Results
2008-12-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes. This AD requires various repetitive inspections to detect cracks along the chemically milled steps of the fuselage skin or missing or loose fasteners in the area of the preventative modification or repairs, replacement of the time-limited repair with the permanent repair if applicable, and applicable corrective actions if necessary, which would end certain repetitive inspections. This AD results from a fatigue test that revealed numerous cracks in the upper skin panel at the chemically milled step above the lap joint. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct such fatigue-related cracks, which could result in the crack tips continuing to turn and grow to the point where the skin bay flaps open, causing decompression of the airplane.
2001-13-51: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2001-13-51, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 206L-4, 407, and 427 helicopters by individual letters. This AD requires visually inspecting certain driveshafts for a crack, a loose bolt or nut, or red powder residue. If a crack, a loose bolt or nut, or red powder residue is found, replacing the driveshaft before further flight and notifying the FAA within 10 days is also required. This amendment is prompted by a driveshaft failure on a BHTC Model 407 helicopter that resulted in an engine shutdown and an emergency landing. Failure of the driveshaft was due to cracking of the flexframe on the forward end of the driveshaft. In addition, three other incidents of a cracked flexframe on the forward end of the driveshaft on other Model 407 helicopters have been reported. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of a driveshaft, loss of drive to the main rotor system, and a subsequent emergency forced landing.
2020-19-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Leonardo S.p.a. Model AW169 helicopters. This AD requires modifying the weight on wheels (WoW) support installation on the main landing gear (MLG). This AD was prompted by a report that an inappropriately tightened WoW support could result in a rotation of the support and improper WoW switch performance. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
95-16-08: 95-16-08 AlliedSignal, Inc.: Amendment 39-9328. Docket 94-ANE-10. Applicability: AlliedSignal, Inc. (formerly Allied-Signal, Inc., Garrett Engine Division, Garrett Turbine Engine Company, and AiResearch Manufacturing Co. of Arizona), TPE331-25, -43, -1, -2, -3, -5, -6, -8, -10, -11, and -12 series, and -55B and -61A Model turboprop engines; and TSE331-3U Model turboshaft engines. These engines are installed on but not limited to Mitsubishi MU-2B series (MU-2 series); Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A. (CASA) C-212 series; Jetstream 3101 and 3201 series; Fairchild SA226 and SA227 series; Prop-Jets, Inc. Model 400; Cessna Model 441; Twin Commander Aircraft Corp. 680, 690, and 695 series, and Model 681; Rockwell Commander or Ayres Corp. S-2R series; Short Brothers and Harland, Ltd. SC7; Dornier 228 Series; Beech Aircraft Corp. 18 and 45 series and Models JRB-6, 3N, 3NM, 3TM, and B100; Pilatus PC-6 series; DeHavilland DH 104 Dove series; Grumman Model TS-2A; Grumman American ModelG-164C; and Schweizer Aircraft Corp. Model G-164 series aircraft. NOTE: This AD applies to each engine identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For engines that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (c) to request approval from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition, or different actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any engine from the applicability of this AD. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent uncontained failure of turbine rotors, fire, or loss of aircraft control, accomplish the following: (a) Within 400 cycles in service (CIS) after the effective date of this AD, review engine life limited part logs, engine repair and maintenance records, maintenance purchase receipts, and aircraft maintenance records (collectively referred to as "records") to identify any engine repair, assembly, or modification that was performed by, or any life limited turbine components received from Fliteline Maintenance, located in Wharton, Texas, domestic repair station certificate number GR2R856K; or Mr. Eugene E. Shanks, mechanic certificate number 1914482; or Mr. Carl Ramirez, mechanic certificate number 466432551 (collectively referred to as "Fliteline"). (b) Within 400 CIS after the effective date of this AD, for engines or components identified in accordance with paragraph (a) of this AD, accomplish the following: (1) If records or other pertinent information indicate that the engine was disassembled beyond aft turbine mainshaft nut removal from the tie bolt by Fliteline, verify life limited turbine components and take appropriate action by the following methods: (i) Remove, disassemble the engine, compare, and match each component's part number (P/N) and serial number (S/N) against that engine's issued life limited part logs. Engine hot section inspection or overhaul normally requires comparing and matching of turbine components with the life limited part logs. An engine hot section inspection or overhaul, subsequent to maintenance by Fliteline, and performed by the engine manufacturer, an FAA certified repair station, or an FAA certified mechanic, other than Fliteline, constitutes compliance with paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this AD. (ii) Validate all Fliteline life limited part log entries by utilizing the component's hourly and cyclic life immediately before the Fliteline entry, as determined byrecords of the engine manufacturer or FAA certified repair stations other than Fliteline. A life limited part log entry is defined as a removal or installation record. Photocopied life limited part logs may be used provided component history can be established. NOTE: Engine manufacturer record and service information referred to in the AD can be attained by calling AlliedSignal Engines Customer Information Center, telephone (800) 338-3378 or (602) 231-5287. (iii) If the P/N, S/N, hourly and cyclic lives or the life limited part log of each life limited turbine component do not match or can not be validated, remove the component from service prior to further flight and replace with a serviceable component. (2) Verify that any requirements of AD's signed off by Fliteline were actually accomplished by visual examination or reinspection of the affected components in accordance with the applicable AD. A complete engine overhaul or other maintenance necessary to accomplishapplicable AD requirements, subsequent to maintenance by Fliteline, and performed by the engine manufacturer, an FAA certified repair station, or an FAA certified mechanic, other than Fliteline, constitutes compliance with paragraph (b)(2) of this AD. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. The request should be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this airworthiness directive, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. (d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the aircraft to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (e) This amendment becomes effective on September 5, 1995.
