Results
97-26-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all EMBRAER Model EMB-120 series airplanes, that requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to include requirements for activation of the ice protection systems, and to add information regarding operation in icing conditions. This amendment also requires installing an ice detector system and revising the AFM to include procedures for testing system integrity. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating that flightcrews experienced difficulties controlling the airplane during (or following) flight in normal icing conditions, when the ice protection system either was not activated when ice began to accumulate on the airplane, or the ice protection system was never activated. These difficulties may have occurred because the flightcrews did not recognize that a significant enough amount of ice had formed on the airplane to require activation of the deicing equipment. The actions specified bythis AD are intended to ensure that the flightcrew is able to recognize the formation of significant ice accretion and take appropriate action; such formation of ice could result in reduced controllability of the airplane in normal icing conditions.
80-12-14: 80-12-14 PIPER (TED SMITH): Amendment 39-3801. Applies to Aerostar Model 600, 601, 601P Serial Nos. 0001 through 0799 airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent the reentry of an engine fire into the underwing structure behind the engine nacelle, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 300 hours' time in service, or ninety days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs sooner, install a metal fairing, P/N 230090-1 and -2, in place of the existing fiberglass fairing, P/N 230023-501 and 502, in accordance with Piper Service Bulletin So 600-83, dated November 21, 1979. (b) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of the modification required by this AD. (c) Alternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. This amendment becomes effective June 19, 1980.
2005-18-20: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Goodrich De-icing and Specialty Systems "FASTprop" propeller de- icers, part numbers P4E1188 series, P4E1601 series, P4E2200 series, P4E2271-10, P4E2575-7, P4E2575-10, P4E2598-10, P5855BSW, P6199SW, P6592SW, P6662SW, and P6975-11, installed. This AD requires inspection, repair, or replacement of those "FASTprop" propeller de-icers that fail daily visual checks. This AD results from reports of Goodrich "FASTprop" propeller de-icers becoming loose or debonded, and detaching from propeller blades during operation.
97-26-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Mooney Aircraft Corporation (Mooney) Models M20F, M20J, and M20L airplanes. This action requires removing the fuel cap retaining lanyard from the fuel filler cap assemblies. A report of lost engine power during flight because of fuel starvation prompted the action. The investigation revealed that the airplane fuel float became trapped by the fuel cap retaining lanyard, keeping the float from following the fuel level. This condition caused the pilot to get a false fuel quantity reading. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of engine power and fuel depletion during flight caused by a false fuel gauge reading.
2016-24-51: We are publishing a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) Model S-92A helicopters, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of these helicopters. This AD requires inspecting certain bearings. This AD is prompted by a report of a failed bearing. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
97-26-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all MAULE Models MX-7-420 and MXT-7-420 airplanes, and all Models M-7-235 and M-7-235A airplanes that are modified in accordance with Maule STC SA2661SO, which incorporates a certain gas turbine engine, certain amphibious floats, and certain propellers. This AD requires amending the Limitations Section of the airplane flight manual (AFM) to prohibit the positioning of the power levers below the flight idle stop while the airplane is in flight. This AFM amendment will include a statement of consequences if the limitation is not followed. This AD results from numerous incidents and five documented accidents involving airplanes equipped with turboprop engines where the propeller beta was improperly utilized during flight. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of airplane control or engine overspeed with consequent loss of engine power caused by the power levers being positioned belowthe flight idle stop while the airplane is in flight.
