2003-11-12:
This document supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2003-03- 13, which currently establishes a technical service life for MORAVAN a.s. (Moravan) Model Z-242L airplanes by restricting Acrobatic and Utility category operations and requiring replacement of the wings after a certain operational time. AD 2003-03-13 resulted from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for the Czech Republic. The restrictions required by AD 2003- 03-13 only take account for the aerobatic load spectrum and do not account for the aerobatic frequency. The restrictions also address the life limit of the wings when they should address the life limit of the entire airframe (life limit of the airplane). Although the aerobatic frequency will extend the operational times, it more importantly will ensure that all airplanes (even those that have not reached the operational limits) are not subject to fatigue cracking caused by exceeding the aerobatic frequency. This AD will maintain the restrictions of AD 2003-03-13, but will incorporate the aerobatic frequency and life limit the airplane instead of just the wings. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent structural failure of the wing due to fatigue cracking. Such failure could result in a wing separating from the airplane with consequent loss of airplane control.
DATES: This AD becomes effective on June 5, 2003.
The Director of the Federal Register previously approved the incorporation by reference of Moravan Mandatory Service Bulletin Z 242L/27a--Rev. 1, dated October 31, 2000, as of March 21, 2003 (68 FR 4910, January 31, 2003).
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Moravan Mandatory Service Bulletin Z 242L/27a--Rev. 2; and Moravan Mandatory Service Bulletin Z24L/38a--Rev. 1, both dated April 15, 2003, as of June 5, 2003.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) must receive any comments on this rule on or before July 7, 2003.
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2021-16-02:
The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Helicopters Model SA330J, AS332C, AS332L, AS332L1, AS332L2, and EC225LP helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of a left-hand (LH) side stairway door that inadvertently opened in flight and tore off from its attachment fittings. This AD requires inspecting the locking safety mechanism of the LH side stairway door handle and depending on the results, corrective action. This AD also requires modifying that locking safety mechanism as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
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2000-14-05:
This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 777 series airplanes. This action requires a one-time measurement of the electrical bonding resistance between the wing spar connectors of the fuel quantity indicating system (FQIS) and the spar structure, installation of bonding jumpers, a one-time operational check of the FQIS system, and corrective action, if necessary. This action is necessary to ensure adequate electrical bonding between the wing spar connectors of the FQIS and the spar structure. Inadequate electrical bonding, in the event of a lightning strike, could cause electrical arcing and ignition of fuel vapor in the main or center fuel tank, which could result in a fuel tank explosion. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
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2000-14-08:
This document adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all The New Piper Aircraft, Inc. (Piper) PA-42 series airplanes that are equipped with pneumatic deicing boots. This AD requires you to revise the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include requirements for activation of the airframe pneumatic deicing boots. This AD is the result of reports of in-flight incidents and an accident (on airplanes other than the affected Piper airplanes) that occurred in icing conditions where the airframe pneumatic deicing boots were not activated. The Piper PA-42 series airplanes have a similar type design (as it relates to airframe pneumatic deice boots) to the incident and accident airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to assure that flight crews activate the pneumatic wing and tail deicing boots at the first signs of ice accumulation. This action will prevent reduced controllability of the aircraft due to adverse aerodynamic effects of ice adhering tothe airplane prior to the first deicing cycle.
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67-12-04:
67-12-04 FAIRCHILD-HILLER: Amdt. 39-391 Part 39 Federal Register April 8, 1967. Applies to Models F-27 Series and FH-227 Series Airplanes.
Compliance required as indicated.
To detect cracks in the rudder horn assembly, accomplish the following:
(a) Within the next 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 450 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 500 hours' time in service from the last inspection, comply with (b).
(b) Visually inspect the rudder horn assembly, P/N 27-243018-11, for cracks, using a glass of at least 10-power, or use an equivalent inspection approved by an FAA maintenance inspector. If a crack is found comply with (c) before further flight.
(c) Replace a cracked part with a part of the same part number that has been inspected in accordance with (b), or use an equivalent part approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region.
