Results
2014-16-25: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2007-06-12 for certain Airbus Model A330-200 and A330-300 airplanes. This new AD reduces the compliance times for reinforcing the structure of the center fuselage. This AD was prompted by a new fatigue and damage tolerance evaluation that revealed the compliance time for an existing reinforcement of the fuselage has to be reduced. We are issuing this AD to prevent fatigue cracking of the fuselage, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the fuselage.
2014-16-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Embraer S.A. Model ERJ 170 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of ``BLEED 1(2) LEAK'' messages displayed on the engine indication and crew alert system (EICAS), and indirect damage to components of the electrical wiring interconnection system (EWIS) in the engine pylon area. This AD requires inspecting the EWIS components for damage, and repair if necessary. This AD also requires installing pre-cooler deflectors on the left- and right-hand pylons, and applying silicone sealant. We are issuing this AD to prevent indirect damage to EWIS components near the engine bleed air pre-coolers, which could result in a dual engine roll back to idle and consequent dual engine power loss and reduced controllability of the airplane.
75-01-04: 75-01-04 BEECH: Amendment 39-2062. Applies to Models A23-19, 19A, M19A and B19 (Serial Numbers MB-1 through MB-520); Model B19 Sport 150 (Serial Numbers MB-521 through MB-616); Models 23, A23, A23A, B23 and C23 (Serial Numbers M-1 through M-1361); Model C23 Sundowner 180 (Serial Numbers M-1362 through M-1485); Models A23-24 and A24 (Serial Numbers MA-1 through MA-368); Model A24R (Serial Numbers MC-2 through MC-95); and Models A24R and B24R Sierra 200 (Serial Numbers MC-96 through MC-180) airplanes. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. A) To reduce the possibility of improper or unintentional movement of the fuel selector valve, within 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, replace the existing fuel selector valve guard with a P/N 169-920001-43 or P/N 169-920000-165 as applicable to the airplane. B) To prevent binding and assure complete shutoff of the P/N 169-920000-61-127 or -131 selector valve in the "Off" position, within 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at each annual, progressive or 100-hour inspection interval as required by Federal Aviation Regulation 91.169, check this valve for binding and shutoff characteristics in accordance with Beechcraft Service Instruction No. 0364-289, Rev. III, or later FAA-approved revision. If the valve does not meet the criteria contained in this Service Instruction, prior to further flight, replace it with an improved selector valve, P/N 169-380086-1, in accordance with Beechcraft Service Instruction No. 0622-289 or later FAA-approved revision. The above inspections are not applicable to the P/N 169-380086-1 selector valve and may be discontinued when it is installed. C) Equivalent methods of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region, Kansas City, Missouri. This amendment becomes effective January 7, 1975.
2014-16-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 series airplanes and Model Avro 146-RJ series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of cracking of the main fitting of the nose landing gear (NLG). This AD requires revising the maintenance program by incorporating a new safe- life limitation for the NLG main fitting. We are issuing this AD to prevent collapse of the NLG, which could lead to degradation of direction control on the ground or an un-commanded turn to the left, and a consequent loss of control of the airplane on the ground, possibly resulting in damage to the airplane and injury to occupants.
2014-16-21: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Dassault Aviation Model FALCON 7X airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports that the pintle pins installed on a certain number of airplanes may be incorrectly protected against corrosion. This AD requires replacing certain pintle pins on the left- and right-hand main landing gear (MLG) with a serviceable part. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct pintle pins that have been incorrectly corrosion-protected, which could cause the pintle pins to shear under normal load and lead to the collapse of the MLG during take-off or landing.
2014-12-52: We are superseding emergency airworthiness directive (AD) 2014-12-52 for all Honeywell International Inc. TFE731-4, -4R, -5AR, - 5BR, -5R, -20R, -20AR, -20BR, -40, -40AR, -40R, -40BR, -50R, and -60 turbofan engines. Emergency AD 2014-12-52 was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of these engines. AD 2014-12-52 required, before further flight, a review of the engine logbook maintenance records to determine if any affected engines are installed. AD 2014-12-52 also prohibited operation of an airplane with two or more affected engines that have 2nd stage low-pressure turbine (LPT2) blades with less than 250 operating hours since new. This AD retains the requirements of AD 2014-12-52 and clarifies the intent of the mandatory requirements. This AD was prompted by reports of LPT2 blade separations. We are issuing this AD to prevent LPT2 blade failure, multiple engine in-flight shutdowns, and damage to the airplane.
