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2009-22-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 767-200, -300, -300F, and -400ER series airplanes. This AD requires an inspection to determine if certain motor operated valve actuators for the fuel tanks are installed, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent an ignition source inside the fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
92-01-06: 92-01-06 BOEING: Amendment 39-8130. Docket No. 91-NM-153-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 757 series airplanes, as listed in Boeing Service Letter 757-SL-28- 8-A, dated June 5, 1991, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within the next 3,000 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo assure that the fuel crossfeed valve and fuel shutoff valves close fully, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tPerform a visual inspection or a functional test of the fuel crossfeed valve and fuel shutoff valves to determine if the valves are correctly installed, in accordance with Boeing Service Letter 757-SL-28-8-A, dated June 5, 1991. If an incorrectly installed valve is found, prior to further flight, remove and re-install it correctly, in accordance with the service letter.\n \n\t(b)\tWithin 30 days after accomplishing the inspection or functional test required by paragraph (a) of this AD, submit a report of the inspection ortest findings from which it is determined that the fuel crossfeed valve or fuel shutoff valves were incorrectly installed, to: Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98055; rapid fax: (206) 227-1181; telex 756366. Information collection requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provision of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-511) and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permitsmay be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(e)\tThe inspection/test requirements of this AD shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Letter 757-SL-28-8-A, dated June 5, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. \n\n\t(f)\t This amendment (39-8130, AD 92-01-06) becomes effective on February 17, 1992.
77-12-07: 77-12-07 BOEING: Amendment 39-2924. Applies to Model 747 airplanes certificated in all categories and equipped with fuel valve actuator assemblies, Boeing P/N 60B92406-27 (ITT General Controls P/N MA11A1173, serial numbers H78442 through H98252 and J00047 through J34689) or Boeing P/N 60B92406-28 (ITT General Controls P/N MA11A1174, serial numbers H95059 through H95074 and J04218 through J37314) installed or manufactured between April 30, 1975, and April 1, 1977. Compliance required as indicated. \n\tTo prevent loss of control of fuel shutoff, crossfeed and required fuel management capability, accomplish the following: \n\tA.\tWithin 145 days or 1300 hours time in service after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive whichever occurs first, remove fuel valve actuator assembly, Boeing P/N 60B92406-27 (ITT General Controls P/N MA11A1173) or Boeing P/N 60B92406-28 (ITT General Controls P/N MA11A1174) from the No. 1, 2, 3 and 4 engine fuel shutoff valves, AND \n\t\t(1)\treplace with actuator assembly Boeing P/N 60B92406-32 (ITT General Controls P/N MA11A1173-1) or Boeing P/N 60B92406-33 (ITT General Controls P/N MA11A1174-1): OR \n\t\t(2)\treplace with an actuator assembly which has been inspected and reworked to incorporate a properly heat treated armature shaft in accordance with ITT General Controls Service Bulletins MA11A1173-24-01 or MA11A1174-24-01, both dated March 30, 1977, and 107728A101-24-01, dated June 10, 1977, or an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\tB.\tWithin 1 year or 3200 hours time in service after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive whichever occurs first, replace or rework the actuator assemblies Boeing P/N 60B92406-27 (ITT General Controls P/N MA11A1173) or Boeing P/N 60B92406-28 (ITT General Controls P/N MA11A1174) which are installed on the No. 1, 2, 3 and 4 crossfeed valves, the No. 1 and 4 reserve tank gravity transfer valves, the center wing tank fuel jettison valves and, if installed, the No. 2 and 3 reserve tank gravity transfer valves in accordance with A.(1) or A.(2) above. \n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to ITT General Controls, Aerospace Products, 1200 South Flower Street, Burbank, California 91502. These documents may also be examined at the Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective June 20, 1977.
