Results
2007-03-17: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as loose rivets on frames C18 BIS and C19, which could result in a reduced structural integrity of the tail area. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-20-09 PL: 97-20-09 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY; FIREFLY AVIATION HELICOPTER SERVICES (PREVIOUSLY ERICKSON AIR CRANE CO.); GARLICK HELICOPTERS, INC.; HAWKINS AND POWERS AVIATION INC.; INTERNATIONAL HELICOPTERS, INC.; RANGER HELICOPTER SERVICES; ROBINSON AIRCRANE; SCOTT PAPER CO.; SMITH HELICOPTERS; SOUTHERN HELICOPTER; SOUTHWEST FLORIDA AVIATION; WESTERN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, INC.; UNC HELICOPTERS; AND U.S. HELICOPTER, INC.: Priority Letter issued on September 17, 1997. Docket No. 97-SW-35-AD.\n\n\tApplicability: Model HH-1K (Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) H5NM), TH-lF (TCDS H12NM, and R00008AT), TH-1L (TCDS H5NM, H7SO, and H4NM), UH-1A (TCDS H3SO), UH-1B (TCDS H1RM, H3NM, H13WE, H3SO, H5SO, and R00012AT), UH-1E (TCDS H5NM, H7SO, H8NM, and H4NM), UH-1F (TCDS H2NM, H7NE, H11SW, H12NM, and R00008AT), UH-1H (TCDS H13WE, H3SO, and H15NM), UH-lL (TCDS H5NM, H7SO, and H4NM), UH-1P (TCDS H12NM, and R00008AT), and SW204 (TCDS H6SO), SW204HP (TCDS H6SO), SW205 (TCDS H6SO), helicopters, with tailboom vertical fin spar, part number (P/N) 205-032-899, 205-030-846, or 205-032-851, all dash numbers, installed, certificated in any category.\n\n\tNOTE 1: This AD applies to each helicopter identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For helicopters that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (c) to request approval from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition, or different actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repairremove any helicopter from the applicability of this AD.\n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.\n\n\tTo prevent in-flight failure of the tailboom vertical fin spar (vertical fin spar) and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following:\n\n\t(a)\tWithin 8 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date of this AD, modify the vertical fin spar as follows:\n\n\t\t(1)\tRemove the 42 gearbox cover and open the drive shaft cover on the vertical fin spar assembly (see Figure 1).\n\n\t\t(2)\tRemove the first four rivets from the fin spar located at the bottom of the vertical fin spar left-hand side at the tailboom and vertical fin spar junction, and the first four rivets aft of the junction along the lower edge of the vertical fin spar side-skin as shown (see Figure 2).\nCAUTION: Extreme care must be taken when drilling and removing rivets from the side of vertical fin spar to ensure the vertical fin spar assembly is not damaged.\n\n\t\t(3)\tTrim the vertical fin spar left-hand side-skin using extreme care to not damage the vertical fin spar assembly (see Figure 3).\n\n\t\t(4)\tDeburr the rivet holes and trimmed side-skin edges. Remove all debris. In a ventilated work area, remove any surface contaminants with a cloth that has been dampened with aliphatic naphtha or an equivalent cleaning solvent.\n\n\t\t(5)\tReattach the side-skin to the vertical fin spar using MS 20470AD rivets. DO NOT install the bottom two rivets into the vertical fin spar where the side-skin was trimmed.\n\n\t\t(6)\tAttach the vertical fin spar side-skin lower edge using the rivets specified in Figure 2.\n\n\t\t(7)\tRefinish all reworked areas.\n\n\t(b)\tAfter modifying the vertical fin spar assembly, immediately inspect the vertical fin spar, and thereafter, inspect at intervals not to exceed 8 hours TIS, for cracks as follows:\n\n\t\t(1)\tRemove the lower aft tailboom inspection door, located at tailboom station 180 (see Figure 4).\n\n\t\t(2)\tRemove the 42 gearbox cover and open the drive shaft cover on the vertical fin (see Figure 1).\n\n\t\t(3)\tThrough the lower aft tailboom inspection door, using a bright light and an inspection mirror, inspect the vertical fin spar assembly adjacent to the tailboom top skin on the forward side, paying special attention to the left-hand edge and the adjacent surfaces (see Figure 2).\n\n\t\t(4)\tIn a ventilated work area, clean all surfaces to be inspected with a cloth dampened with aliphatic naphtha or an equivalent cleaning solvent. Using a bright light and a 10x magnifying glass, inspect the vertical fin spar assembly adjacent to the tailboom top-skin on the in-board and out-board sides, the vertical edge, and the two open rivet holes. Using a bright light and a mirror, inspect the aft side of the vertical fin spar in the same area. Special attention must be given to the left-hand edge of the vertical fin spar and any adjacent surfaces between fin station 66.31 and 71.31 (see Figure 2).\n\n\t\t(5)\tIf any crack is discovered on the vertical fin spar, replace the vertical fin spar assembly with an airworthy vertical fin spar assembly before further flight.\n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, FAA. Operators shall submit their requests through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office.\n\n\tNOTE 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Rotorcraft Certification Office.\n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the helicopter to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.\n\n\t(e)\tPriority Letter AD 97-20-09, issued September 17, 1997, becomes effective upon receipt.
