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90-12-10: 90-12-10 AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: Amendment 39-6624. Docket No. 90-NM-100-AD. Applicability: Model A320 series airplanes, as listed in Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A320-28-1024, Revision 1, dated February 20, 1990, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within 100 landings after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. To ensure proper operation of the fuel quantity indicating system and to prevent the possibility of a spark in the fuel system in the event of a lightning strike, accomplish the following: A. Verify the clearance between fuel probes 23QT1, 23QT2, and 28QT1, and the adjacent structures; install an insulating sleeve on the vent pipe bonding lead; and adjust fuel probe clearance, in accordance with Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A320-28-1024, Revision 1, dated February 20, 1990, or All Operators' Telex (AOT) 28/89/03, dated November 20, 1989. B. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Airbus Industrie, Airbus Support Division, Avenue Didier Daurat, 31700 Blagnac, France. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Standardization Branch, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment (39-6624, AD 90-12-10) becomes effective on June 20, 1990.
71-10-02: 71-10-02 AEROSTAR: Amdt. 39-1206. Applies to all Model 600 and 601 airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance required within the next 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To assure all over-voltage relays are properly grounded, accomplish the following: A. On S/N 61-0001 and 60-0001 through 60-0005: (1) Inspect each overvoltage relay installation and assure that the overvoltage relay base and the aircraft structure are in direct contact. (2) If the installation appears satisfactory from the inspection, use an ohmmeter to determine that low resistance continuity of less than one (1) ohm exists between the base of each overvoltage relay and the airplane structure. (3) If a satisfactory ohmmeter indication is not achieved, ground the overvoltage relay base to the aircraft structure using good aircraft grounding practice. B. On all others; (1) Inspect each installation of thecrimp wire terminal which connects to the overvoltage relay base and assure that the crimp terminal and relay base are in contact. (2) If the results of the inspection are not satisfactory, rearrange the components as follows: (a) Install the nylon bearing from the bottom side of the overvoltage relay base so that it isolates the overvoltage relay base from the aircraft structure. (b) Install the crimp wire terminal over the nylon bearing so that it is in electrical contact with the overvoltage relay base. (c) Install the AN960 washer over the nylon bearing so it is in contact with the crimp wire terminal. (d) Install the two nylon washers on top of the AN960 washer and insert the NAS221 screw through the two nylon washers and the nylon bearing, and tighten the screw into the nut-plate provided. (e) Assure that the nylon bearing is seated properly to prevent electrical contact of the crimp wire terminal, the AN960 washer, and the overvoltage relay base with the NAS221 screw and the aircraft structure. (f) Repeat the above procedure for the opposite side of each overvoltage relay except for elimination of the crimp wire terminal. (3) Using an ohmmeter, determine that low resistance continuity of one (1) ohm or less exists between the base of each overvoltage relay and the airplane structure with the respective alternator switch in the "on" position. Low resistance continuity should not exist with the respective alternator switch in the "off" position. (4) If the existing installation of either overvoltage relay will not give a satisfactory check and cannot be changed as described above, accomplish an equivalent FAA approved modification. If Aerostar Aircraft Corporation Service Bulletin No. S.B. 600-24 dated November 23, 1970, or later FAA approved revision, has been compiled with and an appropriate entry made in the airplanes' permanent maintenance record, the requirements of this AD will be considered satisfied. This amendment becomes effective on May 14, 1971.
2021-23-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Saab AB, Support and Services Model SAAB 340B airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that the circuit breaker for the emergency cabin lighting tripped without fault in the system. This AD requires replacing a certain circuit breaker with a part having a higher rating, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
48-13-03: 48-13-03 PIPER: Applies to PA-12 Airplanes With Battery Holddown of Metal Bracket With Fiber Insulation at Its End. Compliance required by October 1, 1948. To eliminate battery short circuits caused by defective battery holddown brackets, replace brackets by wood blocks, Piper P/N 84682-3 and 84682-9 or equivalent. (Piper Service Bulletin No. 105 dated February 18, 1948, covers this same subject.)
77-19-03: 77-19-03 HUGHES HELICOPTERS: Amendment 39-3038. Applies to Hughes Model 369D helicopters, certificated in all categories, which have P/N 369D21200 main rotor hub serial numbers 0001 through 0178 installed. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent failure of the main rotor retention straps which can result in loss of a main rotor blade accomplish the following: A. Before further flight after the effective date of the AD, visually inspect the lead leg of each main rotor retention strap pack, P/N 369D21210, at the inboard ends to determine if two adjacent metallic anti-fretting laminates P/N 369D21271-5, -51, -53 or -55, have been installed on the upper side of the lead leg of any strap pack. (1) If two adjacent metallic anti-fretting laminates have been installed, visually inspect to determine if one or both are cracked or have been broken off where they extend from the hub. (i) If no anti-fretting laminate is found cracked or broken, repeat the inspections in (1), above, at times in service not to exceed 25 hours. This repetitive inspection can be discontinued when the main rotor hub, P/N 369D21200, has been replaced by a serviceable hub having only one anti-fretting laminate on the upper side of the lead leg of each main rotor strap pack. (ii) If any anti-fretting laminate is found cracked or broken, further visually inspect the main rotor retention strap laminates adjacent to the anti-fretting laminates. (a) If any strap laminate is broken or cracked, replace the main rotor hub, P/N 369D21200, before further flight. (b) If no strap laminate is cracked or broken, replace the main rotor hub, P/N 369D21200, within ten hours time in service. (2) If the inspection reveals that only one metallic anti-fretting laminate has been installed on the upper lead leg of each strap pack no further action is required by this AD. This amendment becomes effective September 27, 1977, for all persons except those to whom it was made effective by telegram dated August 12, 1977, which contained this amendment.