61-21-01: 61-21-01 CANADAIR: Amdt. 348 Part 507 Federal Register October 17, 1961. Applies to Model CL-44D4 Aircraft, Serial Numbers 14, 16, 19 through 23, 25 and 26. Compliance required within the next 25 hours' time in service unless already accomplished within the last 10 hours' time in service and at intervals not to exceed 35 hours' time in service. To preclude failure of the tail pipe door structure, the following must be accomplished: (a) Inspect the following tail pipe compartment access panels for fatigue cracking using dye penetrant or equivalent in the area of the attachment holes. Part Numbers to be inspected are 44-10721, 44-10721-1, 44-10722, 44-10722-1, 44-10726, 44-10721-990, 44- 10721-991, 44-10722-990, 44-10722-991, 44-10726-990, 44-10751, 44-10751-1, 44-10752, 44- 10752-1, and 44-10753. (b) If cracks are found, panels must be replaced, repaired or reinforced in accordance with Canadair Service Bulletin No. CL-44D4-138 or equivalent, or modified in accordance with a Department of Transport and FAA approved modification prior to further flight except ferry flight in accordance with the provisions of CAR 1.76. Following the incorporation of the interim repair or reinforcement covered in Service Bulletin No. CL-44D4- 138, or replacement, the inspections specified in (a) must be continued at intervals not exceeding 35 hours' time in service. If further cracks are found after repair or reinforcement per Canadair Service Bulletin CL-44D4-138, the parts shall be replaced or modified in accordance with Canadian Department of Transport and FAA approved modification. (c) The special inspections required by this airworthiness directive may be discontinued after incorporation of the Canadian Department of Transport and FAA approved modification of the affected parts. (d) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. This directive effective October 17, 1961.
71-11-02: 71-11-02 AVCO LYCOMING: Amdt. 39-1208 as amended by Amendment 39-1403. Applies to all IO- 360A and -C Series engines with serial numbers 1734-51A through 4412-51A and all such series engines remanufactured between 1 September 1965 and 11 October 1967. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent valve failures replace the intake and exhaust hydraulic tappet plunger assembly P/N 76290 with P/N 78290 at the time in service specified below: (a) Engines with less than 400 hours in service on P/N 76290 as of the effective date of this AD, shall comply prior to the accumulation of 450 hours in service. (b) Engines with 400 or more hours in service on P/N 76290 as of the effective date of this AD shall comply within the next 50 hours in service. (Note: Lycoming Service Bulletin No. 328 covers this subject.) Amendment 39-1208 was effective May 19, 1971. This Amendment 39-1403 is effective March 14, 1972.
2016-26-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Agusta Model AB139 and AW139 helicopters. This AD requires performing operational checks of both hydraulic systems. This AD was prompted by an assessment of the hydraulic systems of the helicopter following an accident. These actions are intended to prevent the unsafe condition on these products.
2005-18-17: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier Model DHC-8-400 series airplanes. This AD requires a one-time inspection of the fuel and hydraulic tubes, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires modifying fairlead plate assemblies. This AD results from reports of chafing between fuel and hydraulic tubes and the fairlead plate where the tubes pass through the firewall. We are issuing this AD to prevent chafing of the fuel and hydraulic tubes, which could lead to fuel and/or hydraulic fluid leakage in the engine nacelle area and consequent fire or explosion.
2010-23-21: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Viking Air Limited has completed a system safety review of the aircraft fuel system against fuel tank safety standards introduced in Chapter 525 of the Airworthiness Manual through Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) 2002-043. The identified non-compliances were then assessed using Transport Canada Policy Letter No. 525-001, to determine if mandatory corrective action is required. The assessment showed that supplemental maintenance tasks would be required to prevent potential ignition sources within the fuel system, which could result in a fuel tank explosion. * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-25-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain de Havilland Model DHC-8-100, -200, and -300 series airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections of certain refuel/defuel tube assemblies in the engine nacelles for fuel leakage, and corrective action, if necessary. This amendment will also require eventual modification of all tube assemblies, which will terminate the repetitive inspections. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fuel leaks and consequent increased risk of engine fires.
