Results
85-19-07 R1: 85-19-07 R1 BURKHART GROB: Amendment 39-5132 as amended by Amendment 39-5202. Applies to Model G109 Powered Gliders (serial numbers 6001 through 6159 inclusive) and Model G109B Powered Gliders (serial numbers 6200 through 6317 inclusive) certificated in any category. Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the main landing gear legs, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours time in service, inspect the landing gear legs to determine if they are constructed with boreholes (P/N 109-5000.01) or without boreholes (P/N 109B-5000.01) in accordance with Instruction 1 of Grob-Werke Technical Information TM 817- 19, dated March 18, 1985. (b) If the landing gear is equipped with legs without boreholes no further action is necessary. (c) If the glider is equipped with landing gear legs with boreholes: (1) Within the next 10 hours time in service and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 25 hours time in service from the last inspection, inspect the legs for cracks in accordance with Instruction 2 of Grob-Werke Technical Information TN 817-19, dated March 18, 1985. If cracks are found, replace landing gear leg with a serviceable part before further flight. (2) Exchange landing gear legs with boreholes for landing gear legs without boreholes in accordance with Instruction 4 of Grob-Werke Technical Information TM 817-19, dated March 18, 1985, no later than January 31, 1986. NOTE: Dimensions shown in TM 817-19 are in millimeters. Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Office, AEU-100, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium 09667-1011, telephone 513.38.30. Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA maintenance inspector, the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office, may adjust the compliance time specified in this AD. Grob-Werke Technical Information TM 817-19 dated March 18, 1985, is incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received this document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Burkhart Grob of America, 1070 Navajo Drive, Bluffton Airport Complex, Bluffton, Ohio 45817. These documents also may be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, FAA, New England Region, Room 311, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. Amendment 39-5132 became effective on September 19, 1985. This Amendment 39-5202 becomes effective on January 10, 1986.
2022-20-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain General Electric Company (GE) GEnx-1B and GEnx-2B model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by the detection of melt-related freckles in the forgings and billets, which may reduce the life of certain compressor discharge pressure (CDP) seals, interstage seals, high-pressure turbine (HPT) rotor stage 2 disks, and stages 6-10 compressor rotor spools. This AD requires revising the airworthiness limitations section (ALS) of the applicable GEnx-1B and GEnx-2B Engine Manual (EM) and the operator's existing approved maintenance program or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate reduced life limits for these parts. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2022-20-07: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2021-10-10 for all Airbus Helicopters Model SA330J helicopters. AD 2021-10-10 required repetitively inspecting the main gearbox (MGB) particle detector and the MGB bottom housing (oil sump) for metal particles, analyzing any metal particles that are found, and replacing the MGB if necessary. Since the FAA issued AD 2021-10-10, additional review concluded that installing an improved planet gear assembly is necessary. This AD continues to require repetitively inspecting the MGB particle detector and the MGB bottom housing (oil sump) for metal particles, and analyzing any metal particles that are found, and also requires replacing the planet gear assembly and repetitively inspecting and establishing an airworthiness limitation for that assembly as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-07-28: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Fokker Model F27 series airplanes, that currently requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to provide the flightcrew with modified operational procedures to ensure continuous operation with the high pressure cock (HPC) levers in the lockout position. This amendment retains the requirements of the existing AD for the Normal and Abnormal Procedures Sections of the AFM, and requires incorporation of amended Limitations and Emergency Procedures Sections into the AFM. This amendment is prompted by a report that certain incorrect instructions had been included in the Emergency Procedures Section of the AFM revision required by the existing AD. The actions specified in this AD are intended to ensure that flightcrews follow correct procedures that will maintain the HPC levers in a permanent lockout position to prevent consequent burnout of the engines during flight.
47-20-02: 47-20-02 AERONCA: (Was Mandatory Note 2 of AD-761-2 and Mandatory Note 2 of AD-759-3.) Applies to 7AC Airplanes Having Serial Numbers 226 to 3721; and 11AC, Serial Numbers 1 to 351. Compliance required at next periodic inspection but not later than August 1, 1947. To prevent the oleo strut assembly from separating in flight, replace the fiber piston with aluminum pistons. (Supplementary to Aeronca Service Helps and Hints No. 12 dated February 11, 1947, covers this same subject.)
