Results
2014-06-09: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2009-18-18 for certain ATR--GIE Avions de Transport R[eacute]gional Model ATR42 and ATR72 airplanes. AD 2009-18-18 required repetitive inspections for damage and absence of repair of the cockpit forward side windows, and replacement if necessary. This new AD requires repetitive detailed inspections of the cockpit forward side window for damage and discrepancies; and replacement if necessary. Replacing both cockpit forward side windows with approved windows terminates the repetitive detailed inspections. This new AD also expands the applicability of AD 2009-18-18. The actions required by AD 2009-18-18 are not required by this AD. This AD was prompted by reports of a cockpit forward right- hand side blow out during flight. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct air/water leakage of the cockpit forward side window, which could lead to rapid cabin decompression, resulting in loss of control of the airplane.
2014-07-02: We are superseding airworthiness directive (AD) 2012-26-14 for all Rolls-Royce Deutschland Ltd & Co KG (RRD) BR700-715A1-30, BR700- 715B1-30, and BR700-715C1-30 turbofan engines. AD 2012-26-14 required removal from service of certain high-pressure (HP) compressor stages 1 to 6 rotor disc assemblies before exceeding certain thresholds. This AD requires removal from service at those same thresholds but restricts the applicability to engines exposed to silver-plated nuts, and removes the terminating action statement required by AD 2012-26-14. This AD was prompted by RRD development of a new silver-free nut that, if installed with a new HP compressor stages 1 to 6 rotor disc assembly, would correct the unsafe condition identified in AD 2012-26-14. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the HP compressor stages 1 to 6 rotor disc assembly, which could lead to an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
2014-06-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Alexander Schleicher, Segelflugzeugbau Model ASK 21 gliders. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as inadequate guidance for spin training operations. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2014-05-32: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Pratt & Whitney (PW) PW2037, PW2037D, PW2037M, PW2040, PW2040D, PW2043, PW2146, PW2240, PW2337, PW2643, and F117-PW-100 turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by a rupture of the diffuser-to-high-pressure turbine (HPT) case flange. This AD requires a one-time eddy current inspection (ECI) of affected engines with certain diffuser and HPT cases installed. This AD also requires a fluorescent-penetrant inspection (FPI) of the diffuser case rear flange and HPT case front flange. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the diffuser-to-HPT case flange, which could lead to uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
2014-06-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for SOCATA Model TBM 700 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as landing gear actuator rod and piston becoming unscrewed during operation and the landing gear actuator ball joint becoming uncrimped. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2013-26-14: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2008-08-04 for certain Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. AD 2008-08-04 required repetitive inspections for cracking in the forward lug of the support rib 5 fitting of the left and right main landing gear (MLG), and repair or replacement of any cracked MLG fitting if necessary. AD 2008-08-04 also required modification of the rib bushings of the left and right MLG, which ended the repetitive inspections. This new AD requires, for airplanes on which certain modifications or repairs have been done, repetitive inspections for cracks of the forward lug of each left-hand and right-hand MLG support rib 5 fitting, and repair if necessary; and adds Model A318 series airplanes to the applicability. Replacement of an MLG support rib 5 fitting terminates the repetitive inspection requirements for the MLG support rib 5 fitting at that position. This AD was prompted by reports of cracks found in the forward lug of the MLG support rib 5 fitting. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracking in the forward lug of the MLG, which could result in failure of the lug and consequent collapse of the MLG during takeoff or landing.
2014-05-31: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2008-08-25 that applied to certain The Boeing Company Model 747-400 and 747-400F series airplanes. AD 2008-08-25 required installing drains and drain tubes to eliminate water accumulation in the drip shield above the M826 cardfile in the main equipment center. This new AD requires installing modified drain tubes, relocating wire bundle routing, installing a new drip shield and drip shield deflectors, and replacing insulation blankets. For certain airplanes, this new AD also concurrently requires sealing the drain slot, installing spuds, and installing drain tubes. This AD was prompted by reports of continued water damage to diode fire card 285U0072-1 in the M826 automatic fire overheat logic test system cardfile following a false FWD CARGO FIRE message, with no change in frequency, which resulted in an air turn back. We are issuing this AD to prevent water from exiting over the edge of the existing drip shield and contaminating electrical components in the M826 cardfile, which could result in an electrical short and potential loss of several functions essential for safe flight.
