78-01-17: 78-01-17 KAWASAKI HEAVY INDUSTRIES, LTD: Amendment 39-3122. Applies to models KV-107-II and KV-107-IIA helicopters certificated in all categories.
Compliance is required as indicated.
1. To prevent fatigue cracks on the forward and aft rotor drive shafts, accomplish the following:
Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, replace the forward transmission rotor shaft, P/N 107D1259, and aft rotor shaft extension, P/N 107D3147, in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletin No. KSB107-2 dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Prior to the accumulation of the hours specified in KSB107-2 Section l.d., retire from service all rotor drive shafts. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletin No. 107-3(R-3) dated March 20, 1963, is considered an FAA-approved equivalent.
2. To prevent fatigue failure of the aft rotor transmission quill shaft, P/N 107D2067-1, accomplish the following:Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 120 hours time in service from the last inspection, remove the aft transmission assembly, inspect the mix box and aft transmission assemblies and replace parts in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletin No. KSB107-55 dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Prior to installation on certificated aircraft inspect spare mix box and spare aft transmission assemblies. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletins No. 107-113 dated October 28, 1963, No. 107-113A dated November 22, 1963, and No. 107-182 dated October 7, 1964, is considered an FAA-approved equivalent.
3. To prevent cracking in the synchronizing shaft splined adapter, accomplish the following:
Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 120 hourstime in service from the last inspection, inspect synch shaft splined adapter P/N 107D3154-2 in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletin No. KSB107-56 (R-1) dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA- approved equivalent. Prior to the accumulation of 500 hours of operation retire from service the adapter. Adapter which is modified in accordance with KSB107-56 (R-1) may continue to remain in service for up to 2500 hours of operation. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletin No. 107-116(R-1) dated April 6, 1965, is considered an FAA-approved equivalent.
4. To prevent fatigue failure of the rotor pitch housing, accomplish the following:
Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 25 hours time in service from the last inspection, inspect the rotor pitch housing, P/N 107R2553, and blade root sockets, P/N 42R1043, in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletin No. KSB107-4(R-1)dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Prior to the accumulation of the hours stated in KSB107-4(R-1) retire from service the rotor pitch housing and blade root sockets. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletin No. 107-19 dated November 6, 1962, is considered an FAA-approved equivalent.
5. To prevent simultaneous engine false fire warnings caused by electrical wiring system malfunction, accomplish the following:
Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, remove the engine fire detector test switch, P/N BAC-S30-AZ-3- IN5 (JANCO No. 1-1919-1N5) or P/N 1-1917-2N5, and install test switch, P/N BAC-S30AZ-3- 2N5 (JANCO No. 1-1919-2N5), and modify the wiring arrangements in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletin No. KSB107-137 dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletin No. 107-219 dated September 20, 1965, and No. 107-219A dated October 22, 1965, is considered an FAA-approved equivalent.
6. To prevent failure of the aft transmission collector gear and separation of the aft transmission planetary carrier retention nut either of which may cause dephasing of the main rotors, accomplish the following:
Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect for cracks and modify the aft transmission collector gear, P/N 107D2066-10, -12, -14, -16, and -18, in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletin No. KSB-V107-336, dated September 25, 1972, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Additionally, torque and install lock pins in the aft transmission planetary carrier retention nut, P/N BAC-N10GR39, P/N VS10304-39 or P/N 107D1276-7, in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletin KSB-V107- 332 dated January 26, 1972, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletin No. A107-318(R-1) dated June 19, 1972, is considered an FAA-approvedequivalent.
7. To prevent failure of the aft transmission quill shaft, P/N 107D2067, due to surface defects, accomplish the following:
Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, inspect the quill shaft in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletin No. KSB-V107-370B dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletins No. A107-320 dated April 30, 1973, No. 107-320A dated December 21, 1973, No. A107-320B dated February 25, 1974, and No. 107-320C dated September 25, 1974, is considered an FAA-approved equivalent.
