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82-03-03: 82-03-03 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-4306. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-10, -10F, -15, -30, -30F, and -40 series airplanes certificated in all categories. \n\nTo assure that the DC-10 wing slats remain extended even if the slat control system sustains severe damage, accomplish the following: \n\nUnless already accomplished, compliance is required with paragraphs A and B on or before January 31, 1983, or in accordance with a schedule of accomplishment approved by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. \n\nA.\tModify the leading edge slat servo system and replace the outboard slat system follow-up cables as outlined in the Accomplishment Instructions of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 27-187, original issue, or later revisions approved by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. \n\nB.\tInstall balanced pressure relief valves in hydraulic systems No. 1 and No. 3slat extend lines, left and right wing, as outlined in the Accomplishment Instructions of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 27-189, original issue, or later revisions approved by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. \n\nC.\tWithin the next 2000 flight hours after accomplishment of the modifications noted in paragraph A above, and at intervals not to exceed 4000 flight hours thereafter, visually inspect the balance spring assemblies and outboard slat follow-up cables, left and right wing, for integrity of installation. \n\nD.\tWithin the next 4,000 flight hours after accomplishment of the modifications noted in paragraph B above, and at intervals not to exceed 4,000 flight hours thereafter, functionally check for proper operation of the outboard slat relief valves as outlined in the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraph (E) of McDonnell Douglas DC-10 Service Bulletin 27-189, original issue, or later revisions approved by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. \n\nE.\tUpon the request of an operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region, may adjust the repetitive intervals specified in paragraphs C and D of this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of that operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the change for that operator. \n\nF.\tAlternate means of compliance with this AD which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. \n\nG.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\nThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\nAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). These documents also may be examined at FAA Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle Washington 98108, or 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California 90808. \n\nThis amendment becomes effective February 25, 1982.
52-12-02: 52-12-02 CURTISS-WRIGHT: Applies to all Model C-46 Series aircraft operated under CAR Part 42. Compliance required as indicated. In accordance with CAR 42.11 and to comply with air carrier standards, the main passenger cabin door locking means on all C-46 aircraft used for air carrier passenger operation must be equipped with both internal and external handles so that the door can be opened from either inside or outside in case of emergency. Aircraft not so equipped must be modified to comply by September 1, 1952.
2016-10-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model BD-700-1A10 and BD-700-1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that the network interface installed between the Information Management System (IMS) 6000 unit and the Cabin Entertainment System (CES) network could affect the Aircraft Control Domain (ACD), and result in the transmission of misleading navigational information to the flightcrew. This AD requires inspecting the network interface installation between the IMS and the CES, and disconnecting the installation, if necessary. We are issuing this AD to prevent the transmission of misleading navigational information, which could adversely affect the ability of the flightcrew to maintain the safe flight and landing of the airplane.
2016-10-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of cracking in the fuselage frame. This AD requires inspections for cracking in the fuselage frame, left and right sides, and repair if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fuselage frame fatigue cracking. Such cracking could result in loss of structural integrity and the inability to sustain loading conditions.
2010-14-16: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several cases have been reported where a loss of fluid in the No.2 hydraulic system has caused the power transfer unit (PTU) to overspeed, resulting in pressure fluctuations and increased fluid flow within the No. 1 hydraulic system. In one case, the hydraulic system control logic did not shut down the PTU and the overspeed condition persisted, resulting in the illumination of the No.1 HYD FLUID HOT caution light. * * * * * The unsafe condition is possible loss of both the No. 1 and No. 2 hydraulic systems, resulting in the potential loss of several functions essential for safe flight and landing of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: This AD becomes effective August 17, 2010. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of August 17, 2010. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of September 2, 2008 (73 FR 47818, August 15, 2008). The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain other publications listed in this AD as of July 10, 2007 (72 FR 30968, June 5, 2007).