2014-06-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-8 and 747-8F series airplanes powered by certain General Electric (GE) engines. This AD requires removing certain defective software and installing new, improved software. This AD was prompted by a determination that the existing electronic engine control (EEC) software logic can prevent stowage of the thrust reversers (TRs) during certain circumstances, which could cause the TRs to move back to the deployed position. We are issuing this AD to prevent in-flight deployment of one or more TRs due to loss of the TR auto restow function, which could result in inadequate climb performance at an altitude insufficient for recovery, and consequent uncontrolled flight into terrain.
74-18-09: 74-18-09 BOEING: Amendment 39-1947. Applies to all Model 727 Series Airplanes, certificated in all categories. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated unless already accomplished. \n\tTo prevent failure of the nose and main landing gear actuator aluminum feeder tubes which could prevent complete extension of the landing gear and the possible loss of aircraft control during landing roll, inspect or replace, as necessary, the nose landing gear actuator aluminum feeder tube P/N 69-14198-1, and each main landing gear actuator aluminum feeder tube P/N 65- 17971-1, in accordance with the following: \n\tPART I - COMPLIANCE TIME DETERMINATION \n\tA.\tApplies to all main landing gear actuator assemblies listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 727-32-218 having a P/N 65-17971-1 aluminum feeder tube which have not been overhauled or disassembled since new. \n\t\tInspect or replace, as applicable, in accordance with PART II (A), (B), (C), or (D) of this AD before a total of 12,000 landings, or within the next 3,000 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever comes last. \n\tB.\tApplies to all main landing gear actuator assemblies listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 727-32-218 having a P/N 65-17971-1 aluminum feeder tube which have been overhauled or disassembled. Inspect or replace, as applicable, in accordance with PART II (A), (B), (C), or (D) of this AD within the number of landings specified in the following schedule: \n\n\tOVERHAULED UNITS \n\tFor Actuators with up to 20,000 landings total \n\tWithin next 2,500 landings from effective date of this AD; \n\tFor Actuators above 20,000 and 23,000 landings total \n\tWithin next 2,000 landings from effective date of AD, or a total of 24,500 \n\tlandings, whichever comes first; \n\tFor Actuators above 23,000 landings total \n\tWithin next 1,500 landings from effective date of AD. \n\n\t\tC.\tApplies to all nose landing gear actuator assemblies listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 727-32-218 having a P/N 69-14198-1 aluminum feeder tube. \n\t\tInspect or replace, as applicable, in accordance with PART II (A), (B), (C), or (D) of this AD within the number of landings listed in the following schedule: \n\nTotal No. of Landings on Nose\t Compliance Required Within Landing Gear Actuator\t Next No. of Landings after Feeder Tubes \tEffective date of AD\t 0 - 8,000\t 14,000 8,000 - 14,000\t 8,000 14,000 - 18,000\t\t\t\t 5,000 More than 18,000\t 4,000D.\tApplies to nose landing gear actuator assemblies with aluminum feeder tubes, P/N 69-14198-1, and main landing gear actuators with aluminum feeder tubes, P/N 65-17971-1, which have been inspected or replaced in accordance with PART II (A) or (B) of this AD, as applicable. \n\t\t(1)\tInspect nose landing gear and main landing gear actuator feeder tubes at periodic intervals not to exceed 1,000 landings, in accordance with PART II (A) of this AD; or \n\t\t(2)\tReplace nose landing gear and main landing gear actuator feeder tubes within 1,000 landings in accordance with PART II (B), (C), or (D) of this AD.\n \tE.\tApplies to nose landing gear actuator assemblies with new aluminum feeder tubes, P/N 69-14198-1, and main landing gear actuators with new aluminum feeder tubes, P/N 65- 17971-1, which were installed in accordance with the installation instructions contained in Boeing Service Bulletin 727-32-218 (issued on March 15, 1974): \n\t\t(1)\tInspect or replace main landing gear actuator feedertubes within a total of 14,000 landings in accordance with PART II (A), (B), (C), or (D) of this AD; and \n\t\t(2)\tInspect or replace nose landing gear actuator feeder tubes within a total of 18,000 landings, in accordance with PART II (A), (B), (C), or (D) of this AD. \n\tF.