Results
98-09-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Aerospatiale Model ATR72 series airplanes, that requires a one-time high frequency eddy current inspection to detect cracking of the lower fuselage structure, and repair, if necessary. This amendment also requires modification of certain fastener holes in the lower fuselage structure. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent reduced structural integrity of the airplane due to fatigue cracking in the lower fuselage structure.
2011-09-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * * * * [S]ome Allowable Damage Limits and Repairs published in SRM Chapters 57-61-12 PB101 and 57-61-12 PB201 were de-validated starting from the SRM revision issued on January 2009. The terminology ``De-validated SRM'' used in this AD text refers to the SRM chapters mentioned above. In order to prevent complete inner aileron split due to possible failure or disbonding of the repairs on the inner aileron panels performed as per ``devalidated SRM'', which may result in flutter coupling of the free aileron part, this AD requires a one time inspection of the inner aileron panels to identify the presence of ``de-validated SRM'' repairs and, if necessary, to apply the associated corrective actions [repair]. The flutter coupling of the free aileron part might result in separation of the aileron from the airplane, degradation of airplane control, and increased workload for the flight crew. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2011-09-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires inspecting the fuselage surface for corrosion and cracking behind the external adapter plate of the antennae installation, and repair if necessary. This AD was prompted by a report of a crack found behind the external adapter plate of the antennae during inspection. Similar cracking was found on two additional airplanes, and extensive corrosion was found on one airplane. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct corrosion and cracking behind the external adapter plate of the antennae of certain damage-tolerant structure, which could result in reduced structural integrity and consequent rapid depressurization of the airplane.
59-10-08: 59-10-08 PIPER: Applies to Models PA-18, PA-18A, PA-20 and PA-22, Aircraft. Compliance required not later than July 15, 1959, for Models PA-18, PA-18A, and PA- 22, and not later than November 30, 1959, for the Model PA-20. Recent occurrences have revealed improper compliance with AD 56-26-02 (Canceled March 24, 1958). Therefore, the tank vents drilled into the gas tank cap must be checked as follows: Insert a 0.030-inch diameter wire into the holes at the bottom of the cap. If the holes are properly drilled the wire can be inserted over 3/4 inch until it hits the inside top of the cap. If the holes are not properly drilled the wire will hit the baffle and only enter approximately 1/4 inch. Also, if the cap has one hole drilled and is marked with an "X" adjacent to the hole, and the cap rattles when shaken, a loose internal rivet is indicated. If either of the latter conditions exist, the following must be accomplished: Rework the fuel tank caps by drilling two additional 0.067 holes 1/4 inch from the existing center hole. Drill through bottom part of cap and baffle only. Check these newly drilled holes with the 0.030-inch diameter wire as outlined above. (This airworthiness directive supplements Piper Service Bulletin No. 148A dated May 29, 1957. The drawings included in this bulletin may be referred to as a guide in reworking the fuel tank caps.)
97-23-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Fairchild Model FH-227 series airplanes, that requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to prohibit positioning of the power levers below the flight idle stop during flight, and to add a statement of the consequences of such positioning of the power levers. This amendment is prompted by incidents and accidents involving airplanes equipped with turboprop engines in which the propeller ground beta range was used improperly during flight. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of airplane controllability, or engine overspeed and consequent loss of engine power caused by the power levers being positioned below the flight idle stop when the airplane is in flight.
2011-08-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: There have been four reports of loose or detached main landing gear torque link apex pin locking plate and the locking plate retainer bolt. This condition could result in torque link apex pin disengagement, heavy vibration during landing, damage to main landing gear components and subsequent main landing gear collapse. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products. [[Page 20499]]
96-18-16: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to CFM International (CFMI) CFM56-2/-2A/-2B/-3/-3B/-3C/-5 series turbofan engines, that requires part number reidentification of certain low pressure turbine rotor (LPTR) stub shafts and conical supports, and reduction of the low cycle fatigue (LCF) retirement lives for these reidentified parts. This amendment is prompted by the results of a refined life analysis performed by the manufacturer which revealed minimum calculated LCF lives significantly lower than published LCF retirement lives. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent an LCF failure of the LPTR stub shaft and conical support, which could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the aircraft.