72-16-06: 72-16-06 SIKORSKY: Amendment 39-1496. Applies to all S61A, S61L, S61N and S61R type helicopters. Compliance required as indicated after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive. To assure the proper electrical feeder wiring gage in the A.C. circuit breaker panel, accomplish the following: 1. Within the next 25 hours time in service from the effective date of the Airworthiness Directive comply with Sikorsky Service Bulletin 61B55-27A, Paragraph 2A or later revision approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, New England Region. 2. Within 250 hours time in service from the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive. (a) Conduct a conformity inspection in accordance with the aircraft drawing effectivity list shown in Sikorsky Service Bulletin 61B55-27A, Paragraph 2.B(5) or later revision approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, New England Region. (b) Conduct an inspection of all alterations performed on, or affecting the A.C. circuit breaker panel and substantiate feeder wire sizes affected are adequate for the alterations performed. Changes required as a result of this Airworthiness Directive must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, New England Region. (Ref. Sikorsky S.B. 61B55-27A dated 9 May 1972 for list of Sikorsky Service Bulletins which modified drawings all listed in Paragraph 2.B(5)). Upon request with substantiating data submitted through an FAA maintenance inspector, the Compliance times specified in this Airworthiness Directive may be increased by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, New England Region. This amendment is effective 10 August 1972.
2010-24-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: On two occurrences on Mystere-Falcon 50 aeroplanes in service, it was detected that two pipes of the emergency brake system 2 located near the nose landing gear bearing were swapped. The swapping of these two pipes implies that when the Left Hand (LH) brake pedal is depressed, the Right Hand (RH) brake unit is activated, and conversely, when the RH brake pedal is depressed, the LH brake unit is actuated. This constitutes an unsafe condition, which may go unnoticed as the condition is latent until the emergency brake system 2 is used. This condition, if not corrected, could ultimately lead to a runway excursion of the aeroplane. * * * * * ThisAD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2020-22-17: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Pilatus Aircraft Ltd. (Pilatus) Model PC-24 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI identifies the unsafe condition as movement of the aft fuel pipe within the coupling, which can cause damage to the O-rings and lead to a fuel leak, fuel fire or explosion, and consequent loss of control of the airplane. This AD requires replacing and prohibits installing affected parts. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-14-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-200, -200C, -300, -400, and - 500 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive inspections for cracking of certain lap splices, and corrective action if necessary. This action is necessary to detect and correct fatigue cracks in the lap joints and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2010-23-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several power loss events have been reported, due to rail pressure control failures. Analyses have shown that high pressure (HP) fuel pumps failed as a result of pressure oscillations in the fuel supply line. We are issuing this AD to prevent engine power loss or in-flight shutdown, which could result in loss of control of the airplane.
2014-16-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A300 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by our determination of the need to incorporate new life limits for the main landing gear (MLG) barrel assembly, retraction actuator assembly linkage, and flange duct. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to include the new life limits. We are issuing this AD to prevent reduced structural integrity of the airplane and possible loss of controllability of the airplane.
2014-17-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Viking Air Limited Model DHC-3 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as looseness of the horizontal stabilizer actuator mounting block in the forward-aft and side-to-side directions. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2014-17-02: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2013-18-09 for certain Honeywell ASCa Inc. emergency locator transmitters (ELTs) installed on various transport category airplanes. AD 2013-18-09 required various one-time general visual inspections of the ELT transmitter units (TUs), and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD corrects the manufacturer's name in the AD applicability and adds a source of approval for an installation. AD 2013-18-09 was prompted by a fire on a parked and unoccupied airplane; preliminary information indicated combustion in the area of the ELT TU. This new AD was prompted by the identification of an error in the applicability of AD 2013-18-09. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct discrepancies of the battery wiring installation inside the TU, which could result in an electrical short and possible ignition source.