\tFor the purpose of complying with this AD, the total number of landings on an actuator (feeder tube) may be determined by actual count or, subject to approval by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, by dividing the airplane time in service on which the actuator is installed by the operator's fleet average time per flight. \n\tFor those operators who are unable to determine actuator landings since new, total aircraft landings on which they are installed may be used to determine total number of landings. \n\n\tPART II - COMPLIANCE METHODS \n\n\t(A)\tInspect for evidence of cracks in the area of the "O" ring groove and the areas around the multiple orifice holes in the necked down portions of the nose and main landing actuator feeder tube in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 727-32-218 (issued on March 15, 1974) or later FAA approved revisions, or by an equivalent inspection method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, FAA, Northwest Region, and then comply with PART I-D. If evidence of cracking is found, replace feeder tube in accordance with PART II (B), (C), or (D) of this AD; or \n\t(B)\tReplace the aluminum feeder tube, P/N 69-14198-1 (nose gear) and P/N 65-17971-1 (main gear) with a serviceable used aluminum feeder tube, as determined per PART II (A) of this AD, of the same part number in accordance with such Boeing Service Bulletin 727-32-218 or equivalent method and then comply with PART I-D of this AD as applicable; or \n\t(C)\tReplace the aluminum feeder tube, P/N 69-14198-1 (nose gear) and P/N 65-17971-1 (main gear) with a new aluminum feeder tube of the same part number in accordance with such Boeing Service Bulletin 727-32-218 or equivalent method and then comply with PART I-E of this AD as applicable; or \n\t(D)\tAs terminating action for this AD, replace the aluminum feeder tubes, P/N 69-14198- 1 (nose gear), and P/N 65-17971-1 (main gear) with steel feeder tubes, P/N 69-14198-2 (nose gear) and P/N 65-17971-2 (main gear) in accordance with such Boeing Service Bulletin 727-32- 218 or equivalent method. \n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P. O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. The documents may be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way, Seattle, Washington.\n \n\tThis amendment becomes effective 30 days after publication in Federal Register.
2014-05-24: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 84-19-01 for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-100, 747-200B, and 747-200F series airplanes. AD 84-19-01 required repetitive inspections for cracking of certain tension ties, and repair and certain modifications if necessary. This new AD requires, for certain airplanes, additional inspections for cracking of the tension tie at body station (BS) 760 or 780, corrective action if necessary, and eventual modification of the tension ties. For all airplanes, this new AD requires repetitive post- modification inspections for cracking of the tension tie at BS 760 or 780, and corrective action if necessary. This AD was prompted by reports of cracking in the BS 760 tension tie as a result of bending due to cabin pressurization. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct tension tie cracking, which could eventually result in in- flight depressurization of the airplane and the inability to withstand current regulatory failsafe loads.
2010-19-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Metallurgical non-conformities have been found when performing quality inspections during production of Arriel 1 gas generator (GG) second stage turbine discs introduced by Turbomeca Modification TU347 (P/N 0 292 25 040 0). Analysis has concluded that the approved life limit of the post-TU347 GG second stage turbine disc needs to be reduced to 2,500 GG cycles. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the gas generator second stage turbine disc which could result in the release of high energy debris and damage to the helicopter.
2014-06-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all M7 Aerospace LLC Models SA226-AT, SA226-T, SA226-T(B), SA226-TC, SA227-AC (C-26A), SA227-AT, SA227-BC (C-26A), SA227-CC, SA227-DC (C-26B), SA227- TT, SA26-AT, and SA26-T airplanes. This AD was [[Page 15658]] prompted by reports of airplanes with multiple fatigue cracks in the FS 69.31 front pressure bulkhead. This AD requires repetitively inspecting (visually) the FS 51.31 front pressure bulkhead on SA26 series airplanes and FS 69.31 front pressure bulkhead on SA226 and SA227 series airplanes for cracks, and repairing any cracked bulkhead; this AD also requires reporting certain inspection results to M7 Aerospace LLC. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2014-06-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 747-400 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of auxiliary power unit (APU) faults due to power feeder cable chafing. This AD requires detailed inspections for damage of the APU power feeder cables; replacing the clamps and installing grommets; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct chafing of the APU power feeder cables within a flammable fluid leakage zone, which, with arcing, could result in fire and structural damage.