82-06-03: 82-06-03 CANADAIR: Amendment 39-4343. Applies to Canadair Model CL-600-1A11 airplanes, serial numbers 1005 thru 1008 and 1010 thru 1037 certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished: 1. Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD replace the antiskid control unit P/N 600-87000-23 with P/N 600-87000-27 in accordance with paragraph 2A of Canadair Alert Service Bulletin A600-0094 dated November 20, 1981. Within the next 75 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD perform wiring system modifications to introduce a second power source for the antiskid system per paragraph 2B of the service bulletin. 2. Until such time as both the above requirements are accomplished, the takeoff distances derived from Section 4, page 4-44, or Supplement No. 2, page S2-73, and the landing distances derived from Section 4, page 4-63, or Supplement No. 2, page S2-94 of the FAA approved Airplane Flight Manual, shall be increased by 50 percent for all operations. If any suspected braking deficiency occurs during the brake operation, immediately switch off the antiskid system and control the brakes manually as described in paragraph 35.3 of Section 2 of the Airplane Flight Manual. 3. Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a maintenance base for accomplishment of the inspection required by this AD. 4. Alternate methods of compliance with this AD may be used when they provide an equivalent level of safety and are approved by the Chief, Seattle Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the addresses listed above. These documents may also be examined at the FAA Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. This amendment becomes effective March 22, 1982.
2016-09-10: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2007-10-10 R1 for all Airbus Model A300 B4-600, B4-600R, and F4-600R series airplanes, and Model A300 C4-605R Variant F airplanes (collectively called Model A300-600 series airplanes). AD 2007-10-10 R1 required revising the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate new limitations for fuel tank systems. This new AD requires revising the maintenance program or inspection program to incorporate revised fuel maintenance and inspection tasks. This AD was prompted by issuance of more restrictive maintenance requirements and/or airworthiness limitations by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to prevent the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors caused by latent failures, alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
82-18-03: 82-18-03 CANADAIR: Amendment 39-4442. Applies to Canadair Model CL-600-1A11 airplanes, serial numbers 1002 and subsequent, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required within the next 50 hours time in service. To ensure that the breakout forces of the two rudder anti-jam mechanisms (Part Number 600-90450) are within acceptable limits, accomplish the following if not already accomplished: 1. Measure the anti-jam mechanism breakout forces and re-rig, if necessary, in accordance with Canadair Alert Service Bulletin A600-0030, Revision 1, dated November 10, 1981. 2. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Seattle Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. 3. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). This amendment becomes effective September 1, 1982.
2016-09-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. This AD was prompted by the discovery of a number of incorrectly calibrated angle of attack (AOA) transducers installed in the stall protection system. This AD requires replacement of incorrectly calibrated AOA transducers. We are issuing this AD to detect and replace incorrectly calibrated AOA transducers; incorrect calibration of the transducers could result in late activation of the stick pusher.
2011-03-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires installing new fire handle shutoff system wiring. This AD was prompted by a possible latent failure in the fire handle shutoff relay circuit due to a lack of separation between engine wires. We are issuing this AD to minimize the possibility of a multiple engine shutdown due to single fire handle activation.
67-07-01: 67-07-01 BOEING: Amdt. 39-355 Part 39 Federal Register March 2, 1967. Applies to Model 727 Airplanes Equipped With the Sperry SP-50 Autopilot. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent an unsafe condition which may result when the autopilot does not disengage when the control wheel disconnect button is used, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tFor airplanes having Sperry SP-50 autopilot control panels with 1,500 or more hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, comply with (d) prior to completing the next 50 hours' time in service. \n\n\t(b)\tFor airplanes having Sperry Sp-50 autopilot control panels with less than 1,500 hours' time in service on the effective date of this AD, comply with (d) prior to completing 1,550 hours' total time in service. \n\n\t(c)\tOperators who have not kept records of hours' time in service of individual Sperry SP-50 autopilot control panels shall substitute hours' time in service of the airplane or airplanes in which the individual autopilot control panel was installed. \n\n\t(d)\tInstall a placard in clear view of the pilot with the following information: \n\tAutopilot(s) must be turned off when operating below 3,000 feet above ground level in a terminal area. Verify by position of the control panel engage lever. \n\n\t(e)\tThe placard installed in accordance with (d) may be removed when the Sperry SP-50 autopilot control panel switches have been reworked to Sperry Service Bulletin TA-697-104. \n\n\tThis directive effective March 2, 1967.
