Results
2004-05-17: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Model EMB-135 and -145 series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive inspections to detect discrepancies of both vertical-to-horizontal stabilizer bonding jumpers and the connecting support structure, and corrective action if necessary. This amendment requires modification of the bonding jumpers, including the installation of a protective cover to the elevator control cables, which terminates the requirements of the existing AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent damaged or severed bonding jumpers, which, in the event of a lightning strike, could result in severed elevator control cables and consequent reduced elevator control capability and reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2021-12-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Leonardo S.p.a. Model AW189 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of the bubble window departing from the helicopter during flight. This AD requires installation of a new improved bubble window kit, as specified in a European Aviation Safety Agency (now the European Union Aviation Safety Agency) (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-09-16: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A number of occurrences of an incorrect installation of the trimmable horizontal stabilizer actuator (THSA) have been found and reported during the accomplishment of the AIRBUS Service Bulletin (SB) A320-27-1164 mandated by EASA AD 2006-0223. These issues could lead to a degradation of the integrity of the THSA primary load path and to secondary load path partial or full engagement. * * * * * Degradation of the THSA primary load path could result in latent (undetected) loading and eventual failure of the THSA secondary load path, with consequent uncontrolled movement of the horizontal stabilizer and loss of control of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-05-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * * * * [T]here is a possible path for fluid ingress, resulting in connector internal arcing and hydraulic system malfunction. In addition, as the connectors are located in areas adjacent to fuel tanks, such arcing associated with the presence of a fuel leakage could lead to an uncontrolled fire. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
96-06-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-10, -15, -30, and -40 series airplanes, and Model KC- 10A (military) airplanes. This amendment requires inspection(s) to detect cracks of the attach bolts of the front spar support fitting of each wing, and replacement of attach bolts with ones that are corrosion-resistant. This amendment is prompted by a report of failure of the attach bolts of the front spar fitting as a result of corrosion pitting. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such stress corrosion, which could lead to the failure of the attach bolts of the front spar; this situation could result in reduced structural integrity of the wing.
48-49-02: 48-49-02 NOORDUYN: Applies to All Army UC-64, -64A, -64AS, and -64B Aircraft. Compliance required as soon as possible but not later than February 1, 1949. On airplanes equipped or about to be equipped with Edo Model 55-7170A floats, the float brace wire plates, P/N 16-31131, must be reinforced in accordance with Noorduyn Service Bulletin No. E5/44, dated August 22, 1944, (obtainable upon request from Canadian Car and Foundry Co., Ltd., Montreal 3, Canada), or Army Air Forces Technical Order No. 01-155CB-13, dated October 9, 1944. Other reinforcements shown to be equivalent to those covered in the Service Bulletin or the Technical Order will also be acceptable.
47-42-10: 47-42-10 DOUGLAS: (Was Mandatory Note 7 of AD-781-1.) Applies to the Following DC-6 Airplanes: Serials 42854 Through 42887, Inclusive, and Serials 43000, 43001 and 43055. \n\nTo be accomplished not later than January 1, 1948. \n\nSome operators have experienced malfunctioning of the DC-6 landing gear antiretract mechanism, thereby preventing retraction of the landing gear. Pending redesign of the antiretract mechanism of the landing gear control valve assembly, P/N 3319922, the antiretract mechanism may be permanently disconnected if desired, however, if connected, it must be revised in accordance with this note. \n\nIn order to correct this unsatisfactory condition, which is due to slippage and lost motion in the antiretract cable system, it is necessary to accomplish the following: \n\n1.\tRemove clamp P/N 1338701 from Arens down-lock control cable assembly, P/N 4334802. Install 21-inch dural tube, P/N 1356157, around lower end of the Arens control cable (the upper end of the tube should be flanged). Install AN 735-7 clamp at lower end of tube. (Prior to installing dural tube push 4-inch (7/16 I.D. x 9/16 inch O.D.) synthetic rubber tube over lower end until it clears sufficiently to allow installation of clamp below it.) \n\nOn upper end of dural tube, P/N 1356157, install trunnion, P/N 1356154, which incorporates a bushing, P/N B-162-0688, and clips, P/N 1356156. Attach this assembly to the wheel well cover plate stiffener approximately 21 3/8 inches below upper end of cover plate. \n\nRemove down-lock control cable clamp, P/N 1340559, located 4 1/16 inches from Station 114.5 and install new clamp, P/N 1356158, on angle, P/N 5249561-366, 1 1/16 inches from Station 114.5. \n\n(Douglas Drawing 5334338, Change "H" covers this modification.) \n\n2.\tTo correctly adjust the landing gear down-lock mechanism in order to maintain the required load of 100 pounds on the cable number 108 with the oleo fully extended, the oleo should be fully retracted into the shock strut cylinder and then permitted to fully extend, at least 8 to 10 times, checking and maintaining the 100-pound load after each operation. \n\n(Douglas Drawing 7354206, page 28, covers this same subject.)