(d) The repetitive inspection required by (a) may be discontinued when a modification, approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region is incorporated.
(e) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, may adjust the initial compliance time and the repetitive inspection interval specified in this AD if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator.
This directive effective April 8, 1967.
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2000-14-06:
This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, that currently requires a one-time inspection to determine the part number of the fuel shutoff spar valve for the outboard engines. That AD also requires replacement of certain valves with new valves, or modification of the spar valve body assembly, and various follow-on actions. This amendment adds new requirements to accomplish those actions on additional airplanes; and requires a one- time inspection of the maintenance records of certain airplanes to determine if the fuel shutoff spar valve for the outboard engines has ever been replaced, and various follow-on actions. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating that, due to high fuel pressure, certain fuel system components of the outboard engines have failed. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such high fuel pressure, which could result in failure of the fuel systemcomponents; this situation could result in fuel leakage, and, consequently, lead to an engine fire.
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2013-16-19:
We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model EC120B and EC130B4 helicopters with a certain emergency flotation gear (float) installed. This AD requires inspecting the float for chafing of the fabric covering and adding protectors to the float installation to prevent contact between the float and the protruding
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sections of the installation. This AD was prompted by a report of a float that would not inflate during overhaul because one of the float compartments was punctured due to chafing. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent failure of float and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter during an emergency water landing.
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2013-16-18:
We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A320-214, -232 and -233 airplanes; and Model A321-211, - 213, and -231 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a missing fastener between certain stringers of the fuselage frame that connects the frame to a tee. This AD requires an inspection for a missing fastener, and a rototest inspection and a modification or repair of the fuselage frame at the affected area if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking in the fuselage that could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
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69-16-05:
69-16-05 ALLISON: Amdt. 39-829. Applies to Model 250-C18 engines installed in Bell Model 206A Helicopters.
Compliance: Required as indicated.
To detect incipient engine failure, accomplish the following:
A) Effective immediately upon receipt of this Airworthiness Directive, inspect the lower gear box and the oil outlet magnetic plugs on a daily basis as described in Allison Commercial Service Letter 250 CSL No. 6, dated January 12, 1967. This inspection shall be performed at time intervals not to exceed five (5) hours' time in service.
B) On or before November 3, 1969, install a visual magnetic plug indicator as described in Bell Service Letter 206A-129, dated August 11, 1969, or later FAA approved revision or an equivalent installation approved by Chief, Engineering & Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region.
C) When the installation described in Paragraph B of this Airworthiness Directive has been accomplished, the inspections required by Paragraph A of this Airworthiness Directive will no longer be required.
Effective August 13, 1969, revised August 30, 1969.
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2000-13-07:
This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A330 and A340 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive detailed visual and ultrasonic inspections of the main landing gear (MLG) to detect fatigue cracks, and repair if necessary; replacement of certain nose landing gear (NLG) handwheel controllers and certain placards with new placards; installation of steering angle recording software; and corrective action for exceeding certain steering angles. This AD also requires an AFM revision to limit the nose wheel steering angle for pushback and towing and to limit the nose wheel steering for powered turns. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent MLG failure due to fatigue cracking, which could result in reduced structural capability of the airplane and collapse of the MLG.
