Results
2003-24-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT9D-3A, -7, -7A, -7F, -7H, -7AH, and -7J turbofan engines, with gearbox pressure tube, part number (P/N) 697896, and No. 4 bearing front pressure manifold, P/N 670663, installed. This AD requires a one-time visual inspection of the gearbox pressure tube and No. 4 bearing front pressure manifold and the attaching clamp assemblies for correct positioning and for wear and damage, and replacement if necessary. This AD is prompted by a report of a failed gearbox pressure tube that resulted in an engine fire. We are issuing this AD to prevent engine fires caused by failed gearbox pressure tubes or failed No. 4 bearing front pressure manifolds.
2009-22-03: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Hartzell Propeller Inc. ()HC-()2Y()-() series propellers with non-suffix serial number (SN) propeller hubs installed on Lycoming O-, IO-, LO-, and AEIO-360 series reciprocating engines. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive eddy current inspections (ECIs) of the front cylinder half of the propeller hub for cracks and removing cracked hubs from service before further flight. In addition, that AD allows installation of an improved design propeller hub (suffix SN "A'' or "B'') as terminating action to the repetitive ECI. This ad requires the same actions but changes the affected propeller series designation to ()HC-()2Y(K,R)-() series propellers with non-suffix SN propeller hubs and suffix SN letter "E'' propeller hubs. This AD also expands the engine eligibility to include Lycoming LIO-, TO-, LTO-, AIO-, and TIO-360-series engines. This AD results from the need to make changes to the affected seriesdesignation of propellers, to expand the engine applicability, and to respond to comments received on AD 2006- 18-15. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the propeller hub causing blade separation and subsequent loss of airplane control.
95-06-53: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) T95-06-53 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Boeing Model 737 series airplanes by individual telegrams. This AD requires identification of the part and serial numbers of the main rudder power control unit (PCU), and replacement of certain PCU's with serviceable parts, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating that certain modified rudder PCU's malfunctioned and failed functional retesting. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the rudder actuator piston and the rudder from operating with reduced force capability or moving in a direction opposite the intended direction due to malfunctioning of the rudder PCU; these conditions could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2009-22-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified ECF model helicopters. This AD results from a mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) AD issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community. The MCAI AD states that freezing of the route display on the navigation display (ND) in the Sector mode occurs for flight plans that include procedures in the terminal zone (departure or arrival). The MCAI AD prohibits the use of the UNS-1D navigation system (also known as the Flight Management System (FMS)) for Standard Instrument Departure (SID), Standard Instrument Terminal Arrival Route (STAR), and instrument approach procedures. The actions are intended to prevent the flight crew from relying on a frozen route ND, unanticipated increases in flight crew workload, pilot confusion in the terminal airspace environment, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2003-24-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-31 and DC-9-32 airplanes. This action requires installation of ceiling panels and a protective pad in the tailcone emergency exit passageway. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent people on board the airplane from striking their heads on exposed metal frames in the tailcone area, which could cause injury and delay or impede their evacuation during an emergency. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2020-24-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Piper Aircraft, Inc., Model PA-34-220T airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of damage to the rudder flight control cables and the emergency power supply (EPS) system wiring due to inadequate clearance from the EPS wiring harness. This AD requires inspecting the rudder flight control cables and the EPS wiring for damage, replacing damaged cables and wires if necessary, and re-routing the EPS wiring harness to ensure proper clearance between the EPS and the rudder flight control cables. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-24-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all Dassault Model Mystere-Falcon 200 series airplanes. This action requires a one-time inspection of the fire extinguishing pipe for each engine to determine whether holes for dispersal of fire-extinguishing agent are present, and corrective action if necessary. This action is necessary to ensure that the flightcrew is able to extinguish an engine fire, should one occur. Inability to extinguish an engine fire could result in loss of control of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
56-05-01: 56-05-01 BELL: Applies to Model 47 Helicopters: Model 47D1 Serial Number 477 and Subsequent, Model 47G Serial Numbers 667 Through 692, 694 Through 1511, Model 47G2 Serial Numbers 1342 Through 1418, Model 47H1 Serial Numbers 1347, 1349 Through 1356, 1358, and 1360, All Model 47 Modified to Include 47-644-172-3 Tail Rotor Extension Drive Shaft and All 47-644-172-3 Shafts in Stock. Compliance required by March 1, 1956. As a result of manufacturing error some Bell Model 47 tail rotor extension drive shafts P/N 47-644-172-3 were bored too deep resulting in a weakened wall section. Bell has issued Service Bulletin No. 106 requiring an immediate mandatory inspection by X-ray or by method described in the Service Bulletin. This supersedes telegraph AD of February 3, 1956.
2009-21-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Further to initial qualification tests of the spoiler actuators currently installed in position No. 3 to 7 on A300-600 and A300- 600ST aircraft fleet, a life limit [of 55,750 flight hours] has been defined by the actuator manufacturer. Initially, this life limit had no repercussions, as it was situated well beyond the initial Design Service Goal (DSG) of the aircraft. However, due to the Extended Service Goal (ESG) activities, the spoiler actuator life limit can be reached in service, and therefore the spoiler actuators must be replaced before exceeding this limit. In order to mitigate the risk to have aircraft on which the three hydraulic circuitswould be impacted by affected spoiler actuators, which could result in the loss of controllability of the aircraft, this Airworthiness Directive (AD) requires actions to ensure that at least the level of safety of one hydraulic circuit will be restored within an acceptable timeframe. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-21-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Hamilton Sundstrand Power Systems T-62T-46C12 auxiliary power units (APUs). This AD requires upgrading the software in the APU full- authority digital controller (FADEC) from software version 02.01.000 to version 03.00.000. This AD results from two reports of APU compartment explosions due to over-fueling of the APU at low revolutions-per-minute during the start sequence. We are issuing this AD to prevent over- fueling of the APU during the start sequence, which could lead to fuel explosions, injury, and damage to the APU and the airplane.