96-06-03: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to The Enstrom Helicopter Corporation (Enstrom) Model F-28, F-28A, F-28C, F-28C-2, F-28F, 280, 280C, 280F, and 280FX helicopters, that currently requires initial and repetitive inspections of a certain main rotor transmission clutch assembly (clutch assembly) for bearing roughness, noise, lock-up, or improper oil level and, if necessary, replacement of the clutch assembly. The existing AD also requires replacement of the clutch assembly at certain time-in-service intervals. This amendment requires the same inspections and replacements as required by the existing AD, but would provide for installation of an additional approved replacement part number and provide a reference to three additional manufacturer service documents. This amendment is prompted by the approval of an additional replacement clutch assembly; the manufacturer's issuance of additional service information, and the need to correct a service information letter's number. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the clutch assembly, loss of control of the main rotor system, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2004-05-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 series airplanes, that requires repetitive general visual inspections of the inside of the condenser regenerative air ducts, air cycle machine turbine outlet, and the jet pump ducts on each air conditioning pack to detect oil and/or oil breakdown products leaking from the engine(s) or auxiliary power unit (APU). This AD also requires further inspections and replacement of any affected engine, APU, or component with a serviceable part, if necessary. This action is necessary to prevent impairment of the operational skills and abilities of the flightcrew caused by oil or oil breakdown products in the cabin air, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2021-12-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited Model DHC-8-400 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that a number of nacelle A- frames were not manufactured in accordance with engineering drawings. This AD requires, depending on airplane configuration, removing the fasteners on the nacelle A-frame side brace sub-assemblies, doing an eddy current inspection for cracking, cold-working the holes, installing oversize fasteners, re-identifying the reworked side brace fitting and A-frame, and repair if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
85-16-04: 85-16-04 GATES LEARJET: Amendment 39-5110. Applies to Model 35, 35A, 36, and 36A series airplanes modified by Raisbeck Group Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA766NW, certificated in any category. The affected airplane serial numbers are: 35-023, 35-034, 35-042, 35-044, 35-047, 35A-068, 35A-073, 35A-075, 35A-076, 35A- 086, 35A-092, 35A-093, 35A-095, 35A-118, 35A-127, 35A-132, 35A-135, 35A-145, 35A- 172, 35A-185, 35A-192, 35A-203, 35A-206, 35A-207, 35A-209, 35A-228, 35A-231, 35A- 244, 35A-245, 36-003, 36-004, 36-017, 36A-028, 36A-029, 36A-031, 36A-038, 36A-043, and 36A-044. To prevent deterioration of the airplane lateral control characteristics as a result of aileron buffet or buzz accomplish the following, unless previously accomplished. A. Within the next 200 hours time in service or six months after the effective date of this AD, whichever comes first, accomplish either paragraph 1. or 2., as follows: 1. Reduce MMO by accomplishing the following:a. Submit the FAA approved STC SA766NW Airplane Flight Manual Supplement to the Manager, Flight Test Branch, ANM-160S, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington 98168, to change the limit Mach number from .83 to .80; b. Remove the "Mach Overspeed Warning Switch" and have it reset from Mach .83 to .80. Contact the manufacturer PRECISION SENSOR, P.0. Box 509, Milford, Connecticut 06460, telephone number (203) 877-2795, to have the instrument recalibrated. Reidentify the Mach overspeed warning switch by ink stamping "Mach limit .80" adjacent to the part number. Reinstall the "Mach Overspeed Warning Switch" after it has been calibrated; and c. Remove pilot's and copilot's airspeed indicators and have them modified by changing the "Barber Pole" from Mach number .83 to .80. The instrument must be recalibrated by the instrument manufacturer or a certified repair station. Reidentify the airspeed indicators by ink stamping "Mach limit .80" adjacent to the part number. Reinstall the pilot's and copilot's airspeed indicators after they have been recalibrated. 2. Remove the modifications installed by Raisbeck Group STC SA766NW, and return the aircraft to the original type design configuration or to the Gates Learjet "Softflight" configuration. B. Airplanes may be ferried to a maintenance base for repair in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199. C. Alternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Jet Air Corporation, P.O. Box 245, Bellevue, Washington 98009. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective September 6, 1985.
