Results
2021-17-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Leonardo S.p.a. Model AB139 and AW139 helicopters with certain main rotor blades installed. This AD was prompted by a report of an in- flight loss of a main rotor blade (MRB) tip cap. This AD requires inspecting the MRB tip cap for disbonding. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-23-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2C10 (Regional Jet Series 700, 701, & 702), CL-600-2D15 (Regional Jet Series 705), [[Page 68307]] and CL-600-2D24 (Regional Jet Series 900) airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: There have been two reported cases of failure of the MLG [main landing gear] piston axle, P/N [part number] 49203-3 or 49203-5, resulting from fretting between the inboard axle sleeve and axle thrust face, damage to the protective coating and consequent stress corrosion. In both cases, the MLG did not collapse. * * * * * The unsafe condition is failure of the MLG, which could adversely affect the airplane's safe landing. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
72-06-01: 72-06-01 BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amdt. 39-1406. Applies to Model BAC 1-11 200 and 400 series airplanes which do not have BAC Modification PM 4621 Part (b) incorporated on all flap sections. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent failures of the flap forward inboard pick-up fitting assemblies (six per airplane), accomplish the following: (a) For flap sections with a pick-up fitting assembly with a spigot having P/N AB09- 1723 (pre-Mod. 4621) installed: (1) Remove the lower inboard access panel and visually inspect the pick-up fitting assembly for failure of the spigot in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation Model BAC 1-11 Alert Service Bulletin No. 57-A-PM 4621, Issue 2, dated July 27, 1970 or an FAA-approved equivalent as follows: (i) On the inboard (No. 1) flap sections, within the next 650 landings after the effective date of this AD, or before the accumulation of 7,500 landings on the pick-up fitting assembly spigot, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 650 landings from the last inspection until the spigot is replaced in accordance with paragraph (a)(4)(ii), or the assembly is replaced in accordance with paragraph (a)(4)(iii). (ii) On the center (No. 2) and outboard (No. 3) flap sections, within the next 2,000 landings after the effective date of this AD, or before the accumulation of 7,500 landings on the pick-up assembly spigot, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings from the last inspection until the spigot is replaced in accordance with paragraph (a)(4)(ii), or the assembly is replaced in accordance with paragraph (a)(iii). (2) If a failed spigot is found during an inspection required by paragraph (a)(1), before further flight comply with paragraph (a)(4). (3) Within the next 1,000 landings after the effective date of this AD or before the accumulation of 25,000 landings on the pick-up assembly spigot, whichever occurs later, comply with paragraph (a)(4). (4) Comply with either subparagraph (i), (ii), or (iii). (i) Replace an affected spigot with a serviceable spigot of the same part number and continue to inspect in accordance with paragraph (a) (1); or (ii) Replace an affected spigot with an improved spigot, P/N AB09- 3887 (BAC Modification PM 4621, Part (a) in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation Model BAC 1-11 Service Bulletin No. 57-PM 4621, Issue 1, dated May 18, 1970 or an FAA-approved equivalent and inspect in accordance with paragraph (b)(1); or (iii) Replace the assembly containing the affected spigot with a new assembly (BAC Modification PM 4621, Part (b)) in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation Model BAC 1-11 Service Bulletin No. 57-PM 4621, Issue 1, dated May 18, 1970 or an FAA- approved equivalent. (b) For flap sections with a pick-up fitting assembly with a spigot having P/N AB09- 3887 (post-Mod. 4621, Part (a)) installed: (1) Remove the lower inboard access panel and visually inspect the pick-up fitting assembly for failure of the spigot in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation Model BAC 1-11 Alert Service Bulletin No. 57-A-PM 4621, Issue 2, dated July 27, 1970 or an FAA-approved equivalent as follows: (i) On the inboard (No. 1) flap sections, within the next 650 landings after the effective date of this AD or before the accumulation of 20,000 landings on the pick-up fitting assembly spigot, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 650 landings from the last inspection until the assembly is replaced in accordance with paragraph (b)(4)(ii). (ii) On the center (No. 2) and outboard (No. 3) flap sections, within the next 2,000 landings after the effective date of this AD or before the accumulation of 20,000 landings on the pick-up fitting assembly, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings from the last inspection, until the assembly is replaced in accordance with paragraph (b)(4)(ii). (2) If a failed spigot is found during an inspection required by paragraph (b)(1), before further flight comply with paragraph (b)(4). (3) Within the next 1,000 landings after the effective date of this AD or before the accumulation of 30,000 landings on the pick-up assembly, whichever occurs later, comply with paragraph (b)(4). (4) Comply with either subparagraph (i) or (ii). (i) Replace an affected spigot with a serviceable spigot of the same part number and continue to inspect in accordance with paragraph (b)(1); or (ii) Replace the assembly containing the affected spigot with a new assembly (BAC Modification PM 4621, Part (b)) in accordance with British Aircraft Corporation Model BAC 1-11 Service Bulletin No. 57-PM 4621, Issue 1, dated May 18, 1970 or an FAA- approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective April 6, 1972.