8. To prevent failure of the rotor blade, P/N 107R1202, due to undetected cracks in the spar, accomplish the following:
Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, modify the rotor blades and install the Integral Spar Inspection System (ISIS) in accordance with Kawasaki SB No. KSB-V107-478 dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Additionally, operate, inspect, and maintain the ISIS rotor blades in accordance with Kawasaki Service Bulletin No. KSB-V107-495 dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. The visual checks of the rotor blade ISIS indicator may be performed by the pilot. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletins No. 107-319 dated November 12, 1973, No. 107-326 dated May 20, 1974, and No. 107-329 dated June 7, 1974 is considered an FAA-approved equivalent. NOTE: Installation of the rotor blade leading edge protective strip, P/N WR1017-1, is not mandatory.
9. To prevent cracking of the main rotor blade spars due to corrosion, accomplish the following:
Within the next 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 36 months, inspect for corrosion and alter, as necessary, in accordance with Kawasaki SB KSB-V107-547 dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletin No. 107-334 dated October 29, 1976, is considered an FAA-approved equivalent.
10. To prevent fatigue cracks on the forward transmission rotor shaft and carrier, and aft transmission planetary carrier, accomplish the following:
Within 25 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, replace or modify forward transmission rotor shaft and carrier, P/N AO2D1259 or P/N A07D1269, in accordance with the retirement times specified in Kawasaki SB No. KSB- V107-558 dated September 30, 1977, or an FAA-approved equivalent. Additionally, replace aft rotor transmission planetary carrier with parts of the same design, P/N 107D2419-1, prior to the accumulation of 10,000 hours of operation. Compliance with Boeing-Vertol Service Bulletin No. 107-335 dated May 15, 1977, is considered an FAA-approved equivalent.
11. The equivalent means of compliance specified in paragraphs 1 through 10 of this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing District Office, FAA, Pacific-Asia Region, Honolulu, Hawaii.
This amendment becomes effective January 23, 1978.
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84-03-09: 84-03-09 SUNDSTRAND DATA CONTROL, INC.: Amendment 39-4809. Applies to Sundstrand Model 573A, Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) Part Numbers 981-6009-001/010/011/012/013/014. To prevent loss of recorded data, accomplish the following within the next 2,000 hours time in service or 1 year after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless already accomplished:
A. Inspect the DFDR to determine modification status. For DFDR's which have Mod 8 accomplished, but not Mod 15, accomplish Sundstrand Service Bulletin No. 23, (Document No. 012-0118-123), (Mod 15), dated August 2, 1982, or later FAA approved revisions.
B. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region.
This amendment becomes effective March 19, 1984.
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2010-16-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:
Wear, beyond Engine Manual limits, has been identified on the abutment faces of the splines on the Trent 900 Intermediate Pressure (IP) shaft rigid coupling on several engines during strip. The shaft to coupling spline interface provides the means of controlling the turbine axial setting and wear through of the splines would permit the IP turbine to move rearwards.
Rearward movement of the IP turbine would enable contact with static turbine components and would result in loss of engine performance with potential for in-flight shut down, oil migration and oil fire below the LP turbine discs prior to sufficient indication resulting in loss of LP turbine disc integrity.
We are issuing this AD to detect rearward movement of the IP turbine, which could result in loss of disc integrity, an uncontained failure of the engine, and damage to the airplane.
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2010-04-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:
During routine inspection procedures on the wing assembly line it was identified the possibility of cracks and deformation developing during assembly on the internal wing spars and rib flanges, causing a safe[ty] margin reduction.
* * * * *
The unsafe condition is cracking and deformation of wing spar and rib flanges, which could result in loss of structural integrity of the wing. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
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91-22-06: 91-22-06 PARTENAVIA: Amendment 39-8066. Docket No.91-CE-75-AD.
Applicability: P-68 Series (not applicable to AP-68TP Series) airplanes (serial numbers 1 through 327), certificated in any category.
Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished.
To prevent horizontal stabilator failure, which could result in loss of control of the airplane, accomplish the following:
(a) Within the next 10 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date of this AD, accomplish the following:
(1) Change the airspeed limitations in Section 2 OPERATING LIMITATIONS of the Partenavia P-68 Flight Manual to correspond with Part A of Partenavia Service Bulletin (SB) No. 85, dated July 16, 1991, and operate the airplane accordingly.
(2) Install the Operating Limitation Placard that is included with Partenavia SB No. 85, dated July 16, 1991, on the airplane instrument panel within the pilot's clear view and operate the airplane accordingly.