2008-12-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Vortex inserts are used inside the heat exchanger of the carburettor heating system. Up to serial number (s/n) 0044 inclusive those inserts have been produced from aluminium alloy which has been found to be susceptible of cracks. As a consequence, if left uncorrected some loose parts could migrate in the induction system, reduce the air flow through the carburettor's venturi and lead to a loss of engine power. From s/n 0045 onwards vortex inserts have been produced from stainless steel. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2001-19-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 767-200 and -300 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive inspections to find discrepancies of the barrel nuts that attach the vertical fin to body section 48, and follow-on actions. For certain airplanes, this action requires replacement of certain bolts with new bolts. This action also provides for optional terminating actions for the repetitive inspections. This action is necessary to find and fix corroded, cracked or broken barrel nuts that attach the vertical fin to body section 48, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the vertical fin attachment joint, loss of the vertical fin, and consequent loss of controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2018-21-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-131, A321-231, and A321-232 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of fan cowl door (FCD) losses during take-off. This AD requires modification and re-identification, or replacement, of certain FCDs, and installation of a placard in the flight deck. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-12-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A failure mode has been identified following the examination of parts from another aircraft type (Jetstream 4100 series) that can lead to the loss of a nose-wheel. The Jetstream (HP.137) Mk1, 200, 3100 and 3200 series use a similar method for retaining the wheel assemblies on the landing gear axle and can therefore experience the same type of failure, i.e. a combination of excessive wear and/or adverse tolerances on the axle inner cone, outer cone or wheel hub splined sleeve cones resulting in the loss of the critical gap between the inner flange face of the wheel outer cone and the axle end face. If this gap is lost, it results in the wheel having free playalong the length of the axle. This condition, if not corrected, can cause the wheel nut lock plate to break, leading to the wheel retention nut unscrewing and subsequent separation of the nose wheel from the landing gear axle. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
95-16-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Model DC-9 series airplanes and C-9 (military) airplanes, that requires inspection of the driver links of the thrust reverser door to determine whether the driver links are chamfered, an inspection to detect damage of the overcenter links, and follow-on corrective actions, if necessary; and replacement or rework of the driver links. This amendment is prompted by reports of a thrust reverser door that failed to operate properly due to improperly manufactured (missing chamfers on the) driver links. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent damage to the overcenter links due to missing chamfers on the driver links, which may result in uncommanded opening of the thrust reverser door, and subsequently, adversely affecting controllability of the airplane.
2008-12-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * The assessment and lightning tests showed that certain fuel tube self-bonded couplings do not provide sufficient lightning current capability. The assessment also showed that single failure of the integral bonding wire of the self-bonded couplings could affect electrical bonding between the tubes. Insufficient electrical bonding between fuel tubes or insufficient current capability of fuel tube couplings, if not corrected, could result in arcing and potential ignition source[s] inside the fuel tank during lightning strikes and consequent fuel tank explosion. * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2005-05-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited (Jetstream) Model 4101 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections of the aft fuselage frames for any discrepancies, and any applicable corrective actions. This AD is prompted by reports of corrosion found on the aft fuselage frames due to the ingress of water or liquid. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct corrosion of the aft fuselage frames, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the fuselage.
