Results
2013-13-08: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 767 airplanes. That AD currently requires sealing certain fasteners and stiffeners in the fuel tank, changing certain wire bundle clamp configurations on the fuel tank walls, inspecting certain fasteners in the fuel tanks and determining the method of attachment of the vortex generators; and performing corrective actions if necessary. This new AD adds a general visual inspection for the presence of a polytetrafluoroethylene \n\n((Page 42412)) \n\n(TFE) sleeve at the clamp location on the rear spar, and installation of a TFE sleeve if necessary. This new AD also adds airplanes to the applicability. This AD was prompted by fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer, and the identification of another possible ignition source location. We are issuing this AD to prevent possible ignition sources in the auxiliary (center) fuel tank, main fuel tanks, and surge tanks caused by a wiring short or lightning strike, which could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
71-20-02: 71-20-02 HAWKER SIDDELEY: Amdt. 39-1295. Applies to Model DH-114 "Heron" airplanes. Compliance is required as indicated. To ensure that the emergency escape hatches (P/N's 14 FS.2991A, 4 FS.835A/1, or 4 FS.835A/2) can be opened from outside the airplane accomplish the following: (a) Before further flight check the operation of each escape hatch lock mechanism by turning the external handle with the internal handle in the stowed position. The check required by this paragraph may be performed by the pilot. (b) If an escape hatch lock mechanism is found to be inoperable during the check required by paragraph (a), before further flight, except that the airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repairs can be performed, secure the inoperable lock mechanism to the escape hatch in accordance with Hawker Siddeley Aviation, Ltd., Technical News Sheet Series: Heron (114) No. F.16, Issue 1, dated March 15, 1971, or an FAA- approved equivalent.(c) Within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, secure the lock mechanism to each escape hatch in accordance with Hawker Siddeley Aviation, Ltd., Technical news Sheet Series: Heron (114) No. F.16, Issue 1, dated March 15, 1971, or an FAA-approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective September 23, 1971.
2012-23-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Sikorsky Model S-70, S-70A, and S-70C helicopters, which are restricted category helicopters derived from the military Model UH-60 helicopter. This AD would require reducing or establishing life limits for certain listed helicopter parts. This AD is prompted by a review of the United States Army's analysis of their Model UH-60 fleet, which determined it necessary to establish or reduce the life limits of certain parts. The actions are intended to prevent fatigue failure of a part and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
85-16-09: 85-16-09 PILATUS AIRCRAFT, LTD., AND FAIRCHILD-HILLER: Amendment 39-5107. Applies to Model(s) PC-6 (S/N 1 to and including 844, and S/N 2001 to and including 2092) airplanes certificated in any category. NOTE: Service Bulletin (S/N) Numbers (no.) 142, 143, and 144 all dated December 1984, are applicable to Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., built airplanes which are identified by Serial Numbers (S/N) below 1000, and Service Letters (S/L) PC6-55-2, PC6-55-3 and PC6-55-4 all dated April 9, 1985, are applicable to Fairchild-Hiller built airplanes which are identified by S/N's above 2000. Compliance: Required as indicated after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent a possible loss of airplane control, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 25 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date of this AD: (1) On airplanes S/N 1 to and including 826 and 2001 to and including 2092 (except 524, 676, 707, 710 and 816), perform the required inspection and corrective action if needed in accordance with paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of this AD, and (2) On airplanes S/N 827 to and including 844 perform the required inspection and corrective action if needed in accordance with paragraph (d) of this AD. (b) Using a dye penetrant test method, inspect the Left Hand and Right Hand cap angles adjacent to the rudder hinge attachment points on the vertical stabilizer for cracks, in accordance with S/B No. 142 Section 2, "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS", PARAGRAPH (para.) A "INSPECTION" or S/L PC6-55-2. If cracks are found, prior to further flight replace the defective cap angle and modify the vertical stabilizer in accordance with S/B No. 142, Section 2, "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS" para. B "MODIFICATION", or S/L PC6-55-2. (c) Using a dye penetrant test method inspect the upper and lower cap angles adjacent to the elevator bearing bracket attachment points on the horizontal stabilizer in accordance with S/B No. 143, Section 2 "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS", para. A "INSPECTION", or S/L PC6-55-3. (1) If cracks are found, prior to further flight, repair in accordance with the repair scheme of S/B No. 143 or S/L PC6-55-3, and in addition; (2) If the bolt hole is less than 0.120 inches (in.) (3mm) from the edge of the cap angle, modify the horizontal stabilizer prior to further flight in accordance with S/B No. 143, Section 2 "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS", para. B "MODIFICATION" or S/L PC6-55-3. (d) Visually inspect the area around the rectangular cutout located in the front spar of the horizontal stabilizer, adjacent to the elevator control cables pulley assembly, in