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75-03-01:
75-03-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-2074 as amended by Amendment 39-2421 and 39-3502 is further amended by Amendment 39-3737. Applies to all Boeing Model 707-300, -300B, - 300C, and -400 series airplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin No. 3157, Revision 4, or later FAA approved revisions upon the accumulation of the following number of landings since new: \n\nModels\n707-300, -400\t13,000 or more landings \n707-300B\t8,000 or more landings\n707-300C\t8,000 or more landings \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\tTo detect cracks in the upper wing skin splice plate at W.S. 360, accomplish the following: \n\tA.\tWithin the next 50 landings, unless accomplished within the last 350 landings, and at intervals thereafter not to exceed 400 landings, inspect the upper wing splice plate at station 360 in accordance with (1), (2), or (3) below. Special attention should be focused in the area of stringer 11 as it is in the high stressed area of the splice plate. If cracks are found, repair priorto further flight in accordance with paragraph B below. \n\t\t(1)\tX-Ray inspect per Boeing Service Bulletin No. 3157, Revision 3 and visually inspect the splice plate by removing the aerodynamic sealant between the wing skins from front to rear spar. This inspection method is acceptable for only two successive inspections after the effective date of this amendment. \n\t\t(2)\tLow frequency eddy current inspect as specified in Boeing Service Bulletin No. 3157, Revision 7, or inspections approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\t\t(3)\tInspect in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\tB.\tIf cracks are found, repair prior to further flight in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2510, Revision 3, or later FAA approved revisions, or in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. The repetitive inspections of paragraph A. must be accomplishedin areas not covered by repairs per Part VII of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2510, Revision 3, or later FAA approved revisions. \n\tC.\tThe inspections required by this AD may be terminated when the following is accomplished: \n\t\t(1)\tSplice plate, skin and rib cap fastener holes are oversized to remove fatigue material per Part IV of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2510, Revision 3, or later FAA approved revisions, and complete external doublers are installed in accordance with Part VIII of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 2510, Revision 3, or later FAA approved revisions, or \n\t\t(2)\tOther modifications are made in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\tD.\tFor the purpose of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. \n\tE.\tUpon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the change for that operator. \n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. The documents may be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\tThis supersedes Amendment 39-1829 (39 F.R. 15027), AD 74-09-07, as amended by Amendment 39-2002. \n\tAmendment39-2074 became effective January 27, 1975. \n\tAmendment 39-3421 became effective December 4, 1975. \n\tAmendment 39-3502 became effective July 3, 1979. \n\tThis Amendment 39-3737 becomes effective April 17, 1980.
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2013-15-21:
We are superseding airworthiness directive (AD) 2004-13-06 for certain Airbus Model A319 and A320 series airplanes. AD 2004-13-06 required repetitive detailed inspections to detect cracks in the keel beam side panels, and repair if necessary. This new AD requires repetitive eddy current inspections for cracking in the keel beam side panels, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD was prompted by reports of cracks on the side panels of the keel beams. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracks on the side panels of the keel beams, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
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75-09-01:
75-09-01 LOCKHEED-CALIFORNIA COMPANY: Amendment 39-2172. Applies to L-1011-385-1-193L airplanes, Serial Nos. 1064, 1079, 1114, 1120, and 1125, certificated in all categories. After receipt of this AD, occupancy of the under floor lounge is prohibited until the conformity of the under floor lower lounge floor boards and the related applicable components is verified to establish adherence to the configuration defined by FAA Sealed Drawing List L-1011- 385-1, No. 385-1, supplement entitled, "FAA List for Model L Peculiars" and "Model L Peculiars Drawing List Addendum", dated May 10, 1974, or FAA-approved equivalent configuration. The conformity inspection shall be accomplished by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, or his authorized representative.
This amendment becomes effective April 21, 1975, for all persons except those to whom it was made effective by telegram, dated March 18, 1975.
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85-11-07 R1:
85-11-07 R1 CESSNA: Amendment 39-5115. Applies to Models P210N, P210R (Serial numbers P21000001 through and including P21000855), and T210R (Serial numbers 21064898 through and including 21064929) airplanes, certificated in any category.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished.
To prevent possible separation of the turbocharger oil reservoir outlet fitting and subsequent rapid loss of engine lubricating oil, accomplish the following:
(a) Prior to further flight:
(1) Remove the right side engine cowling to the extent necessary to examine the turbocharger oil reservoir.
(2) Visually inspect using a strong light the top oil outlet fitting for cracks in the vicinity of the weld securing the fitting to the upper surface of the turbocharger oil reservoir.
NOTE: Cracking of the turbocharger oil reservoir outlet fitting may not be evidenced by an oil leak in the vicinity of the oil reservoir installation. Therefore, inspection of the reservoir will depend upon careful cleaning in addition to the use of a strong light.