81-03-03: 81-03-03 B.F. GOODRICH: Amendment 39-4027. Applies to the following brake assemblies with the following brake lining cups: \n\n\tBrake Assembly P/Ns \n\n\t2-1195-7, 2-1195-8, 2-1367, 2-1367-1, 2-1367-2, 2-1147, 2-1147-3 and 2-1190 \n\n\tBrake Lining Cups with part no./date codes as follows: \n\t\n\n342-58\n342-64\n342-94\n342-95 \nE12 80\nD18 80\nD10 80\nE7 80 \nE19 80\nD28 80 \n\n\nE20 80\nE17 80 \n\n\nG19 80\nG13 80 \n\n\nH9 80\nG19 80\n\n\n\n\tThese brake assemblies are used on but not limited to Boeing 727 and Lockheed L-1011 aircraft. \n\n\tWithin 60 days from the effective date of this AD, the above identified lining cups shall not be used on TSO'd brake assemblies unless the following has been accomplished: \n\n\ta)\tAll spare assemblies (i.e. brakes, pressure plates, lining carriers and torque plates) which have been assembled from inventory containing suspected cups, to be visually inspected at the lining cup button cavity for cracks using 4X or greater magnification. Remove cups with visible cracks and replace with serviceable parts. An alternative to the inspection is replacement of suspected cups with parts which are not in the suspected part no./date code groups. \n\n\tb)\tRecords must be kept to assure traceability of inspections and rework of all assemblies and brake assemblies which were assembled from inventory containing suspected cups. \n\n\tc)\tBrake assemblies installed on aircraft prior to the effective date of this AD do not require removal or inspection. \n\n\tB.F. Goodrich Service Bulletins No. 390 (for the Lockheed L-1011) and No. 391 (for the Boeing 727) dated October 9, 1980 also apply to the subject matter of this AD. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective January 28, 1981.
2010-23-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Following five reported cases of balance washer screw failure on similar RATs [ram air turbines]/air driven generators installed on other aircraft types, an investigation * * * determined that a specific batch of the screws had a metallographic non-conformity that increased their susceptibility to brittle fracture. * * * Failure of a balance washer screw can result in loss of the related balance washer, with consequent turbine imbalance. Such imbalance could potentially result in RAT structural failure (including blade failure), loss of RAT electrical power and structural damage to the aircraft and, if deployment was activated by a dual engine shutdown, could also result in loss of hydraulic power for the flight controls [and consequent reduced ability of the flightcrew to maintain the safe flight and landing of the airplane]. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2005-18-16: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for General Electric Company (GE) CF34-3A1 turbofan engines installed on Bombardier series Regional Jets with certain high pressure turbine (HPT) rotating components installed. This AD requires removal from service of certain HPT components prior to the parts exceeding their designated life limits. This AD results from the discovery that the manufacturer removed certain part numbers of HPT rotating components from the Life Limits section of the CF34 Engine Manual, SEI-756. The effect of this manual change was the removal of life limits from certain components that are eligible for installation in GE CF34-3A1 engines. We are issuing this AD to impose life limits on these HPT rotating components to prevent low cycle fatigue (LCF) cracking and failure of those components, which could result in uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
2005-18-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-100, -200, -200C, and -300 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections to detect discrepancies of the retaining pin lugs on the support fitting of the main landing gear (MLG) beam, and rework of the support fitting, or replacement of the fitting if necessary. This AD is prompted by reports of discrepancies of the lugs. We are issuing this AD to prevent separation of the support beam of the MLG from the rear spar, which could cause cracking of the MLG support fitting and a consequent leak in the wing fuel tank or collapse of the MLG.
97-25-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to General Electric Company (GE) CJ610 series turbojet and CF700 series turbofan engines. This action requires removal from service of possibly defective turbine torque rings and compressor drive shafts which may have been manufactured from contaminated material; and replacement with serviceable parts. This amendment is prompted by a report of a cooling plate removed from a GE CT58 series engine that was found to have an iron-rich inclusion that came from a contaminated heat lot. Parts on GE CJ610 series and CF700 series engines which were manufactured from the same and similar heat lots may also be contaminated. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent turbine torque ring or compressor drive shaft failure due to a manufacturing defect, which could result in an uncontained engine failure.