accordance with S/B No. 144, Section 2 "ACCOMPLISHMENT OF INSTRUCTIONS", para. B "CRACK INSPECTION", or S/L PC6-55-4. If cracks are found and; (1) If no crack is longer than 0.20 inches (5mm) install within the next 50 hours TIS standard repair plate (P/N 113.45.06.027) in accordance with S/B No. 144, Section 2 "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS", para. D "INSTALLATION OF STANDARD REPAIR PLATE" or S/L PC6-55-4. (2) If any crack is longer than 0.20 inches (5mm) but less than 0.80 inches (20mm), prior to further flight install standard repair plate (P/N 113.45.06.027) in accordance with para. (d)(1) of this AD. (3) If any crack is longer than 0.80 inches (20mm), prior to further flight repair the horizontal stabilizer in accordance with S/B No. 144, Section 2 "ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS", para. C "SPECIAL PROCEDURES" or S/L PC6-55-4. (e) Each 100 hours TIS after the initial inspection: (1) On airplanes S/N 1 to and including 826 and 2001 to and including 2092 (except 524, 676, 707, 710 and 816) repeat the inspection required by para. (b) of this AD, until the modification described in S/B No. 142, para. 2.B "MODIFICATION" or S/L PC6-55-2 is complied with, at which time this repetitive inspection is no longer required. (2) On airplanes S/N 1 to and including 844 and S/N 2001 to and including 2092, repeat the inspection required by para. (d) of this AD. (f) The intervals between the repetitive 100 hour TIS inspections required by para. (e) of this AD may be adjusted up to 10 percent of the specified interval to allow accomplishment of these inspections concurrent with other scheduled maintenance of the airplane. (g) Aircraft may be flown in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulation 21.197 to a location where this AD can be accomplished. (h) An equivalent method of compliance with this AD, if used, must be approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. All persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request to Pilatus Aircraft, Ltd., CH6370-Stans, Switzerland, or Fairchild-Republic Corp., Showalter Road, Hagerstown, Maryland 21740, or FAA, Office of the Regional Counsel, Room 1558, 601 East 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri64106. This amendment becomes effective on August 31, 1985.
85-19-01: 85-19-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-5134. Applies to Boeing Model 767 and 757 series airplanes, and certain Model 737 and 727 series airplanes, certificated in any category, equipped with Rosemount Angle of Attack (AOA) sensors identified as Model 861CAB or 861CAK and modification number 0001. To prevent the hazards associated with a malfunctioning AOA sensor caused by loose resolver and/or damper gears, accomplish the following as indicated below, unless already accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tInspect Model 757 and 767 series airplanes equipped with Rosemount AOA sensors, Model 861CAB, modification number 0001, within 300 flight hours or 30 days, whichever is later, after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 flight hours or 30 days, whichever is later, until the replacement prescribed in subparagraph A.1. or A.2., below, is accomplished: \n\n\t\t1.\tReplace Rosemount AOA sensors, serial numbers 00475 through 00629, within 180 days after the effective date ofthis AD, with a unit bearing modification number 0001A, in accordance with the instructions in paragraph C., below. \n\n\t\t2.\tReplace Rosemount AOA sensors, serial numbers 00001 through 00474, within 360 days after the effective date of this AD, with a unit bearing modification number 0001A, in accordance with the instructions in paragraph C., below. \n\n\tInspect in accordance with the appropriate Boeing Alert Service Bulletin, 757-34A0026 or 767-34A30, both dated November 12, 1984, or later FAA approved revision. Units determined to be faulty during inspections must be replaced with a serviceable unit, prior to further flight. \n\n\tB.\tInspect Model 727 and 737 series airplanes equipped with Rosemount AOA sensors, Model 861CAK, modification number 0001, within 300 flight hours or 30 days, whichever is later, after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 flight hours or 30 days, whichever is later, until the replacement required in subparagraph B.1., below, is accomplished: \n\n\t\t1.\tReplace Rosemount AOA sensors, serial numbers 00001 through 00173, within 180 days after the effective date of this AD, with a unit bearing modification number 0001A in accordance with the instructions in paragraph C., below. \n\n\tInspect in accordance with paragraph 3 of "Accomplishment Instructions" of the appropriate Boeing Alert Service Bulletin, 727-34A0223 or 737-27A1126, both dated November 12, 1984, or later FAA approved revision. Units determined faulty during inspections must be replaced with a serviceable unit, before further flight. \n\n\tC.\tRemove, inspect, and rework Rosemount AOA sensors as specified in paragraphs A. and B., above, in accordance with the appropriate Rosemount Service Bulletin, 861CAB-34-02 or 861CAK-34-01, both dated November 12, 1984, or later FAA approved revision. Units found with both resolver gears loose must be returned to Rosemount for rework. \n\n\tD.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of replacements required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the above specified service bulletins from the manufacturers may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124, or Rosemount, Inc., P.O. Box 35129, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55435. They may also be examined at the FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective October 12, 1985.