59-07-05: 59-07-05 PIPER: Applies to PA-24-180 Comanche Aircraft. Compliance required not later than June 1, 1959. Inspection has shown the clearance between oil cooler lines and exhaust stack is not adequate on some aircraft. Clearance between the lines and the stack should be a minimum of three-eights of an inch. In the event inadequate clearance exists, the oil cooler lines should be reformed or the fittings in the cooler should be repositioned slightly so that proper clearance can be obtained. If necessary, adapters Piper P/N 451 855 (Weatherhead No. 3200 x 6) can be installed between the oil cooler and the oil cooler line fittings. When providing for the proper clearance make certain there is no interference between the oil cooler lines and the cowl. (Piper Service Bulletin No. 167 dated January 6, 1959, covers this item.)
2011-08-10: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for RR RB211-Trent 700 series turbofan engines. That AD currently requires, for the step aside gearbox (SAGB), repositioning of the oil metering jet up into the oil distributor within the bevel gearshaft, followed by initial and repetitive visual inspections of the magnetic chip detector (MCD). Since we issued that AD, RR has demonstrated that the repositioning of the oil metering jet eliminates the need for the repetitive inspections. This AD changes the applicability from RB211- Trent 700 series turbofan engines, to RB211-Trent 768-60 and Trent 772- 60 turbofan engines. This AD also eliminates the visual inspections of the MCD from the AD requirements. This AD was prompted by RR demonstrating that the repositioning of the oil metering jet eliminates the need for the repetitive inspections, by the need to correct the AD applicability, and by the need to eliminate the visual inspections of the MCD. We are issuing thisAD to prevent in-flight engine shutdowns caused by SAGB driving bevel gearshaft ball bearing failure.
2011-08-01: We are superseding an existing emergency airworthiness directive (EAD) for the Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. (Bell) Model 212 helicopters with a certain main rotor hub inboard strap fitting (fitting) installed. That EAD requires, before further flight, removing certain serial-numbered fittings and replacing them with airworthy fittings. It also requires performing a magnetic particle inspection (MPI) on fittings with certain serial numbers (S/Ns) to inspect for a crack. If a crack is found, the cracked fitting must be replaced with an airworthy fitting, and certain data must be reported to the FAA. This airworthiness directive (AD) retains the requirements of that EAD and expands the applicability to require performing an MPI for a crack on additional serial-numbered fittings. This AD is prompted by the determination that certain fittings were not manufactured in accordance with the approved manufacturing processes and controls. In total, eight fittings have been found that have cracks. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of a fitting, loss of a main rotor blade, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
97-14-15: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Raytheon Aircraft Company (formerly known as Beech Aircraft Corporation) Models E33, F33, G33, E33A, F33A, E33C, F33C, C35, D35, E35, F35, G35, H35, J35, K35, M35, N35, P35, S35, V35, V35A, V35B, V35TC, V35ATC, V35BTC, 36, A36, A36TC, B36TC, 50, B50, C50, 95-55, 95A55, 95B55, 95C55, D55, E55, 56TC, A56TC, 58, 58TC, 95, B95, B95A, D95A, and E95 airplanes. This action requires checking the cabin side door handle and the utility door handle from the interior of the airplane for proper locking. If the door handles do not lock, the proposed AD would require reinstalling the door handles correctly for the lock to engage. Nine reports of the utility and cabin door handle opening from the interior of the airplane without depressing the lock release button prompted this action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent unintentional opening of the cabin side door and the utility door from the interior of the airplane, which, if not detected and corrected, could result in loss of control of the airplane.
96-20-03: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all de Havilland DHC-8-100 and -300 series airplanes, that currently requires repetitive inspections to detect loose bolts at the retract actuator support fitting of the main landing gear, and various follow-on actions, if necessary. That AD was prompted by a report of loose actuator supporting bolts and cracks in the relief radius of the boss at the forward surface of the fittings. This amendment adds a requirement to install a new modification, which, when accomplished, terminates the repetitive inspections. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of hydraulic systems and reduced controllability of the airplane due to loose actuator support bolts or cracks in the relief radius of the boss at the forward surface of the fittings.
