Results
2005-19-17: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain PZL-Swidnik S.A. (PZL-Swidnik) Models PW-5 ``Smyk" and PW-6U gliders. This AD requires you to inspect for the minimum dimension of the left side aileron, right side aileron, and airbrake push-rod ends for certain Model PW-5 ``Smyk" gliders; inspect for the minimum dimension of the aileron, airbrake, and elevator control push-rod ends for certain Model PW-6U gliders; and replace any push-rod end that does not meet the minimum dimension. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Poland. We are issuing this AD to detect and replace any push-rod end that does not meet the minimum dimension, which could result in failure of the control system. This failure could lead to loss of control of the glider.
2011-01-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: There have been two in-service reports of main landing gear (MLG) tire failure on landing, during which a flailing tire tread caused damage to No. 2 and No. 3 hydraulic system lines in the wing auxiliary spar area on the left side of the aircraft. This damage resulted in the loss of supply pressure to the inboard and outboard brakes, as the only remaining braking source available was the No. 3 hydraulic system accumulator. The degradation of the brake system performance could adversely affect the aircraft during landing. * * * * * The unsafe condition is loss of braking capability, which could reduce the ability of the flightcrew to safely land the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
98-04-39: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT8D series turbofan engines. This action requires a one-time borescope inspection of the combustion chamber outer case (CCOC) for cracks on engines identified by serial number that were ultrasonically inspected in accordance with AD 96-23-14 with defective probes. In addition, this AD requires an ultrasonic probe functional check at PW prior to using the probe to perform an ultrasonic inspection if the probe was overhauled, repaired, or otherwise altered since original manufacture and not subsequently functionally checked by PW. This amendment is prompted by reports of defective probes discovered in the field. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent uncontained engine failure, inflight engine shutdown, engine cowl release, and airframe damage. The incorporation by reference of Pratt & Whitney Alert Service Bulletin No. A6202, Revision 1, dated January 4, 1996, as listed in the regulations, was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register as of January 2, 1997 (61 FR 63707, December 2, 1996). Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before April 27 1998.
67-11-03: 67-11-03 HUGHES: Amdt. 39-389, Part 39, Federal Register April 7, 1967. Applies to Models 269A, 269A-1, 269A-2, and 269B Series Helicopters Equipped with Main Rotor Gear Drive Assembly P/N 269A5175 Bearing Serial Numbers 0001 to 1424 Inclusive. Compliance required within the next 25 hours time in service for all aircraft unless already accomplished. To prevent malfunction of the main rotor gear drive assembly P/N 269A5175 caused by failure of the huck bolts P/N SALP-T10-7 that attach the main rotor drive shaft coupling to the ring gear carrier, and to detect damage that may have resulted from operation of the helicopter with the huck bolts installed, accomplish the following in accordance with Hughes Service Information Notice No. N-29 or later FAA-approved revision unless otherwise specified herein: (a) Remove huck bolts P/N SALP-T10-7 and collars P/N 6LC-C10 from the main rotor gear drive assembly P/N 269A5175. Visually inspect the resulting holes for deformity orother damage and check the vertical and horizontal diameters of the holes by means of a hole gauge. Line ream all out-of-tolerance holes to correspond to the tolerance specified for the holes. (b) Replace huck bolts P/N SALP-T10-7 and collars P/N 6LC-C10, respectively, with Hi-Lok bolts P/N's HL-20-PB-10-7, HL-20-PB-10-8, or HL-64-PB10-7 and collars P/N HL 87-10. (c) Inspect the main rotor gear drive assembly P/N 269A5175 for defects specified in Hughes Service Information Notice No. N-29 or later FAA-approved revision. If defects are observed, maintain the affected part or parts in accordance with Hughes Handbook of Maintenance Instructions applicable to the particular helicopter model (including the Overhaul Addendum for the Main Rotor Gear drive Assembly applicable to all helicopter models) or in accordance with a method approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. (d) Operators who have not kept records of hours' time in service of individual main rotor gear drive assemblies shall substitute in lieu thereof hours' time in service of the helicopter. This directive effective April 7, 1967. Revised May 30, 1967.