2021-11-20: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A330-200, A330-300, A340-200, A340-300, A340- 500, and A340-600 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that, for certain lower deck mobile crew rest (LDMCR) units, the connection of a certain halon outlet tube to the outlet of a certain fire extinguisher bottle may be incorrect. This AD requires replacing each affected halon outlet tube with a flexible hose, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-05-21: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Bombardier airplanes as listed above. This action requires lubrication of the flap actuators, repetitive measurements ("checks") of the backlash of the flap actuators, determination of the next backlash measurement interval, and replacement of discrepant actuators with new or overhauled actuators if necessary. This action is necessary to prevent the mechanical disconnection of a flap actuator, which, if followed by failure of the flap panel's second actuator due to increased loading, could result in flap asymmetry and consequent loss of controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
48-01-02: 48-01-02 PIPER: Applies to PA-12 Aircraft Serial Numbers 12-1 Through 12-1989; 12- 1991 Through 12-1993; 12-1997; 12-1999; 12-2001 Through 12-3443; 12-3445 Through 12- 3450; 12-3452 Through 12-3457; 12-3461 Through 12-3465; 12-3481; 12-3535 Through 12- 3542; 12-3553; 12-3901; 12-3903 Through 12-3934; 12-3936; 12-3940; 12-3941; 12-3943 Through 12-3954; 12-3961; 12-3964 Through 12-3970; and 12-3988. Compliance required by February 1, 1948, and at each periodic inspection with modification not later than June 1, 1948. Inspect for interference between the nose cowl and starter ring gear casting and for tightness of the cowl attachments. Replace gear casting if scored deeper than 1/32 inch. Prior to June 1, 1948, install cowl support braces, Piper P/N 11410, to insure proper position and support of cowl. (Piper Service Bulletin No. 100 dated October 20, 1947, covers this same subject.)