2003-13-13: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (Bell) model helicopters that requires a one-time inspection of the adjustable stop screws of the magnetic brake assembly; repairing, as appropriate, certain mechanical damage to the cyclic and collective flight control magnetic brake arm assembly (arm assembly), if necessary; and installing the stop screw with the proper adhesive, adjusting the arm assembly travel, and applying slippage marks. This amendment is prompted by reports that the magnetic brake adjustable screws have backed out, which limited travel of the arm assembly. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect loose adjustable stop screws that could result in limiting the travel of the cyclic and collective arm assembly, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2014-16-19: We are superseding Airworthiness Directives (AD) 2006-21-08, AD 2007-14-01, AD 2008-25-02, AD 2010-04-09, AD 2011-01-02, and AD 2012-16-05, for certain Airbus Model A330 and A340 series airplanes. AD 2006-21-08, AD 2007-14-01, AD 2008-25-02, AD 2010-04-09, AD 2011-01-02, and AD 2012-16-05 required revising the maintenance program or inspection program to incorporate certain maintenance requirements and airworthiness limitations for fuel tank systems. This new AD requires a new maintenance or inspection program revision. This AD was prompted by a determination that more restrictive maintenance requirements and airworthiness limitations are necessary. We are issuing this AD to prevent the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
2014-15-51: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Embraer S.A. Model EMB-500 airplanes. This AD was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes as an emergency AD. This AD requires an inspection and replacement as necessary of the barrel nuts at the horizontal stabilizer to vertical stabilizer attachment joint. This AD was prompted by mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as cracking of the barrel nuts at the horizontal stabilizer to vertical stabilizer attachment joint. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
74-05-05: 74-05-05 BEECH: Amendment 39-1796 as amended by Amendment 39-1841. Applies to Models 60 and A60 (Serial Numbers P-3 through P-246) airplanes now having or subsequently accruing 27 months in service from the date of the original airworthiness certification, except those airplanes having Beech P/N 60-420013-59 or Beech P/N 60-420013-652 pilot's side window installed. Compliance: Required as indicated. To prevent rapid decompression caused by failure of the pilot's side window accomplish the following: A) Effective immediately, operation with the cabin pressurized is prohibited and prior to further flight (1) deactivate the pressurization system by securing the "TEST/DUMP" switch in the "Dump" position and install a placard on the control panel adjacent to the pressurized system controls reading: "CABIN PRESSURIZATION PROHIBITED" and (2) insert a copy of this AD in the limitation section of the airplane flight manual. B) In lieu of Paragraph A(1) and (2), and prior to operation with cabin pressurization, replace existing pilot's side window with Beech P/N 60-420013-59 or Beech P/N 60-420013-652 pilot side window in accordance with Beechcraft Service Instructions No. 0594- 110, or later approved revisions or any equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. C) Upon accomplishment of Paragraph B, reactivate the pressurization system and remove the placard and flight manual insertion required by Paragraph A. Amendment 39-1796 became effective March 8, 1974. This Amendment 39-1841 becomes effective May 17, 1974.
2009-19-51: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2009-19-51, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of the Agusta Model AB139 and AW139 helicopters by individual letters. This AD requires inspecting the tail panels for debonding and, if the debonding area exceeds a certain limit, repairing the tailboom. This AD results from a mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) AD issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community. The MCAI AD states that while taxiing, the tailboom of a Model AW139 helicopter bent and collapsed. Also, EASA had received previous reports of evidence of debonding on some tailboom panels of the specified Agusta model helicopters. This condition, if not corrected, could result in failure of a tailboom and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter. DATES: Effective on February 8, 2010,to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by Emergency AD 2009- 19-51, issued on September 16, 2009, which contained the requirements of this amendment. Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before March 23, 2010.
