Results
2010-13-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model DC-10-10, DC-10-10F, and MD-10-10F airplanes. This AD requires a one-time high frequency eddy current inspection of fastener holes for cracks at the left and right side wing rear spar lower cap at station Xors=345, and other specified and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from a report of three instances of Model DC-10-10F airplanes having fuel leaks in the wing rear spar lower cap at station Xors=345. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracks in the spar cap, which could lead to cracking of the lower wing skin, fuel leaks, and the inability of the structure to sustain limit load.
93-08-11: 93-08-11 DASSAULT AVIATION: Amendment 39-8558. Docket 92-NM-219-AD. Applicability: Model Mystere-Falcon 900 series airplanes; serial numbers 1 through 14, inclusive; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent reduced structural integrity of the fuselage, accomplish the following: (a) For airplane having serial number 1: Prior to the accumulation of 3,750 total landings, or within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, modify the upper part of frame 30 in the stiffener area between stringers 7 and 8, in accordance with Dassault Aviation F900-93 Service Bulletin F900-53-14 and Appendix 1 to that service bulletin, both dated July 8, 1992. (b) For airplanes having serial numbers 2 through 14, inclusive: Modify the upper part of frame 30 in the stiffener area between stringers 7 and 8, in accordance with Dassault Aviation F900-93 Service Bulletin F900-53-14 and Appendix 1 to that service bulletin, both dated July 8, 1992; and at the later of the times specified in paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) of this AD. (1) Prior to the accumulation of 3,750 total landings, or within 6 years since date of manufacture, whichever occurs first. (2) Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (e) The modification shall be done in accordance with Dassault Aviation F900-93 Service Bulletin F900-53-14 and Appendix 1 to that service bulletin, both dated July 8, 1992. (NOTE: Appendix 1 contains pages 101 through 109.) This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Falcon Jet Corporation, Customer Support Department, Teterboro Airport, Teterboro, New Jersey 07608. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (f) This amendment becomes effective on June 1, 1993.
98-24-21: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Eurocopter France (ECF) Model AS 332C, AS 332L, AS 332L1, and AS 332L2 helicopters. This action requires inserting instructions into the Model AS 332C, AS 332L, AS 332L1, and AS 332L2 Rotorcraft Flight Manuals (RFMs) regarding actions to take if either the "OVSP 1" or "OVSP 2" amber warning light illuminates. This action also requires, for the Model AS 332C, AS 332L, and AS 332L1 helicopters, measuring the vibration levels of the engine-to-main gearbox (MGB) shaft, inspecting the torque on the MGB coupling bolts, and conducting an engine-to-MGB coupling 23,000 revolutions per minute (RPM) input check. This amendment is prompted by an accident involving a Model AS 332L1 helicopter in which the helicopter experienced an engine overspeed resulting in failure of both engines. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent failure of the rotor drive engine-to-MGB coupling, which, if undetected, could result in an engine overspeed leading to an uncontained engine turbine wheel burst and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
76-24-03: 76-24-03 PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT: Amendment 39-2776. Applies to all Pratt & Whitney Aircraft JT9D turbofan engines containing fan blades, part numbers 658931, 718431, 726221, 734721, 735831, 735841, 740421, 740431, 740441, 740521, 741131, 741141, 748231, 748321, 748931, 750621, 750631, 758031, 758181, 758191, 758221, 760631, 760641, 760721, 760731, 760831, 760841, 760941, 761041, 761121, 761131, and 761141. Compliance required as follows unless already accomplished. To preclude failure of fan blades due to fatigue originating from undetected foreign object damage, inspect the critical areas of the blades in accordance with the procedures given in PWA ASB 4573, dated March 26, 1976, or later FAA approved revision, as follows: 1. Visually inspect all fan blades within the next 600 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, and every 600 hours time in service thereafter. 2. Eddy current inspect all fan blades that have been previously damaged and blend repaired within the next 600 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD. 3. Eddy current inspect fan blades reworked per PWA Service Bulletins 4124 or 4262, without prior or subsequent damage or blend repairs, within the next 3500 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD. If foreign object damage with a depth of .005 inch or more is found in the critical area, blend and inspect in accordance with Option 1 or Option 2 procedures given in PWA ASB No. 4573, dated March 26, 1976, or later FAA approved revision. (NOTE: The AD does not change the present fan blade blend limits given in the JT9D engine manual.) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA New England Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data tojustify the increase for that operator. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, Division of United Technologies Corporation, 400 Main Street, East Hartford, Connecticut 06108. These documents may also be examined at Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, and at FAA headquarters, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. A historical file on this AD which includes the incorporated material in full is maintained by the FAA at its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at the New England Region. This amendment becomes effective December 30, 1976.
