Results
2008-14-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for IAE V2500-A1, V2522-A5, V2524-A5, V2527-A5, V2527E-A5, V2527M-A5, V2530-A5, V2533-A5, V2525-D5, and V2528-D5 turbofan engines. This AD requires removing certain No. 4 bearing oil system components from service at the next shop visit or by an end date determined by the engine model. This AD results from instances of oil loss from the No. 4 bearing compartment. We are issuing this AD to prevent heat damage to high- pressure turbine (HPT) and low-pressure turbine (LPT) critical life limited hardware such as the HPT stage 1-2 airseal. Damage to the HPT stage 1-2 airseal could cause uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
46-37-01: 46-37-01 PIPER: (Was Mandatory Note 12 of AD-691-02 and Mandatory Note 1 of AD- 780-3.) Applies to J3C-65 and J3C-65S, Serial Numbers 14027 and Up and All PA-12. Compliance required by November 1, 1946. To prevent possible failure of the fuel strainer bowl, replace the present thin fuel strainer bowl gasket with a 1/8-inch thick cork and neoprene gasket supplied by Piper. The bowl seat nut should be tightened only finger tight. The bowl should be carefully examined for signs of flaws or cracks and should be replaced if any are found. (Piper Service Bulletin No. 89 dated July 11, 1946, covers this same subject.)
2008-14-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 206A, 206B, 206L, 206L-1, 206L-3, and 206L-4 helicopters. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The aviation authority of Canada, with which we have a bilateral agreement, states in the MCAI: "It has been determined that some helicopters have been fitted with a CRES steel fitting, part number (P/N) 407-030-750-103, and the installation of the tailboom attachment bolt does not meet the design criteria.'' We are issuing this AD to require actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition that results from an improper installation of the tailboom attachment bolt in the upper left-hand tailboom attachment CRES steel fitting.
53-05-01: 53-05-01 BOEING, CONVAIR, DOUGLAS and LOCKHEED: Applies to All Boeing 377, Convair 240 Series, Douglas DC-6 Series, and Lockheed 749 Series Airplanes With Curtiss Reversing Propellers.\n\n\tItems I through IV are to be accomplished by means of progressive modification program to be submitted to and approved by the FAA. This program shall begin no later than September 1, 1953, and shall be completed no later than March 1, 1954. (For Boeing 377 completion must be no later than July 1, 1954.) The replacement program in item III and the maintenance and inspection program in item V shall be instituted no later than April 1, 1953.\n\n\tI.\tRevise propeller slip rings, brush cap connector plug and harness to provide isolation of the reverse slip ring and brushes by relocating them between the "Common" and "Bonding" slip rings and brushes, which are both maintained at ground potential. Curtiss Information Reports have been issued to cover this subject, as follows: Convair 240 Series, Report No. 245S dated November 5, 1951; Douglas DC-6 Series, Report No. 249S dated December 4, 1951; Boeing 377, Report No. 258S dated March 21, 1953; Lockheed 749 (C634S Propeller), Report No. 250S dated April 15, 1952; Lockheed 749 (C632S Propeller), Report No. 267S dated May 14, 1952.\n\n\tII.\tA. Install Curtiss brush cap P/N 148764, which has provisions for a separate brush cap connector for the reversing lead. This change may be accomplished after or simultaneously with I, and in accordance with Curtiss Information Report No. 273-S, dated January 15, 1953.\n\n\t\tB.\tIsolate the reversing circuit from the propeller brush cap to (and including) the "I" terminal on the reverse pitch relay, in the manner described below. Where applicable, the same isolation shall be provided for the extension of the reversing circuit to the secondary reverse lock relay.\n\n\t\t\t(1)\tTerminal strips. Any one of the following methods of isolation may be used:\n\n\t\t\t\t(a)\tElimination of connections at terminal strips by using continuous wiring.\n\n\t\t\t\t(b)\tProviding separate covered terminal strip for reversing lead connections.\n\n\t\t\t\t(c)\tIsolating the reversing lead stud, terminals, and associated hardware from all nearby components in an insulating cover which is so designed or secured to the wiring that the wire will stay in place in case of breakage of the terminal; or so that the broken wire and terminal will remain insulated by the cover from contact with other circuits if the wire comes off its terminal. The nature of the cover design or provisions for its attachment must be such that its installation will not be overlooked during maintenance. \n\n\t\t\t\t(d)\tRemoving or grounding studs adjacent to the reversing lead stud and securing all adjacent wiring and the reversing lead to prevent contact of broken leads with reversing terminal or contact of broken reversing lead with other terminals. If the adjacent studs are grounded, rather than removed, the studs must be identified distinctively so that they will not inadvertently be used for the attachment of wires serving other circuits.