96-20-08: This amendment supersedes AD 93-19-06, which currently requires repetitively inspecting acrylic cabin and cockpit side windows for cracks on certain Fairchild Aircraft SA26, SA226, and SA227 series airplanes, and, if cracks are found that exceed certain limitations, replacing that window. This action maintains the requirement of repetitively inspecting the cabin and cockpit side windows, and adds a life limit for the single-pane cockpit side windows. Acrylic window failures on the affected airplanes prompted this action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent acrylic cabin or cockpit side window failures, which could result in airframe damage and decompression injuries. The incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations was previously approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of November 19, 1993 (58 FR 51771, October 5, 1993).
2011-07-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * Under certain conditions, an ignition source may develop in the wing tank vapour space, due to insufficient clearance between the wiring along the Fuel Quantity Tank Units (FQTU's) and the local reinforcing structure around the upper skin cut-out. This condition, if not corrected, in combination with flammable fuel vapours, could result in a wing tank explosion and consequent loss of the aeroplane. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
57-01-02: 57-01-02 PIPER: Applies to Model PA-23, Serial Numbers 23-1 to 23-844 Inclusive. Compliance required not later than February 15, 1957. The following inspection and action is necessary in order to prevent the possibility of stabilizer failure or malfunction in the event the proper number of bolts are not found attaching the front stabilizer fittings, right and left, P/N 17093-00. Inspect the two front stabilizer attachment fittings and ascertain that there are three bolts securing each fitting to the longitudinal stringer and the bulkhead (two in the stringer and one in the bulkhead). If less than three bolts have been used, the unsatisfactory condition must be corrected. It will be necessary to remove the stabilizer fairing on the bottom side, and to use a mirror to make the inspection. (Piper Service Bulletin No. 150 of December 21, 1956, covers this same subject.)
57-05-03: 57-05-03 PIPER: Applies to Model PA-23, Serial Numbers 23-1 to 23-903 Inclusive. Compliance required at the next 100-hour inspection but not later than May 1, 1957. The following careful examination and action is required to overcome excessive wear and possible failure of the elevator push-pull tube. 1. Careful examination should be made of the wear area on the elevator push-pull tube at the point where it passes through the fiber rollers. Any tube that shows wear exceeding 0.005 inch must be replaced. 2. Obtain four each of nylon block, Piper P/N 19225-00 and eight AN 960-516 washers. Remove the four bearings, P/N 80012-67 and the six washers, P/N 81342-61 from the fiber roller installation and reuse in the nylon block installation. Install the above parts, except for the rollers, in accordance with the sketch and instructions shown in Piper Service Bulletin No. 151 dated February 11, 1957.
2018-03-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A330-202, -203, -223, and -243 airplanes; and Model A340- 211, -212, -311, and -313 airplanes. This AD requires contacting the FAA to obtain instructions for addressing the unsafe condition on these products, and doing the actions specified in those instructions. This AD was prompted by a report of a hard contact that was found between the constant speed motor/generator feeder line route 6G/6E and the optional cabin temperature control pipe on the upper shell between certain frames. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
49-07-02: 49-07-02\tNORTH AMERICAN: Applies to Army BC-1A, AT-6, -6A, -6B, -6C: Navy SNJ-2, -3, -4 Aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required not later than April 1, 1949. \n\n\tAccidents have occurred in the above model aircraft from engine stoppage on takeoffs and landings when operating on the left tank standpipe outlet with the fuel in the tank down to the level of the standpipe. \n\n\tSuch engine stoppages have occurred because pilots not fully familiar with the fuel system have misinterpreted the left tank fuel gage as indicating total available fuel quantity with selector valve on the Left Hand Main (standpipe) position, unaware that the change to Reserve or Right Hand Main position must be made before the fuel level in the left tank drops to 20 gallons. \n\n\tTo preclude the possibility of pilot error with regard to the foregoing, the following placard shall be installed in each cockpit: \n\n\t"CAUTION: Unless Left Tank is full, use Reserve or Right Tank for Takeoff and Landing."