85-18-05 R2: 85-18-05 R2 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT: Amendment 39-5129 as amended by Amendment 39-5525 is further amended by Amendment 39-6098. Applicability: Model S-61L, S-61N, S-61NM, and S-61R series helicopters, certificated in all categories, and S-61A (S/N's 61083, 61087, 61094, and 61161) and S-61V (S/N 61271) helicopters, certificated in the restricted category, which are engaged in more than six external cargo lifts per flight hour under Part 133, Class B, Rotorcraft external load combination operations. Compliance: Required as indicated (unless already accomplished). To prevent operation with a main rotor spar crack and possible loss of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, remove main rotor blades from the rotorcraft that are not approved for use in Part 133 (Class B, Rotorcraft-external load combination operations), and replace with approved blades. The approved main rotor blades are as follows: (1) The following blades are approved for Model S-61L, transport category helicopters operating up to a combined vehicle and cargo gross weight of 22,000 lbs., provided the main rotor blades have been altered and maintained in accordance with Service Bulletin (SB) 61B15-6, Rev. P, or later FAA-approved revisions, excluding Section 2, Part II: (i) P/N's S6115-20501-041 and -042. (ii) P/N's S6115-20601-042, -047, and -048. (iii) P/N's 61170-20201-055, -056, -058, -059, -060, -061, -062, -065, and -067. (iv) P/N's S6117-20101-041, -046, -050, -051, -054, -055, -056, -057, and 058. (2) The following blades are approved for Model S-61N, transport category helicopters operating up to a combined vehicle and cargo gross weight of 22,000 lbs., or Model S-61NM, transport category helicopters operating up to a combined vehicle and cargo gross weight of 20,500 lbs., provided the main rotor blades have been altered and maintained in accordance with SB No. 61B15-6, Rev. P, or later FAA-approved revisions, excluding Section 2, Part II: (i) P/N's S6115-20501-041, and -042. (ii) P/N's S6115-20601-041, -042, -045, -046, -047, and -048. (iii) P/N's S6188-15001-041 and -045. (iv) P/N's 61170-20201-054, -055, -056, 058, -059, 060, -061, -062, -065, -067. (v) P/N's S6117-20101-041, -046, -050, -051, -054, -055, -056, -057, and -058. (3) P/N's 61170-20201-062 blades are approved for the Model S-61A (S/N's 61083 and 61094), restricted category helicopters, operating up to a combined vehicle and cargo gross weight of 22,000 lbs. (4) P/N's S6115-20201-2 and -3 blades are approved for the Model S-61A (S/N's 61087 and 61161), restricted category helicopter, operating up to a combined vehicle and cargo gross weight of 19,000 lbs. (5) P/N 61170-20201-060 blades are approved for the Model S-61V (S/N 61271), restricted category helicopter, operating up to a combined vehicle and cargo gross weight of 19,100 lbs. (6) The following blades are approved for Model S-61R transport category helicopters operating up to a combined aircraft and cargo gross weight of 19,500 pounds: (i) P/N's S6115-20501-041 and -042. (ii) P/N's S6115-20601-042, and -045 through -048. (iii) P/N's S6117-20101-041, -050, -051, -054, -056, -057, and -058. (iv) P/N's 61170-20201-055, -056, -058 through -062, -064, -065, and -067. (b) Within the next 1 1/2 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect main rotor blades equipped with approved visual blade pressure indicators (VBIM) but not equipped with an in-cockpit blade inspection system (CBIM) in accordance with paragraph (c). After the initial inspection, conduct further inspections in accordance with paragraph (c) prior to the first flight of each day and conduct subsequent visual inspections of the VBIM indicators in accordance with Section 2, Part IV, paragraph la of Sikorsky Service Bulletin No. 61B15-6, Revision P, or later FAA-approved revisions, at intervals not to exceed 1 1/2 hours time in service from the last inspection. (c) Inspect the VBIM indicators of the main rotor blades in accordance with procedures set forth in Section 2, Part IV, of Sikorsky SB No. 61B15-6 Rev. P, or later FAA-approved revisions. (1) Conduct visual inspection of blade-mounted VBIM indicators from the transmission work platform of the helicopter or equivalent to ensure that an accurate visual check is conducted. (2) The visual inspection of blade-mounted VBIM indicators shall be conducted by either an individual who holds a pilot certificate with appropriate rating, or a mechanic certificate with airframe rating, or by an appropriately certificated maintenance entity. The person performing this inspection or check shall make entries of the results in the aircraft maintenance record including a description and date of the inspection and the name of the individual performing the inspection along with the certificate number, kind of certificate, and signature. (d) For helicopters equipped with in-cockpit CBIM (reference Sikorsky SB No. 61B15-20D). (1) Prior to the first flight of the day, after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, and every 8 hours time in service thereafter. (i) Visually inspect the main rotor blade VBIM pressure indicators in accordance with paragraph (c). (ii) Test the VBIM pressure indicators and the in-cockpit CBIM transducers in accordance with the procedures set forth in Section 2, Part IV, of Sikorsky SB No. 61B15-6, Rev. P, or later FAA-approved