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98-21-24: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Pratt & Whitney JT8D series turbofan engines, that requires removal, visual inspection, eddy current inspection, repair or replacement of affected compressor disks. This amendment is prompted by reports of improper fixturing during the electrolytic cleaning process of certain compressor disks at a certified repair station, Avial or Greenwich Air Services, currently GE Engine Services Dallas LP, certificate number RA1R445K of Dallas, Texas, that can result in damage to the disks in the form of arc burns. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent compressor disk cracking from arc burns in tie rod holes, shielding holes, or pressure balance holes, which could lead to a fracture of a compressor disk, resulting in uncontained release of engine fragments, inflight engine shutdown, and airframe damage.
98-21-32: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Airbus Model A300, A310, and A300-600 series airplanes, that currently requires performing a ram air turbine (RAT) extension test; removing and disassembling the RAT uplock mechanism; performing an inspection to detect corrosion of the RAT uplock mechanism, and replacement with a new assembly, if necessary; and cleaning all the parts of the RAT control shaft and its bearing component parts. This amendment requires modification of the RAT unlocking control unit, which constitutes terminating action for the repetitive tests and inspections. This amendment also limits the applicability of the existing AD. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent corrosion of the RAT uplock pin/shaft and needle, which could result in failure of the RAT to deployand consequent loss of emergency hydraulic power to the flight controls in the event that power is lost in both engines.
91-19-06: 91-19-06 I.A.M. RINALDO PIAGGIO S.P.A.: Amendment 39-8033. Docket No. 91-CE-68-AD. Applicability: Model Avante P180 airplanes (serial numbers 1004, 1006, 1007, and 1009 through 1015), certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent movement or separation of the vertical stabilizer caused by failure of the No. 1 spar attachment, which could result in loss of control of the airplane, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 25 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 50 hours TIS until the modification described in paragraphs (a) (2) and (b) of this AD is accomplished, perform an endoscope inspection of the No. 1 spar of the vertical stabilizer attachment for cracks in accordance with the paragraphs (1) through (3) of Part A of 2. ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS in Piaggio Avante P180 Service Bulletin 80-0008, Revision No. 1, dated June 26,1991. (1) If no cracks are found, prior to further flight, remove the endoscope, install an inspection plastic plug, return the airplane to service, and accomplish the repetitive inspection requirements. NOTE: The modification described in paragraphs (a) (2) and (b) of this AD may be accomplished as terminating action for the inspection requirements of this AD provided that no cracks are found per the inspections required in paragraph (a) of this AD. (2) If cracks are found, prior to further flight, modify the No. 1 spar of the vertical stabilizer spar attachment and install a reinforcement kit in accordance with paragraphs (1) through (15) of Part B of 2. ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS in Piaggio Avante P180 Service Bulletin 80-0008, Revision No. 1, dated June 26, 1991. (b) Within the next 500 hours TIS after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished in accordance with paragraph (a) (2) of this AD, modify the vertical stabilizer spar attachment andinstall a reinforcement kit in accordance with paragraphs (4) through (15) of Part B of 2. ACCOMPLISHMENT INSTRUCTIONS in Piaggio Avante P180 Service Bulletin 80-0008, Revision No. 1, dated June 26, 1991. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office, Europe, Africa, Middle East office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. The request should be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office. (e) The inspections and modification required by this AD shall be done in accordance with Piaggio Avante P180 Service Bulletin 80-0008, Revision No. 1, dated June 26, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from I.A.M. Rinaldo Piaggio S.p.A., Via Cibrario, 4, 16154 Genoa, Italy. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, NW; Room 8401, Washington, DC. This amendment (39-8033, AD 91-19-06) becomes effective on October 10, 1991.
98-21-23: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to CFM International, S.A. (CFMI) CFM56-7B series turbofan engines. This action supersedes telegraphic AD T98-18-51 that currently requires an inspection of electronic engine control (EEC) fault messages on both engines for the presence of any of the hydromechanical unit (HMU) fuel metering valve (FMV) signal faults identified in the All Operators Wire every 20 flight cycles or 3 calendar days, whichever occurs first, and, if necessary, removing the HMU and replacing it with a serviceable HMU. This action also requires installation of improved EEC software that constitutes terminating action to the repetitive fault message inspections. This amendment is prompted by development of improved EEC software that obviates the need for the repetitive fault message inspections. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent an uncommanded engine acceleration event, or inflight engine shutdown.