(b) Withinthe next 500 hours TIS after the effective date of this AD, install a reinforcement strip on the lower side of the horizontal tailplane in accordance with the instructions in paragraphs 1 through 5 of Part B of Partenavia SB No. 85, dated July 16, 1991.
(c) After compliance with paragraph (b) of this AD, paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this AD no longer apply and the Operating Limitation Placard may be removed and the flight manual limitations may be restored to their original measurements.
(d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.
(e) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance times that provides an equivalent level of safety, may be approved by the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, c/o American Embassy, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium. The request should be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Brussels Aircraft Certification Office.
(f) The modifications and installations required by this AD shall be done in accordance with Partenavia Service Bulletin No. 85, dated July 16, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Partenavia, Costruzioni Aeronautiche S.p.A., Via G. Pascoli n. 7, 80026 Casoria (NA), Italy. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, NW; Room 8401, Washington, DC.
This amendment (39-8066, AD 91-22-06) becomes effective on November 12, 1991.
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2010-16-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:
The operation of the airbrake lever in the "airbrakes out'' to "lift spoiler'' range has been the subject of two occurrence reports. The lift spoilers on the BAe 146 and Avro 146-RJ aeroplanes have been designed to deploy on landing to provide aerodynamic braking and to dump lift to ensure that the wheel brakes can provide the necessary speed reduction.
* * * * *
The effects of deceleration and landing inertia loads can cause uncommanded movement of the airbrake selector lever from the "lift spoiler'' position to the "airbrakes out'' position, causing the lift spoilers to retract during the landing roll. This condition, if not corrected, would increase the landing distance, possibly resulting in a runway overrun and consequent injury to aeroplane occupants.
* * * * *
We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
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46-13-01: 46-13-01 LOCKHEED: (Was Service Note 2 of AD-723-2.) Applies to All Model 18 Aircraft.
When replacing the landing gear actuating cylinder flexible hose, P/N 55252-3, the length of ferrules should be compared. If longer ferrules are found on the new hoses, an elbow should be inserted between the hose and the cylinder aft port, to prevent possible damage to the hose by the landing gear scissors. (Lockheed Service Letter No. 18-28, dated June 15, 1945, revised December 10, 1945, covers this same subject.)
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47-10-07: 47-10-07 LOCKHEED: (Was Mandatory Note 8 of AD-763-3.) Applies Only to Model 49 Serial Numbers 2021 to 2088, Inclusive.
Compliance required prior to April 1, 1947.
Replace the existing restrictor valve (P/N 66404) in each main landing gear down line with a winterized type restrictor valve (LAC P/N 667489.)
(LAC Service Instruction 049/SI-75, covers this same subject.)
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91-02-11: 91-02-11 AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: Amendment 39-6860. Docket No. 90-NM-66-AD.
Applicability: All Model A320-111, -211, and -231 series airplanes, certificated in any category.
Compliance: Required within 45 days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished.
To prevent failure of the landing gear to retract following takeoff, accomplish the following:
A. Install wiring and electronic components in relay 48GA's energization system, in accordance with Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A320-32-1035, Revision 2, dated December 18, 1989; or Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A320-32-1048, Revision 1, dated July 10, 1990.
B. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.
NOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113.
C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD.
All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Airbus Industrie, Airbus Support Division, Avenue Didier Daurat, 31700 Blagnac, France. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington.
This amendment (39-6860, AD 91-02-11) becomes effective on February 25, 1991.
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2010-14-19: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as:
* * * [P]artial blockage of the water absorbing filter element P/N (part number) QA06123 was observed several times. The blockage was created by carbon debris from the cartridge and from the burst disc of the Halon bottle.
This water absorbing filter element is part of Halon Dual-Filter Assembly installed also in the Flow Metering System (FMS) of the cargo compartment Fire Extinguishing System used in the A330 and A340 aeroplanes.
Blockage of the water absorbing filter element could lead to reduction of Halon outflow, leading to incapacity to maintain fire extinguishing agent concentration. Combined with fire, this could result in an uncontrolled fire in the affected compartment, which would constitute an unsafe condition.
* * * * *
We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
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