating action for the inspections required by paragraph(a) of this AD. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tThe inspection and replacement shall be done in accordance with Boeing Service Letter 757-SL-27-52-B, dated April 30, 1990. The replacement with improved torque tube assemblies shall be done in accordance with Boeing ServiceBulletin 757-27-0099, dated March 12, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on December 23, 1992.
80-21-08: 80-21-08 PIPER: Amendment 39-3934. Applies to Model PA-25 series airplanes certificated in all categories which have incorporated STC SA501SW. (Docket No. 80-ASW-42.) Compliance required as indicated. For airplanes with forward wing spar(s) with 500 hours or more time in service since incorporation of STC SA501SW, compliance is required within 5 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. For airplanes with forward wing spar(s) with less than 500 hours time in service since incorporation of STC SA501SW, compliance is required upon accumulation of 500 hours time in service since incorporation of STC SA501SW or within the next 5 hours time in service, whichever is later. \n\n\tTo detect cracks or other damage in the forward wing spar cap, accomplish the following. \n\n\t(a)\tRemove the wing walk lower rear and lower front (leading edge) skin panels from each wing. \n\n\t(b)\tDetach the leading edge skin panel covering the wing strut attachment to the main spar sufficiently to allow inspection of the rear flange of the lower spar cap. \n\n\t(c)\tVisually inspect the upright, bulbed flange on the aft side of the front and rear spars (upper and lower) of both wings for misdrilled holes common to the bulbed spar flange and skin attach angles. Conduct this inspection in the areas uncovered by (a) and (b). \n\n\t\t(1)\tThe center unit of each fastener hole must be between .18 and .34 inches from the free end of the bulbed spar flange. \n\n\t\t(2)\tA gage fabricated as shown in figure number 1 may be used to check for misdrilled holes. \n\n\t\t(3)\tFigures 2 and 3 show how the gage is used. \n\n\t(d)\tInspect the uncovered spar caps for cracks visually and with standard dye or fluorescent penetrant inspection procedures. Place special attention to the inboard 10 inches of the front spar aft, lower cap. \n\n\t(e)\tIf misdrilled holes or cracks are found in (c) or (d), parts must be replaced with serviceable parts of the same part number. Replace blind fasteners common to the spar cap and skin angles (if removal is necessary) with MS20600M4 rivets. \n\n\t(f)\tVisually inspect the left and right lower spar web at the inboard end for installation of the fatigue resistant doubler plates, Piper P/N 60373 and Moore/Hutcherson P/N's SPD 20025-1 and -2. The fatigue resistant doublers extend outboard of the wing-fuselage attach lug 15 inches while the original single spar web doubler extends only 6 inches outboard of the attach lug. If the fatigue resistant doubler plates are not installed, accomplish the following within the next 100 hours time in service: \n\n\t\t(1)\tRemove left and right wing from fuselage. \n\n\t\t(2)\tRemove wing attach fitting located on each forward wing spar root. \n\n\t\t(3)\tUsing standard dye or fluorescent penetrant inspection procedures, inspect the inboard end of the forward spars for a distance of 24 inches outboard of the wing-fuselage attach lug for cracks. Inspect both the spar web and the spar cap with particular attention placed on the inboard 10 inches of the rear flange of the lower spar cap. \n\n\t\t(4)\tIf cracks are found, part must be replaced with serviceable parts of the same part number before further flight. Replace blind fasteners common to the spar cap and skin angles (if removal is necessary) with MS20600M4 rivets. \n\n\t\t(5)\tAfter the inspections and repair of (f)(3) and (f)(4), respectively, install the doubler plates of Moore/Hutcherson drawing SPD 20025. \n\n\t\t(6)\tReinstall the wing attach fittings and the wings. \n\n\t(g)\tReinstall the leading edge skin covers and walkway lower skin panels. \n\n\t(h)\tAircraft may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where inspections can be accomplished. \n\n\t(i)\tEquivalent methods of complying with this AD may be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Southwest Region. This supersedes Amendment 39-1755 (38 FR 34460), AD 73-26-02, as amended by Amendment 39-1792 (39 FR 7164). \n\n\tThis amendmentbecomes effective October 15, 1980. \n\n\n\nFIGURE NO. 1 GAGE (.06" ALUM. OR STL.) \nAD 80-21-08 \n\n\n\nAD 80-21-08\n\n\n\nAD 80-21-08
2011-18-19: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. That AD currently requires frequent inspections of the fuel pressure supply for excessive oscillations to determine if high-pressure (HP) fuel pumps have been exposed to damaging pressure oscillations. Pumps that have been exposed require replacement before further flight. This new AD requires the initial and repetitive inspections of AD 2010-23-09, but also requires installing HP fuel pump part number (P/N) E4A-30-200-000, as mandatory terminating action to the repetitive inspections. We are issuing this AD to prevent engine power loss or in-flight shutdown, which could result in loss of control of the airplane.
