Results
60-10-04: 60-10-04 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 138 Part 507 Federal Register May 3, 1960. Applies to All Models 049, 149, 649, 749, 1049, and 1649 Series Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. A crack was found in the segment ring of the fuselage aft pressure bulkhead. The crack, approximately 37 inches long, was in the top left section of the ring, extending from a point right of center. As a result of investigation of the failure, the following must be accomplished on all aircraft with more than 30,000 hours' time in service. (a) Within the next 180 hours' time in service, unless already accomplished within the last 4,500 hours' time in service, and every 4,500 hours' time in service thereafter, inspect the entire peripheral ring of the aft pressure bulkhead at the bend radius adjacent to the skin using one of the following methods or equivalent: (1) Radiographic inspection. (2) Pressurize the cabin to a minimum of 2 p.s.i. Apply soap solution to the rear face of thering and examine for leakage. This will require removal of the sealing compound. (b) If cracks are found, they must be repaired in accordance with FAA approved manufacturer's instructions. Pressurized flight is prohibited until cracks are repaired. (c) When any part of the aft pressure bulkhead peripheral ring is replaced by a new part, inspection of the new part per (a) is not required until the new part has accumulated 30,000 hours' time in service. (d) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. (Lockheed Service Letter FS/240954 covers this subject.) Revised July 11, 1961. Revised March 9, 1962.
2009-11-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH (Eurocopter) Model EC135 helicopters. This AD results from a report of abnormal main rotor blade vibrations on a Eurocopter Model EC135 helicopter. This AD also results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Community. The MCAI states that an operator reported unusual vibrations during the start phase of the main rotor blade on one helicopter. The vibrations stopped after the application of torque. Subsequent maintenance personnel found that six of the eight attachment screws of the lower hub-shaft bearing support were loose. This condition was discovered in two additional helicopters. Loose screws in the bearing support, if not detected and corrected, could result in abnormal main rotor blade vibrations and subsequent damage to the main transmission.
2009-11-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Resulting from the assessment of fuel tank wiring installations required by SFAR 88 (Special Federal Aviation Regulation) and equivalent JAA/EASA (Joint Aviation Authorities/European Aviation Safety Agency) policy, BAE Systems (Operations) Limited has revised the HS.748 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), now at Revision 19, to introduce Chapter 05-10-00 ``Critical Design Configuration Control Limitations (CDCCL)--Fuel System''. The CDCCLs provide instructions to retain critical ignition source prevention features during configuration changes that may be caused by modification, repair or maintenance actions. The CDCCLs have been identified as requirements for continued airworthiness to address the risk of fuel vapour ignition sources remaining undetected. This condition, if not corrected, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the aircraft. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
61-18-01: 61-18-01 BOEING: Amdt. 326 Part 507 Federal Register August 24, 1961 as amended by amendment 39-1002. Applies to Boeing 707 Series Aircraft Serial Nos. 17586-17652, 17658- 17690, 17692-17712, 17718-17724, 17903-17906, 17918-17919, 17925-17930, 18012 and 18054 and Boeing 720 Series Aircraft Serial Nos. 17907-17917, 18013-18020, 18023, and 18041 as indicated. \n\n\tDue to failure in a main landing gear trunnion support, the following inspections, contained in paragraphs (a), (b), and (c), are required on all specified 707 Series aircraft until paragraph (d) has been accomplished. Paragraph (e) is required on all specified 707 Series aircraft after paragraph (d) is accomplished and on all specified 720 Series aircraft. \n\n\t(a) Within the next 200 hours' time in service, unless already accomplished within the last 150 hours' time in service, and thereafter at every 350 hours' time in service: \n\n\t\t(1) Clean the web, upper and lower chord areas and aft flanges on the inboard and outboard side of 220,000 p.s.i. heat treat steel main landing gear trunnion support rib and conduct a visual inspection of the cleaned areas for evidence of cracks.