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85-14-02 R2: 85-14-02 R2 GARRETT AUXILIARY POWER DIVISION (FORMERLY GARRETT TURBINE ENGINE COMPANY AND THE AIRESEARCH MANUFACTURING COMPANY OF ARIZONA): Amendment 39-5571 as amended by Amendment 39-6115. \n\n\tApplicability: All GTEC Models GTCP331-200A, -200AC, -200C, -200ER, -250F, -25OH, and -200P Auxiliary Power Units (APU) with fan assembly, Garrett Part Number 3862160-3, -4, or -5, installed; as installed in, but not limited to, Boeing Model 757, and 767 series airplanes, Airbus Model A310 and A300-600 series airplanes, and certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes with dual units; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent an uncontained APU cooling fan failure, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tUpon removal of the cooling fan assembly, Garrett Part Number 3862160-3 or -4, from an affected GTCP331 series Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) for any reason; or within 1,000 airplane hours time-in-service after August 15, 1985, or prior to September 15, 1985, whichever comes first, for the Boeing Model 757 and 767 series airplanes; and within 1,000 airplane hours time-in-service after April 2, 1987 (the effective date of Amendment 39-5571), for all other airplanes with a GTCP331 series APU installed; incorporate the new fan assembly with the improved fan containment housing as specified in Section 2.A, "Accomplishment Instructions," of Garrett Service Bulletin GTCP331-49-5546, dated August 9, 1984. \n\n\tB.\tUpon removal of the modified cooling fan assembly, Garrett Part Number 3862160-5, from an affected GTCP331 series APU for any reason, or within six (6) months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, for all airplanes with GTCP331 series APU installed, incorporate the latest improved fan containment configuration in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Garrett Service Bulletin 3862160-49-5716, dated November 19, 1987. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\t\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a maintenance base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Garrett Airline Service Division, A Division of the Allied-Signal Aerospace Company, Technical Publications, Dept. 65-70, P.O. Box 29003, Phoenix, Arizona 85038. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tAirworthiness Directive 85-14-02, effective August 15, 1985, was revised by Amendment 39-5571 (AD 85-14-02 R1) which was effective April 2, 1987. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6115, AD 85-14-02 R2) becomes effective February 22, 1989.
2014-15-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-100B SUD, 747-200B, 747-300, 747-400, and 747-400D series airplanes. This AD was prompted by an evaluation by the design approval holder (DAH) indicating that the upper deck tension ties are subject to widespread fatigue damage (WFD). This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracking in the upper deck tension ties, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary; tension tie replacement; and post-replacement repetitive inspections for cracking in the upper deck tension ties, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the upper deck tension ties. Severed or disconnected tension ties at multiple locations could result in rapid decompression and loss of structural integrity of the airplane.
46-24-02: 46-24-02 DOUGLAS: (Was Mandatory Note 3 of AD-762-7.) Applies to C-54 Series Aircraft. \n\n\tTo be accomplished not later than next periodic inspection. \n\n\tRevise the magneto wires forward of the firewall in accordance with Douglas Service Bulletin No. C-54-283 dated March 19, 1946. This is necessary to prevent burning of the magneto ground wire conduit which will cause the magneto to short out.
99-27-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all British Aerospace Model BAC 1-11 200 and 400 series airplanes, that requires replacing the thrust reverser control unit selector valve with a new or modified valve and inspecting for proper rigging of the thrust reverser cable drums and thrust reverser control unit selector valve detent, and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment also requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual to provide the flight crew with procedures to address uncontrolled operation of the thrust reverser system. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to provide the flight crew with procedures in the event of uncommanded deployment of the thrust reverser, and to prevent uncommanded deployment of the thrust reverser in flight or on the ground, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
99-27-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Rolls-Royce Limited Dart series turboprop engines. This amendment requires a one-time visual inspection of the interior of the switch to determine the type of low torque switch, and removal from service of unapproved Klixon low torque switches and replacement with serviceable parts. This amendment is prompted by the discovery of unapproved low torque switches in fleet operation. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent possible low torque switch failure, which could result in failure of a propeller to auto-feather following an engine power loss, resulting in possible loss of control of the airplane due to high asymmetric drag.