80-20-02: 80-20-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-3928. Applies to all Boeing Model 747 airplanes which are equipped with B.F. Goodrich slides or turbofans identified in B.F. Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-060 dated July 14, 1980. \n\n\tNOTE: Boeing Service Bulletin 747-25-2543 dated September 5, 1980, lists the airplanes originally delivered with the affected slides. These slides may be on airplanes not listed in this service bulletin.\n \n\tCompliance is required as indicated. Accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 30 days from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, replace the flapper valves in affected B.F. Goodrich slides installed on the upper deck of any Model 747-200F and 747-200C airplanes carrying passengers on the upper deck only. Install flapper valves in accordance with B.F. Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-060 dated July 14, 1980, or later FAA approved revisions or in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\n\tB.\tPrior to January 1, 1981, replace the flapper valves in all remaining B.F. Goodrich slides and turbofans in accordance with B.F. Goodrich Service Bulletin 25-060 dated July 14, 1980, or later FAA approved revisions or in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region.\n \n\tC.\tUpon request of the operator, an FAA Maintenance Inspector, subject to prior approval by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region may adjust the compliance times if the request contains substantiating data to justify the changes. \n\n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents mayalso be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective October 7, 1980.
2005-18-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100& 440) airplanes, that requires performing an inspection of the electrical harnesses of the spoiler and the brake pressure sensor unit on both sides of the wing root to detect any chafing or wire damage, and repairing or replacing any damaged or chafed harness or wire with a new harness, as applicable. This action also provides/requires a terminating modification for the one-time inspection. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct chafing of the electrical cables of the spoiler and brake pressure sensor unit on both sides of the wing root, which could result in loss of the flight control system and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
97-25-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Mitsubishi Heavy Industry (Mitsubishi) MU-2B series airplanes. This AD requires amending the Limitations Section of the airplane flight manual (AFM) to prohibit the positioning of the power levers below the flight idle stop while the airplane is in flight. This AFM amendment will include a statement of consequences if the limitation is not followed. This AD results from numerous incidents and five documented accidents involving airplanes equipped with turboprop engines where the propeller beta was improperly utilized during flight. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of airplane control or engine overspeed with consequent loss of engine power caused by the power levers being positioned below the flight idle stop while the airplane is in flight.
97-25-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Raytheon Aircraft Company (Raytheon) 65, 90, 99, 100, 200, 300, 1900, and 2000 series airplanes. This AD requires amending the Limitations Section of the airplane flight manual (AFM) to prohibit lifting or positioning the power levers below the flight idle stop while the airplane is in flight. This AFM amendment will include a statement of consequences if the limitation is not followed. This AD results from numerous incidents and five documented accidents involving airplanes equipped with turboprop engines where the propeller beta was improperly utilized during flight. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent nose down pitch and a descent rate leading to aircraft damage and injury to personnel caused by the power levers being positioned below the flight idle stop or the power levers being lifted while the airplane is in flight.
60-13-03: 60-13-03 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 176 Part 507 Federal Register June 24, 1960. Applies to All 188 Airplanes Not Equipped With Fuel Tank Pressure Relief Overflow Valves. Compliance required as indicated. Service experience indicates that a check of the fueling system valves at a high fuel level point should be made when filling tanks to capacity. This check is necessary to determine that the system is functioning properly since failure of a fueling valve to close fully may subject the tank to high fuel pressure which could cause not only tank rupture but structural damage. To prevent possible fuel tank overpressurizing, the following actions are required commencing not later than 10 days after publication of this airworthiness directive in the Federal Register. (a) Conduct a check of the fueling system at the start of each fueling operation in accordance with the placard located on the fueling panel. (b) (1) On all outboard tanks and on extended inboard tanks, when installed,conduct a second check of the primary and secondary controls between 8,000 and 10,000 pounds fuel per item 2 on the placard. (2) When standard inboard tanks are installed, conduct a second check of the primary and secondary controls between 4,500 and 6,500 pounds fuel. (c) Any malfunctions indicated by the checks required by items (a) and (b) of this airworthiness directive must be corrected prior to continuance of pressure fueling to that tank. (d) The fueling panel will be monitored during the entire fueling operation. This supersedes paragraph (d) of AD 60-09-03.