\n \n\t\t(2) Clean and visually, or radiographically, inspect the forward trunnion support fitting for evidence of cracks on the forward and aft side in the region of the bearing collar. \n\n\t\t(3) If evidence of cracks is found in (a)(1) or (a)(2) above, conduct more detail inspections using fluorescent dye penetrant at temperatures of 50 degrees F. or above, X-ray, or equivalent. \n\n\t(b) Within the next 35 hours' time in service, unless already accomplished within the last 30 hours' time in service and thereafter at every 125 hours' time in service, clean the main landing gear aft trunnion bearing support, paying particular attention to the areas listed below, and conduct a fluorescent dye penetrant inspection or equivalent for cracks; \n\n\t\t(1) Area around the barrel nut hole, both forward and aft sides. \n\n\t\t(2) A strip 1/2-inch wide around upper bearing support, from the upper barrel nut to lower 1.31 diameter inboard (tension) bolt hole, on aft side. \n\n\t\t(3) A strip 1/2-inch wide around upper bearing, from upper barrel nut to trunnion support rib, on forward side. \n\n\t(c) If cracks exceeding allowable lengths specified in the latest revision of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 859 (R-2 or later) are found during inspections (a) and (b), the affected components must be replaced or repaired in accordance with FAA approved Boeing procedures prior to further flight. When cracks less than the maximum allowable lengths specified in S.B. 859 (R-2 or later), are found, the following shall be accomplished: \n\n\t\t(1) Stop drill in accordance with S.B. 859 (R-2 or later) instructions and inspect for crack progression at each 350 hours' time in service after stop drilling. If cracks progress beyond the stop drilled hole, contact Boeing for FAA approved Boeing repair procedures to be incorporated prior to further flight. \n\n\t\t(2) If cracks are not accessible for stop drilling prior to further flight FAA approved Boeing instructions must be obtained for the required inspection intervals and procedures for the specific crack location and length. \n\n\t(d) Unless already accomplished at the factory or by the operator within the next 3,500 hours' time in service conduct the following detail inspections and rework as indicated: \n\n\t\t(1) Remove the main landing gear and trunnion in accordance with BAC Maintenance Manual Procedure. \n\n\t\t(2) Remove all nuts and washers along the periphery of the trunnion support rib. \n\n\t\t(3) Rework the main landing gear trunnion support fittings per the latest revision of FAA approved S.B. No. 874 (August 9, 1960, or later). \n\n\t\t(4) Following the rework, clean the aft and forward trunnion support fittings and perform a thorough magnetic particle and visual inspection for cracks. \n\n\t\t(5) Conduct a thorough visual inspection for evidence of cracks in the main landing gear trunnion support rib and flanges using a low power (2- or 3- power) wide-field (at least 2 1/2-in diameter field of view) magnifying glass or FAA approved equivalent, and covering every square inch of exposed area (both sides) with special emphasis around each and every bolt hole on all flanges and boundaries. Any suspected discrepancy should be confirmed with dye penetrant or equivalent after paint removal. \n\n\t\t(6) If cracks are found during inspections (d)(1) through (d)(5), the affected components must be replaced or repaired in accordance with FAA approved Boeing procedures prior to further flights. \n\n\t\t(7) After reinstalling nuts and washers in accordance with Part I, Subparagraph (e), S.B. 859 (R-2 or later), measure the gap between the upper and lower flanges and skin at several points along the forward 8 inches of each flange using a thickness gage. See latest revision of FAA approved S.B. 859 (R-2 or later) Part I, Subparagraph (f) for instructions if any gap exceeds 0.02 inch. \n\n\t(e) The following repetitive inspections are required on all specified 707 Series aircraft upon completion of inspections and rework outlined in (d) and on all specified 720 Series aircraft. These provisions of paragraph (e), (1) and (2) may be deleted from the 720 aircraft inspection intervals, provided that no cracks have been found in the steel main landing gear trunnion support rib. If cracks are found or have been found in the rib assembly and repaired per Service Bulletin No. 859 (R-2) the repetitive inspections of paragraph (e), (1) and (2) shall apply. \n\n\t\t(1) Every 420 hours' time in service, visually inspect the forward and aft trunnion support fittings for cracks. \n\n\t\t(2) Every 840 hours' time in service visually inspect the web and flanges on the inboard and outboard sides of the trunnion support rib for cracks. \n\n\t\t(3) Every 5,000 hours' time in service clean all areas of the main landing gear trunnion support assembly ofdirt and grease using Naphtha TT-N-95 or BNS 3-2. After cleaning, together with mirror and lighting as required, and using a low powered (2- or 3-power) wide-field (at least 2 1/2-inch diameter field of view) magnifying glass, or FAA approved equivalent, conduct the following inspections as indicated: \n\n\t\t\t(i) Visually inspect the web and flanges on the inboard and outboard sides of the trunnion support rib for evidence of cracks. \n\n\t\t\t(ii) Visually