2018-06-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Pacific Aerospace Limited Model 750XL airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as the possibility for the control column to snag on the cockpit control tee handles on certain airplanes. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
73-06-01: 73-06-01\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-1603. Applies to all Model 727 series airplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 27-129 dated 3 October 1969, or later FAA approved Revisions. \n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\tTo prevent failures of the leading edge slat actuators, accomplish the following: \n\t(a)\tWithin 3000 landings from the effective date of this AD. \n\t\t(1)\tRework actuators (Ronson Part No. 1U1095) on leading edge slats numbered 1, 2, 7 and 8 in accordance with rework instructions in Boeing Service Bulletin 27-129, dated 3 October 1969, or later FAA approved Revisions, or rework in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region, or \n\t\t(2)\tReplace actuators (Ronson Part No. 1U1095) on slats numbered 1, 2, 7 and 8 with redesigned actuators, Ronson Part Nos. 1U1095-5 or 1U1095-9-2, or replace with actuators, Decoto Part Nos. 2-690029-1, -2, or -3. \n\t(b)\tRework of the actuators, Ronson Part No. 1U1095 in accordance with (a)(1) above orreplacement of the actuators in accordance with (a)(2) above constitutes terminating action under the provisions of this AD. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective March 13, 1973.
2000-10-01: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Airbus Model A300 B2, A300 B2K, A300 B2-200, A300 B4, A300 B4-100, and A300 B4-200 series airplanes, that currently requires certain structural inspections and modifications. This amendment requires that those inspections be accomplished on additional airplanes. This action also requires new repetitive inspections for airplanes in certain configurations at revised thresholds and intervals. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct corrosion and cracking of the wings and fuselage, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
2003-11-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Israel Aircraft Industries, Ltd. Model 1121, 1121A, 1121B, 1123, 1124, and 1124A series airplanes, that requires removing the existing oxygen shutoff valve and installing a new oxygen shutoff valve. This action is necessary to prevent rapid adiabatic compression within the oxygen line between the oxygen shutoff valve and the pressure regulator due to a shutoff valve that can be opened quickly, which could result in overheating of the oxygen system, and consequent fire in the cockpit. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2022-04-01: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for DG Flugzeugbau GmbH Model DG-1000T gliders and Schempp-Hirth Flugzeugbau GmbH Model Duo Discus T gliders with a Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH Solo Model 2350C or 2350D engine installed. This AD was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as failure of the bearing of the upper pulley of the belt driven reduction gear resulting in separation of the propeller from the engine. This AD requires replacing a certain hex-nut and establishing a life limit for the ball bearing assembly. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2013-13-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain [[Page 41287]] Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of an uncommanded nose landing gear (NLG) retraction. This AD requires installing a power interruption protection circuit for the landing gear control interface unit (LGCIU). We are issuing this AD to prevent untimely unlocking and/or retraction of the NLG, which, while on the ground, could result in injury to ground personnel and damage to the airplane.