2021-12-01: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-25- 13, which applied to all Engine Alliance (EA) GP7270 and GP7277 model turbofan engines with a certain low-pressure compressor (LPC) 1st-stage fan blade installed. AD 2019-25-13 required an ultrasonic inspection of the affected LPC 1st-stage fan blades and replacement of any affected LPC 1st-stage fan blade that fails the inspection. This AD lowers the initial inspection threshold and requires repetitive ultrasonic inspections on affected LPC 1st-stage fan blades. This AD was prompted by a report of an in-flight shutdown (IFSD) of an engine due to the fracture of multiple LPC 1st-stage fan blades. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
83-07-51 R1: 83-07-51 R1 CANADAIR: Amendment 39-4874. Applies to Model CL-600-1A11 (CL-600) and CL-600-2A12 (CL-601) airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated on all airplanes with 150 hours or more total time in service. To prevent failure of the flap vane support assembly, P/N 600-14250-14, accomplish the following, unless previously accomplished: A. Prior to further flight, except for a flaps up ferry flight, remove the six (three per side) inboard flap vane support beam assemblies, P/N 600-14250-14, and perform a dye penetrant inspection of the beam assemblies in accordance with Canadair Alert Service Bulletin A600-0357, Revision 1, dated June 17, 1983 (CL-600); or A601-0010, Revision 1, dated June 17, 1983 (CL-601). If no cracks are found, repeat the inspection at intervals not to exceed 50 hours time in service. B. If cracks are found in one beam assembly, replace all six assemblies with new parts of the same part number prior to further flight. Reinspect as noted in paragraph A., above, after the accumulation of 150 additional hours time in service. C. If no cracks are found in any beam assembly, insert a NOTE in the "Flaps Extended Speed" paragraph of the Limitations Section of the Airplane Flight Manual to read: "Maximum Speed with Flaps 45 degrees, 160 KIAS." D. Post a placard on the left and right hand instrument panels to read: "Maximum Speed with Flaps 45 degrees, 160 KIAS." E. The repetitive inspections required by this AD and the flight manual/flap placard speed restrictions given in paragraphs C. and D., above, may be terminated upon installation of modified beam and trunnion assemblies in accordance with Parts C and D of the Service Bulletin. F. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region. G. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. This amendment becomes effective June 5, 1984, and was effective earlier to all recipients of Telegraphic AD T83-07-51 dated April 6, 1983.
65-22-03: 65-22-03 MOONEY: Amdt. 39-138 Part 39 Federal Register September 16, 1965. Applies to Models M20 and M20A Airplanes. Compliance required within the next 25 hours' time in service after September 16, 1965, unless already accomplished within the last 75 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the last inspection until tail truss, Mooney P/N 4009, is replaced with tail truss, Mooney P/N 48007, in accordance with Mooney Service Bulletin No. 20-138 or later FAA-approved revision. To prevent further cracking in the tubular steel tail truss that supports the empennage on airplanes with wood wings and wood empennage, accomplish the following: (a) Remove sheet metal fairings over tail truss, remove and disassemble empennage, and remove tail truss. Inspect visually for cracks all welded joints and adjacent structures in tail truss, P/N 4009, using at least a 10-power glass or FAA-approved equivalent. (b) If cracks are foundin U-fitting, P/N 4010, at the lower forward end of the truss, repair before further flight in accordance with Mooney Service Letter No. 20-68 or later FAA- approved revision or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southwest Region. (c) If cracks are found in the tail truss within 0.50 inch of an existing weld bead except in U-fitting, P/N 4010, repair before further flight in an FAA-approved manner flame annealing any area where old and new welds join. (d) If cracks are found in the tail truss 0.50 inch or more from an existing weld bead except in U-fitting, P/N 4010, before further flight - (1) Replace the tail truss with an unused part of the same part number or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southwest Region; or (2) Repair it in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southwest Region or by a Mooney Aircraft, Inc., Designated Engineering Representative. (Mooney Service Letters Nos. 20-30, 20-49, and 20-49A also pertain to this subject.) This directive effective September 16, 1965. Revised November 4, 1965. Revised August 20, 1966.
