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2009-15-03: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During scheduled maintenance inspection, a bolt which connects the PCU (power control unit) to the elevator surface was found fractured in the assembly. Further inspection of the assembly revealed that the bearing on the PCU rod end had seized, which resulted in damage to the attachment fitting bushing and fracture of the bolt. Inspection of other in-service airplanes revealed two more seized PCU attachment joints. However, except seizure, no fractured bolt was found on these airplanes. Failure of the bolts in both PCUs on one side could result in disconnection of the elevator control surface which would lead to flutter and loss of the aircraft.* * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2020-21-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model AS-365N2, AS 365 N3, EC 155B, EC155B1, and SA- 365N1 helicopters. This AD requires inspecting the tail rotor gearbox (TGB) housing recess, and depending on the inspection results, performing more in-depth inspections and removing certain parts from service. This AD also prohibits installing a TGB unless it has passed certain inspections and has a new TGB control rod bearing installed. This AD was prompted by the discovery of a foreign object obstructing the oil duct of a TGB control bearing. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
2009-14-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: This Airworthiness Directive (AD) is issued following the discovery of hot air leaks when operating the wing anti-icing system. The seals Part Number (P/N) MS29513-325, near the de-icing valves (12H1) and (12H2) in frame 33 area, do not have the proper temperature rating. The consequences, in the area of the hot air leak, are risks of ignition of potential hydraulic leaks. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
93-24-02 R1: 93-24-02 R1 PIPER AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amendment 39-8810 which revises Amendment 39-8751. Docket No. 93-CE-57-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: PA31, PA31P, and PA31T series airplanes (all models and serial numbers), certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within the next 30 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent elevator control problems, which could lead to loss of control of the airplane, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tEnsure that the elevator control tube assembly area is not damaged by accomplishing the following inspections and procedures: \n\n\t\t(1)\tGain access to the elevator controls in the tail by removing the bottom half of the tailcone and the fuselage side panels. \n\n\t\t(2)\tRemove the long pushrod that connects the bellcrank and the elevator horn. \n\n\t\t(3)\tSecure the aft end of the bungee link to the elevator horn with safety wire for removal and installation of the bungee attach bolt.(4)\tInspect, using FAA-approved magnetic procedures, the rod end shank and threads for cracks. If found cracked, prior to further flight, replace the rod end with part number (P/N) 49261-02 or P/N 452-658. \n\n\t\t(5)\tVisually inspect the bearing in the rod end for wear and free movement. If wear is found or the bearing will not move, prior to further flight, replace the rod end with P/N 49261-02 or P/N 452-658. \n\n\t\t(6)\tInspect, using a 10X magnifying glass, the forward attach holes in the pushrod for cracks, corrosion, or elongation. If cracks, corrosion, or elongation is found, prior to further flight, replace the pushrod with P/N 40847-00, 40847-04, or 40847-07, as applicable. \n\n\t\t(7)\tVisually inspect the forward and aft attach area to ensure that both a forward bolt, P/N 402 311 (AN 174-12A), and an aft bolt, P/N 402 317 (AN 174-11A), are installed. If either one of these bolts is not installed, prior to further flight, install the applicable bolt or replace the existing boltwith one of the applicable part number. \n\n\t\t(8)\tRemove the safety wire, reinstall the pushrod, check to ensure that the elevator rigging is correct, and reinstall the bottom half of the tailcone and the fuselage side panels. \n\n\tNOTE 1: Figure 1 of this AD illustrates the elevator assembly and the specific areas that are to be inspected. \n\n\t(b)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 1669 Phoenix Parkway, Suite 210C, Atlanta, Georgia 30349. The request shall be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Atlanta ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Atlanta ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tInformation related to this AD may be examined at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. \n\n\t(e)\tThis amendment (39-8810) revises AD 93-24-02, Amendment 39-8751. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on February 15, 1994. \n\n\t\t\t\t\t\t93-24-02 \n\n\t\t\t\t\t FIGURE 1
2009-14-10: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: An inspection of a PZL-104 aeroplane that had a relatively long operational background revealed a severe corrosion of the steel front fuselage structural elements. It is likely that such corrosion can also be present on other aeroplanes of similar design and operational history. If left uncorrected, this condition could lead to loss of strength of the structural front posts elements and consequent reduction of the structural strength of the aeroplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: This AD becomes effective August 12, 2009. On August 12, 2009, the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of PZL-104 Wilga 80 Maintenance Manual, pages 5-4 and 25-10, dated April 7, 2009, listed in this AD. As of May 18, 2009 (74 FR 18979; April 27, 2009), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of EADS- PZL "Warszawa-Ok]cie'' S.A. Mandatory Bulletin No. 10409036, dated March 18, 2009, listed in this AD.