(3) If no cracks are detected in the outlet fitting of the turbocharger oil reservoir, reinspect this area at each additional 25 hours time-in-service thereafter, or in the alternative, replace the turbocharger oil reservoir as follows:
(A) For Model P210N (serial numbers P21000001 through P21000834) airplanes remove the existing reservoir and install a Cessna Part Number 2150106- 32 reservoir in accordance with the installation procedures contained in Paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(6) of this AD.
(B) For Model P210R (serial numbers P21000835 through and including P21000855), and T210R (serial numbers 21064898 through and including 21064929) airplanes remove the existing reservoir and install a Cessna Part Number 2150106-33 reservoir in accordance with the installation procedures contained in Paragraphs (c)(1) through (c)(6) of this AD.
(b) The repetitive inspections requiredby Paragraph (a) (3) of this AD may be discontinued when the modification in Paragraph (a) (3) (A) or Paragraph (a) (3) (B) of this AD is accomplished.
(c) If any cracks are detected in the outlet fitting in accomplishing Paragraph (a) (2) of this AD, prior to further flight, remove the existing turbocharger oil reservoir and install a Cessna Part Number 2150106-32 reservoir (for Model P210N serial numbers P21000001 through P21000834) or Part Number 2150106-33 reservoir (for Model P210R serial numbers P21000835 through and including P21000855) and Model T210R, (serial numbers 21064898 through and including 21064929) airplanes available from Cessna Aircraft Company using the following procedure:
(1) Install the check valve with the arrow pointing away from the oil reservoir outlet fitting.
(2) Use a wrench on the reservoir fitting to isolate the torque when tightening the check valve.
(3) Attach the breather vent line.
(4) Mount the rubber flexible hanger to the firewall and reservoir.
(5) Initially secure the oil inlet and outlet lines by hand. Then use a wrench on the oil reservoir inlet fitting and the check valve fitting to isolate the effects of tightening the oil scavenge hoses. Tighten the oil scavenge hoses to the turbocharger oil reservoir.
(6) Run the engine to check for oil leaks and eliminate any leaks prior to returning the airplane to service.
(d) An equivalent method of compliance may be used if approved by the Manager, Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, Federal Aviation Administration, Central Region, 1801 Airport Road, Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209.
Cessna Single Engine Service Bulletin SE85-11, dated June 7, 1985, covers the subject matter of this AD.
This amendment becomes effective on August 9, 1985, to all persons except those to whom it has already been made effective by priority letter from the FAA dated June 6, 1985, and is identified as AD 85-11-07.
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85-03-06 R1:
85-03-06 R1 BOEING: Amendment 39-4998 as amended by Amendment 39-5205. Applies to Model 737 series airplanes certificated in all categories listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53- 1031, Revision 3, dated October 28, 1983. To prevent rapid decompression resulting from undetected cracking of the wing-to-body drag angle, accomplish the following (unless previously accomplished) prior to the accumulation of 8,000 landings on Group I airplanes, or 35,000 landings on Group II airplanes, or within 1 year or 4,000 landings from the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later: \n\n\tA.\tVisually inspect the upper drag angles for cracks in accordance with the Flight Safety Addendum of Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53-1031, Revision 3, or later FAA approved revisions. Repeat the visual inspections at intervals not to exceed 4,000 landings.\n \n\tB.\tIf cracks are found, replace cracked parts with new aluminum parts and continue the inspections of paragraph A., above, or modify in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53-1031, Revision 1, or later FAA-approved revisions. \n\n\tC.\tModification of airplanes in accordance with Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 737-53-1031, Revision 1, or later FAA-approved revisions, constitutes terminating action for this AD. \n\n\tD.\tAirplanes may be flown to a maintenance base for drag angle replacement or modification in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 with prior approval of the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tE.\tFor purposes of complying with the AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. \n\n\tF.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, Northwest Mountain Region, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tG.\tUpon request by the operator, an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, subject to prior approval by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals in this AD, if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for the operator. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tAmendment 39-4998 became effective March 11, 1985. \n\tThis Amendment 39-5205 becomes effective February 3, 1986.