69-18-03: 69-18-03 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amdt. 39-832. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Models DC-8-42, DC-8-43, DC-8F-54, DC-8F-55, DC-8-61, DC-8-62, DC-8-62F, DC-8-63 and DC-8-63F aircraft listed in McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin No. 34-107, revised August 20, 1969, or later FAA approved revision. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 200 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo detect possible chafing on the static pipe assembly by the aircraft control cables due to improper clearance from the static pipe assembly, accomplish the following, or an equivalent inspection or modification approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(a)\tInspect the first officer's static system for proper clearance, minimum 1/2 inch, between the static pipe assembly, P/N 7646168-228 or 7754670-105, and the aircraft control cables and for evidence of possible chafing on the static pipe assembly by the aircraft control cables. The static pipe assembly is located below the floor directly under the electrical power equipment panel in the cockpit area. \n\n\t(b)\t(i)\tIf the proper clearance, minimum 1/2 inch, is found and there is no evidence of chafing no further action is necessary. \n\n\t\t(ii)\tIf the proper clearance, minimum 1/2 inch, is not found and there is no evidence of chafing, provide the proper clearance, minimum 1/2 inch, in accordance with the Douglas Service Bulletin, No. 34-107, revised August 20, 1969, or a later FAA approved revision, prior to further flight. \n\n\t\t(iii)\tIf there is evidence of chafing, replace the static pipe assembly, P/N 7646168-228 or 7754670-105, and provide proper clearance, minimum 1/2 inch, in accordance with the Douglas DC-8 Service Bulletin, No. 34-107, revised August 20, 1969, or a later FAA approved revision, prior to further flight. \n\n\t\t(iv)\tAircraft upon which repairs must be accomplished may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the repaircan be performed. \n\n\tNOTE: McDonnell Douglas advises that a Service Bulletin No. 34-108, will be issued in September, 1969, describing the installation of a new static pipe design in place of static pipe assembly, P/N 746168-228 or 7754670-105. Based on present information, the installation will constitute an equivalent modification; and, if accomplished, will be considered as an alternative method of compliance with this AD. \n\n\tThis Amendment becomes effective September 3, 1969.
98-21-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain British Aerospace Jetstream Model 3101 airplanes. This AD requires modifying the airplane s navigational system by shortening and re-clipping the cable looms to the No. 1 and No. 2 vertical gyroscopes, installing a warning label adjacent to the gyroscopes, and performing an operational check on the system. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for the United Kingdom. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a cross connection in the No. 1 and No. 2 vertical gyroscopes, which could result in navigational errors during flight.
64-24-04: 64-24-04 MCCAULEY: Amdt. 822 Part 507 Federal Register October 20, 1964. Applies to McCauley Constant Speed Models 2A36, B2A36, C2A36, D2A36, 2D36 Series Propellers Installed on Various Single-Engine Tractor-Type Aircraft Except Propellers with Blade Serial Numbers with a "K" prefix Above Serial Number K25150 and to All Propellers with a "Y" Following the Blade Serial Number. Also Excluded Are All Propellers with Blades with Plain Serial Numbers Above 27064 and Below 21298. (A Plain Serial Number is One Without a Prefix or Suffix Letter.) These may be found on such aircraft as Bellanca 14-19-2, 14-19-3; CallAir A-6; Cessna 180 Series, 182 Series, 185 Series, 210 Series, 305B, 321; Cessna 172 "Doyn" Conversion; Fletcher FU-24 Series; Lockheed 402-2; Meyers 200, 200A; Mooney Mark 20A, 20B, 20C; Navion B, D, E, F, G; Piper PA-24-180, PA-24-250; and Taylorcraft 20.) Compliance required as indicated. Because of the occurrence of cracks in the blade threaded shank on several propellers, accomplish the following: (a) Propellers with affected blades not having accumulated the maximum time listed in Table II-C of McCauley Service Bulletin No. 48-C dated July 6, 1964, before the effective date of this AD and which have not been previously inspected in accordance with AD 63-8-4 shall be equipped with new blades prior to the accumulation of 100 hours' time in service after the accumulation of the maximum time in service listed in Table II-C of McCauley Service Bulletin No. 48-C dated July 6, 1964. (b) Propellers with affected blades having accumulated a total time in service less than 1,000 hours when inspected in accordance with AD 63-8-4 and having accumulated less than 75 hours over the total service hours listed in Table III-C of McCauley Service Bulletin No. 48-C dated July 6, 1964, on the effective date of this AD shall be equipped with new blades prior to the accumulation of 100 hours' time in service over the total service hours listed inTable III-C. (c) Propellers with affected blades having accumulated a total time in service less than 1,000 hours when inspected in accordance with AD 63-08-04 and having accumulated more than 75 hours over the total service hours listed in Table III-C of McCauley Service Bulletin No. 48-C dated July 6, 1964, on the effective date of this AD shall be equipped with new blades within the next 25 hours' time in service. (d) Propellers with blades having accumulated a total time of less than 1,000 hours when inspected in accordance with AD 63-08-04 and which have not accumulated the maximum time in service listed in Table III-C of McCauley Service Bulletin No. 48-C dated July 6, 1964, on the effective date of this AD shall be equipped with new blades prior to the accumulation of 100 hours' time in service after the accumulation of the maximum time in service listed in Table III-C of McCauley Service Bulletin No. 48-C dated July 6, 1964. (e) Propellers with blades having accumulated a total time in service of 1,000 hours or more when inspected in accordance with AD 63-08-04 shall be equipped with new blades at the next propeller overhaul, or prior to the next 1,000 hours after the last blade thread inspection, whichever occurs first. (f) Identification of propeller blade serial numbers shall be determined in accordance with McCauley Service Bulletin No. 48-C dated July 6, 1964. (McCauley Service Bulletin No. 48-C dated July 6, 1964, including Supplemental Revisions, and Service Manual 620215 cover this same subject.) This supersedes AD 63-08-04. This directive effective November 20, 1964.