2008-23-19: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 757 airplanes. This AD requires sealing the fasteners on the front and rear spars inside the left and right main fuel tanks and on the rear spar and lower panel of the center fuel tank. This AD also requires inspections of the wire bundle support installations to verify if certain clamps are installed and if Teflon sleeving covers the wire bundles inside the left and right equipment cooling system bays, on the left and right rear spars, and on the left and right front spars; and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from a fuel system review conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct improper wire bundle support installation and sleeving and to prevent improperly sealed fasteners in the main and center fuel tanks from becoming an ignition source, in the event of a fault current, which could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
2014-05-13: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2004-12-07 for certain The Boeing Company Model 757 series airplanes equipped with Rolls-Royce RB211 engines. AD 2004-12-07 required modification of the nacelle strut and wing structure; and for certain airplanes, repetitive detailed inspections of certain aft bulkhead fasteners for loose or missing fasteners, and corrective action if necessary. For certain other airplanes, AD 2004-12-07 required a one-time detailed inspection of the middle gusset of the inboard side load fitting for proper alignment, and realignment if necessary; a one-time eddy current inspection of certain fastener holes for cracking, and repair if necessary; and a detailed inspection of certain fasteners for loose or missing fasteners, and replacement with new fasteners if necessary. This new AD specifies a maximum compliance time limit. This AD was prompted by reports indicating that the actual operational loads applied to the nacelle are higher than the analytical loads that were used during the initial design. We are issuing this AD to prevent fatigue cracking in primary strut structure and consequent reduced structural integrity of the strut.
2014-05-12: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2010-15-08 for all The Boeing Company Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. AD 2010-15-08 required repetitive inspections for discrepancies of each carriage spindle of the outboard mid-flaps; repetitive gap checks of the inboard and outboard carriages of the outboard mid-flaps to detect fractured carriage spindles; measuring to ensure that any new or serviceable carriage spindle meets minimum allowable diameter measurements taken at three locations; repetitive inspections, measurements, and overhaul of the carriage spindles; replacement of any carriage spindle when it has reached its maximum life limit; and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD requires reducing the life limit of the carriages, reducing the repetitive interval for certain inspections and gap checks for certain carriages. This new AD also adds an option, for certain replacements, of doing an inspection, and related investigativeand corrective actions if necessary. This AD was prompted by a report of failure of both flap carriages. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracked, corroded, or fractured carriage spindles, which could lead to severe flap asymmetry, and could result in reduced control or loss of controllability of the airplane.
75-18-01: 75-18-01 ENTWICKLUNGSGEMEINSCHAFT (MESSERSCHMITT-BOLKOW-BLOHM GmbH): Amendment 39-2318. Applies to Phoebus A1 and B1 gliders, serial numbers 702 thru 751, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent loss of rudder control, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the last inspection, inspect the rudder control cable lever as follows: (1) Remove headrest, luggage container, and seat. (2) Disconnect rudder control cables from cable lever. (3) Remove rudder control rod and rudder control cable lever (P/N 15120-4236). (4) Inspect rudder control cable lever weld for cracks using a magnifying glass with a magnification power of not less than five. (5) If a crack is found comply with paragraph (b) of this AD. (b) If a rudder control cable lever weld crack is found during an inspection required by paragraph (a), replace the rudder control cable lever P/N 15120-4236 with a serviceable part of the same part number or an FAA-approved equivalent. (MBB Service Bulletin No. PHOEBUS 27-20/1, dated March 1975, pertains to this AD.) This amendment becomes effective August 18, 1975.
