Results
2021-21-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all General Electric Company (GE) GEnx-1B64, GEnx-1B64/P1, GEnx-1B64/P2, GEnx-1B67, GEnx-1B67/P1, GEnx-1B67/P2, GEnx-1B70, GEnx-1B70/75/P1, GEnx-1B70/75/P2, GEnx-1B70/P1, GEnx-1B70/P2, GEnx-1B70C/P1, GEnx-1B70C/ P2, GEnx-1B74/75/P1, GEnx-1B74/75/P2, GEnx-1B76/P2, GEnx-1B76A/P2, GEnx-2B67, GEnx-2B67/P, and GEnx-2B67B model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by an in-service occurrence of loss of engine thrust control resulting in uncommanded high thrust. This AD requires revising the operator's existing FAA-approved minimum equipment list (MEL) by incorporating into the MEL the dispatch restrictions listed in this AD. This AD also requires initial and repetitive replacement of the electronic engine control (EEC) MN4 microprocessor. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
78-17-08: 78-17-08 PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT: Amendment 39-3288. Applies to all Pratt & Whitney Aircraft JT9D-3, -3A, -7, -7A, -7AH, -7H, -7F, -7J, -20, and -20B turbofan engines containing fifteenth stage compressor disk, P/N 672915 or P/N 658615. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To preclude failures of fifteenth stage compressor disks due to low cycle fatigue cracking, inspect disks in accordance with the procedures specified in Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Alert Service Bulletin 4908, dated August 7, 1978, or later revision approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, as specified below: (a) For disks with 6500 or more cycles in service, on the effective date of this AD, inspect within the next 100 cycles in service. (b) For disks having less than 6500 cycles in service, on the effective date of this AD, inspect prior to reaching 6600 cycles. (c) Reinspect the disks in paragraphs (a) and (b) in accordance with the following schedule: 1. Disks inspected by the Rim Access Ultrasonic Inspection method must be reinspected within the next 600 cycles and every 600 cycles in service thereafter. 2. Disks inspected by the HPC Central Cavity Access or the Detail Access Eddy Current Inspection method must be reinspected within the next 1600 cycles and every 1600 cycles thereafter. If any crack indications are found, the disk must be removed from service prior to further flight. In no case shall the established life limit of the disk be exceeded. Upon request of the operator, an equivalent method of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region. Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, New England Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection interval specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive, who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, Division of United Technologies Corporation, 400 Main Street, East Hartford, Connecticut 06108. These documents may also be examined at the Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts, and at FAA Headquarters, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. A historical file on this AD, which includes the incorporated material in full, is maintained by the FAA at its Headquarters in Washington, D.C., and the New England Region. This amendment becomes effective September 1, 1978.
91-10-04: 91-10-04 TEXTRON LYCOMING: Amendment 39-6981. Docket No. 91-ANE-10. Applicability: Textron Lycoming Model TIO-540-AE2A engines, with serial numbers up to but not including L9161-61A, except L9157-61A, installed in Piper Malibu Mirage aircraft. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent engine power loss, engine fire, and possible loss of aircraft, accomplish the following: (a) Remove and replace exhaust transition flange bolts, within the next 10 hours in service, after the effective date of this AD, in accordance with the following procedures: (1) Apply penetrating oil to existing exhaust transition flange bolts and remove the two bolts. (2) Install the following hardware in place of the removed bolts: LYCOMING PART NO. DESCRIPTION QUANTITY LW-31SS-1.19 Bolt 2 77611 Gasket 1 STD-2043 Nut 2 (3) Torque the bolts to 17 ft.-lbs. (Do not use lockwashers on the bolts.) It may be necessary to start thelock nut prior to torqueing. (4) Install the locknuts on the protruding threads of the bolts, and insure that the bolts do not loosen during installation. (5) Recheck torque on bolt heads to ensure proper torque is retained (17 ft.-lbs.) NOTE: Further information can be obtained from Textron Lycoming Service Bulletin No. 491A, dated February 21, 1990. (b) Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. (c) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Inspector (maintenance, avionics, or operations, as appropriate), an alternate method of compliance with the requirements of this AD or adjustments to the compliance schedule specified in this AD may be approved by the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, ANE-170, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, FAA, New England Region, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York 11581. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Textron Lycoming/Subsidiary of Textron Inc., Williamsport, Pennsylvania 17701. These documents may be examined at the FAA, New England Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 311, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts. This amendment (39-6981, AD 91-10-04) becomes effective on May 21, 1991.