47-10-15: 47-10-15 LOCKHEED: (Was Mandatory Note 17 of AD-763-3.) Applies to All Model 49 Serials Up to and Including 2075. Compliance required prior to recertification. Prior to recertification of all aircraft whose certificates were revoked by direction of the Administrator on July 11, 1946, the following Service Documents must be complied with. LOCKHEED SERVICE BULLETINS: *49/SB-50, revised August 24, 1946 - Revision of Cabin Air Recirculating Fan. 49/SB-58, dated July 22, 1946 - Sealing of Main Landing Gear Doors. 49/SB-86, dated July 18, 1946 - Rerouting of Thermocouple Wires. *49/SB-91, revised September 10, 1946 - Replacements of Electrical Power Feed-Through Studs. *49/SB-93, revised August 11, 1946 - Rework of Exhaust System Ball Joints and Collector Segment. 49/SB-95, dated July 22, 1946 - Insulation of Generator Circuit Breakers. (a) 49/SB-97, revised October 28, 1946 - Sealing, Draining, and Ventilation of Nacelles. 49/SB-98, dated July 26, 1946 - Removal of Engine Filtered Air Components and Plumbing. *49/SB-100, revised August 27, 1946 - Replacement of Fuel Pressure Warning Units. 49/SB-101, revised August 6, 1947 - Modification of Hydraulic Pump Case Drain Lines. 49/SB-102, dated July 23, 1946 - Relocation of Engine Fuel Pump Lines. 49/SB-104, revised July 23, 1946 - Replacement of Windshield Wiper Motor Circuit Fuse. 49/SB-106, dated July 22, 1946 - Replacement of Windshield Heater Wire. 49/SB-109, revised August 22, 1946 - Provision for Vacuum Pump Cooling. 49/SB-113, revised August 6, 1946 - Replacement of Aluminum Electrical Wires and Terminals. 49/SB-114, revised July 31, 1946 - Protection of Electrical Receptacle. 49/SB-115, dated July 23, 1946 - Insulation of Galley Circuit Breaker. 49/SB-116, revised August 2, 1946 - Installation of Generator Field Circuit Breaker (Switch Type). *49/SB-117, revised September 5, 1946 - Insulation of Right Angle Electrical Terminals and Electrical Wiring. 49/SB-118, revised August 10, 1946 - Support of Electrical Wiring in Main Gear Wheel Well. 49/SB-119, revised July 27, 1946 - Sealing of Main Landing Gear Door Hinge. 49/SB-119A, revised August 13, 1946 - Sealing of Main Landing Gear Doors. *49/SB-121, revised September 16, 1946 - Installation of Fire Resistant Hoses and Double Hose Clamps in Nacelle Zones 2 and 3. 49/SB-122, dated July 25, 1946 - Installation of Stainless Steel CO2 Lines. *49/SB-123, revised August 27, 1946 - Replacement of Alcohol Tank, Supply Lines and Vent Line (4-pump system). 49/SB-125, dated June 23, 1946 - Removal of Cargo Compartment Insulation. 49/SB-126, dated July 23, 1946 - Protection of Electrical Junctions and Disconnects at Fire Wall. 49/SB-127, revised July 31, 1946 - Sealing of Cabin Heater Panel. 49/SB-131, revised August 10, 1946 - Rerouting of Drain Line for Deicer Distributor Oil Separator. 49/SB-132, revised August 12, 1946 - Attachment of Electrical Wire Bundles in Forward Passenger Compartment. 49/SB-133, revised July 31, 1946 - Installation of Brass Liners and Double Hose Clamps in Line Between Sump Tank and Propeller Feathering Pump. (a) 49/SB-134, revised October 28, 1946 - Installation of Protective Shield for Engine Torquemeter Plumbing. 49/SB-135, revised August 11, 1946 - Addition of Fuselage Drain Provisions. 49/SB-136, dated July 31, 1946 - Protection of Cabin Heater Flexible Fuel Line. 49/SB-137, dated July 27, 1946 - Addition of Double Hose Clamps on Inboard Fuel Tank Interconnection Line. *49/SB-138, revised September 25, 1946 - Provisions for Increase of CO2 Capacity. *49/SB-155, revised August 28, 1946 - Installation of Copper Wires in Lieu of Aluminum Wires. **49/SB-161, dated August 29, 1946 - Replacement of Alcohol Tank, Supply Lines, and Vent Line 2-pump system). LOCKHEED SERVICE INSTRUCTIONS: *49/SI-22, revised October 10, 1946 - Installation of Engine Plumbing and Electrical Wiring Heat Protective System. *49/SI-41, revised August 16, 1946 - Nacelle Fire Extinguishing System Revisions. 49/SI-105, revised August 7, 1946 - Replacement of Hydraulic Secondary Return Line. LOCKHEED SERVICE INFORMATION LETTERS: *No. 42, revised September 10, 1946 (Canceled). No. 56, dated August 10, 1946 - Periodic Inspection of Vacuum Pump Pressure Hose. No. 57, revised August 15, 1946 - Fuselage Fire Control and Smoke Elimination Procedures. No. 58, revised August 15, 1946 - Combating Belly Cargo Compartment and Fuselage Fires. No. 60, dated August 10, 1946 (Canceled). TWA Engineering Order No. 2762 - Rework of Auxiliary Hydraulic Supply Tank and Discharge Line. *Service Documents identified by an asterisk and by (a) have been revised subsequent to issuance of AD-763 (Special) dated Aug. 21, 1946, as indicated by the later revision date effective in each instance. Aircraft previously recertificated in accordance with AD-763 (Special) should be checked for compliance with these later revisions within next 200 hours of operations. **Service Bulletin 49/SB-161 was not called for in AD-763 (Special), but has subsequently been found necessary, inasmuch as Bulletin 49/SB-123 does not adequately describe changes to 2-pump anti-icing systems. Aircraft incorporating 2-pump anti-icing systems should be checked for conformity with Bulletin 49/SB-161 prior to certification.