83-06-05 R1: 83-06-05 R1 SIAI-MARCHETTI: Amendment 39-4591 as amended by Amendment 39-4830. Applies to Models F260, F260B, and F260C (including SF260), (Serial Numbers up to 774 inclusive) airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To preclude failure of the nose-gear barrel joint weld, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 100 hours time-in-service on those barrels having 400 or more hours time-in-service on the effective date of this AD or prior to the accumulation of 500 hours time-in-service on those barrels having less than 400 hours time-in-service on the effective date of this AD and thereafter at intervals not exceeding 100 hours time-in-service accomplish the following: (1) Using a dye-penetrant method, inspect the nose-gear barrel joint weld at the attachment plate for cracks. Perform the inspection in accordance with the "Instructions" section of SIAI-Marchetti SB No. 260B34A, dated October 1, 1983, or an FAA approved equivalent. (i) If a crack is found, prior to further flight replace the nose-gear barrel in accordance with the applicable paragraph of SB No. 260B34A. (b) Operators who have not kept records of hours time-in-service for the nose-gear barrel must substitute airplane hours time-in-service. (c) Replacement of the barrels in accordance with Table "A" of the SIAI-Marchetti SB No. 260B34A eliminates the requirement for the periodic inspections in paragraph (a). (d) The intervals between the repetitive inspections required by this AD may be adjusted up to 10 percent of the specified interval to allow accomplishing these inspections concurrent with other scheduled maintenance of the airplane. (e) Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD can be accomplished. (f) An equivalent method of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, Europe, Africa and Middle EastOffice, FAA, c/o American Embassy, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. Amendment 39-4591 became effective March 31, 1983. This Amendment 39-4830 becomes effective March 26, 1984.
2016-08-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all General Electric Company (GE) CF6-80C2A1, CF6-80C2A2, CF6-80C2A3, CF6- 80C2A5, CF6-80C2A5F, CF6-80C2A8, CF6-80C2B1, CF6-80C2B1F, CF6-80C2B1F1, CF6-80C2B1F2, CF6-80C2B2, CF6-80C2B2F, CF6-80C2B3F, CF6-80C2B4, CF6- 80C2B4F, CF6-80C2B5F, CF6-80C2B6, CF6-80C2B6F, CF6-80C2B6FA, CF6- 80C2B7F, CF6-80C2B8F, CF6-80C2D1F, CF6-80C2L1F, CF6-80C2K1F and CF6- 80E1A1, CF6-80E1A2, CF6-80E1A3, CF6-80E1A4, and CF6-80E1A4/B turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by reports of a burn-through of the accessory heat shield during an engine fire, propagating the fire into the accessory compartment and igniting additional flammable fuel source. This AD requires replacing the accessory heat shield assembly. We are issuing this AD to prevent fires from propagating into the accessory compartment, resulting in an uncontrolled engine fire, and damage to the airplane.
83-24-01: 83-24-01 BRITISH AEROSPACE AIRCRAFT GROUP: Amendment 39-4770. Applies to Model HS 748 series 2A airplanes, certificated in all categories. To prevent failure of the wing structure, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished: A. Prior to accumulation of 10,000 landings, or within the next 750 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, visually inspect the wing structure in accordance with paragraph 2.B of the Accomplishment Instructions of British Aerospace HS 748 Aircraft Service Bulletin 57/34, Revision 3, dated March 3, 1980. B. Repeat the inspections as specified in Table No. 1 of the service bulletin. C. If any cracks are found, accomplish paragraph 2.D of the service bulletin. D. For the purpose of this AD, and when approved by an FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be computed by dividing each airplane's time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the aircraft type. E. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. F. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. This amendment becomes effective December 23, 1983.