2009-14-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: P&WC has determined that the Post-Service Bulletin (SB) PW300- 72-24287 High Pressure Compressor (HPC) drum rotor assemblies P/N 30B2478 and 30B2542 on PW 305A and 305B engines with single stage coated labyrinth seals, are susceptible to developing significant cracks in the region of the labyrinth seal. We are issuing this AD to detect cracks in the HPC drum rotor assembly, which could lead to an uncontained failure of the drum rotor assembly and damage to the airplane.
2020-21-19: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-24- 11, which applied to certain Dassault Aviation Model FALCON 900EX airplanes. AD 2019-24-11 required revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. This AD continues to require those maintenance or inspection program revisions, and also requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate additional new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations; as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. This AD was prompted by a determination that new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations are necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
95-01-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Terra Corporation TRT 250 series transponders, that requires removing the transponder from the aircraft, inspecting it to determine if the AD applies, and replacing any affected transponder with a modified Terra Corporation transponder or another transponder that responds properly to Mode S interrogations from both an Air Traffic Control Radio Beacon System (ATCRBS)/Mode S ground station and Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) II airborne equipment. This amendment is prompted by FAA tests that show that the transponder does not respond properly to certain interrogations by a Mode S or TCAS II signal. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the transponder to respond properly to Mode S interrogations from both Mode S ground stations and TCAS II airborne equipment, which could result in loss of airspace separation.
82-16-12: 82-16-12 BELL: Amendment 39-4431. Applies to Bell Model 206 helicopters with Chadwick C-22 Auxiliary Fuel System installed per Supplemental Type Certificate SH139WE. Compliance is required as indicated. To provide early warning of auxiliary fuel transfer pump malfunction and the associated decrease in usable auxiliary fuel, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished: 1. Within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, install a placard, in accordance with Chadwick Service Bulletin 20-81-01 dated October 6, 1981, or FAA approved equivalent limiting usable auxiliary fuel to half the amount in the auxiliary tanks at takeoff. 2. Within 300 hours time-in-service or 6 months from the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, install the C-22-FM Flow Monitoring Kit in accordance with Chadwick Service Bulletin 20-81-01 dated October 6, 1981, or FAA approved equivalent. The placard installed per item 1 above may be removed, provided the revisedFlight Manual Supplement, Chadwick Auxiliary Fuel System C-22, dated October 21, 1981, is incorporated in the Rotorcraft Flight Manual. 3. Alternate modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Seattle Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. 4. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulation Part 21, Sections 21.197 and 21.199 to operate each helicopter to a base for the accomplishment of the modification required by this AD. This amendment becomes effective September 1, 1982.
64-02-04: 64-02-04 CANADAIR: Amdt. 677 Part 507 Federal Register January 23, 1964. Applies to all Model CL-44D4 aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. As a result of an incident indicating binding of a sealed coupling due to rotation of an eccentrically bored nylatron bushing in an eccentrically bored housing P/N 44A53941-951, accomplish the following inspection within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished. (a) Inspect all 14 control system couplings P/N 44A53940 to determine if housing P/N 44A53941-951 is being utilized (housing P/N impression is stamped on unpressurized face of mounting flange). (b) If housing P/N 44A53941-951 is being utilized, accomplish one of the following before further flight. (1) Replace housing P/N 44A53941-951 with housing P/N 44A53941 with no dash number modified per Canadair Service Bulletin No. 304, Revision B, dated July 11, 1963, or an equivalent approved by Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. (2) Rework housing P/N 44A53941-951 as follows: (i) Remove nylatron or steel bushing from housing P/N 44A53941- 951; (ii) Rebore the hole for bushing to 0.750 plus 0.000 minus 0.001 inch-diameter and make bushing hole concentric within 0.001 inch with the hole bore for the bearings; (iii) Reinstall special nylatron bushing which will provide 0.0010 to 0.0025 inch interference fit with housing bore; (iv) Finish bore inner diameter of nylatron bushing 0.629 plus 0.001 minus 0.000 inch and make hole in the bushing concentric within 0.001 inch with the hole bore for bearings; and (v) Reidentify housing as P/N 44A53941-952. (3) Remove nylatron or steel bushing from housing P/N 44A53941-951 for interim aircraft operation. However, housing shall be replaced or reworked in accordance with either (b)(1) or (b)(2) within 100 hours' time in service after the removal of the bushing. Couplings that are reworked or replaced after this interim operation shall be thoroughly cleaned and lubricated before reinstallation. (Canadair Service Bulletin No. 304, Revision B, dated July 11, 1963, and Canadair Limited telegram dated January 7, 1964, to Seaboard World Airlines, Flying Tigers Airlines and Slick Airways covers this same subject.) This directive effective January 23, 1964.