67-14-08: 67-14-08 RATIER-FIGEAC: Amdt. 39-393, Part 39, Federal Register April 11, 1967. Applies to Model FH 76-1 Propellers Installed on Pilatus Model PC-6 Series Airplanes. Compliance required within the next 200 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, or previously modified by Ratier Fageac (Amendment No. 1018). To prevent failure of the magnesium pitch change reduction gear housing, P/N 76-300- 01, rework the housing in accordance with Ratier Figeac Service Bulletin 61-44, dated December 1966, or later SGAC-approved revision. This directive effective May 11, 1967.
98-09-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain British Aerospace BAe Model ATP airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections to detect corrosion of the brake hydraulic accumulators in the vicinity of the mounting straps; and corrective actions, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct corrosion of the brake hydraulic accumulators, which could lead to loss of hydraulic pressure and consequent loss of braking capability of the airplane.
2003-11-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all McDonnell Douglas Model MD-90-30 airplanes, that requires replacement of the starter relay of the auxiliary power unit (APU) with a new, improved relay. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the APU starter relay, which could result in depleted main airplane batteries, overheated APU starters, and damage to the wiring adjacent to the APU starter. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2013-09-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain DASSAULT AVIATION Model FALCON 2000, FALCON 2000EX, MYSTERE-FALCON 900, and FALCON 900EX airplanes; and all Model MYSTERE-FALCON 50 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that collapse of the main landing gear (MLG) could cause wing tank structure failure, which could result in fuel spillage and consequent fire hazard. This AD requires modification of the wing fuel tanks in the area of the wheel well. We are issuing this AD to prevent fuel spillage in the event of a MLG collapse, and consequent fire hazard.
2013-11-17: We are superseding airworthiness directive (AD) 2010-14-14 that applies to certain Embraer S.A. Model ERJ 170 and ERJ 190 airplanes. AD 2010-14-14 currently requires, for certain airplanes, repetitively replacing the low-stage check valve and associated seals of the right hand (RH) engine's engine bleed system with a new check valve and new seals, replacing the low pressure check valves (LPCVs), and revising the maintenance program. For certain other airplanes, AD 2010-14-14 requires replacing a certain low-stage check valve with an improved low-stage check valve. For certain airplanes, this new AD adds replacing certain LPCVs of the left hand (LH) and RH engines, which would be an option for other airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of uncommanded engine shutdowns on both Model ERJ 170 and ERJ 190 airplanes due to excessive wear and failure of LPCVs having certain part numbers. We are issuing this AD to prevent the possibility of a dual engine in-flight shutdown due toLPCV failure.
74-25-11: 74-25-11 LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA: Amendment 39-2042. Applies to L-1011-385-1 Series airplanes, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. To provide protection in the event of unknown incipient failure condition in the housing of the fire pull handle module assembly, P/N 1520324, accomplish the following: Within 72 hours of receipt of this AD, adopt the following changes to the operator's operation manual, or its equivalent. (1) Change the EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES section to read, in pertinent part: 'Engine Fire or Severe Damage.' Reschedule reference step "Fuel Tank Valve - Check Closed" to be accomplished as the first referenced item prior to, "If warning persists after 30 seconds, discharge second bottle." NOTE: The manufacturer is issuing a revision to the FAA- approved airplane flight manual which covers the same subject. (2) Incorporate and comply with the following operating limitation: "Any APU operation in flight shall be with the APU auto-fire shutdown system armed and operative", until Lockheed Service Bulletin 093-26-010, Part 2E, has been accomplished for the APU fire pull handle, P/N 1520324. This amendment is effective December 16, 1974, and was effective November 20, 1974, for all recipients of the telegram dated November 20, 1974, which contained this amendment.