97-25-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all Raytheon Aircraft Company (Raytheon) 58, 60, 90, 100, 200, and 300 series and Model 2000 airplanes (formerly referred to as Beech 58, 60, 90, 100, 200, and 300 series and Beech Models 65-90 and 2000 airplanes). This AD requires replacing certain AlliedSignal Aerospace outflow/safety valves in the pressurization system with new or serviceable valves. The AD results from a report of cracking and consequent failure of the affected outflow safety valves in the pressurization system. Investigation has revealed problems during the manufacturing process of certain Allied Signal outflow/safety valves. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent outflow/safety valve cracking and consequent failure, which could result in rapid decompression of the airplane.
64-20-02: 64-20-02 SUD AVIATION: Amdt. 800 Part 507 Federal Register August 22, 1964. Applies to Caravelle Models III and VIR Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. As a result of a landing gear malfunction which resulted in landing gear interference with the aluminum fuel lines and electric wiring in the wheel wells, accomplish the following modifications: (a) Within 300 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, install 3 fusible plugs in each main landing gear wheel hub on all Model III aircraft except aircraft with Serial Numbers 170, 177, and higher as provided for in Hispano Suiza Aero Service Bulletin 111, Section 1, No. 46, dated December 2, 1963. (b) Within 6,000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, remove existing aluminum alloy fuel lines in the main landing gear wheel well and replace them with stainless steel tubing in all Models III and VIR aircraft except aircraft with Serial Numbers 136, 160, 171, and higher, as provided for in Sud Service Bulletin 28-31 dated February 12, 1964, or FAA approved equivalent. (c) Within 6,000 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, install protective shrouds over electric wiring and fuel lines in the main landing gear wheel wells on all Model III aircraft except aircraft with Serial Numbers 172 and higher as provided for in Sud Service Bulletin 53-35 dated May 4, 1964, or FAA approved equivalent. (Sud Service Bulletins 28-31 dated February 12, 1964, 53-35 Revision 1 dated May 4, 1964, and Hispano Suiza Service Bulletin 111, Sections 1, No. 46 dated December 2, 1963, pertain to this same subject.) This directive effective September 21, 1964.
61-08-03: 61-08-03 VICKERS: Amdt. 274 Part 507 Federal Register April 8, 1961. Applies to Viscount Models 744 and 745D Series Airplanes. Compliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. As a result of reported failures of the bolt, P/N 80216-627, forming the forward attachment of the outboard diagonal strut on the inboard engine nacelle structure the following must be accomplished on the structure of both inboard engine nacelles. (a) Bolts P/N 80216-627 or bolts P/N 70116-9*, as applicable, having 4,000 or more hours' time in service must be removed not later than the next 600 landings and inspected for cracks by magnetic particle inspection or FAA approved equivalent method. Particular attention should be given to the area at the junction of the head and shank and also to the thread undercut. (b) Bolts found cracked must be replaced prior to further flight. (c) Compliance with "The Action" paragraphs of British Aircraft Corporation (Operating) Limited, Preliminary Technical Leaflet (PTL 228), Issue 2 (700 Series) is required when accomplishing the inspection of paragraph (a). (d) After compliance with (a), (b), and (c) no further inspection is necessary. (e) For the purpose of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each aircraft's hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the aircraft type. Model 745D operators who have kept a record of flights prior to the effective date of this AD may account for them in complying with this AD by counting each flight as one landing. (British Aircraft Corporation (Operating) Limited, PTL No.228, Issue 2, (700 Series) covers this subject. This directive effective May 9, 1961. Revised September 28, 1965. *Bolts P/N 80216-627 were incorporated by Mod. 1306 and on later production aircraft. Pre-mod. standard bolts P/N70116-9 are identical except 1/32-inch less in diameter.