\n\n\t\t\t(2)\tMultiple pin connector assemblies. Any one of the following methods of isolation may be used:\n\n\t\t\t\t(a)\tElimination of connectors by using continuous wiring.\n\n\t\t\t\t(b)\tProviding separate connectors for each reversing circuit.\n\n\t\t\t\t(c)\tDeactivating all pins adjacent to the one carrying the reversing circuit. These pins are to be retained in the connector but identified distinctively so that they will not be used inadvertently. When distinctively identified, these pins may also be used for circuits which cannot supply sufficient energy to drive the pitch-change motor or to release the pitch change motor brake, or for circuits which are energized only when reversing is desired. At the points where wires are attached to the connector pins, all exposed metal parts are to be protected with insulating covers so secured that contact between circuits cannot occur in case of failure of the connection or in case foreign material is left in the connector assembly.\n\n\t\t\t(3)\tExposed terminals on relays or switches.\n\n\t\t\t\t(a)\tAs specified in item B(1)(c) for terminal strips, or\n\n\t\t\t\t(b)\tIf the terminal is a type which cannot be protected as specified above, cover all exposed metal components with insulating material and secure all wires so that no wire can touch another terminal if the wire breaks or falls off its own terminal. Install insulating barriers as necessary to prevent inadvertent contact between broken or loose wires and other terminals.\n\n\t\t\t(4)\tReverse circuit wiring. Modify in one of the following ways:\n\n\t\t\t\t(a)\tPhysically isolate the reverse wire from all other circuits.\n\n\t\t\t\t(b)\tIf the wiring is run in bundles with other wires, a shielded wire is to be used. The shielding shall be grounded at both ends, and a protective cover shall be provided over the shielding. The shielding shall be carried as close as possible to all terminal points.\n\n\t\t\t(5)\tNacelle filter. If the reverse wire and, where applicable, the lead to the secondary reverse lock relay, is enclosed in conduit or shielding for its entire length from the brush cap to the "I" terminal of the reverse pitch relay, the lead may be routed so as to bypass the nacelle filter thus eliminating the need for isolating the condenser terminals. If the reverse wire is isolated in such manner that filtering is still necessary, provide an additional filter which is physically separated from the existing nacelle filter.\n\n\tIII.\tComply with AD 56-08-01.\n\n\tIV.\tAn unmodified C632S Series propellers which have both the reverse pitch circuit and the feathering circuit opened by the same limit switch when the propeller blades are at the reverse pitch position modify the propeller limit switch arrangement so that it will be possible to energize the increase pitch circuit by operating the feathering control even when the propeller is in reverse pitch. Curtiss Information Reports have been issued to cover this subject, as follows: CV-240 Series, Report No. 245S, dated November 5, 1951;DC-6 Series, Report No. 249S, dated December 4, 1951; L-749 Series, Report No. 267S, dated May 14, 1952.\n\n\tV.\tMaintenance practices.\n\n\t\tA.\tAt each nearest scheduled service to 350 hours:\n\n\t\t\t(1)\tInspect all points specified in items II.B.(1) and II.B.(3). The inspections of item II.B.(1) may be discontinued if the modifications made to the system are of the type described in items II.B.(1)(a) or II.B.(1)(b).\n\n\t\tB.\tAt any time that an electrical fault occurs in a circuit which is carried in the same bundles or the same conduits as the reverse wing, representative terminal points in the faulty circuit are to be inspected to determine whether any damage may have occurred within the bundles or conduit. If there is evidence of possible damage, all the wiring involved is to be removed for inspection. Damaged wiring will be replaced as necessary.\n\n\t\tC.\tAt each scheduled service nearest to 350 hours, perform an electrical check of the reverse safety switches in the pedestal assembly to assure that the switches open when throttles are moved forward out of the reverse position. \n\n\t\tD.\tAt any time that operations are performed which may affect the relative position of the solenoid lock and throttle switches, but in any event at intervals not to exceed 1,500 hours: Check the relationship between the position of the pedestal strikers when they are: (a) in contact with the solenoid latch; (b) at the point where the detent roller contacts the first detent cam; and (c) when the reversing microswitches are actuated. It shall not be possible for the switches to be actuated before the latch and the detent engage the striker and the cam. This determination shall be made by positive measurements rather than observation of engine r.p.m. at which these actions take place.