98-21-09: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 98-21-09, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Robinson Helicopter Company (RHC) Model R22 helicopters by individual letters. This AD requires installing fuel tank vent tube(s), with modified attachment to the mast tube, if not previously accomplished; installing a spring into the flexible tube leading to the main fuel tank; and installing a spring into the flexible tube leading to the auxiliary fuel tank, if an auxiliary fuel tank is installed. This amendment is prompted by an incident in which the flexible vent connecting the rigid vent tube to the main fuel tank kinked, resulting in fuel starvation and a hard landing after uncommanded engine shutdown. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fuel starvation, loss of engine power, and a subsequent forced landing.
2022-11-04: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2020-26- 13, which applied to certain Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) Model S-92A helicopters. AD 2020-26-13 required establishing the life limit for certain part-numbered horizontal stabilizer root fittings FWD (forward root fittings) and certain part-numbered stabilizer strut fittings. AD 2020-26-13 also required repetitively inspecting certain parts, and depending on the inspection results, removing parts from service. Finally AD 2020-26-13 prohibited installing certain stabilizer assemblies on any helicopter. Since the FAA issued AD 2020-26-13, the manufacturer notified the FAA that due to an error in the service information, certain part numbers in AD 2020-26-13 are incorrect. Also, the FAA determined that additional inspections are required to address the unsafe condition. This AD retains certain requirements and the prohibition for installing certain stabilizer assemblies on any helicopter from AD 2020-26-13, corrects certain part numbers, and requires additional repetitive inspections. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
98-24-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Stemme GmbH & Co. KG (Stemme) Model S10 sailplanes. This AD requires replacing the flap drive rocker, part number (P/N) 10SW-RMW, with a modified flap drive rocker. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the flap drive rocker caused by the design of the original part, which could result in loss of lateral control and wing flap control with consequent reduced and/or loss of sailplane control.
2013-11-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of hydraulic fluid contamination (including contamination caused by hydraulic fluid in its liquid, vapor, and/or solid (coked) form) found in the strut forward dry bay. This AD requires repetitive general visual inspections of the strut forward dry bay for the presence of hydraulic fluid, and related investigative and corrective actions (including checking drain lines for blockage due to hydraulic fluid coking, and cleaning or replacing drain lines to allow drainage) if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct hydraulic fluid contamination of the strut forward dry bay, which could result in hydrogen embrittlement of the titanium forward engine mount bulkhead fittings, and consequent inability of the fittings to carry engine loads, resulting in engine separation. Hydraulic embrittlement also could cause a through-crack formation across the fittings through which an engine fire could breach into the strut, resulting in an uncontained strut fire.
98-24-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Ursula Hanle (Hanle) Model H101 "Salto" sailplanes. This AD requires replacing the airbrake lever with one of improved design. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the airbrake from deploying during high g maneuvers, which could result in an overstressing effect on the airframe with consequent reduced sailplane control.
98-24-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain EXTRA Flugzeugbau GmbH (EXTRA) Models EA-300, EA-300S, and EA-300L airplanes. This AD requires repetitively inspecting the rudder pedal for proper alignment, the safety control stop for wear and proper clearance, the rudder cables for elongation, and the rudder pedal footrest for cracks. This AD also requires correcting or replacing any discrepant part, as applicable. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the rudder pedal footrest caused by overloading the rudder pedal safety control stop, which could result in loss of directional control of the airplane.