inspect the forward trunnion support fitting for evidence of cracks of the forward and aft sides in the region of the bearing collar. \n\n\t\t\t(iii) Visual inspect the aft trunnion support fitting for evidence of cracks. \n\n\t\t\t(iv) Crack indications found in (i), (ii), and (iii) should be confirmed by dye penetrant inspection. Allowable crack limits and FAA approved rework information for (i) is shown in FAA approved Service Bulletin No. 859 (R-2 or later) (Figure 2). \n\n\t\t(4) If cracks are found in the inspections of (e), the affected components must be replaced or repaired in accordance with FAA approved Boeing procedures prior to further flight. \n\n\t\t(5) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. \n\n\t(Boeing Service Bulletin Number 859 (R-2) pertains to this subject.) \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 60-08-01. \n\n\tAmendment 326 effective September 23, 1961. \n\n\tRevised January 26, 1962. \n\n\tRevised October 26, 1963. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-1002) becomes effective June 6, 1970.
81-09-01: 81-09-01 BEECH: Amendment 39-4090. Models C90 (Serial Numbers LJ-642 through LJ-935, LJ-937, and LJ-939 through LJ-941), E90 (Serial Numbers LW-118 through LW-344) and H90 (Military T-44A) (Serial Numbers LL-1 through LL-40 and LL-42 through LL-61) airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance is required as indicated unless already accomplished. To prevent malfunction of the landing gear retraction system caused by improper alignment of bearings, accomplish the following: A) Within the next 100 landings after the effective date of this AD, use procedures specified by Beechcraft Service Instructions (SIs) T-44A-0051 for Model H90 (Military T-44A) or SIs 1160 for Models C90 and E90 to accomplish the following basic actions: 1. Determine whether alignment of bearings in the landing gear retract system is proper as follows: (a) At each end of the Beech Part Number (P/N) 50-810240 torque shaft, disconnect the bearing inner race from the torque shaft.(b) Using only finger force, attempt to slide each race part way out of the bearing along the torque shaft. (c) Disregard paragraphs A)1.(d) through A)2.(f) below if the above attempt is successful. (d) Remove the AN3-31A bolt which attaches the aft end of the gear box to the airframe. (e) Move the aft end of the gearbox upward or downward until action per paragraph A)1.(b) above is successful. (f) Find if the previously removed AN3-31A (or a new AN3-32A per paragraph A)2., below) bolt can be installed without deforming holes in the airframe and without moving the gearbox from the position that results in successful action per paragraph A)1.(b), above. (g) Disregard paragraphs A)2.(a) through A)2.(f) below if action per paragraphs A)1.(b) or A)1.(f) above is successful. 2. Correct any improper alignment of bearings in the landing gear retract system as follows: (a) If action, in accordance with the applicable SIs, shows this to be necessary, make and install P/N 50-820201-31, -33 and/or -35 shims under bearing supports. (b) Determine the amount of misalignment between holes for the AN3-31A bolt while the gearbox is positioned per paragraph A)1.(e), above. (c) Determine or accurately estimate the number of landings during which the P/N 50-810240 torque shaft has been used. Disregard paragraph A)2.(d) below, if one of the following combinations exists: Hole Misalignment Number of Landings 1/2 hole or less less than 5,000 1/2 to 3/4 hole 600 or less 3/4 to 1 hole 200 or less NOTE: This AD takes precedence over applicable SIs, in that inspection of the torque shaft is required when the combination of 1/2-hole or less misalignment and more than 5,000 landings exists. (d) Remove the P/N 50-810240 torque shaft from the gearbox and inspect the shaft for a crack, using a dye penetrant method as specified in FAA Advisory Circular AC 43.13-1A. Pay particular attention to circumferential areas on each side of the bearing race that is brazed to the shaft. If the shaft is found to be cracked, replace it with a serviceable P/N 50-810240 torque shaft. (e) Elongate holes in the airframe as necessary to permit installation of a new AN3-32A bolt in place of the previously removed AN3-31A bolt. Make and install a P/N 50-820201-67 washer plate assembly and a P/N 50-820201-37 plate with the new AN3-32A bolt, as shown in SIs 1160 and T-44A-0051. (f) Repeat action that is specified by paragraphs A)1.(b) through A)1.(g). (g) Restore the airplane to an airworthy configuration. B) Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Aircraft Certification Program, Room 238, Terminal Building 2299, Mid-Continent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 67209; telephone (316) 942-4285. C) For the purpose of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determinedby dividing each airplane's hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. This amendment becomes effective April 23, 1981.