79-11-04: 79-11-04 FAIRCHILD (HILLER): Amendment 39-3479. Applies to Model 1100 and FH-1100 type helicopters certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. In order to prevent cracking of the transmission lower housing gimbal ring support, accomplish the following: a. For P/N 24-23030-7 transmission lower housings (installed in P/N 24-23000-11, -31, and -41 transmission assemblies) which have accumulated 500 or more hours since new or overhauled, inspect and repair as necessary within 50 hours after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 500 hours, in accordance with Fairchild Service Bulletin No. FH-1100-23-10 dated September 25, 1974, revised April 24, 1979. This inspection shall be repeated at each 500-hour interval thereafter. b. For P/N 24-23030-7 transmission lower housings which have accumulated 1200 or more hours, unless already accomplished within the last 1100 hours, ream the gimbalring mounting holes to the next larger size in accordance with Fairchild Service Bulletin No. FH-1100-23-10 dated September 25, 1974, revised April 24, 1979, within 100 hours after the effective date of this AD and at each 1200-hour interval thereafter. c. As a result of the inspection and repair required under paragraphs a and b herein, if the gimbal ring mounting hole diameter exceeds 0.8755 inch or a total time of 3600 hours is attained on the P/N 24-23030-7 lower housing assembly the housing shall be retired from further service. d. Upon installation of transmission lower housing assembly P/N 24-23030-11, the requirements of this AD are no longer applicable. e. Equivalent inspections or parts must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region, may adjust the inspection interval specified in this airworthiness directive. f. Rotorcraft may be flown to a base where the maintenance required by this airworthiness directive is to be performed per FARs 21.197 and 21.199. This amendment is effective June 4, 1979.
2016-08-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 777-200, -200LR, -300, and -300ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of fractured forward attach fittings of the inboard flap outboard aft flap track. The fractured fittings were determined to be the result of corrosion pits forming on the inside diameter of the fittings. This AD requires an inspection for the affected part number and serial number of the main flap; various additional repetitive inspections of the fitting, if necessary; and replacement of the fitting or nested bushing installation, if necessary, which would terminate the inspections. This AD also provides an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fracture of the fitting, which could result in the loss of the inboard aft flap and could lead to a punctured fuselage, causing injury to the flightcrew and passengers, and damage to the airplane.
2000-23-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A310 and A300-600 series airplanes, that requires replacement of the flight control computers (FCC) with new, improved FCC's having updated software installed. This amendment also requires, for some airplanes, modification of the wiring of the FCC's. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent autopilot reversions in certain flight conditions, which could result in misunderstanding by the flight crew and consequent reduced ability to take appropriate action. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2016-07-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Dassault Aviation Model FALCON 7X airplanes. This AD was prompted by a fuel leak that occurred in the baggage compartment during fuel system pressurization. This AD requires opening the fuel boxes and restoring the sealing. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of a connector or coupling on a fuel line, which, in combination with a leak in the corresponding enclosure (i.e., fuel box), could result in a fire in the baggage compartment and affect the safe flight of the airplane.
2011-01-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: [T]he FAA published SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation 88). By mail referenced 04/00/02/07/01-L296 of March 4th, 2002 and 04/00/02/07/03-L024 of February 3rd, 2003 the JAA [Joint Aviation Authorities] recommended to the National Aviation Authorities (NAA) the application of a similar regulation. The aim of this regulation is to require * * * a definition review against explosion hazards. * * * * * Failure of the auxiliary power unit (APU) bleed leak detection system could result in overheat of the fuel tank located in the horizontal stabilizer and ignition of the fuel vapors in that tank, which could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
68-26-02: 68-26-02 DE HAVILLAND: Amdt. 39-694. Applies to DHC-6 Type Airplanes. To detect loose or missing jo-bolts in wing struts which have accumulated 150 or more hours time in service as of the effective date of this A.D., accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 50 hours time in service, unless already accomplished, visually inspect the top and bottom of the right and left wing struts, P/N C6W1005-3, -4, for loose or missing jo-bolts in accordance with the procedure described in deHavilland Service Bulletin No. 6/166, or an FAA approved equivalent procedure. (b) Identical inspections must be conducted at subsequent times in service of 450 to 550 hours, 2450 to 2550 hours and 7450 to 7550 hours after the inspection required by (a) and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 5000 hours time in service. (c) Prior to further flight, missing jo-bolts must be replaced with jo-bolts of the same part number or an FAA approved equivalent part; but a maximum of four (4)missing in any strut may be replaced within the next 250 hours time in service provided: (1) they are not all next to each other in the same row of twelve (12); or (2) they do not include more than two (2) which are next to each other in the same row of twelve (12) within six (6) inches of the strut end. (d) Equivalent parts and inspection procedures must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region. (e) The compliance times may be increased by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Eastern Region, upon receipt of substantiating data submitted through an FAA maintenance inspector. This amendment is effective December 20, 1968.