75-01-06: 75-01-06\tAIRESEARCH MANUFACTURING COMPANY of ARIZONA: Amendment 39-2064 as amended by Amendment 39-2079. Applies to model GTCP660-4 (prior to Serial No. P37808) and GTCP660-4R (Prior to Serial No. P133) Auxiliary Power Units installed in, but not limited to, Boeing B-747 airplanes, certificated in all categories. \n\n\tTo detect fatigue cracks in the fuel pump body, P/N 968502-2 and -3, and provide for replacement of assemblies, accomplish the following. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\t(a)\tFor APU fuel pump bodies, P/N 968502-2 or -3, with less than 7500 operating cycles time in service on the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t(1)\tWithin 15 days time in service after the effective date of this AD, install a placard in view of the flight crew to prohibit all inflight operation of the APU. Thereafter, the APU may not be used during flight but may be used for ground operations. \n\n\t\t(2)\tWithin 500 APU operating cycles after the effective date of this AD, check the fuel pump ultimate relief valve setting in accordance with paragraph 2.B. and C. of AiResearch Service Bulletin GTCP660-49-A3673, dated December 13, 1974, or later FAA approved revisions. \n\n\tNote 1. For the purposes of this AD, a fuel pump body operating cycle is any operation consisting of an APU start and shutdown. The number of cycles may be determined by actual count, or subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, may be calculated by dividing the fuel pump assembly time in service by the operator's fleet average APU operating time per APU cycle. If the actual fuel pump total time is unknown, APU operating time on which this pump is installed may be substituted for this figure. \n\n\t\t(3)\tIf the relief valve setting determined in (a)(2) above is in excess of the limits shown on line one, table one, of the above referenced service bulletin, inspect the fuel pump body, P/N 968502-2 or -3, for cracks in accordance with paragraph 2.E. of the above referenced service bulletin. \n\n\t\t(4)\tUnits found to be cracked per (a)(3) above must be rendered unserviceable and must be replaced with a new or serviceable fuel pump body, P/N 968502-2, -3, or -4, which has been inspected per paragraph 2.E. of the above referenced service bulletin prior to further operation. \n\n\tNote 2. Observe fuel pump body interchangability restrictions detailed in paragraph 2.E. of the above referenced service bulletin. \n\n\t\t(5)\tUnits found to be free of cracks per (a)(3) above may be returned to, or placed in, service after having determined that the relief valve has been properly adjusted and recording the total operating cycles on the pump body in accordance with paragraph 2.F. of the above referenced service bulletin. \n\n\t\t(6)\tNew or serviceable units returned to service in accordance with those requirements described in (a)(5), above, must be inspected for cracks before accumulating 7,500 cycles total time in service, andat intervals not to exceed 2,500 cycles thereafter. \n\n\t\t(7)\tOperators whose maintenance records show verification that they have been correctly setting this fuel pump ultimate relief valve using a procedure corresponding with paragraphs 2.B. and C. of the above referenced service bulletin are not required to install the placard or perform the pressure setting check required by (a)(1) and (a)(2) above. \n\n\t\t(8)\tThe operating restriction prescribed in (a)(1) above may be discontinued and the placard may be removed when the ultimate relief valve pressure check is conducted in accordance with (a)(2) through (a)(6) above. \n\n\t(b)\tFor fuel pump bodies, P/N 968502-2 or -3, with 7500 or more cycles in service on the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t(1)\tWithin 15 days time in service after the effective date of this AD install a placard in view of the flight crew to prohibit all taxi and inflight operation of the APU. Thereafter, the APU may not be used during taxi or flight but may be used for static ground operation. \n\n\t\t(2)\tWithin 500 APU operating cycles in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect the fuel pump body, P/N 968502-2 or -3, for cracks in accordance with paragraph 2.E. of the above referenced service bulletin. \n\n\t\t(3)\tUnits found to contain cracks must be rendered unserviceable and must be replaced with a new or serviceable fuel pump body, P/N 968502-2, -3, or -4 which has been inspected per paragraph 2.E. of the above referenced service bulletin prior to further operation. Prior to the installation of these units, it must be determined that the ultimate relief valve has been properly adjusted and the total operating cycles must be recorded on the pump body in accordance with paragraph 2.F. of the above referenced service bulletin. \n\n\t\t(4)\tUnits found to be free of cracks per (b)(2) above may be returned to, or placed in service after having determined that the ultimate