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88-11-09: 88-11-09 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-5891. Applies to all Model BAC 1- 11 200 and 400 series airplanes, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent jamming of engine controls due to a failed mounting bracket of the aft attendant's seat, accomplish the following: A. Prior to the accumulation of 12,000 landings, or within the next 350 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, inspect the mounting brackets of the aft attendant's seat for cracks in accordance with British Aerospace Alert Service Bulletin 53-A- PM5931, Issue No. 1, dated November 19, 1986. 1. If cracks are detected less than 1 inch in length, repair prior to further flight and continue to inspect at intervals of 350 landings, in accordance with the service bulletin. 2. If cracks exceed 1 inch in length, replace brackets prior to further flight, in accordance with the service bulletin. 3. If no cracks are found, repeat the inspections in accordance with the service bulletin at intervals not to exceed 3,600 landings. B. Incorporation of Modification PM5931 constitutes terminating action for the requirements of this AD. C. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety and which has the concurrence of an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. D. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to British Aerospace, Librarian, P.O. Box 17414, Dulles International Airport, Washington, D.C. 20041. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment 39-5891 becomes effective June 27, 1988.
85-06-07: 85-06-07 ALEXANDER SCHLEICHER: Amendment 39-5097. Applies to Model ASK-21 Gliders, S/Ns 21194 through 21228, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required prior to next flight. To prevent the main wheel fairing from (1) causing structural damage to the fuselage wheel well box cutout and (2) loosening a rib during a hard landing causing aileron control problems, accomplish the following: Inspect the wheel box cutout in the fuselage for clearance, and modify if necessary, in accordance with Actions 1 through 5 of Alexander Schleicher ASK-21 Technical Note No. 17, dated October 1, 1984, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Upon request, an equivalent means of compliance with the requirements of this AD may be approved by the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office, AEU-100, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, 1000 Brussels, Belgium, telephone 513.38.30 X27l0. Alexander Schleicher ASK-21 Technical Note No. 17, dated October 1, 1984, is incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a) (1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received this document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Alexander Schleicher, Segelflugzeugbau, D-6416 Poppenhausen, Federal Republic of Germany. This document also may be examined at the Office of the Regional Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803, weekdays, except Federal holidays between the hours of 8:00 am. and 4:30 pm. This amendment becomes effective July 25, 1985, to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by Priority Letter AD No. 85-06-07, issued March 26, 1985, which contained this amendment.
84-18-04: 84-18-04 ROBINSON HELICOPTER COMPANY: Amendment 39-4948. Applies to Model R-22 series helicopters certificated in all categories having main rotor gearbox Part Number A006-1, Revision A through V, installed. Compliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent main rotor gearbox failure, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 15 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 35 hours time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 50 hours time in service from the last inspection: (1) Remove the oil level sight glass from the main rotor gearbox. NOTE: To prevent oil loss the right skid may be elevated. (2) Manually rotate the drive system and visually inspect all 12 bolt heads located on underside of ring gear using suitable illumination. (3) If any bolt failure is observed (including head separation), replace the gearbox with a serviceable gearboxbefore further flight. (4) If no indication of bolt failure is observed, reinstall sight glass in accordance with normal maintenance instructions. (b) If the main rotor gearbox oil chip detector illuminates during ground or flight operation, in addition to normal maintenance procedures, comply with paragraph (a) before further flight. (c) Within the next 200 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, modify the main rotor gearbox to include Robinson Kit No. KI-37 in accordance with Instructions No. KI-37 dated August 24, 1984. When this modification has been accomplished, the inspections required by Paragraph (a) may be discontinued. NOTE: Robinson Service Bulletin No. 43, dated August 24, 1984, pertains to this subject. (d) The helicopter may be flown under the provisions of FAR Sections 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the inspections and modification of paragraphs (a) and (c) may be accomplished, provided the gearbox oil chip detector has not illuminated. (e) Alternative means of compliance providing an equivalent level of safety with this AD may be used when approved by the Manager, Western Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. This amendment becomes effective November 8, 1984, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by priority letter AD 84-18-04 issued September 6, 1984, which contained this amendment.
87-25-52: 87-25-52 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-5843. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81, -82, -83, and -87 series airplanes, as listed in McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A32-222, dated December 10, 1987, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo eliminate the potential for decreased braking performance or loss of braking capability during landing or rejected takeoff, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 10 days after the effective date of this AD, inspect the Brake/Anti-Skid Control Unit in accordance with Paragraph B of the Accomplishment Instructions of McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A32-222, dated December 10, 1987, or later revision approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. If correct Brake/Anti-Skid Control Unit is installed, no further action is necessary. \n\n\tB.\tIf incorrect Brake/Anti-Skid Control Unit is installed, before further flight, remove the incorrect anti-skid control unit, reconfigure the keying rack and electrical connector, and install the correct anti-skid control unit, in accordance with Paragraphs D, E, and F of the Accomplishment Instructions of McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A32-222, dated December 10, 1987, or later revision approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tC.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with inspection requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to the McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director of Publications, C1-L00 (54-60). These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis AD was effective earlier to all recipients of telegraphic AD T87-25-52, issued December 11, 1987. \n\n\tThis amendment 39-5843 becomes effective March 7, 1988.
2017-01-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A318 and A319 series airplanes, Model A320-211, -212, - 214, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes, and Model A321 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a rupture of a main landing gear (MLG) sliding tube axle. This AD requires identification of the part number and serial number of the MLG sliding tubes; inspection of affected chromium plates and sliding tube axles for damage; and replacement of the sliding tube if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2024-17-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500- 1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of a missing pintle fuse pin in the left-hand (LH) main landing gear (MLG) discovered during scheduled maintenance. This AD requires doing an inspection of the MLG pintle housing assembly to verify that the pintle fuse pins are present and correctly installed, and corrective actions if necessary, as specified in a Transport Canada Emergency AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2017-01-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Diamond Aircraft Industries GmbH Model DA 42 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as an uncommanded engine shutdown during flight due to failure of the propeller regulating valve caused by hot exhaust gases escaping from fractured engine exhaust pipes. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
98-01-19: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Dornier Model 328-100 series airplanes, that requires replacement of the main landing gear (MLG) uplocks with new or modified MLG uplocks. This amendment is prompted by the issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the MLG to lock in the stowed position due to ice accumulation on the uplock hook and roller assembly, which could result in the inadvertent deployment of the MLG during flight.
2021-09-05: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2016-08-20 for certain Airbus Helicopters (previously Eurocopter France) EC130B4 and EC130T2 helicopters. AD 2016-08-20 required repetitively inspecting the tail boom to Fenestron junction frame (junction frame) for a crack. This new AD continues to require inspecting the junction frame with the horizontal stabilizer removed, and expands the applicability, revises the compliance time and the inspection procedures for inspecting the junction frame, adds inspection procedures for certain helicopters, allows repair of the junction frame, and requires modifying and then repetitively inspecting the junction frame and reporting certain information. This AD was prompted by additional cracks and the availability of a design change that modifies the junction frame. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
2017-01-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Defense and Space S.A. Model C-212 airplanes. This AD was prompted by multiple reports of damaged and cracked rudder torque tube shafts. This AD requires various repetitive inspections, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also provides a modification which terminates the repetitive inspections. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.