99-19-13: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain British Aerospace Model HS 748 series airplanes, that requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include requirements for activation of the airframe pneumatic deicing boots. This amendment is prompted by reports of inflight incidents and an accident that occurred in icing conditions where the airframe pneumatic deicing boots were not activated. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that flightcrews activate the pneumatic wing and tail deicing boots at the first signs of ice accumulation. This action will prevent reduced controllability of the aircraft due to adverse aerodynamic effects of ice adhering to the airplane prior to the first deicing cycle.
2011-07-10: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information [[Page 17759]] (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Investigation of a recent high altitude loss of cabin pressurization on a BD-100-1A10 aircraft determined that it was caused by a partial blockage of a safety valve cabin pressure- sensing port, in conjunction with a dormant failure/leakage of the safety valve manometric capsule. The blockage, caused by accumulation of lint/dust on the grid of the port plug, did not allow sufficient airflow through the cabin pressure-sensing port to compensate for the rate of leakage from the manometric capsule, resulting in the opening of the safety valve. It was also determined that failure of the manometric capsule alone would not result in the opening of the safety valve. * * * * * The unsafe condition is possible loss of cabin pressure caused by the opening of the safety valve. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
96-19-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Saab Model SAAB 2000 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive visual inspections to detect whether the de-icing system boots on the horizontal stabilizer are inflating fully. It also requires modification of the stabilizer de-icing system tube as terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating that condensational water may collect in the de-icing system tube, freeze in low temperatures, and keep the boots from inflating fully. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent such failure which, if not corrected, could keep the stabilizer de-icing system from operating properly, and consequently result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2011-07-02: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. That AD currently requires initial and repetitive torque inspections of the 3rd stage and 4th stage low- pressure turbine (LPT) blades for shroud notch wear and replacement of the blade if wear limits are exceeded. That AD also requires replacing LPT-to-exhaust case bolts and nuts with bolts and nuts made of Tinidur material. This new AD requires the same torque inspection, blade, and Tinidur nut replacement actions, but requires replacement of the LPT- to-exhaust case bolts with longer bolts made of Tinidur material. This AD also requires installation of crushable sleeve spacers on the bolts. This AD was prompted by nine reports of failure of Tinidur material LPT-to-exhaust case bolts, as a result of blade failure, since AD 2005- 02-03 became effective. We are issuing this AD to prevent turbine blade failures that could result in uncontained engine debris and damage to the airplane.
86-14-10: 86-14-10 FOKKER B.V.: Amendment 39-5349. Applies to all Model F27 airplanes, certificated in any category, equipped with a forward cabin bulkhead and door between the passenger cabin and the cargo compartment. Compliance is required within 120 days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To preclude blockage of the evacuation path through the forward cabin bulkhead door, accomplish the following: A. Inspect the door hinges to determine if the hinge design prevents the door from being lifted off the lower portion of the hinges, with the door opened. If so, no further action is required. B. If the hinge design permits the opened door to be lifted off the lower portion of the hinges, modify the hinge installation: 1. In accordance with Fokker Service Bulletin F27/25-58, dated December 20, 1985, for airplanes with the serial numbers to which the service bulletin applies, provided other hinge installation modifications made since initial delivery do not preclude that modification; or 2. To another FAA-approved Fokker F27 configuration which would prevent the door, when open, from being lifted off the lower portion of the hinges. C. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. D. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Manager, Maintenance and Engineering, Fokker B.V., Product Support, P.O. Box 7600, 11172J Schiphol Oost, The Netherlands. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment becomes effective August 7, 1986.