2021-17-12: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2020-13-07 for all Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd & Co KG (RRD) Trent 1000-D2, Trent 1000-J2, and Trent 1000-K2 model turbofan engines with a certain part- numbered fuel pump installed. AD 2020-13-07 required removal and replacement of the fuel pump with a part eligible for installation. This AD was prompted by the manufacturer's investigation into an unexpected reduction in fuel pump performance in certain high life fuel pumps and subsequent determination that an additional part-numbered fuel pump is subject to the same unsafe condition. This AD requires new and reduced life limits for certain part-numbered fuel pumps, depending on the engine model the fuel pump is installed on. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-09-06: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Airbus Model A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. That AD currently requires identification of the part number and serial number of the parking brake operated valve (PBOV); and, if necessary, inspection of the PBOV, including a functional check of the PBOV, and follow-on and corrective actions. That AD also provides for an optional terminating action for the requirements of that AD. This new action mandates the previously optional terminating action, which terminates the inspection requirements of the previous AD. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent leakage of hydraulic fluid from the PBOV, which could cause the loss of the parking brake accumulator, and render the alternate braking system and the parking/emergency braking system inoperative, as well as causing the loss of function of the yellow hydraulic system (which provides all or part of the hydraulics for the elevator, rudder, aileron, flaps, stabilizer, yaw damper, pitch and yaw feel systems and autopilot, and certain spoilers).
2021-16-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Leonardo S.p.a. Model AB412 and AB412 EP helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of the failure of both inverters in-flight, leading to an autopilot disconnection. This AD requires a one-time inspection of the clearance between a certain protective grommet installed in the emergency bus interlock compartment and the cable assemblies passing through it, and depending on the finding, applicable corrective actions, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
77-13-06: 77-13-06 PILATUS AIRCRAFT LTD. AND FAIRCHILD HILLER: Amendment 39- 2928. Applies to Pilatus Model PC-6 airplanes (all variants) with serial numbers up through 743 and Fairchild Hiller Model PC-6 airplanes, serial numbers 2001 through 2019, 2021 through 2038, and 2040 through 2049, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent a possible landing flap nose rib fatigue failure, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 25 hours time in service, and, thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 100 hours time in service since the last inspection, visually inspect all the end ribs of the landing flaps for cracks in accordance with Pilatus Service Bulletin No. 124, paragraph 2.1, dated January 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) If a crack is found during any inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, before further flight, repair the crack in accordance with paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 of Pilatus Service Bulletin No. 124, dated January 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (c) Within the next 1,000 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, reinforce the landing flap nose end ribs in accordance with paragraph 2.3 of Pilatus Service Bulletin No. 124, dated January 1976, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (d) The repetitive inspections required by paragraph (a) of this AD may be discontinued after the reinforcement has been accomplished in accordance with paragraph (c) of this AD, and all cracks have been repaired in accordance with paragraph (b) of this AD. (Fairchild Hiller Service Bulletin PC-6-51-3 pertains to this same subject.) This amendment becomes effective July 25, 1977.
98-09-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Fokker Model F27 Mark 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, and 700 series airplanes, that requires a modification of the lapjoint below the chine line at certain fuselage stations. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue cracking in the lapjoint below the chine line at certain fuselage stations, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the fuselage.
2004-08-18: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Dornier Model 328-300 series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive inspections of motive flow check valves and adjacent parts for fuel leaks, and replacement of the valves if leaks are detected. This amendment requires new repetitive engine operational tests. This amendment also requires replacement of the motive flow check valves with new parts, which would constitute terminating action for the repetitive inspections and engine operational tests. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent leakage of fuel from the motive flow check valves, which could result in fuel vapors coming into contact with fuel ignition sources and consequent fuel tank explosion and fire. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2021-16-05: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2016-12- 51, which applied to all Airbus Helicopters Model AS332L2 and Model EC225LP helicopters. AD 2016-12-51 prohibited all further flight of Model AS332L2 and Model EC225LP helicopters. This AD requires replacing certain second stage planet gear assemblies, removing certain epicyclic modules, installing a full flow magnetic plug (FFMP), revising the existing \n\n((Page 50227)) \n\nrotorcraft flight manual (RFM) for your helicopter, repetitively inspecting the main gearbox (MGB) particle detectors, repetitively inspecting the MGB oil filter and oil cooler, and corrective action if necessary, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The actions specified in this AD terminate the flight prohibition. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.