2001-18-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model 717 series airplanes. This action requires a one-time inspection of the support seal tubes of the rudder trim and load-feel actuator assembly of the rudder trim control system, located in the aft accessory compartment, for proper clearance between the actuator support seal tube and spring capsule assembly, and applicable follow-on/corrective actions. This action is necessary to detect and correct the accumulation of moisture in the rudder trim and load-feel actuator of the rudder trim control system. Such moisture could freeze and cause stiff operation, binding, or jamming of the rudder trim control system and consequent jamming of the rudder; and adversely affect directional control of an airplane.
2008-12-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Short Brothers Model SD3-60 airplanes. This AD requires deactivation of auxiliary fuel tank systems installed in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate SA00404AT. This AD results from fuel tank system review requirements done in accordance with Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (SFAR 88), which identified potential unsafe conditions. We are issuing this AD to prevent the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
2005-05-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A300 B4-600, B4-600R, and F4-600R series airplanes, and Model C4-605R Variant F airplanes (collectively called A300-600); and Model A310 series airplanes; equipped with certain Honeywell inertial reference units (IRUs). This AD requires revising the Limitations section of the airplane flight manual to prohibit the use of CAT 2 and CAT 3 automatic landing and rollout procedures at certain airports. This AD is prompted by a report that some magnetic deviation tables in the IRU database are obsolete and contain significant differences with the real magnetic deviations. We are issuing this AD to prevent an airplane from deviating from the runway centerline, and possibly departing the runway.
63-17-06: 63-17-06 SIKORSKY: Amdt. 605 Part 507 Federal Register August 21, 1963. Applies to All Model S-62A Helicopters Utilizing Main Transmission Assembly P/N S6235-20000-3 through -10. Compliance required as indicated. (a) Input shaft helical gears, P/N S6235-20158 having 250 or more hours' time in service upon the effective date of this AD shall be inspected in accordance with Sikorsky Aircraft Service Bulletin No. 62B35-6 before further flight after the effective date of this AD. (b) Input shaft helical gears P/N S6235-20158 having less than 250 hours' time in service upon the effective date of this AD, shall be inspected in accordance with Sikorsky Aircraft Service Bulletin No. 62B35-6 prior to the accumulation of 250 hours' time in service. (c) The input shaft helical gears shall be reinspected within every 250 hours' time in service from the last inspection. (d) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. (Sikorsky Aircraft Service Bulletin No. 62B35-6 dated July 29, 1963, covers this same subject.) This directive effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated August 2, 1963.
2005-05-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections for cracking of the elevator "G" weight support structure, and repairs if necessary. This AD also provides for an optional terminating action. This AD is prompted by reported cracking of the elevator "G" weight support structure. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the elevator "G" weight support structure with possible consequent jamming of the right-hand elevator servo tab and reduced controllability of the airplane.
95-16-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to AlliedSignal Inc. LTS101 series turboshaft and LTP101 series turboprop engines, that requires replacement of cast material axial compressor rotors with wrought material axial compressor rotors that have improved fatigue characteristics and material properties. This amendment is prompted by 36 reports of axial compressor blade failures on cast rotors. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent engine power loss and inflight engine shutdown.
2005-03-11: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Boeing Model 767 series airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive detailed and eddy current inspections of the aft pressure bulkhead for damage and cracking, and repair if necessary. This new AD also requires one-time detailed and high frequency eddy current inspections of any "oil-can" located on the aft pressure bulkhead, and related corrective actions if necessary. An "oil-can" is an area on a pressure dome web that moves when pushed from the forward side. This AD is prompted by reports of cracking at "oil-can" boundaries on the aft pressure bulkhead. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the aft pressure bulkhead, which could result in rapid depressurization of the airplane and possible damage or interference with the airplane control systems that penetrate the bulkhead, and consequent loss of controllability of the airplane. \n\nDATES: This AD becomes effective March 18, 2005. \n\n\tOn March 22, 2004 (69 FR 10321, March 5, 2004), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-53A0026, Revision 5, dated January 29, 2004.