98-21-20: This amendment supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 97-04-02, which currently requires installing new exterior placards with operating instructions for the airstair door, cargo door, and emergency exits, as applicable, on certain Raytheon Aircraft Company (Raytheon) Models 1900, 1900C, and 1900D airplanes. This AD requires either modifying the existing exterior placards with door operating instructions installed in accordance with AD 97-04-02; or installing new exterior placards with operating instructions for the airstair door, cargo door, and emergency exits, as applicable. This AD results from reports of the placards (required by AD 97-04-02) covering the atmospheric vents for the cabin door differential pressure lock. The actions specified by this AD are intended to continue to assure that clear and complete operating instructions are visible for opening the airstair door, cargo door, or emergency exits, and to prevent improper operation of the cabin door differential pressure lock caused by the placards blocking the atmospheric vents.
88-15-01: 88-15-01 VALENTIN GmbH: Amendment 39-5958. Applies to Model Taifun 17E powered sailplanes (all serial numbers) certificated in any category. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent the possibility of inadequate warning of an impending stall which could result in the loss of control of the powered sailplane, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 30 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD or by September 15, 1988, whichever occurs first, install a stall warning system in accordance with the installation instructions of Valentin Technical Note (TN) No. 8/818, dated December 10, 1985. (b) Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. (c) Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office, AEU-100, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, 15 Rue de la Loi B-1040 Brussels, Belgium; telephone 513.38.30 Ext. 2710; or the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, Aircraft Certification Division, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, 181 South Franklin Avenue, Room 202, Valley Stream, New York 11581; telephone (516) 791- 6680. (d) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Airworthiness Inspector, the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office, or the Manager, New York Aircraft Certification Office, may adjust the compliance time specified in this AD. Valentin-Flugzeugbau GmbH TN No. 8/818, dated December 10, 1985, and associated installation instructions, identified and described in this document, are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 551(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents may obtain copies upon request from Valentin- Flugzeugbau GmbH, Flugplatzstrasse 18, D-8728 Hassfurt, Federal Republic of Germany; telephone 0 95 21/47 30; or Morris Aviation, Ltd., P.O. Box 718, Statesboro, Georgia, 30458; telephone (912) 489-8161. These documents may also be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, Room 311, Rules Docket 88-ANE-26, between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, except federal holidays. This amendment 39-5958 becomes effective on July 14, 1988.
78-11-03: 78-11-03 PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT: Amendment 39-3224. Applies to all Pratt & Whitney Aircraft JT3D turbofan engine models. Compliance required not later than March 1, 1980, unless already accomplished. To preclude failures of first stage fan blades due to forging laps, which could result in aircraft damage, perform a one-time blue etch anodize inspection of the blades in accordance with the procedures given in Pratt & Whitney Alert Service Bulletin 4733, dated May 5, 1977, or later FAA approved revision, and Special Instruction 2F-77, dated January 28, 1977, or later FAA approved revision. Fan blades that exhibit blue etch linear indications in the inspection areas shown in Figure 1 of ASB 4733 must be reworked or scrapped in accordance with the forging lap repair limits established in Figure 2 of ASB 4733, dated May 5, 1977, or later FAA approved revision. NOTE: The AD does not change the present fan blade blend limits given in the JT3D engine manual. Themanufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, Division of United Technologies Corporation, 400 Main Street, East Hartford, Connecticut 06108. These documents may also be examined at Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, and at FAA Headquarters, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, D.C. This amendment becomes effective August 10, 1978.
2013-05-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Rolls-Royce plc (RR) RB211-Trent 970-84, RB211-Trent 970B-84, RB211- Trent 972-84, RB211-Trent 972B-84, RB211-Trent 977-84, RB211-Trent 977B-84, and RB211-Trent 980-84 turbofan engines. This AD requires inspection of the intermediate pressure compressor rear stub shaft (IPC RSS) piston ring. This AD was prompted by the failure of an oil pump drive shear neck due to a piston ring seal that was not seated properly in the IPC RSS groove. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the oil pump drive shear neck, which could result in loss of oil pressure in one or more engines and reduced control of the airplane.
2010-13-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Investigation into a landing gear retraction problem on a production test flight revealed that, during aircraft pressurization and depressurization cycles, the pressure floor in the main landing gear bay deflects to a small extent. This causes relative misalignment between the [alternate-extension system] AES bypass valve, the downlock assist valve and the summing lever which, in turn, can result in damage to and potential failure of the respective clevis attached to one or both of the valves. Such a clevis failure could remain dormant and, in the subsequent event that use of the AES was required, full landing gear extension may not be achievable. * ** * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.