76-24-02: 76-24-02 LAKE AIRCRAFT, DIVISION OF CONSOLIDATED AERONAUTICS, INC: Amendment 39-2774. Applies to all Lake Model LA-4-200 airplanes certified in all categories equipped with Stewart Warner Model 8406J engine oil coolers. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. To preclude possible oil cooler failures allowing rapid loss of engine oil which could result in engine stoppage, accomplish the following: A. Before next flight of the affected airplanes, inspect the engine oil cooler (fluid fitting side) to determine whether it is a Model 8406J S/N 101 through 1500. 1. If the oil cooler is a Model 8406J S/N 101 through 1500, prior to further flight, replace this cooler with an FAA approved oil cooler not of the above model and serial number. 2. If the oil cooler is not of the model and serial number listed above, make an entry in the aircraft maintenance records indicating that this airworthiness directive has been accomplished and the airplane may be returned to service. B. The inspection and maintenance record entry required by paragraph A2 may be accomplished by holder of a pilot's certificate issued under Part 61 of the Federal Aviation Regulations on any aircraft owned or operated by him. C. Equivalent methods of compliance with this AD may be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, New England Region. NOTE: A ferry permit to accomplish a needed oil cooler replacement may be issued under the provisions of FAR 21.197 by FAA District Offices, with appropriate limitations. This amendment becomes effective immediately upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately upon receipt of airmail letter dated October 15, 1976.
2009-26-08: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Late in 2002 the manufacturer advised CASA of another Nomad accident which was possibly caused by aileron flutter with the flaps at 38 degrees. This, along with the other flutter incidents, has resulted in the manufacturer issuing ANMD-57-18 Issue 1 as a precautionary measure while they further investigate the issue. The manufacturer has now completed their investigation and issued Alert Service Bulletin ANMD-27-53 to modify flap actuation linkages to restore the necessary rigidity to the outboard flap, and hence the aileron. The unacceptable flexibility of the outboard flap mechanism allows flutter to occur in extreme circumstances. We areissuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-26-07: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Turbomeca Arriel 1A1, 1A2, 1B, 1C, 1C1, 1C2, 1D, 1D1, 1E2, 1K1, 1S, and 1S1 turboshaft engines. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of certain reduction gearboxes (module M05) for oil leakage, repair if leaking, and repair of all affected modules as optional terminating action to the repetitive inspections. This AD requires the same actions, but adds five more serial numbers of the reduction gearboxes (module M05) that are affected, and adds an alternative optional terminating action to the repetitive visual inspections. This AD results from Turbomeca identifying five additional reduction gearboxes (module M05) affected, and adding an alternative optional terminating action to the repetitive visual inspections. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncommanded in- flight engine shutdown, possible engine fire, and an emergency autorotation landing.
87-04-06: 87-04-06 GATES LEARJET CORPORATION: Amendment 39-5530. Applies to Learjet Models 35, 35A, 36, and 36A airplanes equipped with a J.E.T. FC-530 autopilot/flight director; Model 35A airplanes equipped with a J.E.T. FC-535 autopilot/flight director; and Model 55 airplanes equipped with a J.E.T. FC-550 autopilot/flight director; certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent the potential for operations with unsafe flight director steering commands, accomplish the following: A. For Models 35, 35A, 36, and 36A airplanes equipped with J.E.T. FC-530 autopilot/flight director, except airplanes S/N 35-620, 35-627 and subsequent, and 36-057 and subsequent, within the next 10 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, insert the following information in "Section I - Limitations" of the Gates Learjet 35/36 series Airplane Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS) for the J.E.T. FC-530 autopilot/flight director, AFMS W1029, dated 4/23/85, revised 3/11/86 (or Gates Learjet 35A, 36A J.E.T. FC-530 autopilot/flight director, AFMS W1029, dated 9/20/82, revised 5/13/83): 1. Add the following limitation and Note: Flight director VOR enroute and approach operations are prohibited. NOTE: Autopilot-coupled VOR operations and raw data displays are not affected and may be used. 2. Change the final limitation to read as follows: For autopilot V0R approach, the flaps must be lowered to 8 degrees or more. B. For Model 35A airplanes equipped with J.E.T. FC-535 autopilot/flight directors within the next 10 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, insert the following information in "Section I - Limitations" of the Gates Learjet Model 35A/36A AFMS for the J.E.T. FC-535 autopilot/flight director, AFMS T1204, dated 3/16/84, revised 4/4/84: 1. Add the following limitation and Note: Flight director VOR/TACAN enroute and approach operations are prohibited.NOTE: Autopilot-coupled V0R/TACAN operations and raw data displays are not affected and may be used. 2. Change the final limitation to read as follows: For autopilot V0R/TACAN approach, the flaps must be lowered to 8 degrees or more. C. For Model 55 airplanes equipped with J.E.T. FC-550 autopilot/flight directors, airplanes Serial Numbers 55-003 through 55-011, not incorporating ECR 2524, ECR 2525, AAK 55-81-2, or AAK 55-83-1, within the next 10 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, insert the following information in "Section I - Limitations" of the Gates Learjet Model 55 AFMS for the J.E.T. FC-550 autopilot/flight director, AFMS W1001, dated 4/14/81, revised 8/31/81: 1. Add the following limitation and Note: Flight director VOR enroute operations are prohibited. NOTE: Autopilot-coupled VOR enroute operations and raw data displays are not affected and may be used. D. For Model 55 airplanes equipped with J.E.T. FC-550 autopilot/flight director.