76-06-01: 76-06-01 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT: Amendment 39-2541. Applies to S-61L, S-61N, S- 61NM, S-61R, S-62A, S-64A, S-64E, S-64F helicopters certified in all categories, including Military CH-3C, HH-3C, CH-3E, HH-3E, CH-54B helicopters certificated in all categories and equipped with: 1. Model 66WAP200 hydraulic pumps, Serial Numbers 1080 through 1086, 2013, 2015, 2228, 2298, 2670, 2889, and all Serial Numbers with "DO-" prefix, except FAA approved New York Air Brake Company Serial Numbers DO-1 through DO-83. 2. Model 66WAN200 hydraulic pumps, Serial Numbers DO-2110, DO-2117, DO- 2163, DO-2165, DO-2222, DO-2227. Compliance required as indicated. To detect flaking chrome plating from the pistons of Model 66WAP200 hydraulic pump, Serial Numbers 1080 through 1086, 2013, 2015, 2228, 2298, 2670, 2889, and all Serial Numbers with "DO-" prefix, except FAA approved New York Air Brake Company Serial Numbers DO-1 through DO-83; and Model 66WAN200 hydraulic pump, Serial Numbers DO-2110, DO-2117, DO-2163, DO-2165, DO-2222, DO-2227, accomplish the following: a. Before the first flight each day, inspect the filter and filter bowl on the primary, auxiliary, and utility hydraulic manifold for the presence of chrome plating flakes, in accordance with the applicable Maintenance Manual instructions. If flakes are found, remove all pumps, with serial numbers noted above, and replace with FAA approved pumps before further flight. Immediately after replacement of the pump, flush and inspect the hydraulic system in accordance with the applicable Maintenance Manual instructions. NOTE: For the requirements regarding the listing of compliance with this AD in the helicopter's permanent maintenance record, see FAR 91.173. b. Within the next 180 calendar days after the effective date of this AD, replace all pumps, with serial numbers noted above, with FAA approved New York Air Brake Company pumps. c. Advise the FAA, Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, New EnglandRegion, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, of the serial numbers of unapproved pumps found, the registration and serial number of the helicopter on which they are installed, and the serial nubmers of the replacement pumps. (Reporting approved by the Office of Management and Budget under OMB No. 04-R0174.) d. After complying with Paragraph (b) of this AD, the inspection required by Paragraph (a) may be discontinued. This amendment becomes effective March 24, 1976.
2014-14-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A320-111, -211, -212, and -231 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of broken struts of the center wing box (CWB). This AD requires a detailed inspection of the CWB struts for cracking, and repair if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracked or broken struts, which could result in strut failure and consequent reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
2010-16-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model MD-90-30 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting for corrosion of the retract cylinder support fitting for the main landing gear (MLG) and the mating bore for the support fitting in the MLG trunnion fitting, performing corrective actions if necessary, and replacing cadmium-plated retract cylinder support bushings and bearings. This AD results from reports of the retract cylinder support fitting for the MLG failing during gear extension and subsequently damaging the hydraulic system. We are issuing this AD to prevent corrosion and damage that could compromise the integrity of the retract cylinder support fitting for the MLG, which could adversely affect the airplane's safe landing.
2008-17-06: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Bombardier Model DHC-8-400 series airplanes. The existing AD currently requires revising the Limitations section of the airplane flight manual (AFM) to include procedures for pulling the "HYD PWR XFER'' circuit breaker in the event of the loss of all hydraulic fluid in the No. 1 or No. 2 hydraulic system. This AD requires a revision to the AFM to include additional procedures for ensuring that the "PTU CNTRL'' switch is Normal, the "PTU CNTRL ON'' advisory light is out, and the "HYD PWR XFER'' circuit breaker is pulled in the event of the illumination of the "2 HYD ISO VALVE'' caution light. This AD resulted from low No. 2 hydraulic pressure in-flight, which caused the power transfer unit to overspeed, and the fluid flow within the No. 1 hydraulic system to increase. We are issuing this AD to prevent possible loss of both the No. 1 and No. 2 hydraulic systems, resulting in the potential loss of several functions essential for safe flight and landing of the airplane. DATES: This AD becomes effective September 2, 2008. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of September 2, 2008. On July 10, 2007 (72 FR 30968, June 5, 2007), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain other publications. We must receive any comments on this AD by September 15, 2008.
99-26-18: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all British Aerospace (Jetstream) Model 4101 airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections to detect loose or migrated levers of the elevator cable tension regulators, and replacement of the regulator assembly with a new assembly, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct loose or migrated regulator levers of the elevator cable tension regulators, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.