50-23-01: 50-23-01 PIPER: Applies to All Models PA-17 Aircraft and PA-15 Aircraft Equipped With PA-17 Type Landing Gear Shock Struts. Compliance required by July 15, 1950. Inspect landing gear shock strut end fittings, P/N 11806 (four per airplane) for cracks or other defects in the small bend radii. Replace fittings found to be defective. Excessive tightening of the attachment bolts may induce failure by restricting rotation of the fitting on the bolt, therefore, the end fittings should be installed free to rotate. (Piper Service Letter No. 129, dated October 28, 1949, covers the same subject.)
2008-14-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) helicopters. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The Aviation Authority of Canada with whom we have a bilateral agreement states in the MCAI: "Horizontal stabilizers part numbers 206-023-119-167 and 407-023-801-109 may have manufacturing flaws on the inside surface of the upper and/or lower skin at the tailboom attachment inserts. These flaws may result in cracking of the skin and failure of the horizontal stabilizer.'' The manufacturer's service information states that in addition to cracks, the horizontal stabilizer may have deformation or debonding around and between the inserts. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2006-17-02: The FAA supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 84-09-05, which applies to certain GROB-WERKE GMBH & CO KG (previously identified as BURKHART-GROB FLUGZEUGBAU INDUSTRIESTRABE) Model G102 ASTIR CS sailplanes. AD 84-09-05 requires you to install a modified spherical locking bolt and nut in the forward horizontal stabilizer connection to the vertical stabilizer and install new locking pins in the aft connecting plate for the horizontal stabilizer. Since we issued AD 84- 09-05, fatigue cracks were found in the modified spherical locking bolt. Consequently, this AD requires you to replace the modified spherical locking bolt, the retaining pins (collar bolts), and associated hardware; add a life limit on the spherical locking bolt and the retaining pins; and repetitively inspect the front and rear horizontal stabilizer attachment. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracks in the spherical locking bolt, which could result in failure of the horizontal stabilizer connection. This failure could lead to loss of control.
49-14-01: 49-14-01 PIPER: Applies to Model J3 Series, Serial Numbers 14027 and Up; PA-11, Serial Numbers 11-1 to 11-910; and PA-12, All Airplanes. To be accomplished by April 20, 1949. Inspect the fittings (P/N 40861) at each end of the elevator connector tube (P/N 40261) to determine if the end fittings are riveted to the tube with two rivets 90 degrees apart. If not, attach the end fitting to the tube with two 1/8-inch diameter, 3/4-inch long soft steel, flat or round head rivets 90 degrees apart; or replace with a new connector tube assembly. Full forward position of the control stick will expose the rearward fitting and full rearward position of the stick will expose the forward fitting. (Piper Service Bulletin No. 111 covers the same subject.)
2024-12-09: The FAA is correcting an airworthiness directive (AD) that was published in the Federal Register. That AD applies to all The Boeing Company Model 757 airplanes. As published, the AD number referenced throughout the final rule is incorrect. This document corrects that error. In all other respects, the original document remains the same.