2009-11-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) to supersede AD 2008-12-16, which applies to certain M7 Aerospace LP SA226 and SA227 series airplanes. AD 2008-12-16 currently requires you to inspect wires and tube assemblies for chafing, arcing, or insufficient clearance between components. If chafing, arcing, or insufficient clearance between components is found, AD 2008-12-16 requires you to clear, repair, and/or replace all chafed wires, components, and tube assemblies. AD 2008-12-16 also requires you to cover the four-gauge wires leaving the battery box with firesleeving and secure them with a clamp. Since we issued AD 2008-12-16, M7 Aerospace LP has notified us that Model SA227-BC (C-26A) was inadvertently left out of the Applicability section of the AD, and they updated some of the service information due to parts availability. Operators have also identified issues with model applicability that needed clarification. Consequently, this AD retains the actions of AD 2008-12-16, adds Model SA227-BC (C-26A) to the Applicability section, and regroups the models for clarification. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct chafing of electrical wires, components, and tube assemblies. This condition could result in arcing of exposed wires with consequent burning of a hole in a hydraulic line or the bleed air line. This failure could lead to a hydraulic fluid leak and a possible fire in the engine nacelle compartment. DATES: This AD becomes effective on July 2, 2009. On July 2, 2009, the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in Table 2 of this AD. As of July 23, 2008 (73 FR 34615, June 18, 2008), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in Table 3 of this AD.
2009-11-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) to supersede AD 2008-10-12, which applies to certain Air Tractor, Inc. AT- 400, AT-500, AT-600, and AT-800 series airplanes. AD 2008-10-12 currently requires repetitively inspecting the engine mounts for cracks, repairing any crack damage found, and installing gussets as a terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This AD results from a report of a Model AT-602 airplane with a crack completely through the gusset that was installed as required in AD 2008-10-12. Consequently, this AD would require you to continue repetitively inspecting the engine mounts for cracks for all previously affected Air Tractor, Inc. AT-400, AT-500, AT-600, and AT-800 series airplanes with or without gussets installed, and repairing any crack damage found. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in the engine mount, which could result in failure of the engine mount. This failure could lead to separation of the engine from the airplane.
2009-11-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Lockheed Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G series airplanes. This AD requires an inspection to identify discrepant barrel nuts in the upper wing joint, engine truss, and rear beam pylon support; and replacement of any discrepant barrel nut with a new barrel nut, if necessary. This AD results from a report of severe cracking of multiple barrel nuts in the wing station (WS) 220 upper wing joint found during scheduled maintenance. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracking of the barrel nuts in the upper wing joint, engine truss, and rear beam pylon support, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the affected part and consequent detachment of the wing or engine from the airplane.