2016-06-14: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all General Electric Company (GE) CF6-80E1 turbofan engines with rotating compressor discharge pressure (CDP) seal, part number (P/N) 1669M73P02, installed. This AD was prompted by reports from the manufacturer of cracks in the teeth of two rotating CDP seals found during engine shop visits. This AD requires stripping of the coating, inspecting, and recoating the teeth of the affected rotating CDP seals. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracking of the CDP seal teeth, uncontained part release, damage to the engine, and damage to the airplane.
2011-01-01: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The earlier MCAI, Brazilian Airworthiness Directive 2007-08-01, effective September 27, 2007, describes the unsafe condition as: Fuel system reassessment, performed according to RBHA-E88/SFAR- 88 (Regulamento Brasileiro de Homologacao Aeronautica 88/Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88), requires the inclusion of new maintenance tasks in the Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) and in the Fuel System Limitations (FSL), necessary to preclude ignition sources in the fuel system. * * * The new MCAI, Brazilian Airworthiness Directive 2009-08-03, effective August 20, 2009, describes the unsafe condition as: An airplane fuel tank systems review required by Special Federal Aviation Regulation Number 88 (SFAR 88) and "RBHA Especial N mero 88'' (RBHA E 88) has shown that additional maintenance and inspection instructions are necessary to maintain the design features required to preclude the existence or development of an ignition source within the fuel tanks of the airplane. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
63-16-05: 63-16-05 UNIVERSAL: Amdt. 589 Part 507 Federal Register July 24, 1963. Applies to All Models Temco D-16 and D-16A Aircraft. Compliance required within 25 hours' time in service following the effective date of this AD and at each periodic inspection thereafter. (a) Inspect the flap and landing gear actuating cylinders for cracks. If any cracks appear, the cylinder must be replaced. (b) Determine, by means of a hydraulic gage, that the hydraulic system pressure relief valve is adjusted to 1125 + 25, -0 p.s.i. Excessive pressures could cause damage to the components of the system. (c) Unless already installed, install hydraulic fluid restrictors in the nose gear lines, Serial Numbers 1271 and subsequent, main gear lines, Serial Numbers 1790 and subsequent, and flap lines, all serial numbers. (d) Inspect the linkage adjustments of the landing gear bungee springs and the flap stops and determine that they have been properly adjusted in accordance with appropriate service manuals. (Tusco Corporation Service Letter No. 79 dated December 23, 1958, covers this same subject.) This directive effective August 23, 1963.
2016-07-01: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2014-07-04R1 for certain Model S-92A helicopters. AD 2014-07-04R1 required repetitive inspections in the upper deck area for incorrectly installed clamps and chafing between the electrical wires and the hydraulic lines and replacing any unairworthy wires or hydraulic lines. This new AD requires altering the wiring system in the upper deck area to correct the unsafe condition described in AD 2014-07-04R1. We are issuing this AD to prevent a fire in an area of the helicopter without extinguishing capability and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
84-21-03: 84-21-03 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-4939. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, and C-9 (Military) series airplanes, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated unless previously accomplished. To prevent jamming of the elevator controls by a detached forward rod end, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 650 hours time in service or 90 calendar days, whichever occurs first after the effective date of this AD, visually inspect the fitting assembly (rod end) part number (P/N) 3938704-1 and pushrod P/N 3938705-501, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A27-266, dated March 12, 1984, hereinafter referred to as ASB27-266, or later FAA approved revisions. \n\n\tB.\tIf results of visual inspection are satisfactory, accomplish paragraph 4 of Part 2, Accomplishment Instructions, of ASB27-266. \n\n\tC.\tIf results of visual inspection are unsatisfactory, proceed in accordance with paragraph 5, Accomplishment Instructions of ASB27-266. \n\n\tNOTE: If rod end P/N SM4-6T3 (exclude DC-9-80 series) is required and not available, P/N SM4-6T may be substituted. The latter has only one grease fitting which must be oriented to allow access for scheduled lubrication. \n\n\tD.\tAlternative inspections, modifications, or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). These documents also may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective November 26, 1984.