relief valve has been properly set in accordance with paragraphs 2.B. and C. of the above referenced service bulletin. \n\n\t\t(5)\tFor crack free units returned to service in accordance with (b)(4) above, repeat the fuel pump body crack inspections at intervals not to exceed 2,500 cycles thereafter. If cracks are found, remove from service and replace the unit as prescribed in (b)(3) above. \n\n\t\t(6)\tNew or serviceable crack free units installed to replace cracked units in accordance with those requirements described in (b)(3), above, must be inspected for cracks at or before accumulating 7500 total cycles, and at or before 2500 cycle intervals thereafter. \n\n\t\t(7)\tThe operating restriction prescribed in (b)(1), above, may be discontinued and the placard may be removed when the fuel pump body inspection is conducted in accordance with (b)(2) through (b)(6) above. \n\n\t(c)\tFuel pump bodies may be continued in service beyond 7,500 cycles, and the recurring inspections andoperational restrictions required by paragraphs (a) and (b) above may be discontinued, when: \t \n\n\t\t(1)\tA relief bleed down valve, P/N 3603770-1, is incorporated per Service Bulletin GTCP660-49-3662, with either a new fuel pump body or a serviceable fuel pump body which has been inspected and determined to be crack free. \n\n\t\t(2)\tAn APU log book entry describing this modification must be made. \n\n\t(d)\tEquivalent procedures may be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, upon submission of adequate substantiation data. \n\n\t(e)\tAircraft may be flown to a base for the accomplishment of maintenance required by this AD, per FAR's 21.197 and 21.199. \n\n\tAmendment 39-2064 became effective January 13, 1975. \n\n\tThis amendment 39-2079 becomes effective January 31, 1975.
2021-05-16: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Pratt & Whitney Division (PW) PW4164, PW4164-1D, PW4168, PW4168-1D, PW4168A, PW4168A-1D, and PW4170 model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by several reports of low-pressure turbine (LPT) 4th- stage vane cluster assemblies leaning back and notching into the rotating LPT 4th-stage blades, causing some blades to fracture and release. This AD requires initial and repetitive replacements of the LPT 4th-stage air sealing ring segment assemblies with parts eligible for installation. This AD also requires initial and repetitive dimensional inspections of the LPT case for bulging and, depending on the results of the dimensional inspections, repair or replacement of the LPT case. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2013-13-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-400, -400D, and -400F series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of two in-service occurrences on Model 737-400 airplanes of total loss of boost pump pressure of the fuel feed system, followed by loss of fuel system suction feed capability on one engine, and in-flight shutdown of the engine. This AD requires repetitive operational tests of the engine fuel suction feed of the fuel system, and other related testing and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct loss of the engine fuel suction feed capability of the fuel system, which, in the event of total loss of the fuel boost pumps, could result in multi- engine flameout, inability to restart the engines, and consequent forced landing of the airplane.
2003-11-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Dassault Model Mystere-Falcon 900 and Falcon 900EX series airplanes, that requires replacement of certain self- adhering soundproofing mats under the passenger consoles in the cabin, which are not sufficiently fire-retardant, with mats that are not self- adhering and are sufficiently fire-retardant. This action is necessary to prevent an uncontrolled fire in the cabin due to self-adhering soundproofing mats under the passenger consoles in the cabin, which are not sufficiently fire-retardant. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2013-09-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model DHC-8-400 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of chafing found on the main landing gear (MLG) yoke. The chafing was attributed to contact between the nacelle fire detection wires and the MLG yoke. This AD requires inspections of the nacelle fire detection wires and the MLG yoke for damage; replacing nacelle fire detection wires, if necessary; repairing the MLG yoke, if necessary; and installing brackets and associated hardware to secure the fire detection wires. We are issuing this AD to prevent chafing between the nacelle fire detection wires and the MLG yoke. Chafing could lead to cracking and subsequent failure of the MLG yoke, which could adversely affect the safe landing of the airplane. In addition, chafing of the nacelle fire detection wires could cause them to fail and prevent the detection of a fire in the nacelle assembly. [[Page 38824]]