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2025-04-08:
The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain MHI RJ Aviation ULC Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 and 440), CL-600-2C10 (Regional Jet Series 700, 701, and 702), CL-600- 2C11 (Regional Jet Series 550), CL-600-2D15 (Regional Jet Series 705), CL-600-2D24 (Regional Jet Series 900), and CL-600-2E25 (Regional Jet Series 1000) airplanes. This AD was prompted by the determination that radio altimeters cannot be relied upon to perform their intended function if they experience interference from wireless broadband operations in the 3.7-3.98 GHz frequency band (5G C-Band). This AD requires installing a new radio frequency (RF) bandpass filter on the coaxial line between the radio altimeter and the receive antenna in the aft equipment compartment. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
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86-07-06:
86-07-06 BOEING: Amendment 39-5270. Applies to Model 747 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-54-2111, Revision 1, dated November 22, 1985, certificated in any category. To prevent failure of the forward lug of an inboard pylon upper link, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 850 landings after the effective date of this AD or prior to the accumulation of 8,000 landings, whichever occurs later, perform a close visual or ultrasonic inspection of the forward lug of the inboard pylon upper link for cracks in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-54-2111, Revision 1, dated November 22, 1985, or later FAA- approved revision. \n\n\tNOTE: Definition of close visual (detailed) inspection method: Close intensive visual inspections of highly defined structural details or locations searching for evidence of structural irregularity. Using adequate lighting and where necessary, inspection aids such as mirrors, etc., surfacecleaning and access procedures may be required to gain proximity. \n\n\tB.\tCracked parts must be replaced or modified prior to further flight. The part may be modified, if cracking is within rework limits, by the installation of bushings of a new design in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-54-2111, Revision 1, dated November 22, 1985, or later FAA-approved revision. \n\n\tC.\tIf no cracks are found, perform repetitive inspections, as described in paragraph A., above, at the following intervals: \n\n\t\t1.\tIf the immediately prior inspection was a close visual inspection, reinspect within the next 850 landings. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf the immediately prior inspection was an ultrasonic inspection, reinspect within the next 1,700 landings. \n\n\tD.\tInstallation of inboard pylon upper links that have been modified in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-54-2111, Revision 1, dated November 22, 1985, or later FAA- approved revision, is considered to be terminating action for the requirementsof this AD. \n\n\tE.\tCompliance with this AD does not terminate the inspection requirements of the Supplemental Structural Inspection Document (SSID) Airworthiness Directive AD 84-21-02 (Amdt. 39-4936; 49 FR 44890), if applicable. \n\n\tF.\tUpon the request of an operator, an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, subject to prior approval of the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, may adjust the inspection times specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of that operator, if the request contains substantiating data to justify the change for that operator. \n\n\tG.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tH.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this proposal who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective May 8, 1986.
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2013-15-11:
We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 727 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of cracking in the left-side chord of the fin closure rib on the vertical stabilizer. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the left and right side chords of the fin closure rib for cracking and corrosion, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking and corrosion in the left- and right-side chords of the fin closure rib, which could lead to widespread cracking in the chords that might weaken the fin closure rib structure and result in loss of airplane control due to lack of horizontal stabilizer support.
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2013-15-14:
We are superseding airworthiness directive (AD) 2008-06-29, which applied to all The Boeing Company Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. AD 2008-06-29 required repetitive inspections of the downstop assemblies on the main tracks of the No. 2, 3, 4, and No. 5 slats and the inboard track of the No. 1 and 6 slats to verify if any parts are missing, damaged, or in the wrong order; other specified actions; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD retains these requirements and adds an inspection of the slat can interior for foreign object debris (FOD), and removal of any FOD found; modification of the slat track hardware; an inspection for FOD and for damage to the interior surface of the slat cans; and related investigative and corrective actions, if necessary. This AD was prompted by development of a modification by the manufacturer, which, when installed, would terminate the repetitive inspections. We are issuing this AD to prevent loose or missing parts in the main slat track downstop assemblies, which could puncture the slat track housing and result in a fuel leak and consequent fire.