2022-21-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain General Electric Company (GE) CF34-8C and CF34-8E model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by a report of a crack found on the low-pressure turbine (LPT) stage 5 disk at the forward arm area. This AD requires the removal of the affected LPT stage 5 disk and replacement with a part eligible for installation. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-07-27: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to various transport category airplanes equipped with certain Honeywell air data inertial reference units (ADIRU). This action requires inspection of a failed ADIRU to determine its modification status, and replacement of an unmodified failed ADIRU with a serviceable ADIRU. This action also provides for optional terminating action for the requirements of the AD. This amendment is prompted by reports of dual critical failures of inertial reference units on ADIRU's during flight. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent loss of the main sources of attitude data, consequent high pilot workload, and a significant increase in the likelihood of pilot error.
99-13-08 R1: This amendment revises an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Lockheed Model L 1011-385 series airplanes, that currently requires inspections to detect cracking and other discrepancies of certain web-to-cap fasteners of the rear spar between inner wing station (IWS) 310 and IWS 343, and of the web area around those fasteners; various follow-on actions; and modification of the web-to-cap fastener holes of the rear spar between IWS 299 and IWS 343, which, when accomplished, defers the initiation of the inspections for a certain period of time. The actions specified by that AD are intended to prevent fatigue cracking in the web of the rear spar of the wing, which could result in failure of the rear spar of the wing and consequent fuel spillage. This amendment, for certain airplanes, extends the compliance time for the modification of the web-to-cap fastener holes, and eliminates references to modification of the outboard spar.
86-05-12: 86-05-12 HARTZELL PROPELLER PRODUCTS DIVISION: Amendment 39-5333. Applies to Hartzell Model HC-B3TN-5( )/T10282( ) propellers installed on Fairchild Model SA226-TC aircraft modified by Garrett STC SA344GL or Par Air STC SA4872SW with TPE331-10UA engines. Compliance required prior to accumulating 1,000 hours time in service since new or 300 hours time in service since overhaul, or within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless already accomplished. To prevent propeller blade separation near the hub which could result in engine separation from the aircraft, accomplish the following: (a) Remove propeller from aircraft. (b) Accomplish the following in accordance with Hartzell Service Bulletin No. 136C dated March 3, 1986, or FAA approved equivalent: (1) Disassemble propeller and visually inspect the blade pilot tube bore area. Particular attention shall be made to area between the inner needle bearing assembly and bearing spacer. (2) Remove all evidence of scratches, tool marks, corrosion, etc. in the blade pilot tube bore area. Do not exceed the maximum rework limitations defined in the service bulletin. (3) Etch the blade pilot tube bore area prior to penetrant inspection. Ensure removal of all etching solution. (4) Penetrant inspect the blade pilot tube bore area. (5) Coat the blade pilot tube bore area with alodine. (6) Install bearing spacer and inner needle bearing assembly. Pilot tube bore must be lubricated to facilitate bearing installation. (c) Replace, prior to further flight, all blades showing evidence of cracks or other unairworthy conditions with airworthy blades. (d) Place the following WARNING in the Limitation Section of the FAA approved airplane flight manual supplement: "The TPE331-10UA engine is capable of developing in excess of the maximum allowable torque approved for this installation. Use of torque in excess of the maximum approved limits may cause propeller failure." NOTES: (1) Propeller blades with serial numbers subsequent to F74359 have had the intent of this AD incorporated during manufacture and are not affected by this AD. (2) This AD does not apply to propellers installed on TPE331-3 engines unless the propellers were previously installed on TPE331-10UA engines for at least 1000 hours time in service since new or at least 300 hours time in service since overhaul. Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 2300 East Devon Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois 60018. Hartzell Service Bulletin No. 136C dated March 3, 1986, identified and described in this document is incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C.552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received this document from the manufacture may obtain copies upon request to Hartzell Propeller Products Division, TRW Aircraft Components Group, 350 Washington Ave., Piqua, Ohio 45356. This document also may be examined at the Office of Regional Counsel, FAA, Attn: Rules Docket No. 86-ANE-9, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 8:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. This amendment becomes effective June 27, 1986, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by priority letter AD 86-05-12 issued March 7, 1986, which contained this amendment.
99-23-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Dornier Model 328-100 series airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections to detect damage and discrepancies of various control cables and certain fairleads/swivel guides for the autopilot, elevator, rudder, aileron, and engine; and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the pilot s control cables for the autopilot, elevator, rudder, aileron, and engine, which could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.