Results
77-22-03: 77-22-03 LOCKHEED: Amendment 39-3063. Applies to all Model 1329-23A and Model 1329-23D airplanes, serial numbers 5001 through 5092, 5094 through 5096 and 5121; all Model 1329-23E airplanes, serial numbers 5093, 5097 through 5120 and 5122 through 5162; and all Model 1329-25 airplanes, serial numbers 5201 through 5221. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the reinforcing doubler and ring segment for the lower VHF antenna, accomplish the following: On Model 1329-23A, Model 1329-23D and Model 1329-23E airplanes, within the next 25 hours flying time, inspect for cracks in the reinforcing doubler and ring segment for the lower VHF antenna in accordance with Service Bulletin 329-281 or later FAA approved revision. If cracks are found, before further flight, replace the reinforcing doubler and ring segment in accordance with Service Bulletin 329-281 or later FAA approved revision, or in an equivalent manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Southern Region. On Model 1329-23A, Model 1329-23D and Model 1329-23E airplanes on which cracks are not found, within the next 300 hours flying time, replace the reinforcing doubler and ring segment in accordance with Service Bulletin 329-281 or later FAA approved revision, or in an equivalent manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Southern Region. On Model 1329-25 airplanes, serial numbers 5201 through 5221, within the next 300 hours flying time, replace the reinforcing doubler and ring segment in accordance with Service Bulletin 329II-53-6 or later FAA approved revision, or in an equivalent manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Administration, Southern Region. This amendment becomes effective October 28, 1977.
2010-16-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: It has been found the occurrence of corrosion on the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) mounting rods that could cause the APU rod to break, affecting the APU support structure integrity. APU support structure failure could result in loss of power of the APU and possible loss of control of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2010-04-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The aileron hinges and the stabilizer are fastened with steel tube rivets and brass tube rivets. During a complete overhaul, broken brass tube rivets have been detected. It has been determined that, due to production quality issue, the upset heads of the brass tube rivets could break under normal load conditions. This condition, if not corrected, could possibly lead to loss of control of the powered sailplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
76-15-02: 76-15-02 ALEXANDER SCHLEICHER: Amendment 39-2674. Applies to Rhonlerche II gliders, all serial numbers, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To detect cracks in the welded area between the flight control horizontal torsion tube and the front control stick mount and to prevent front control stick separation from the mount, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD visually inspect with a 5 power magnifier the welded area between the flight control horizontal torsion tube and the front control stick mount in accordance with Alexander Schleicher Technical Note No. 13, page 1, dated June 23, 1975, and page 2, dated July 1, 1975, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) If a crack is found in performing the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, prior to further flight, repair cracks and reinforce the torsion tube-mount area in accordance with Alexander Schleicher Technical Note No. 13, page 1, dated June 23, 1975, and page 2, dated July 1, 1975, or an FAA-approved equivalent. (c) If no crack is found in performing the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD, within the next 100 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, reinforce the torsion tube-mount area in accordance with Alexander Schleicher Technical Note No. 13, page 1, dated June 23, 1975, and page 2, dated July 1, 1975, or an FAA-approved equivalent. This amendment becomes effective August 2, 1976.
94-15-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all Aerospatiale Model ATR72 series airplanes. This action requires inspections to detect damage, corrosion, or cracking of the hinge pin on each shock absorber on the main landing gear (MLG), and repair or replacement of the pins, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports of rupture of certain hinge pins due to stress corrosion of the pins in the shock absorber on the MLG on Model ATR72 series airplanes. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent loss of the MLG during a hard landing due to malfunction of the shock absorber on the MLG.
93-21-05: 93-21-05 AEROSPATIALE: Amendment 39-8719. Docket 93-NM-54-AD. Applicability: Model ATR42-200 and -300 series airplanes, serial numbers 3 through 179 inclusive; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent a severe out-of-trim condition, which could lead to reduced controllability of the airplane, accomplish the following: (a) Within 6 months after the effective date of this AD, modify the autopilot disengagement wiring located at shelf 82VU, in accordance with Aerospatiale Service Bulletin ATR42-22-0012, dated April 2, 1990; or Revision 1, dated October 12, 1992. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) The modification shall be done in accordance with Aerospatiale Service Bulletin ATR42-22-0012, dated April 2, 1990; or Aerospatiale Service Bulletin ATR42-22-0012, Revision 1, dated October 12, 1992. Revision 1 of Aerospatiale Service Bulletin ATR42-22-0012 contains the following list of effective pages: Page Number Revision Level Shown on Page Date Shown on Page 1-4, 7-8 1 October 12, 1992 5-6 Original April 2, 1990 This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Aerospatiale, 316 Route de Bayonne, 31060 Toulouse, Cedex 03, France. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (e) This amendment becomes effective on December 13, 1993.