2014-15-13: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2005-15-04 for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-1A11 (CL-600), CL-600-2A12 (CL- 601), and CL-600-2B16 (CL-601-3A, CL-601-3R, and CL-604 Variants) airplanes. AD 2005-15-04 required operators to assign serial numbers or part numbers to certain landing gear parts; establish the number of landings on the parts, if necessary; and revise the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) to reflect the new life limits of the landing gear parts. This new AD adds airplanes to the applicability, requires operators to assign serial numbers or part numbers to certain additional landing gear parts to establish the number of landings on the parts if necessary, and requires operators to record in all required airplane technical records and manuals the new part numbers, serial numbers, and landings assigned to these parts. This AD was prompted by reports that landing gear parts that have safe-life limits but do not have serial numbers or part numbers can be removed from one landing gear and re-installed on another, making tracking difficult. We are issuing this AD to prevent life-limited landing gear parts from being used beyond their safe-life limits, which could lead to collapse of the landing gear.
2013-13-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A310 series airplanes; and Model A300 B4-600, B4-600R, and F4-600R series airplanes, and Model A300 C4-605R Variant F airplanes (collectively called A300-600 series airplanes). This AD was prompted by the revision of certain airworthiness limitation items (ALI) documents, which require more restrictive maintenance requirements and airworthiness limitations. This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to incorporate the limitations section. We are issuing this AD to prevent fatigue cracking, damage, or corrosion in principal structural elements, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
72-18-01: 72-18-01 BEECH: Amdt. 39-1505. Applies to Models 35, A35, B35 and C35 airplanes (Serial Numbers D-1 through D-2900) with a P/N 35-924065 fuel unit modified by the installation of Beech Kit No. 35-5030S (Serial Numbers 100 through 989) or any equivalent installation using a warning light with a dimming feature. (NOTE: Installation of either Beech Kit No. 35-5030S or P/N 35-924230 fuel unit is required by AD 69-18-01.) To prevent dimming of fuel selector valve disengagement warning light, unless already accomplished, accomplish the following: A) Effective immediately until Paragraph B has been accomplished, adjust the dimming lens on the fuel selector valve disengagement warning light to maximum bright. B) Within the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, either replace MS 25041-2 light indicator assembly with MS 25041-6 light indicator assembly or replace the dimming lens assembly of the MS 25041-2 light assembly with the non-dimming lens assembly from an MS 25041-6 light assembly. Any equivalent method of compliance must be submitted to and approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. This amendment becomes effective August 29, 1972.
2021-05-21: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2017-23-08 for Agusta S.p.A. (now Leonardo S.p.a.) Model AB139 and AW139 helicopters. AD 2017-23-08 required repetitively inspecting the main rotor (M/R) rotating scissors, removing certain lower half scissor spherical bearings (bearings) from service, replacing the removed bearings with a new bearing, and installing a special nut. This new AD retains the requirements of AD 2017-23-08 and requires replacing each affected bearing with a certain part-numbered bearing. This AD was prompted by investigation results determining that a quality control issue may have affected the production of the affected bearings. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
2014-16-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2B16 (CL-604 Variant) airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of in-flight uncommanded rudder movements. This AD requires revising the airplane flight manual (AFM) to incorporate an uncommanded yaw motion procedure. We are issuing this AD to prevent in- flight uncommanded rudder movements, which could lead to structural failure and subsequent loss of the airplane.
2014-16-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777-200 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of smoke or flames in the passenger cabin of various transport category airplanes related to the wiring for the passenger cabin in-flight entertainment (IFE) system, cabin lighting, and passenger seats. This AD requires, for certain airplanes, doing an inspection of the electrical power control panel for a certain part number, and corrective action if necessary; and, for certain other airplanes, installing a new electrical power control panel, and making changes to the wiring and certain electrical load management system (ELMS) panels. We are issuing this AD to ensure that the flightcrew is able to turn off electrical power to the IFE systems and other non- essential electrical systems through one or two switches in the flight deck in the event of smoke or flames. In the event of smoke or flames in the airplane flight deck or passenger cabin, the flightcrew's inability to turn off electrical power to the IFE system and other non- essential electrical systems could result in the inability to control smoke or flames in the airplane flight deck or passenger cabin during a non-normal or emergency situation, and consequent loss of control of the airplane.