2018-26-02: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2016-25-19 for Airbus Helicopters (previously Eurocopter France) Model AS350B3 and EC130B4 helicopters. AD 2016-25-19 required inspecting the pilot's and co-pilot's throttle twist for proper operation. This new AD retains the requirements of AD 2016-25-19 and adds certain model helicopters to the applicability. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
2000-17-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Aerospatiale Model ATR42-200, -300, and -320 series airplanes, that requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate life limits for certain items and inspections to detect fatigue cracking in certain structures. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that fatigue cracking of certain structural elements is detected and corrected; such fatigue cracking could adversely affect the structural integrity of these airplanes.
2000-17-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Lockheed Model L-1011-385 series airplanes, that requires modifications of the engine turbine cooling air panel at the flight engineer/second officer's console, pilot s caution and warning light panel on the main instrument panel, and monitoring system for the engine turbine air temperature. This amendment is prompted by reports of an undetected fire breaching the high speed gearbox (HSGB) case on certain Rolls Royce engines installed on in-service airplanes due to lack of an internal fire detection system within the HSGB. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent undetected fires originating within the HSGB from breaching the HSGB case, which could result in engine damage and increased difficulty in extinguishing a fire.
2007-03-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as cracking in the wing main landing gear (MLG) rib 5 aft bearing forward lug, which could affect the structural integrity of the MLG attachment. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
83-02-05: 83-02-05\tMCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-4544. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8-70 series airplanes, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished.\n\n\tTo prevent separation of the exhaust nozzle plug, accomplish the following within 300 flight hours after the effective date of this AD:\n\n\tA.\tReplace all NAS560XK4-5 screws with NAS560XK4-4 screws and check for running torque at the exhaust plug splice in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-8-70 Alert Service Bulletin A78-107, dated November 30, 1982, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region.\n\n\tB.\tReplace all nut plates not meeting the minimum run down torque of five-inch pounds.\n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD.\n\n\tD.\tAlternate means of compliance which providean equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region.\n\n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1).\n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). These documents also may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California.\n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective February 7, 1983.
2014-05-06 R1: We are revising Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2014-05-06 for Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH Model EC135 and MBB-BK 117C-2 helicopters. AD 2014-05-06 required repetitive inspections of the flight-control bearings, replacing any loose bearings with airworthy flight-control bearings, and installing bushings and washers. This new AD retains the requirements of AD 2014-05-06 but removes the repetitive inspections. The actions of this AD are intended to correct an unsafe condition on these products.
2000-17-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Fairchild Aircraft, Inc. (Fairchild) SA226 and SA227 series airplanes equipped with certain Ozone Industries, Inc., main landing gear (MLG) assemblies. This AD requires you to repetitively inspect the MLG drag brace assembly (consists of both brace and links) for cracks, and requires you to replace or rework any cracked MLG drag brace assembly. This AD is the result of several reports of cracks in the MLG drag brace assemblies on the affected airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct cracks in MLG drag brace assembly. Continued airplane operation with such cracks could lead to MLG failure and result in loss of control of the airplane during takeoff or landing operations.
91-05-16: 91-05-16 BOEING: Amendment 39-6913. Docket No. 90-NM-154-AD.\n\n\tApplicability: Model 737 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737- 32A1224, Revision 1, dated April 12, 1990, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo ensure the structural integrity of the main landing gear (MLG) actuator beam arm and actuator beam attached bolts, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tPrior to the accumulation of 10,000 landings or 4 years of service, after new or overhauled main landing gear installation, whichever occurs first, or within the next 600 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tPerform visual and ultrasonic inspections of the actuator beam arm clevis for evidence of cracking, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-32A1224, Revision 1, dated April 12, 1990. \n\n\t\t\ta.\tIf cracks are found, prior to further flight, remove andrework, or replace the actuator beam arm in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t\tb.\tIf no cracks are found, repeat the ultrasonic inspections in accordance with the service bulletin, at intervals not to exceed 600 landings. \n\n\t\t2.\tRemove both of the actuator beam bolts and perform a one-time visual and dye penetrant inspection for evidence of plating degradation, corrosion, or cracking, in accordance with the service bulletin. If evidence of plating degradation, corrosion, or cracking is found, prior to further flight, rework or replace the bolts in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\tB.\tModification of the actuator beam arm, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-32A1224, Revision 1, dated April 12, 1990, constitutes terminating action for the inspections required by paragraph A.1. of this AD. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.\n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6913, AD 91-05-16) becomes effective on April 1, 1991.