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75-17-10:
75-17-10 SLINGSBY SAILPLANES: Amendment 39-2312. Applies to T59D Kestrel gliders certificated in all categories.
Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished.
To prevent structural failure of the elevator actuator bracket, accomplish the following:
(a) Within the next 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 5 hours' time in service, visually inspect the elevator actuator bracket P/N 59A-30-11 for cracks in the inside welded corners.
(b) If cracks are found, prior to further flight, replace the elevator actuator bracket, P/N 59A-30-11, with a machined aluminum bracket, P/N 59A-03-8A/B/C, in accordance with Slingsby Sailplanes Technical Instruction No. 65, Issue 2, dated May 23, 1974, or an FAA- approved equivalent.
(c) The inspections required by paragraph (a) of this AD may be discontinued after a machined aluminum elevator actuator bracket, P/N 59A-03-8A/B/C, has been installed in place of P/N 59A-30-11 in accordance with Slingsby Sailplanes Technical Instruction No. 65, Issue 2, dated May 23, 1974, or an FAA-approved equivalent.
This amendment becomes effective August 18, 1974.
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97-17-08:
This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Raytheon Aircraft Company (Raytheon) Model 1900D airplanes (formerly known as Beech Aircraft Corporation Model 1900D airplanes) that have not had the propeller removed and re-installed since factory installation. This action requires inspecting the propeller mounting bolts for the proper torque and replacing or re-torquing any propeller bolt with the wrong torque level. The manufacturer discovered some under-torqued propeller mounting bolts during factory installation of the propeller. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fatigue cracking and failure of the propeller mounting bolts, which if not detected and corrected, could result in loss of the propeller.
Comments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before October 30, 1997.
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2013-16-04:
We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Eclipse Aerospace, Inc. Model EA500 airplanes equipped with Avio, Avio with ETT, or Avio NG 1.0 avionics suites. This AD was prompted by a report of potential aircraft hardware failure in the autopilot control panel and the center switch panel. This AD requires either incorporating updates to the aircraft computer system software or incorporating a temporary revision to the aircraft flight manual. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
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2025-05-13:
The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. (P&WC) Model PW535E and PW535E1 engines. This AD was prompted by a manufacturer design review that indicated certain flange bolts securing the gas generator case and turbine support case are susceptible to cracking at their current low- cycle fatigue (LCF) life. This AD requires repetitive borescope inspections (BSI) of the gas generator case to turbine support case retaining bolts for evidence of bolt cracks, bolt fracture, missing bolts, or loose bolts and replacement, if necessary, as specified in a Transport Canada AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
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2013-15-12:
We are superseding airworthiness directive (AD) 2004-15-07, for certain Airbus Model A310 series airplanes. AD 2004-15-07 required repetitive inspections for fatigue cracking of the area around the fasteners of the landing plate of the aileron access doors of the bottom skin panel of the wings, and related corrective action. AD 2004- 15-07 also provided for an optional terminating action to end the repetitive inspections. This new AD reduces the initial inspection compliance time and intervals, and provides additional terminating action options. This AD was prompted by a reassessment of a previous fatigue threshold and inspection interval, which resulted in a determination that reduced inspection thresholds and intervals for accomplishment of the tasks are necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the area around the fasteners of the landing plate of the aileron access doors and the bottom skin panel of the wings, which could result in reducedstructural integrity of the wings.
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97-26-05:
This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all British Aerospace (Jetstream) Model HS 748 series airplanes. This action requires inspections of the inspection holes in all engine W frame socket fittings to determine if certain fasteners have been installed, or if the inspection holes have been reworked; and corrective action, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent fatigue cracking at the inspection hole locations, due to the installation of certain fasteners or hole enlargement, which could result in failure of the engine mount structure and consequent separation of the engine from the airplane.
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