2021-11-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Helicopters Model EC 155B, EC155B1, SA-365N, SA-365N1, AS-365N2, and AS 365 N3 helicopters, as identified in a European Aviation Safety Agency (now European Union Aviation Safety Agency) (EASA) AD. This AD was prompted by a report of an in-flight loss of engine and main gearbox (MGB) cowlings. This AD requires inspecting the MGB fixed cowling front fitting (MGB front fitting), and depending on findings, corrective action. This AD also requires a new modification, which is a terminating action for the inspection, as specified in an EASA AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-04-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Airbus Model A300 B2 and A300 B4 series airplanes; A300 B4-600, B4-600R, C4-605R Variant F, and F4-600R (collectively called A300-600); and A310 series airplanes. This AD requires, for certain airplanes, identifying the part number of the landing gear selector valves. For all airplanes, this AD requires repetitive maintenance tasks or operational tests of the landing gear selector valves, and replacing discrepant valves with certain new valves. This action is necessary to prevent failure of the landing gear selector valves, which could result in residual pressure on the retraction chamber side of the electro-hydraulic selector, and consequent uncommanded retraction of the landing gear when the airplane is on the ground. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2021-11-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) Model PC-24 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI identifies the unsafe condition as the engine attachment hardware not \n\n((Page 30762)) \n\nconforming to the approved design, which could affect the structural integrity of the airplane. This AD requires inspecting the engine attachment hardware for missing washers and loose nuts and taking corrective actions as necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
70-26-03: 70-26-03 BOEING: Amdt. 39-1130 as amended by Amendment 39-1161 is further amended by Amendment 39-1307. Applies to all Model 727 series airplanes. \n\n\tCompliance required on all airplanes with 10,000 or more landings as follows: \n\n\t(1)\tWithin 300 landings after the effective date of this AD where not previously inspected in accordance with these procedures; or \n\t(2)\tWithin 2000 landings since the initial inspection where previously inspected in accordance with these procedures; and \n\t(3)\tThereafter at intervals not to exceed 2000 landings since the last such inspection. \n\tTo detect cracks in the main landing gear trunnion support beam, P/N 65-16230, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tInspect in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 57-115, dated November 20, 1970, or later FAA approved revisions, or an equivalent inspection approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(b)\tIf cracks are found, before further flight, accomplish one of the following: \n\t\t(1)\tRework the beam in accordance with rework instructions in Boeing Service Bulletin 57-120, dated 30 April 1971, or later FAA approved revisions, and repeat the inspection required in (3) above, or \n\t\t(2)\tRepair the beam in a manner approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, and repeat the inspection required in (3) above, or \n\t\t(3)\tReplace the beam with a serviceable beam. If this beam is a previously reworked beam, or has 10,000 or more landings, repeat the inspection required in (3) above. \n\t(c)\tWhere records maintained by the operator are such as will permit a clear determination of the number of landings accumulated by the main landing gear trunnion support beam, P/N 65-16230, installed on the airplane, the inspection times prescribed by this AD may be applied to the beam rather than to the airplane. \n\t(d)\tInspections prescribed by this AD do not apply. \n\t\t(1)\tTo replacement beams P/N 65-62335; or \n\t\t(2)\tTo replacement beams P/N65-16230 until the replacement beams (P/N 65- 16230) have accumulated 10,000 landings. \n\tFor the purpose of this AD the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. \n\tAmendment 39-1130 became effective December 30, 1970. \n\tAmendment 39-1161 became effective March 6, 1971. \n\tThis amendment 39-1307 becomes effective October 8, 1971.
2004-05-15: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Dassault Model Mystere-Falcon 900 series airplanes, that requires revising the Abnormal Procedures section of the airplane flight manual to advise the flightcrew to avoid use of certain display modes during approaches. This AD also requires replacing certain symbol generators of the Electronic Flight Information System (EFIS) with modified symbol generators. This action is necessary to prevent distraction of the flightcrew during a critical phase of flight due to certain EFIS displays flashing or going blank, which could result in loss of control of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2021-11-21: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain CFM International, S.A. (CFM) LEAP-1A model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by a report of a manufacturing quality escape found during an inspection of a high-pressure turbine (HPT) case. This AD requires the removal from service of the affected HPT case. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-03-10: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A debonding area was detected on the RH [right-hand] elevator of an A340 in-service aeroplane during a scheduled maintenance task inspection. Investigation has revealed that this debonding may have been caused by water ingress and, if not detected and corrected, might compromise the structural integrity of the elevators [and could result in reduced controllability of the airplane]. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
95-13-12 R1: This amendment clarifies information in an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 767 series airplanes, that currently requires tests, inspections, and adjustments of the thrust reverser system. That AD also requires installation of a terminating modification and repetitive follow-on actions. The actions specified in that AD are intended to prevent possible discrepancies that exist in the current thrust reverser control system, which could result in inadvertent deployment of a thrust reverser during flight. This amendment clarifies the requirements of the current AD by specifying a revised number of pound-inches of torque operators should use when performing the torque check of the cone brake of the center drive unit (CDU). This amendment is prompted by information from the manufacturer that a current requirement of the AD requires clarification.