97-07-06: This amendment supersedes an existing priority letter airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. Model 412 helicopters, that currently requires a daily inspection of certain swashplate support assemblies. It also requires a reduction in VNE, and installation of appropriate airspeed indicator markings and a placard. This amendment requires the same actions required by the existing priority letter AD, but restricts the applicability to the Model 412 helicopters with a certain steel main rotor control swashplate support assembly (steel swashplate support assembly) installed. This amendment also allows the installation of an improved main rotor control swashplate assembly that terminates the requirements of this AD. This amendment is prompted by reported cracking and in-service failures of certain steel swashplate support assemblies. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the steel swashplate support assembly that could result in loss of main rotor control and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2009-25-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the Eurocopter France (ECF) Model EC120B helicopters. This AD results from a mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) AD issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community. The MCAI AD states that operators have reported that latching push buttons on the Emergency Floatation Gear Lighting and Ancillary Control Unit (LACU) used to arm the emergency floatation gear are unreliable, and the `FLOAT ARM' pushbutton does not latch in the depressed (LACU armed) position. These actions are intended to prohibit flight over water if a functional test indicates that the emergency floatation gear cannot be armed, which would preclude deployment of the floats in an emergency water ditching that could result in helicopter damage and a fatality.
93-24-10: 93-24-10 LEARJET: Amendment 39-8759. Docket 93-NM-95-AD. Applicability: Model 55, 55B, and 55C airplanes; serial numbers 55-003 through 55-147, inclusive; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent the loss of both generators during flight, accomplish the following: (a) Within 100 hours time-in-service or 90 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, modify the wiring inside the left- and right-hand generator interface boxes and between these two boxes, and perform an operational test of the DC power distribution system in accordance with Learjet Service Bulletin SB 55-24-4, dated May 3, 1993. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Small Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Wichita ACO. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Wichita ACO. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) The modification and operational test shall be done in accordance with Learjet Service Bulletin SB 55-24-4, dated May 3, 1993. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Learjet Corporation, Customer Services, P.O. Box 7707, Wichita, Kansas 67277-7707. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (e) This amendment becomes effective on January 18, 1994.
2008-05-18 R1: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that would revise an existing AD. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Subsequent to accidents involving Fuel Tank System explosions in flight * * * and on ground, * * * Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88 (SFAR88) * * * required a safety review of the aircraft Fuel Tank System * * *. * * * * * Fuel Airworthiness Limitations are items arising from a systems safety analysis that have been shown to have failure mode(s) associated with an `unsafe condition' * * *. These are identified in Failure Conditions for which an unacceptable probability of ignition risk could exist if specific tasks and/or practices are not performed in accordance with the manufacturers' requirements. ThisAD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. DATES: This AD becomes effective November 23, 2009. On April 16, 2008 (73 FR 13071, March 12, 2008), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD. We must receive comments on this AD by December 21, 2009.
92-02-03: 92-02-03 BOEING: Amendment 39-8139. Docket No. 91-NM-259-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 727 and 727-100 series airplanes; equipped with a main cargo deck door installed in accordance with Supplemental Type Certification (STC) SA1368SO; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent an inadvertent in-flight opening of the main deck cargo door, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 30 days after the effective date of this AD and thereafter prior to takeoff, each time the cargo door is cycled, verify that all seven cargo door latch lockpins are operative. Inoperative latch lockpins must be repaired, prior to further flight, in accordance with an FAA- approved method. \n\n\t(b)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), ACE-115A, FAA, Small AirplaneDirectorate. The request shall be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Atlanta ACO, ACE-115A. \n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(d)\tThis amendment (39-8139, AD 92-02-03) becomes effective on January 21, 1992.
2009-25-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the BHTC Model 407 and Model 427 helicopters. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) ADs issued by the aviation authority of Canada. The MCAI ADs state that some hydraulic pump driveshaft assemblies may have been delivered with a missing internal plug or fastening rivet. This condition, if not corrected, could result in a loss of hydraulic pressure and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2009-22-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-200C and 747-200F series airplanes. This AD requires installing larger moisture shrouds and additional drain lines in the electrical/electronic equipment center. This AD results from reports of water contamination in the electrical/electronic units in the main equipment center. We are issuing this AD to prevent water contamination in the electrical/electronic units in the main equipment center, which could result in an electrical short and potential loss of several functions essential for safe flight.