2024-12-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Centerpointe Aerospace Inc. (Centerpointe) Model S-58BT, S-58DT, S- 58ET, S-58FT, S-58HT, and S-58JT helicopters. This AD was prompted by an indication of a crack on the angle gearbox mount (AGBM). This AD requires repetitively performing a fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) of the AGBM at specified time intervals and, depending on the results, removing the AGBM from service. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2024-11-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc., Model BD-100-1A10 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that new or more restrictive maintenance tasks are necessary. This AD requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive maintenance tasks. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-13-29: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81 (MD-81), DC-9-82 (MD-82), DC-9-83 (MD- 83), DC-9-87 (MD-87), and MD-88 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracking of the overwing frames from stations 845 to 905 (MD-87 stations 731 to 791), left and right sides, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of cracked overwing frames. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct such cracking, which could sever the frame, increase the loading of adjacent frames, and result in damage to adjacent structure and loss of overall structural integrity of the airplane.
2024-14-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all International Aero Engines, LLC (IAE LLC) Model PW1122G-JM, PW1124G1- JM, PW1124G-JM, PW1127G1-JM, PW1127G1A-JM, PW1127G1B-JM, PW1127G-JM, PW1127GA-JM, PW1129G-JM, PW1130G-JM, PW1133G-JM, and PW1133GA-JM engines. This AD was prompted by an in-flight shutdown (IFSD) caused by the fracture of a low-pressure compressor (LPC) 1st-stage integrally bladed rotor (IBR-1). This AD requires removal and replacement of affected LPC key washers and affected LPC IBR-1 and installation of inlet guide vane (IGV) spacers. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2024-12-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Embraer S.A. Model ERJ 170 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a landing gear not locked indication during the final approach, which led the flight crew to declare an emergency. This AD requires reviewing maintenance records of the main landing gear (MLG) assemblies to determine whether the MLG was modified according to a certain service bulletin or restored during overhaul maintenance; inspecting the left and right MLG locking-stay bracket assemblies to verify that the correct attaching hardware is correctly installed on the brackets; replacing nuts having certain part numbers (P/Ns); replacing the locking-stay bracket assembly, if necessary; and prohibits the installation of affected parts on the MLG locking-stay bracket assembly; as specified in an Ag[ecirc]ncia Nacional de Avia[ccedil][atilde]o Civil (ANAC) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-13-24: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: It has been found on in-service aircraft that some aileron tab bellcrank assemblies were not in accordance with the definition drawings. The main item concerned is the retainer Part Number S2711004620000, which has been manufactured with a hole larger than it should be, or redrilled out of limits. The function of the retainer is to maintain the spacer in position in case of rupture or loss of the bolt which links the tab control rod to the bellcrank assembly. If the diameter of the retainer hole is out of limit, the retainer function is lost and fail-safe installation is no longer ensured. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to loss of theaileron tab bellcrank functionality, resulting in diminished control of the aircraft. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-14-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 777-200, -200LR, -300, and -300ER series airplanes. This AD requires a one-time inspection to determine the part number of the cargo compartment fire suppression filter/regulator. This AD also requires, for certain airplanes, a revision of the "Maximum Diversion Time in Minutes'' for ETOPS operation specified in the Operations Specifications. For certain airplanes, this AD also provides for optional replacement of the cargo compartment fire suppression filter/ regulator, which would allow revision of the "Maximum Diversion Time in Minutes'' for ETOPS operation specified in the Operations Specifications to restore the airplane's full ETOPS capability. This AD results from a report that the filter/regulator installed in the cargo fire suppression system did not meter the Halon for the certified duration during ETOPS flight tests. We are issuing this AD to prevent ETOPS operation with insufficient cargo fire suppression capability, which could result in an uncontained fire in the cargo compartment.
2024-13-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 737-8, 737-9, and 737-8200 airplanes and Model 737-700, -800, and -900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by multiple reports of passenger service unit (PSU) oxygen generators shifting out of position within their associated PSU assemblies because of a retention failure. This AD requires a general visual inspection of the PSU oxygen generator installation to determine the configuration of the thermal pads of the retention straps and applicable on-condition actions. This AD also prohibits the installation of affected parts. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-14-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Lockheed Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, 382G, and 382J series airplanes. This AD requires, among other actions, an inspection to determine whether a certain upper engine mount bolt is installed, and replacement of any discrepant upper engine mount bolt with a new one. This AD results from a report indicating that several upper engine mount bolts manufactured by a certain supplier broke during installation. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the upper engine mount bolts, which could result in reduced structural capability of an engine mount, and possible separation of a strut and engine from the airplane during flight.