58-11-01: 58-11-01 DOUGLAS: Applies to All DC-6 and DC-7 Series Aircraft as Indicated. \n\n\tSeveral instances have been reported wherein cracks have been found or failures have occurred in the nose wheel upper retract link assembly, P/N 5325437. In at least one case, failure resulted in folding of the nose gear when the aircraft stopped, following landing and taxi. \n\n\tThe failures occurred in the forged end fitting, P/N 5328993, caused by a crack starting in the vicinity of the 1/8-inch radius where the fitting is machined to the O.D. of the tube, P/N 2329712. Cracks in the unfailed parts were found in the same location. Failures occurred on two airplanes having a total of 24,000 and 13,800 hours respectively and a crack was reported on one airplane with 7,521 hours. The airplane time is not significant since the interchange of landing gear components at major overhaul may result in the gear components actually having more or less time than the airplanes themselves. \n\n\tSubsequent to DC-6 Series fuselage No. 435 and DC-7 Series fuselage No. 434, Douglas increased the 1/8-inch radius to 3/4-inch radius. The following must be accomplished on all nose gear upper retract link assemblies, P/N 5325437, delivered by the manufacturer that do not incorporate the larger radius. \n\n\t1.\tInspect the right and left hand forged end fitting with the 1/8-inch radius at the earliest possible opportunity where facilities are available, and in any case, at the inspection period nearest 100 hours. Inspection should preferable be accomplished by magnaflux; however, dye penetrant inspection can be considered satisfactory if parts are uniformly warned to open tight cracks. \n\n\t2.\tIf cracks are found, parts must be replaced. No rework is considered feasible. \n\n\t3.\tParts which are not cracked should be reworked at the earliest practicable opportunity to increase the 1/8-inch radius to 3/4-inch and polish the area to a 32-micro-inch finish. The reworked area should be protected with zinc chromate primer and aluminized lacquer and the reworked parts properly identified to distinguish them from those manufactured with the 3/4-inch radius. \n\n\t4.\tAfter the initial inspection, all parts must be inspected regularly at the inspection period nearest to 300 hours until rework is accomplished. \n\n\t5.\tAfter rework, inspections at frequent intervals should continue to assure that the rework has removed damaged material and/or incipient cracks. \n\n\t(Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A-677 for the DC-6 Series and A-139 for the DC-7 Series cover the above subject and describe how to increase the 1/8-inch radius to a 3/4-inch radius.)
96-24-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Lockheed Model 382 series airplanes, that requires that all landing gear brakes be inspected for wear and replaced if the wear limits prescribed in this AD are not met, and that the new landing gear brake wear limits be incorporated into the FAA-approved maintenance inspection program. This amendment is prompted by an accident in which a transport category airplane executed a rejected takeoff (RTO) and was unable to stop on the runway due to worn brakes; and the subsequent review of allowable brake wear limits for all transport category airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of brake effectiveness during a high energy RTO.
96-25-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Pratt & Whitney JT9D series turbofan engines, that requires installing an improved design turbine exhaust case (TEC) with a thicker containment wall, modifying the existing TEC to incorporate a containment shield, or modifying the existing TEC to replace the "P" flange and case wall. This amendment is prompted by reports of 64 uncontained engine failures since 1972. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent release of uncontained debris from the TEC following an internal engine failure, which can result in damage to the aircraft.
96-23-14: This amendment supersedes two existing airworthiness directives (ADs), applicable to Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D series turbofan engines, that currently require repetitive eddy current, fluorescent penetrant, fluorescent magnetic penetrant, or visual inspections for cracks in the rear flange, and ultrasonic, fluorescent penetrant, or fluorescent magnetic penetrant inspections for cracks in the PS4 boss, and drain bosses of the combustion chamber outer case (CCOC); and an additional inspection of the CCOC rear flange for intergranular cracking. This amendment requires reducing the rear flange inspection interval for CCOCs when only the aft face of the rear flange has been inspected, and introducing an improved ultrasonic probe assembly. In addition, this amendment introduces a rotating eddy current probe for shop inspections in which the case is removed from the engine. Also, this amendment eliminates fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI), fluorescent magnetic particle inspection (FMPI), and visual inspections from hot section disassembly level inspection procedures. This amendment is prompted by reports of crack origins in the forward face of the rear flange that could not be detected by the inspection methods for installed CCOC's that were mandated in the current ADs. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent uncontained engine failure, inflight engine shutdown, engine cowl release, and airframe damage.
92-26-03: 92-26-03 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8430. Docket No. 92-NM-207-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model MD-11 series airplanes; as listed in McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Alert Service Bulletin A27-30, dated August 20, 1992; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent uncommanded slat deployment during flight at cruise altitude, which could create significant vibrations and cause damage to the elevators, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 60 days after the effective date of this AD, install a cover on the flap/slat control module quadrant in the flight compartment in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Alert Service Bulletin A27-30, dated August 20, 1992. \n\n\t(b)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(d)\tThe installation shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Alert Service Bulletin A27-30, dated August 20, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90846-0001, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Publications - Technical Administrative Support, C1-L5B. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(e)\tThis amendment becomes effective on December 23, 1992.
2011-17-08: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * The airworthiness limitations applicable to Damage Tolerant Airworthiness Limitation Items (DT ALI) are currently given in Airbus A330 ALI Document reference AI/SE-M4/95A.0089/97, which is approved by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and referenced in Airbus Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) Part 2. The issue 17 of Airbus A330 ALI Document introduces more restrictive maintenance requirements/airworthiness limitations. Failure to comply with this issue constitutes an unsafe condition. This [EASA] AD supersedes EASA AD 2009-0102 [and retains the requirements therein], and requires the implementationof the new or more restrictive maintenance requirements/airworthiness limitations as specified in Airbus A330 ALI Document issue 17. The unsafe condition is fatigue cracking, damage, and corrosion in certain structure, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.