2017-02-51: We are publishing a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) Model S-92A helicopters. This AD requires inspecting certain bearings. This AD is prompted by reports of failed bearings with subsequent loss of tail rotor (TR) control. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these helicopters.
2005-19-20: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The New Piper Aircraft, Inc. (Piper) Models PA-28-160, PA-28-161, PA- 28-180, and PA-28-181 airplanes that incorporate Petersen Aviation, Inc. Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA2660CE installed between April 20, 1998, and April 1, 2005, and incorporate Petersen Aviation, Inc. Service Bulletin SB98-1. This AD requires you to replace the AN894-6-4 bushing screw thread expanders on the gascolator and bushing attached to the inlet of the top fuel pump with NAS1564-6-4J reducers and AN818-6 nuts. This AD results from reports of fuel leaks during the post STC installation tests. We are issuing this AD to prevent fuel fittings used in STC SA2660CE from leaking fuel in the engine compartment, which could result in an engine fire. This condition could lead to loss of control of the airplane.
98-04-41: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-200 and -300 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive inspections to detect cracks in the hinge and lift actuator box area of the main deck cargo door and upper jamb of the fuselage; and repair or replacement of any cracked part with a new part having the same part number. This amendment is prompted by a report that, during a periodic heavy maintenance check, cracks were found in the upper jamb area of the fuselage and in the main deck cargo door. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect and correct such cracking, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the main cargo door and/or fuselage, and consequent loss or opening of the main deck cargo door while the airplane is in flight, or reduced controllability of the airplane.
68-22-02: 68-22-02 ALLISON: Applies to Model 250-C18, 250-C18A, and 250-C10B engines, to wit Allison Model 250-C18 engines having compressor assemblies installed with serial numbers prior to Serial Number CAC 21073; Model 250-C18A engines having compressor assemblies installed with serial numbers prior to Serial Numbers CAC 20202; and all Model 250-C10B engines. The Allison model engines to which this AD is applicable must be modified in accordance with Allison Commercial Engine Bulletin 250 CEB-51 and 250 CEB-52 dated October 16, 1968, on or before May 1, 1969. Until modified, the engines to which this AD is applicable may be operated provided: (1) They are not operated with N1 (gas producer) rpm greater than 96.5 percent, except for "takeoff"; (2) Time operated at "takeoff" does not exceed two (2) minutes; (3) The generator load does not exceed 60 amps when the engine is operating above 70 percent N1 rpm.* NOTE: This amendment becomes effective November 1, 1968. *As a resultof these operating restrictions, the rotorcraft flight manual and certain power plant instrument markings for the Bell 206A, the Fairchild Hiller FH-1100, and the Hughes 369A and 369H helicopters in which these engines are installed may require modifications or the installation of suitable placards. The necessary information for such changes is available from the manufacturers of these helicopters.
54-21-01: 54-21-01 AC DIAPHRAGM TYPE FUEL PUMPS: Applies to All Aircraft Powered by Continental, Aircooled or Lycoming Engines Which Are Equipped With AC Diaphragm Type Fuel Pumps. Compliance required as soon as possible but not later than November 30, 1954. The occurrence of severe fuel leakage in flight, caused by loosening of AC fuel pump surge chambers, has revealed the existence of AC fuel pumps not adequately safetied to prevent loosening of the sediment bowl and the surge chamber. The following should be accomplished: 1. Inspect sediment bowl cap screw and surge chamber (if there is one) for adequate safetying. 2. If not safetied, lockwiring or equivalent must be accomplished in accordance with good aircraft practice. One acceptable method of safetying is described by Lycoming Service Bulletin No. 174.
98-04-36: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Gulfstream Model G-159 series airplanes, that requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to specify procedures that would prohibit flight in severe icing conditions (as determined by certain visual cues), limit or prohibit the use of various flight control devices while in severe icing conditions, and provide the flight crew with recognition cues for, and procedures for exiting from, severe icing conditions. This amendment is prompted by results of a review of the requirements for certification of the airplane in icing conditions, new information on the icing environment, and icing data provided currently to the flight crews. The actions specified by this AD are intended to minimize the potential hazards associated with operating the airplane in severe icing conditions by providing more clearly defined procedures and limitations associated with such conditions.