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2002-12-14: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for specified Eurocopter France (ECF) model helicopters that currently requires inserting statements into the Limitations section of the Rotorcraft Flight Manual (RFM) prohibiting flight under certain atmospheric conditions. This amendment contains the same requirements but corrects, expands, and updates the applicability. This amendment is prompted by an incident in which a Multi-Purpose Air Intake (MPAI) inlet seal deflated after the P2 air system line, which feeds the seal, clogged due to the formation of ice. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent clogging of the MPAI seal P2 air system line due to ice formation, which could result in deflation of the MPAI seal, loss of engine power, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
67-31-03: 67-31-03 BRITISH AIRCRAFT: Amdt. 39-519, Part 39, Federal Register November 30, 1967. Applies to Model BAC 1-11 200 and 400 Series Airplanes. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent reversal of the rudder feel function, within the next 500 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following: (a) Replace the paired links located in the rudder feel simulator linkage, Hobson P/N CH 504-071 or CH 504-280 with redesigned Hobson slotted links, P/N CH 504-446 in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation on BAC 1-11 Alert Service Bulletin PM 3290, or later ARB-approved issue, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Staff, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Region. (b) Attach Hobson slotted links P/N CH 504-446 with bolts P/N CH 127803-25 (NAS 1108-25) and CH-127803-22 (NAS 1108-22), or self-retained bolt P/N CH 127800 (NAS 1108-27-SR) and rivet P/N CH 524-129-3. If bolts P/N CH127803-25 (NAS 1108-25) and CH 127803-22 (NAS 1108-22) are used, replace these bolts with self-retained bolt P/N CH 127800 (NAS 1108-27-SR) and rivet P/N CH-524-129-3 during the next overhaul of the rudder feel simulator units. This amendment effective November 30, 1967.
52-25-01: 52-25-01 DOUGLAS: Applies to All Models DC3 Aircraft Equipped With Vacuum Systems. \n\n\tTo be accomplished not later than May 1, 1953. \n\n\tTo guard against the possibility of excessive air temperatures and associated fire hazards in the vacuum system discharge line, one of the following modifications must be accomplished: \n\n\t1.\tInstall a fusible plug in the side of the vacuum pump discharge port at right angles to the axis of the discharge port boss. Some pumps incorporate a plugged hole in the discharge port which may be enlarged to a 3/8-inch pipe tapped hole to accommodate the fusible plug. This plug should employ an AN 840-8D fitting with a binary eutectic mixture of 67.8 percent tin and 32.2 percent cadmium, which has a melting point of 351 degrees F. A drawing describing the design of such a plug is shown in Figure 2. The 3/8-inch plug fitting is intended for pumps such as the Model 3P-211 and 3P-485. For smaller pumps such as the 3P-207, an AN 840-6D fitting, incorporating the same modification as shown below, should be used. Brass fittings of the same design as the above dual fittings are acceptable. Incorporation of an overboard drain line clamped to the fusible plug is recommended but is not mandatory. On installations which do not use an overboard discharge line the possibility exists that the plug may damage other nacelle components if it can hit them upon being blown out of the adapter at high velocity. Therefore, if no overboard discharge line is provided, the installation must be made in such a manner that the plug will not be directed toward any vulnerable components when it issues from the adapter, or \n\n\t2.\tEmploy an oil separator equivalent in principle to the Genisco No. 40081 incorporating a pressure relief valve which can be disassembled for cleaning. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Letter A-129-T-1271/WB-11-Q-4 dated April 1, 1949, covers this type modification.)
2025-01-07: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2022-11- 01, which applied to certain Airbus SAS Model A300 series airplanes; Model A300 B4-600, B4-600R, and F4-600R series airplanes; and Model A300 C4-605R Variant F airplanes (collectively called Model A300-600 series airplanes). AD 2022-11-01 required a detailed inspection (DET) of the main landing gear (MLG) support rib 5 lower flange, a fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) around the spot facing of certain fastener holes if necessary, and applicable corrective actions. This AD was prompted by the determination that additional airplanes are affected by the unsafe condition. This AD continues to require the actions in AD 2022-11-01 and adds airplanes to the applicability, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2015-21-10: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2015-19-03 for all The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and - 900ER series airplanes. AD 2015-19-03 required revising the maintenance or inspection program to include new airworthiness limitations. This AD continues to require a maintenance or inspection program revision, but with revised language. This AD was prompted by a determination that certain language in the airworthiness limitation was not accurate in AD 2015-19-03. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct latent failures of the fuel shutoff valve to the engine, which could result in the inability to shut off fuel to the engine and, in case of certain engine fires, an uncontrollable fire that could lead to wing failure.