2004-23-11: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-14 and DC-9-15 airplanes; and Model DC-9-20, DC-9-30, DC-9-40, and DC-9-50 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive high frequency eddy current inspections to detect cracks in the vertical radius of the upper cap of the center wing rear spar, and repair if necessary. This AD is prompted by reports of cracks in the upper cap of the center wing rear spar that resulted from stress corrosion. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking of the left or right upper cap of the center rear spar, which would cause a possible fuel leak and structural failure of the upper cap, and result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
2014-05-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Bombardier, Inc. Model DHC-8-400 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that a batch of main landing gear (MLG) door actuators with a certain part number having certain serial numbers could be assembled with the scraper installed backward. This AD requires repetitive functional checks of the MLG alternate extension system (AES) and eventual replacement of certain MLG door actuators with actuators that have either been reworked or do not have certain serial numbers. We are issuing this AD to prevent incorrectly installed scrapers, which could hinder the operation of the MLG AES, and result in failure of the MLG AES on one side, and consequent unsafe asymmetrical landing configuration.
2014-05-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Helicopters Model AS332L1 helicopters. This AD requires replacing the rivets on the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) Y350 longitudinal beams (longitudinal beams Y350). This AD was prompted by a report that non-conforming rivets had been installed on an AS332 helicopter during a production modification. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent failure of the longitudinal beams Y350 and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2014-05-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model AS332C, AS332L, AS332L1, AS332L2, and SA330J helicopters. This AD prohibits use of the hydraulic hoist in helicopters equipped with certain parts and configurations until a hoist beam lower fitting protector is installed. This AD was prompted by a report that the hoist cable jammed during a rescue at sea. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent the hoist cable from jamming and subsequent cable failure, which could result in injury and damage to the helicopter.
2014-05-07: We are superseding airworthiness directive (AD) 2010-11-51 for Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model AS350B, BA, B1, B2, C, D, and D1 helicopters and Model AS355E, F, F1, F2, and N helicopters with certain part-numbered tail gearbox (TGB) control levers installed. AD 2010-11- 51 required repetitive visual inspections of the TGB control lever for a crack and replacing a cracked TGB control lever with an airworthy TGB control lever. This new AD retains the requirements of AD 2010-11-51 and also requires inspecting other areas of the TGB control lever not previously inspected and at additional inspection intervals. This AD was prompted by several reports of cracking in a TGB control lever. The actions of this AD are intended to prevent failure of the TGB control lever, loss of tail rotor control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2014-04-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model AB412 and AB412 EP helicopters. This AD requires inspecting the tail rotor (T/R) blade for a crack, corrosion, nick, scratch, dent, or other damage and replacing or repairing the blade, depending on the damage. This AD is prompted by reports of T/R blade failures caused by fatigue cracking that originated from surface damage. These actions are intended to prevent failure of the T/R blade and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2014-05-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 777 airplanes. This AD requires, for certain airplanes, replacing radio altimeter transceivers with upgraded units, and, for all airplanes, replacing low range radio altimeter antennas with new antennas. This AD was prompted by operator reports of erratic low range radio altimeter (LRRA) operation while the airplane is airborne. We are issuing this AD to prevent adverse system responses and flight deck effects that could result in loss of controllability of the airplane or landing short of the runway during landing.
2021-05-02: The FAA is removing Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2021-05-02, which applied to all Airbus Helicopters Model AS350B, AS350BA, AS350B1, AS350B2, AS350B3, AS350C, and AS350D helicopters; Model AS355E, AS355F, AS355F1, AS355F2, AS355N, and AS355NP helicopters; and Model EC130B4 and EC130T2 helicopters. AD 2021-05-02 required determining whether the helicopter has been operated in a severe environment since the last inspection of the main rotor hub-to-mast attachment screws, an inspection of the main rotor hub-to-mast attachment screws if the helicopter has been operated in a severe environment, and replacement of the main rotor hub-to-mast attachment screws if necessary, as specified in a European Aviation Safety Agency (now European Union Aviation Safety Agency) (EASA) AD, which was incorporated by reference. Since the FAA issued AD 2021-05- 02, reported inspection results and further investigation have confirmed that the report of failed main rotor hub-to-mast attachment screws, which prompted AD 2021-05-02, was an isolated case which resulted from a maintenance mistake. Therefore, the FAA has determined that no unsafe condition is likely to exist or develop on the main rotor hub-to-mast attachment screws on other helicopters in the fleet. Accordingly, AD 2021-05-02 is removed.