2009-15-16 R1: The FAA is revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-10 series airplanes, DC-9-30 series airplanes, DC-9-81 (MD-81) airplanes, DC-9-82 (MD-82) airplanes, DC-9-83 (MD-83) airplanes, DC-9-87 (MD-87) airplanes, MD-88 airplanes, and MD-90-30 airplanes. That AD currently requires modifying the flight deck door. This AD revises the applicability by removing certain airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that certain equipment of the flight deck door is defective. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of this equipment, which could jeopardize flight safety. \n\nDATES: This AD is effective August 5, 2010, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by AD 2009-15-16, issued July 15, 2009, which contained the requirements of this amendment. \n\tThe Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of August 5,2010. \n\tOn July 6, 2010 (75 FR 38017, July 1, 2010), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain other publication listed in the AD. \n\tWe must receive any comments on this AD by September 20, 2010.
2010-16-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes. This AD requires inspecting to verify the part number of the low-pressure flex-hoses of the flightcrew and supernumerary oxygen system installed under the oxygen mask stowage box at flightcrew and supernumerary oxygen mask locations, and replacing the flex-hose with a new non-conductive low- pressure flex-hose if necessary. This AD results from reports of low- pressure flex-hoses of the flightcrew oxygen system that burned through due to inadvertent electrical current from a short circuit in an adjacent audio select panel. We are issuing this AD to prevent inadvertent electrical current, which can cause the low-pressure flex- hoses used in the flightcrew and supernumerary oxygen systems to melt or burn, resulting in oxygen system leakage and smoke or fire.
86-17-06: 86-17-06 ALLISON GAS TURBINE DIVISION, GENERAL MOTORS CORP. (Allison, formerly Detroit Diesel Allison): Amendment 39-5370. Applies to Allison 501-D13, -D13A, -D13D, and -D13H engine reduction gear assemblies equipped with thrust sensitive switch assembly, P/N's 6792891, 6794122, 6794359, 6807776, 23005483, or 23005485. Compliance is required within 60 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent the possibility of unwanted autofeather or the inability to autofeather when required, accomplish the following: Replace thrust sensitive switch assemblies, P/N's 6792891, 6794122, 6794359, 6807776, 23005483, and 23005485 with P/N 6870559, a single carbon contact switch assembly, in accordance with the detailed instructions provided in Allison Commercial Engine Alert Bulletin CEB-A-73-84, Revision 2, dated October 1, 1984, or FAA approved equivalent. Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, 2300 East Devon Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois 60018. Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA maintenance inspector, the Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, may adjust the compliance time specified in this AD. Allison Commercial Engine Alert Bulletin CEB-A-73-84, Revision 2, dated October 1, 1984, identified and described in this document, is incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received this document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Allison Gas Turbine Division, General Motors Corp., P.O. Box 420, Indianapolis, Indiana 46206-0420. This document also may be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, FAA, ATTN: Rules Docket No. 82-ANE-50, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803 and may be examined weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 8:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. This amendment becomes effective on September 15, 1986.
2010-16-01: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an airworthiness authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The earlier MCAI, Brazilian Airworthiness Directive 2007-08-02, effective September 27, 2007, describes the unsafe condition as: Fuel system reassessment, performed according to RBHA-E88/SFAR- 88 (Regulamento Brasileiro de Homologacao Aeronautica 88/Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88), requires the inclusion of new maintenance tasks in the Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL) and in the Fuel System Limitations (FSL), necessary to preclude ignition sources in the fuel system. * * * The new MCAI, Brazilian Airworthiness Directive 2009-08-03, effective August 20, 2009, describes the unsafe condition as: An airplane fuel tank systems review required bySpecial Federal Aviation Regulation Number 88 (SFAR 88) and "RBHA Especial N[uacute]mero 88'' (RBHA E 88) has shown that additional maintenance and inspection instructions are necessary to maintain the design features required to preclude the existence or development of an ignition source within the fuel tanks of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. DATES: This AD becomes effective September 9, 2010. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in this AD as of September 9, 2010. On July 30, 2008 (73 FR 35904, June 25, 2008), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in this AD.