revisions. (2) Check the in-cockpit blade inspection system electrical circuit and CBIM warning light in flight by activating the (cockpit) BIM test switch located on the left overhead quarter panel at least once each (1) hour time in service during flight operations in accordance with the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM). (i) If the (cockpit) BIM warning light illuminates, continue operations in a normal manner. (ii) If the (cockpit) BIM warning light does not illuminate, immediately check the BIM circuit breaker and reset if tripped. (A) Repeat check of (cockpit) BIM test switch to verify if warning light illuminates. Continue with normal operations if BIM warning light functions properly. (B) If the (cockpit) BIM warning light fails to illuminate, discontinue external load operations and land as soon as practical. Investigate and correct malfunction prior to further flight. (3) If the (cockpit) BIM warning light illuminates during flight, discontinue external load operations and follow the appropriate emergency flight procedures in Part I, Section III, of the SA 4045-30 (S-61L) SA4045-100 (S-61L), or SA4045-82 (S-61N) RFM's. NOTE: For Model S-61 helicopters not engaged in Part 133 external load operations, AD 74-20-07, Rev. 5, main rotor blade inspection requirements are applicable. (e) Each blade with any black or red indication visible in the blade VBIM pressure indicator (or whose transducer activates the cockpit BIM warning light) is restricted from further flight until the cause of the indication is determined and corrected in accordance with procedures given in Sikorsky SB 61B15-6, Rev. P, or later FAA-approved revisions. (f) Alternate inspections, repairs, modifications, or other means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. (g) Rotorcraft may be flown in accordance with the provisions of FAR Sections 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished, except when a VBIM or CBIM indication exists. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552 (a) (1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Sikorsky Aircraft, Division of United Technologies, North Main Street, Stratford, Connecticut 06601, Attn: S-61 Commercial Product Support Department. These documents also may be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest Region, FAA, Bldg. 3B, 4400 Blue Mound Road, Fort Worth, Texas 76106. This amendment revises Amendment 39-5129 (50 FR 38506; September 23, 1985), AD 85-18-05, as amended by Amendment 39-5525 (52 FR 8582; March 19, 1987), AD 85-18-05 R1 which was effective on April 13, 1987. This amendment (39-6098, AD 85-18-05 R2) becomes effective February 8, 1989.
2009-25-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: An operator of A330 aeroplane fitted with Rolls-Royce (RR) Trent 772 B engines experienced an engine1 uncontained multiple turbine blade failure. Investigations have shown that High Pressure/ Intermediate Pressure (HP/IP) oil vent tubes are prone to be affected by carbon deposit or to be damaged by their outer heat shields leading to a fire inside or outside the vent tube and resulting into IP Turbine (IPT) disc drive arm fracture and thus IPT disc overspeed. If not corrected, IPT disc overspeed could lead to an uncontained engine failure, i.e. multiple turbine blade failure or HP/IP turbine disc burst, which would constitute an unsafe condition. ** * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
93-23-01: 93-23-01 NORDSKOG INDUSTRIES, INC.: Amendment 39-8735. Docket 93-NM-181-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Nordskog water heaters and coffee makers, as listed in Nordskog Industries, Inc., Service Bulletin SB-93-34, dated October 21, 1993; as installed in, but not limited to Boeing Model 727, 737, 747, 757, and 767 series airplanes; McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, DC-9-80, and DC-10 series airplanes, and MD-11 airplanes; Lockheed Model L-1011 series airplanes; Airbus Industrie Model A300, A310, and A320 series airplanes; Gulfstream Model G-1159 series airplanes and Model G-IV airplanes; de Havilland, Inc., Model DHC-8 series airplanes; Dassault-Aviation Model Mystere-Falcon 50 and 900 series airplanes; Canadair Model CL-600-1A11 (CL-600), CL-600-2A12 (CL-601), and CL-600-2B16 (CL-601-3A and -3R) and CL-600-2B19 series airplanes; and Fokker Model F27 and F28 series airplanes; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo preventexplosions of galley water heaters and coffee makers and subsequent injuries to passengers or cabin crew members, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 30 days after the effective date of this AD, perform a one-time inspection to determine whether a NUPRO pressure relief valve having part number (P/N) SS-2C4-65 has been installed, in accordance with Nordskog Industries, Inc., Service Bulletin SB-93-34, dated October 21, 1993. If any NUPRO pressure relief valve having P/N SS-2C4-65 has been installed, prior to further flight, accomplish either paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this AD. \n\n\t\t(1)\tRemove the NUPRO pressure relief valve having P/N SS-2C4-65 and install a new, improved NUPRO pressure relief valve having P/N SS-CHF2-65, in accordance with the service bulletin. Or \n\n\t\t(2)\tDeactivate any Nordskog water heater or coffee maker listed in the service bulletin on which a NUPRO pressure relief valve having P/N SS-2C4-65 has been installed, and install a placard stating, "Not tobe used." \n\n\t(b)\tAs of the effective date of this AD, no person shall install a NUPRO pressure relief valve having P/N SS-2C4-65 on any airplane. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tThe inspection and replacement shall be done in accordance with Nordskog Industries, Inc., Service Bulletin SB-93-34, dated October 21, 1993. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Nordskog Industries, Inc., 16000 Strathern Street, Van Nuys, California 91406. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Los Angeles ACO, 3229 E. Spring Street, Long Beach, California 90806-2425; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on December 7, 1993.