2011-06-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A fatal accident occurred to a CAP 10C, in which the pilot lost control of the aeroplane. The following investigation has revealed that the probable cause of the accident was the improper locking of a turnbuckle (locking clip missing) of the flight control cables, and the subsequent inadvertent release of the pitchup control cable from the turnbuckle. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2001-18-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 767-200, -300, -300F and -400ER series airplanes. This action requires repetitive inspections to find discrepancies of the wire bundles located between the P50 panel and the nose wheel well structure, and corrective actions, if necessary. This action is necessary to find and fix such discrepancies, which could result in electrical arcing, smoke, or fire in the cabin, and failure of certain systems essential to safe flight and landing of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2008-12-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for various transport category airplanes. This AD requires deactivation of Rogerson Aircraft Corporation auxiliary fuel tanks. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer, which identified potential unsafe conditions for which the manufacturer has not provided corrective actions. We are issuing this AD to prevent the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
2008-11-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: To date, there have been at least 10 reported events on Fokker 70 (F28 Mark 0070) and Fokker 100 (F28 Mark 0100) aircraft where the flight crew manually overpowered the autopilot, inadvertently neglecting to disengage the autopilot. * * * When the autopilot is not disengaged, the elevator servomotor is overpowered and the horizontal stabilizer is moved by the Automatic Flight Control & Augmentation System (AFCAS) auto-trim in a direction opposite to the (manual) deflection of the elevator, causing high elevator control forces. This condition, if not corrected, could cause the stabilizer to move to an extreme out-of-trim position, creating the (remote) possibility of loss of control of the aircraft, due to the extreme control loads. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
95-16-01: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes, that currently requires a revision to the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) that prohibits autoland operation below 100 feet above ground level, and installation of flight control computer software. It also provides for an optional terminating action for the AFM revision. This amendment provides for a new optional terminating action for the AFM revision. This amendment is prompted by reports of erroneous central aural warning system altitude callouts and erroneous radio altimeter indications during autoland approaches due to radio frequency leakage (RF) on airplanes on which the optional terminating action had been accomplished. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent radio altimeter antenna/coaxial cable RF leakage, which could result in early and/or abnormal flare (pitch) control during autoland operation and potential degradation of the landing capability of the airplane.
86-24-03 R1: 86-24-03 R1 PIONEER PARACHUTE COMPANY: Amendment 39-5565. Applies to Model K-XX, K-XXII and 26 foot conical canopies with the following serial numbers: K-XX, P/N 5375-1 Color Patterns: Light Blue Upper Panels and Royal Blue Lower Panels or Yellow Upper Panels and Tan Lower Panels 598162 598927 598966 599000 599043 598318 598928 598967 599001 599048 598865 598929 598968 599004 599049 598866 598930 598969 599005 599050 598923 598937 598970 599006 599051 598924 598960 598971 599008 599087 598925 598961 598972 599009 599165 598926 598965 598995 599042 599166 Color Patterns: Light Blue Upper Panels and Tan Lower Panels or Yellow Upper Panels and Tan Lower Panels 598307 598345 598364 598526 598535 598317 598346 598366 598527 598536 598320 598347 598367 598528 598537 598340 598348 598521 598529 598545 598341 598349 598522 598530 598571 598342 598350 598523 598531 598572 598343 598351 598524 598532 598592 598344 598363 598525 598533 598863 Color Pattern: White Panels 598539 598550 598843 598998 599563 598540 598552 598844 598999 599613 598541 598553 598845 599002 599614 598542 598554 598858 599003 599640 598546 598555 598864 599007 599701 598547 598556 598962 599164 599702 598548 598579 598996 599561 599703 598549 598842 598997 599562 599711 K-XXII, P/N 5418-1 598557 598561 598565 598569 599076 598558 598562 598566 598650 599441 598559 598563 598567 598651 599638 598560 598564 598568 599044 599639 26 foot conical, P/N 2412-501 Color Pattern: All White 599093 To prevent use of affected canopies as FAA approved canopies, due to understrength material, remove or obliterate TSO-C23b marking prior to next use after receipt of this AD, unless already accomplished. NOTES: (1) Pioneer Parachute Company Safety Notice, dated December 22, 1986, applies to this AD. (2) Investigation is continuing, and this AD may be amended in light of the results of the investigation. Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Aircraft Certification Division, Federal Aviation Administration, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, telephone (617) 273-7103. This amendment becomes effective March 20, 1987, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by Priority Letter AD No. 86-24-03, issued November 21, 1986, and Priority Letter AD No. 86-24-03R1, issued January 13, 1987, which contained this amendment.
2020-19-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Bell Textron Inc. (Type Certificate previously held by Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.) (Bell), Model 204B, 205A-1, and 212 helicopters. This AD was prompted by reports of corrosion on main rotor hub tension-torsion strap (TT strap) assemblies. This AD requires reducing the life limit of a certain part-numbered TT strap assembly and prohibits installing this TT strap assembly on any helicopter. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.