86-20-12: 86-20-12 CESSNA: Amendment 39-5442. Applies to the Model 404 (Serial Numbers 404- 0001 through 404-0136, 404-0201 through 404-0246, 404-0401 through 404-0460, 404-0601 through 404-0695, and 404-0801 through 404-0859) airplanes certificated in any category: Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To ensure the structural integrity of the engine mount beams, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect the engine beams for cracks in accordance with the provisions of Cessna Multi-Engine Service Bulletin MEB 86-7, dated April 18, 1986, per the following schedule: (1) On all airplanes with 1600 or more hours time-in-service (TIS), fluorescent penetrant inspect the engine beams within the next 100 flight hours and at each 800 hours TIS thereafter. (2) On all airplanes with less than 1600 hours TIS, fluorescent penetrant inspect the engine beams between 1600 and 1700 hours TIS and at each 800 hours TIS thereafter. (3) The fluorescent penetrant inspections required by paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD are no longer required on engine beams that have Service Kit SK 404-40 installed. (b) If cracks are found in the inspection of Paragraph (a), prior to further flight perform the following in accordance with Cessna Service Bulletin MEB 86-7: (1) If cracks found in the top (horizontal portion) of the beam are less than 2.00 inches in length, stop drill and install SK 404-40 in accordance with MEB 86-7. (2) If cracks found in the top (horizontal portion) of the beam are greater than 2.00 inches in length, contact Cessna Aircraft Company for FAA approved repair disposition at the following address: Cessna Aircraft Company, Customer Service, P.O. Box 1521, Wichita, Kansas 67201; Telephone (316) 946-7550. (c) Aircraft may be flown in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulation 21.197 to a location where the provisions of this AD can be accomplished. (d) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid- Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request to Cessna Aircraft Company, P.O. Box 1521, Wichita, Kansas 67201; or FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This amendment becomes effective October 21, 1986.
2025-01-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain CFM International, S.A. (CFM) Model LEAP-1A and LEAP-1C engines. This AD was prompted by an investigation of an in-flight shut down event that revealed the aft arm of the high-pressure turbine (HPT) rotor interstage seal had failed. This AD requires removal from service and replacement of the HPT rotor interstage seal for LEAP-1A engines. Since the HPT rotor interstage seal part number is interchangeable between LEAP-1A and LEAP-1C engines, this AD also prohibits installation of these affected parts onto any LEAP-1A or LEAP-1C engine. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
85-11-05 R1: 85-11-05 R1 CESSNA: Amendment 39-5106. Applies to Cessna Model T303 (serial numbers T30300001 thru T30300315) airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance: Required before further flight, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible flutter of the vertical stabilizer that could cause the loss of the vertical stabilizer and/or airplane control, accomplish the following: (a) Fabricate and install adjacent to the anti-ice system switches the following placard using letters of a minimum 0.10 inch in height: "FLIGHT INTO KNOWN ICING PROHIBITED" and operate the airplane in accordance with this limitation. (b) Insert a copy of this AD in front of the airplane limitation section in the Airplane Flight Manual. (c) The requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD may be accomplished by the holder of a pilot certificate issued under Part 61 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) on any airplane owned or operated by him. The person accomplishing these actions must make the appropriate aircraft maintenance record entry as prescribed by FAR 03.9. (d) The placard required in paragraph (a) may be removed and flight into known icing conducted for those airplanes on which the Cessna known icing equipment is installed (as listed in the Equipment List in the Airplane Flight Manual) when the rudder is modified in accordance with Cessna Multi-Engine Service Bulletin MEB85-7, Revision 1, dated June 28, 1985. (e) An equivalent means of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Office, Federal Aviation Administration, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209; Telephone (316) 946-4400. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request to the Cessna Aircraft Company Customer Services, Post Office Box 1521, Wichita, Kansas 67201, or FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. This amendment becomes effective on July 31, 1985, to all persons except those to whom it has already been made effective by priority letter from the FAA dated May 31, 1985, and is identified as AD 85-11-05.
2025-03-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Helicopters Model AS332L, AS332L1, AS 365 N3, SA-365C1, SA- 365C2, SA-365N, and SA-365N1 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report that certain rescue hoist cable assemblies may be equipped with a defective ball end. This AD requires inspecting certain rescue hoist cable assemblies and, depending on the results, replacing the rescue hoist cable assembly. This AD also allows installing certain rescue hoist cable assemblies and certain rescue hoists provided its requirements are met. These actions are specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2015-19-51: We are publishing a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S-76A, S-76B, S-76C, and S-76D helicopters, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of these helicopters. This AD requires inspecting the main rotor (M/R) and tail rotor (T/R) pushrod assemblies and the jamnuts, and applying slippage marks across the pushrod tubes and jamnuts. This AD is prompted by an accident of a Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S-76C helicopter. During preliminary investigation, a failed pushrod assembly was identified. These actions are intended to prevent loss of M/R or T/R flight control and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.