Results
2004-03-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Learjet Model 31, 31A, 35, 35A (C-21A), 36, and 36A airplanes, that requires modification of the drag angles of the fuselage and engine pylons to gain access to the shear webs of the forward engine beams; repetitive inspections of the shear webs of the forward engine beams for cracks; follow-on actions; and modification/repair of the shear webs of the forward engine beams, as necessary, which terminates the repetitive inspections. This action is necessary to prevent significant structural damage to the engine pylons, possible separation of the engines from the fuselage, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
95-18-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Beech Model 400 and 400A airplanes, that requires modification of the autopilot and rudder boost interlock. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that the rudder boost system installed on these airplanes does not operate correctly during deployment of a thrust reverser. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent incorrect operation of the rudder boost system during deployment of a thrust reverser and to prevent the autopilot from exceeding certain bank angle limits; these conditions could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
95-24-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain de Havilland Model DHC-8 series airplanes. This action requires eddy current inspections to detect cracking of the pivot tubes in the drag strut of the nose landing gear (NLG), and repair or replacement of any cracked tube with a serviceable or new tube. This amendment is prompted by reports that the pivot tubes cracked or failed completely due to fatigue. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent such fatigue cracking and subsequent failure of the pivot tube, which could result in a nose gear-up landing.
69-15-06: 69-15-06 LEARJET: Amendment 39-802. Applies to Model 23 (Serial Numbers 23-012, 23-019 and 23-030 thru 23-099) equipped with Controlex ball bearing throttle cables; Model 24 (Serial Numbers 24-100 thru 24-139) equipped with Controlex ball bearing throttle cables; and (Serial Numbers 24-140 thru 24-180); and Model 25 (Serial Numbers 25-003 thru 25-024) Airplanes. Compliance: Within 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive, unless already accomplished: To prevent the possibility of the engine power control cable jamming, accomplish the following: Remove the one-piece Controlex throttle cables and install two-piece quick-disconnect type ball bearing throttle cables in accordance with Lear Service Kit No. 23/24/25-317, dated May 19, 1969, or later Federal Aviation Administration approved revision, or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Central Region. This amendment becomes effective August 15, 1969.
2021-01-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain MHI RJ Aviation ULC Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. This AD was prompted by evidence that a revised structural life limit of some components of the nose landing gear (NLG) and/or main landing gear (MLG) was not implemented during repair. This AD requires verifying that the affected components are installed on the airplane, revising the structural life limits in the existing structural deviation inspection requirements (SDIR) airplane document, and replacing affected components if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
57-25-02: 57-25-02 HELIO: Applies to Model H-391B Aircraft Serial Numbers 001 Through 055. Compliance required as indicated. Cracks have been found in the fin front spar underneath the steel attachment fittings holding the stabilizer to the fin. Cracks were also discovered in the flanges of the fins nose ribs second and third from the bottom. To preclude possible failure of the fin spar, the following inspections and rework are required: 1. Aircraft with less than 400 hours total time. (a) Inspect visually for cracks the fin front spar and lower nose ribs within the next 100 hours of operation and every 100 hours thereafter until reinforced as described in Helio Service Bulletin No. 17 or equivalent. (b) If cracks are found they must be stopdrilled and the parts reinforced prior to further flight. (c) If no cracks are found reinforcement of the fin front spar and lower nose ribs attachments is required prior to the accumulation of 400 hours total time.2. Aircraft having 400 hours or more total time. (a) Visual inspection and reinforcement are required within the next 25 hours flight time. If any cracks are found, they should be stop-drilled prior to adding the reinforcements. (Helio Service Bulletin No. 17 covers this subject.)
95-15-52: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) T95-15-52 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of certain Boeing Model 747-100 and -200 series airplanes by individual telegrams. This AD requires a revision of the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) and Airplane Weight and Balance Supplement to restrict cargo loading to a certain level. This AD also provides for the removal of the restrictions following accomplishment of a modification of the longitudinal floor beams. This amendment is prompted by a determination that inadequate strength in the floor beams exists on certain airplanes that have been modified for cargo configurations. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the longitudinal floor beams, which may cause the keel beam to fail and result in rupture of the fuselage.
95-23-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to The New Piper Aircraft, Inc. (Piper) Model PA-46-350P airplanes. This action requires installing a placard (to the right of the manifold pressure gauge in full view of the pilot) that specifies manifold pressure limits, and incorporating a revision into the Limitations section of the Pilot's Operating Handbook (POH). The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue damage to the propeller caused by operating above certain manifold pressure limits.
2021-02-14: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that the necessary sealant was not applied to the side of body (SOB) slot as a result of a production drawing that provided unclear SOB slot sealant application instructions. This AD requires a general visual inspection for insufficient sealant in the SOB slot, and related investigative and corrective actions. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-03-01: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for a certain Air Cruisers Company Emergency Evacuation Slide/Raft System. That AD currently requires a one-time unpacking and subsequent repacking of the slide/raft systems, identified by basic part number (P/N) with dash numbers, and serial numbers (SNs) listed in the AD, and mandates repacking of all other slide/raft systems of the same design at the next required normal maintenance schedule of the slide/raft system. This AD contains the same requirements but replaces the specific slide/raft system P/N dash numbers with the word "-series", reduces the number of affected slide/raft systems to the SNs identified in paragraph (g) of the AD, and eliminates mandating the utilization of the applicable Folding Procedures for subsequent repacking of all slide/raft systems of the same design during the normal scheduled maintenance. This AD is prompted by recent information received that Air Cruisers Company has made modifications which have added new dash numbers to the slide/raft system basic P/N. This has affected some of the SN slide/raft systems listed in the AD. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the slide/raft to properly inflate, which could impede the emergency evacuation of passengers in the event of an airplane emergency. \n\nDATES: This AD becomes effective March 11, 2004. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations as of March 11, 2004. The incorporation by reference of certain other publications, as listed in the regulations, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of March 7, 2003 (68 FR 4897; January 31, 2003).