2009-10-11: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Based on some recent in-service findings for fluid ingress and/ or inner skin disbond damage on rudders which could result in reduced structural integrity of the rudder, AIRBUS decided to introduce some further structural inspections to specific rudder areas[.] * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2009-10-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Field experiences have revealed cracks in the frames and closing angle on the forward engine cowl door * * *. In case of a damaged frame and/or closing angle, the forward engine cowl door can loosen during flight and depart from the aircraft. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-04-06: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all Boeing Model 747 series airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive detailed inspections of the aft pressure bulkhead for indications of "oil cans'' and previous oil can repairs, and corrective actions if necessary. An oil can is an area on a pressure dome web that moves when pushed from the forward side. This new AD requires a reduced compliance time for the initial detailed inspection and revises the applicability. This AD results from a report that cracks in oil-canned areas were found during an inspection of the aft pressure bulkhead. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct the propagation of fatigue cracks in the vicinity of oil cans on the web of the aft pressure bulkhead, which could result in rapid decompression of the airplane and overpressurization of the tail section, and consequent loss of control of the airplane.
2009-10-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During testing, it was discovered that when the outflow valve (OFV) manual mode connector is not connected, the manual mode motor and altitude limitation are not properly tested. Consequently, a disconnect of the OFV manual mode and/or a related wiring failure could potentially result in a dormant loss of several CPC [cabin pressure control] backup/safety functions, including OFV manual control, altitude limitation, emergency depressurization and smoke clearance. * * * * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2009-10-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) 150 and 152 series airplanes. This AD requires you to either install a placard prohibiting spins and other acrobatic maneuvers in the airplane or to replace the rudder stop, rudder stop bumper, and attachment hardware with a new rudder stop modification kit and replace the safety wire with jamnuts. This AD results from follow-on investigations of two accidents where the rudder was found in the over-travel position with the stop plate hooked over the stop bolt heads. While neither of the accident aircraft met type design, investigations revealed that aircraft in full conformity with type design can exceed the travel limits set by the rudder stops. We are issuing this AD to prevent the rudder from traveling past the normal travel limit. Operation in this non-certificated control position is unacceptable and could cause undesirable consequences, such as contact between the rudder and the elevator.
2009-10-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747-400 and 747-400D series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections to detect cracks in the floor panel attachment fastener holes of the Section 41 upper deck floor beam upper chords, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of cracks found in the Section 41 upper deck floor beam upper chords. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in these chords, which could become large and cause the floor beams to become severed and result in rapid decompression or reduced controllability of the airplane.
2009-10-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A number of Flap Actuators with P/N [part number] 601R93101-21 and 601R93101-25 were identified as having pinion gears that did not have acceptable certificates of conformance from the supplier. This condition could result in flap failure. * * * Endurance testing conducted at Eaton Aerospace with representative discrepant gears predicted a 3,000 flight cycle life limit for the affected actuators. Fleet leaders with suspect installed actuators are rapidly approaching this threshold. Failure of the flap actuator pinion gear set could cause the right or left inboard panel to disconnect, which could result in flap asymmetry and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2009-10-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney models PW2037, PW2037(M), and PW2040 turbofan engines with high-pressure turbine (HPT) 2nd stage hubs that have previously been exposed to Pratt & Whitney cleaning procedure SPOP 10 or SPOP 9 or equivalent procedure. This AD requires a onetime optical comparator inspection (OCI) of the blade retention slots of the affected HPT 2nd stage hubs at the next HPT overhaul after the effective date of the AD. This AD results from an uncontained release of HPT 2nd stage blades and blade retention lugs. We are issuing this AD to remove nonconforming HPT 2nd stage hubs, which could result in an uncontained release of turbine blades and blade retention lugs, and damage to the airplane.
2009-08-51: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting emergency airworthiness directive (AD) 2009-08-51 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of RRC AE 3007A series turbofan engines. This AD requires performing an eddy current inspection (ECI) or surface wave ultrasonic test (SWUT) inspection on each affected high-pressure turbine wheel. This AD results from additional reports of cracks in the high-pressure turbine (HPT) stage 2 wheels identified from the required inspections in AD 2008-26-06. A revised risk assessment that includes these additional reports indicates we need to require a higher inspection rate. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncontained failure of the HPT stage 2 wheel and damage to the airplane.