2008-13-23: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During maintenance water has been found in the elevator [assembly]. The unsafe condition is water or ice accumulating in the elevator assembly, which could result in corrosion and consequent reduced structural integrity of the flight control surface, or an unbalanced flight control surface. These conditions could result in reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2024-12-01: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2022-14- 10, which applied to certain Airbus SAS Model A318 series airplanes; Model A319-111, -112, -113, -114, -115, -131, -132, and -133 airplanes; Model A320-211, -212, -214, -216, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes; and Model A321-111, -112, -131, -211, -212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. AD 2022-14-10 required repetitive inspections for cracking of the radius of the front spar vertical stringers and the horizontal floor beam on a certain frame (FR), repetitive inspections for cracking of the fastener holes of the front spar vertical stringers on that frame, and repair if necessary. AD 2022-14-10 also provided, for certain airplanes, a modification of the center wing box area that terminates the repetitive inspections under certain conditions. Since the FAA issued AD 2022-14-10, an additional airplane model has been identified that is also subject to the unsafe condition. This AD continues to require the actions in AD 2022-14-10 and adds Model A321-271N airplanes to the applicability, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference (IBR). The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2024-10-13: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Helicopters Model AS332C, AS332C1, AS3322L, AS332L1, AS332L2, and EC225LP helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of cracks on the fuel filter bowl (bowl) due to over-torquing. This AD requires visually inspecting the bowls of the right hand (RH) and left hand (LH) fuel filters for any cracks and seepage. Depending on the inspection results, this AD requires removing an affected fuel filter from service and replacing that part. This AD also allows a certain fuel filter to be installed on a helicopter if certain actions are accomplished. These requirements are specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-13-28: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Hartzell Propeller Inc. left-hand rotating ( )HC-( )(2,3)Y(K,R)-2 two- and three-bladed, aluminum hub, "compact'' series propellers, with hubs having a non-suffix serial number, and lubrication holes located on the shoulder of the hub blade socket. These propellers are installed on Lycoming Engines LIO-360 series and LO-360 series reciprocating engines installed on Piper Aircraft, Inc. Seneca PA-34-200 and Seminole PA-44-180, and Hawker Beechcraft Corporation Model 76 Duchess, airplanes. This AD requires initial and repetitive eddy current inspections (ECI), of the area around the lubrication holes of the hub blade sockets. This AD results from four reports of propeller hub cracks, including two in-flight blade separation events. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the propeller hub, which could result in blade separation and loss of control of the airplane.
2024-13-03: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Lindstrand Balloons Ltd. Model 42A, 56A, 60A, 69A, 77A, 90A, 105A, 120A, 150A, 180A, 210A, 240A, 260A, 310A, 69B, 77B, 90B, 105B, and Drinks Can hot air balloons. This AD was prompted by a report of degraded polyester filled Aramid (Kevlar) load tapes where the Kevlar core was exposed to ultraviolet light, which could compromise the residual strength of the tapes and the structural integrity of the hot air balloon envelope. This AD requires repetitively checking the hot air balloon envelope for damage (degraded, stretched, or frayed load tapes or exposed Kevlar core) and removing any damaged hot air balloon envelope from service. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-13-19: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A recent incident evidenced that some failures of the Pitot probe heating resistance may not be seen by the low current detection system on aircraft not equipped with [ATR] modification 05469 * * *. In some conditions, an out of tolerance resistance, failing to provide a proper Pitot probe de-icing could not be detected. * * * * * The unsafe condition is that undetected icing of the pitot probe could produce incorrect airspeed readings, which could lead to loss of control of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2024-10-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Leonardo S.p.a. Model AW189 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of an uncommanded deployment of the emergency life-raft system (ELS). This AD requires a one-time inspection of the life-raft installations and, depending on the results, accomplishing additional actions, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.