52-15-01: 52-15-01 BOEING: Applies to all model 377 Airplanes with Hamilton Standard Propellers. Items I and II are to be accomplished by means of a progressive modification program to be submitted to and approved by the FAA. This program shall begin no later than August 1, 1952, and shall be completed no later than April 1, 1953. I. In order to prevent inadvertent actuation of the propeller reversing solenoid valves, protect the reversing solenoid circuits from all other electrical circuits and protect the reversing solenoid circuits from each other. This is to be accomplished in accordance with attachment A (see AD 52-13-02) and the following instructions which pertain to specific features to be considered in isolation of the reversing circuits from other circuits. Other features which are not specifically referred to in this list shall be treated in an equivalent manner. A. If any multiple pin connector assemblies are used in the reversing solenoid circuits, they are to be modified as specified in item 2 of attachment A. B. Modify the following terminal strips as specified in item 1 of attachment A: (1) Terminal strip at RH and LH wing break junction shield. (2) Terminal strip at pilot's pedestal. C. Protect the following exposed terminals as specified in item 3 of attachment A: (1) Exposed terminal to which the solenoid valve leads are connected on "A" relays in propeller relay shield. (2) Exposed terminals at throttle reversing switches. D. Reversing solenoid circuit wiring shall comply with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 79 unless the circuits are completely isolated from all other circuits. The shielding on the wire shall be grounded at both ends and a protective cover shall be provided over the shielding wherever it runs in conduit with other wires. E. Other circuit modifications: All airplanes shall be modified to comply with Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin No. 221. II. Pedestal assembly. Make one of the following modifications: A. Increase the height of the quadrant stop at the positive idle position by 1/8 of an inch. In addition, change the present positive taper on the stop and the sliding member of the throttle to a zero taper or a negative taper of not more than 3 degrees. B. Add a plate to throttle quadrant. The plate is to be hinged at its rearward edge and its forward edge should be so located that it will act as a stop in the forward idle position. It shall not be possible to force the plate open solely by pulling rearward on the throttles. In addition, remove the positive taper from the existing quadrant stop and the sliding member of the throttle and provide a zero taper or a negative taper of not more than 3 degrees. III. Maintenance practices (to be instituted not later than August 1, 1952): A. At each nearest scheduled service to 350 hours: (1) Inspect all points specified in items IB and IC. The inspections of item IB may be discontinued if the modifications made to the system are of the type described in item 1(a) or 1(b) of attachment A. B. At any time that an electrical fault occurs in a circuit which is carried in the same bundles or the same conduits as the reversing solenoid circuit, representative terminal points in the faulty circuit are to be inspected to determine whether any damage may have occurred within the bundles or conduit. If there is evidence of possible damage, all the wiring involved is to be removed for inspection. Damaged wiring is replaced as necessary. C. At each nearest scheduled service to 350 hours, perform an electrical check of the reverse safety switches in the pedestal assembly to assure that the switch is open when the throttles are moved forward out of the reverse position, unless it is shown that failure of any of the reverse safety switches to open will be clearly apparent to the flight crew by reason of improper operation of the propeller control system. Because of the many technical considerations involved, analyses showing that the objective of this revision has been accomplished should be referred to the FAA for engineering evaluation and approval. In the event the modifications outlined in A or B are not completed in accordance with B. If the Pedestal assembly is modified in accordance with item IIB, the operating instructions for airplanes so modified shall specify that the plate be open for takeoff and that it shall be closed immediately following takeoff. The plate shall remain closed during all other regimes of flight except that it shall again be opened just prior to landing. V. (Note: Propeller governor design changes which are under development, and whose purpose is to provide a high pressure hydraulic circuit bypass to safeguard against inadvertent reversing and ability to feather even when the reversing solenoid is energized, are still under consideration and may be the subject of a future Directive.)
2011-06-09: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Prompted by a reported in-service event, EASA issued AD 2009- 0084 to prevent unwanted movement of pilot- or co-pilot seat in the horizontal direction which is considered as potentially unsafe, especially during the takeoff phase when the speed of the aeroplane is greater than 100 knots and until landing gear retraction. * * * * * Uncommanded movement of the pilot and co-pilot seats during takeoff or landing could interfere with the operation of the airplane and, as a result, could cause loss of control of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.