2009-10-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During a recent Aileron Dual Load Path and Linkage Inspection, which is a certification maintenance requirement (CMR) task, the installed control rods were found to be corroded. The affected rod assemblies were removed for investigation and it was found that the Tab Side Fitting was cracked. Subsequently, similar cracks were found on another aeroplane in a supporting lever of the Control Rod attachment fitting of the Trim Tab. Those cracks were found during the applicable CMR inspection. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to structural failure of the dual load path attachment arrangement of the affected trim and spring tabs, possibly resulting in a flutter problem that could lead to loss of control of the aeroplane. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
2009-10-02: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited (Jetstream) Model 4101 airplanes. That AD currently requires operators to determine the number of flight cycles accumulated on each component of the main landing gear (MLG) and the nose landing gear (NLG), and to replace each component that reaches its life limit with a serviceable component. The existing AD also requires operators to revise the Airworthiness Limitations (AWL) section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) in the aircraft maintenance manual to reflect the new life limits for structurally significant items. This new AD requires a new revision of the AWL section of the ICA to incorporate revised life limits for structurally significant items, operational and functional tests of certain systems, and instructions to retain critical ignition source prevention features during configuration changes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of certain structurally significant items, including the MLG and the NLG, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane; and to prevent fuel vapor ignition sources, which could result in fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
2008-16-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Hawker Beechcraft Corporation Model 390 airplanes. This AD requires you to repetitively do a post-flight check (owner/operator holding at least a private pilot certificate checking for residual heat in the angle-of- attack (AOA) probes or an appropriately-rated mechanic doing a maintenance manual operational test of the heat of the AOA probes) after every flight and replace or modify (upload software) the stall warning AOA transmitters. This AD results from reports of the potential for unannunciated loss of the heating function in the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) stall warning AOA transmitters of Model 390 airplanes. We are issuing this AD to correct potentially inadequate stall warning with loss of stick pusher function.
2009-09-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive detailed and high frequency eddy current inspections to detect cracks of the backup intercostals and the upper sill of the forward airstair doorway, and applicable corrective actions. This AD also provides for an optional terminating action, which would eliminate the need for repetitive inspections. This AD results from a report indicating that cracks were found in the backup intercostals and upper sill web of the forward airstair doorway. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the backup intercostals and upper sill web of the forward airstair doorway, which could result in a rapid loss of cabin pressure.
2009-09-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive external surface high frequency eddy current inspections to detect cracks in the radius detail of the upper lobe doubler on both sides of the airplane, and applicable corrective action. This AD results from reports of cracks in the radius detail of the upper lobe doublers. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in the upper lobe doublers. Such cracks could result in significant degradation of the fuselage structure and reduce its ability to carry flight loads from the vertical stabilizer, which could adversely affect the controllability of the airplane.
2009-06-22: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: An A320 aircraft experienced an event where it was not possible to open the reinforced cockpit door, even after power had been removed from the aircraft. Investigation has identified that the cockpit door latch/striker assembly may have overheated, causing permanent internal damage prior to being electrically isolated by the internal thermal fuse. This condition, in case of a rapid decompression in the cockpit, would prevent the necessary unlocking/ opening of the door, which may lead to failure of the airplane structure. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2009-09-05: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to certain Airbus Model A318-100 and A319-100 series airplanes; A320-111 airplanes; A320-200 series airplanes; and A321-100 and A321-200 series airplanes. That AD currently requires a one-time inspection of the horizontal hinge pin of the 103VU electrical panel in the avionics compartment to determine if the hinge pin can move out of the hinge, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This new AD instead requires installing a hinge pin stopper on the internal door of the 103VU electrical panel. This AD results from a report indicating that electrical wire damage was found in the 103VU electrical panel due to contact between the hinge pin and the adjacent electrical wire harness. We are issuing this AD to prevent contact between the horizontal hinge pin and the adjacent electrical wire harness, which could result in damage to electrical wires, and consequent arcing and/or failure of associated systems.
2009-09-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several cases of Gas Generator Turbine (HP Turbine) blade rearward displacement have been detected during borescope inspection or in repair centre following engine disassembly. Two of them resulted in blade rubs between the rear face of the fir-tree roots and the rear bearing support cover. High HP blade rearward displacement can potentially result in blade release due to fatigue of the blade, which would cause an uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown. We are issuing this AD to prevent an uncommanded in-flight engine shutdown which could result in an emergency autorotation landing or, at worst, an accident.