- airplanes S/N 55-003 through 55-011, incorporating ECR 2524, ECR 2525, AAK 55-81-2, or AAK 55-83-I; and airplanes S/N 55-012 through 55-126; within the next 10 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, insert the following information in "Section I - Limitations" of the appropriate Gates Learjet Model 55 AFMS for the J.E.T. FC-550 autopilot/flight director: AFMS WI002, dated 8/25/81, revised 2/15/83 (for airplanes S/N 55-003 through 55-011, incorporating ECR 2524 or AAK 55-81-2, and airplanes S/N 55-012 through 55-042); or AFMS W1003, dated 8/31/81, revised 2/15/83 (for airplanes S/N 55-003 through 55-042, incorporating ECR 2524 and ECR 2525, or AAK 55-83-I; and airplanes S/N 55-043 and 55-126): 1. Add the following limitation and Note: Flight director VOR enroute and approach operations are prohibited. NOTE: Autopilot-coupled VOR operations and raw data displays are not affected and may be used. 2. Add the following limitation:For autopilot VOR approach, the flaps must be lowered to 8 degrees or more. E. In order to comply with the applicable requirements of paragraph A., B., C., or D., above, a copy of this AD may be used as a temporary amendment to the AFMS and carried in the airplane as part of the AFMS until replaced by the appropriate FAA-approved Gates Learjet published temporary Flight Manual (TFM) Supplement Change. These include: 1. TFM Supplement Change to AFMS W1029 for the Models 35/36 series with J.E.T. FC-530 autopilot/flight director: TFM 86-1, dated 4/1/86. 2. TFM Supplement Change to AFMS T1204 for the Models 35A/36A with J.E.T. FC-535 autopilot/flight director: TFM 86-2, dated 4/1/86. 3. TFM Supplement Change to AFMS WI001 for the Model 55 with J.E.T. FC-550 autopilot/flight director: TFM 86-3, dated 4/1/86. 4. TFM Supplement Change to AFMS WI 002 and AFMS WI 003 for the Model 55 with J.E.T. FC-550 autopilot/flight director: TFM 86-4, dated 4/1/86. F. Installation of the modification described in Gates Learjet Service Bulletins SB35/36-22-5 or SB55-22-2, both dated 1/5/87, as applicable, constitutes terminating action for the requirements of this AD. G. Alternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Central Region. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate Temporary Airplane Flight Manual Supplement Changes and other service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Gates Learjet Corporation, P.O. Box 7707, Wichita, Kansas 67277. The service information may be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or FAA, Central Region, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas. This amendment becomes effective March 9, 1987.
89-20-13: 89-20-13 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC. (BHTI): Amendment 39-8027. Docket No. 89-ASW-49. Final Rule of priority letter AD. Applicability: All Model 206L, 206L-1, and 206L-3 helicopters, all serial numbers, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required before further flight, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure and separation of the horizontal stabilizer from the helicopter, which could result in a strike on the tail rotor, causing loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Visually inspect to determine if the horizontal stabilizer installed on the helicopter has the required raised external doubler. The doubler is visible on the top of the stabilizer surface extending approximately 4 inches outward from either side of the tailboom and covering the upper surface of the horizontal stabilizer from within one half inch of the forward leading edge to the trailing edge. (b) If the horizontal stabilizer installed does nothave the required external doubler, remove and replace the stabilizer with an airworthy part before further flight. The addition of an external doubler to the Helicomb International part will not bring the horizontal stabilizer into conformity with the approved type design and will not provide an equivalent level of safety. (c) Report the registration number of the affected helicopter and the serial number of the discrepant stabilizer if found. This report is to be made to the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, ASW-170, Southwest Region, Federal Aviation Administration, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0170, telephone (817) 624-5170, within l0 days of the inspection. (Reporting approved by the Office of Management and Budget under OMB No. 2120-0056.) (d) An alternate method of compliance which provides an equivalent level of safety, may be used if approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, Southwest Region, Federal Aviation Administration, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0170, telephone (817) 624-5170. This amendment (39-8027, AD 89-20-13) becomes effective on October 15, 1991, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by Priority Letter AD 89-20-13, issued October 4, 1989, which contained this amendment.