2007-21-14 R1: The FAA is revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all Airbus Model A310 airplanes. That AD currently requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate new limitations for fuel tank systems. This AD clarifies the intended effect of the AD on spare and on-airplane fuel tank system components. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors caused by latent failures, alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
91-12-17: 91-12-17 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-7029. Docket No. 90-NM-280-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: All McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-15F, -32F, -33F, -34F, and C-9 (military) series airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent inadvertent opening of the forward upper cargo door in flight, a condition which could result in loss of pressurization and reduced controllability of the aircraft, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin four months after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed one year, perform magnetic particle inspections on the cargo door latch spool fitting attach bolts or replace the non-Inconel cargo door latch spool fitting attach bolts with new bolts, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions for Phase 2 of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A52-174, dated August 7, 1990, or Revision 1, dated December 14, 1990. \n\n\t\t1.\tIf a bolt doesnot pass the magnetic particle inspection, prior to further flight, replace it with a new bolt and seal in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf a bolt passes the magnetic particle inspection, prior to further flight, reinstall the bolt and seal in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\tB.\tThe inspections required by paragraph A. of this AD are not required for Inconel bolts, part numbers RA21026-7-28, 77711-7-28, and 3D0031-7-28. \n\n\tC.\tWithin two years after the effective date of this AD, replace all non-Inconel cargo door latch spool fitting attach bolts with Inconel bolts, part numbers RA21026-7-28, 77711-7-28, or 3D0031-7-28, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Phase 3 of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A52-174, dated August 7, 1990; or Phase 4 of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A52-174, Revision 1, dated December 14, 1990. Installation of Inconel bolts constitutes terminating action for the requirements of paragraph A. of this AD. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes unpressurized to a base for the accomplishment of the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tE.\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90846-0001, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Publications, C1-HCW (54-60). These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington; or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-7029, AD 91-12-17) becomes effective on July 15, 1991.
2009-25-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Twin Commander Aircraft LLC Models 690, 690A, and 690B airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect between the surface of the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) upper wing skins and the engine mount beam support straps for any signs of corrosion, replace the upper steel straps with parts of improved design, and modify both wings. This AD results from reports that corrosion was found between the mating surfaces of the wing upper skin surface and the engine mount beam support straps. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct corrosion on the engine mount beam support straps and the upper wing skins, which could result in failure of the engine mount beam support straps. This failure could lead to loss of the engine and possible loss of control of the airplane.
2009-21-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A recent incident has been reported with a Dornier 328-100 aeroplane, where the right-hand (RH) power lever jammed in flight- idle position during the landing roll-out. The aeroplane was stopped by excessive braking. The investigation by the operator revealed that the cockpit door locking device * * * had fallen off the RH cockpit wall and blocked the RH power/condition lever pulley/cable cluster below the door. * * * This condition, if not corrected, could cause interference with the engine- and/or flight control cables, possibly resulting in reduced control of the aeroplane. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correctthe unsafe condition on these products.