Results
2011-24-08: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A helicopter experienced an inadvertent activation of the 65% N1 (gas generator speed) back up control mode. The subsequent technical investigations carried by Turbomeca revealed that an N2 (power turbine speed) sensor harness wire crimping discrepancy was at the origin of this event. Further quality investigations performed with the supplier led to the conclusion that N2 sensor Part Number (P/N) 0 301 52 001 0 whose Serial Numbers (S/N) are between S/N 242 and S/N 339 inclusive are potentially concerned by the same manufacturing discrepancy. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to the inadvertent activation of the 65% N1 back up mode and consequently to significant power loss on one or more or both engines installed on the same helicopter, potentially resulting in an emergency landing of the helicopter. We are issuing this AD to prevent inadvertent activation of the backup control mode, which could result in engine power loss and emergency landing of the helicopter.
52-28-01: 52-28-01 AERONCA: Applies to All Model 11AC and S11AC Aircraft Equipped With the Auxiliary Fuel Tank Installation. Compliance required not later than January 31, 1953. Accidents have occurred in the above model aircraft due to misuse of the fuel transfer system. These accidents have been caused by pilots attempting to transfer fuel while taking off or in a climb attitude. To preclude the possibility of pilot error with regard to the foregoing, the following placard, or its equivalent, shall be displayed near the fuel transfer system shutoff valve and in view of the pilot: "Transfer fuel in level flight or glide only and when main tank is half full or less. Valve is to be closed except while transferring fuel."
2011-23-08: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Bombardier, Inc. Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Seven cases of on-ground hydraulic accumulator screw cap/end cap failure have been experienced on CL-600-2B19 aeroplanes, resulting in the loss of the associated hydraulic system and high-energy impact damage to adjacent systems and structure. * * * * * * * * A detailed analysis of the calculated line of trajectory of a failed screw cap/end cap for each of the accumulators has been conducted, resulting in the identification of several areas where systems and/or structural components could potentially be damaged. Although all of the failures to date have occurred on the ground, an in-flight failure affecting such components could potentially have an adverse effect on the controllability of the aeroplane. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
70-03-02: 70-03-02 BRITISH AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Amdt. 39-929. Applies to Viscount Models 744, 745D, and 810 series airplanes. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent possible failure of the fuselage pressure shell in the area under the dorsal fin structure, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 90 days after the effective date of this airworthiness directive or within eight years after the date of manufacture, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 12 months from the last inspection, visually inspect the fuselage skin under the dorsal fin for corrosion and breakdown of the protective paint. These inspections may be accomplished through the leading edge access panel for the anti-icing duct connection at the base of the fin and through new inspection holes installed in the dorsal fin in accordance with Figures 2 and 3 of the British Aircraft Corporation Preliminary Technical Leaflet No. 278, Issue 1, for Model 744 and 745D airplanes; orPreliminary Technical Leaflet No. 143, Issue 1 for Model 810 airplanes; or an FAA-approved equivalent. (b) If skin corrosion is found during the inspections required by paragraph (a), before further flight: (1) Repair the corroded area in accordance with the Viscount Repair Manual, or 2) Remove the complete dorsal fin (segments or all at once), repair the corroded skin, and reseal, and repaint the fuselage skin under the dorsal fin in accordance with the Airframe Corrosion Section of Viscount Overhaul Manual, for Model 744 airplanes; the Instruction Manual, for Model 745D airplanes; the Aircraft Manual, for Model 810 airplanes; or an FAA-approved equivalent. (c) The repetitive inspections required by paragraph (a) may be discontinued when all segments of the dorsal fin have been removed and the corrective action required by paragraph (b)(2) has been accomplished. This amendment becomes effective February 22, 1970.
2003-04-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Piaggio Aero Industries S.p.A. (Piaggio) Model P-180 airplanes. This AD requires you to install a placard on the inside of the lavatory door that prohibits occupying the lavatory seat during takeoff and landing. This AD also requires you to incorporate a temporary revision into the Limitations Section of the pilot operating handbook/airplane flight manual (POH/AFM). This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Italy. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent passengers from occupying the lavatory seat during takeoff and landing. The lavatory/cabin partition could fail and lead to passenger injury in an emergency situation.
98-04-28: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Cessna Aircraft Company Models T303, 310R, T310R, 335, 340A, 402B, 402C, 404, F406, 414, 414A, 421B, 421C, 425, and 441 airplanes. This action requires revising the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to specify procedures that would prohibit flight in severe icing conditions (as determined by certain visual cues), limit or prohibit the use of various flight control devices while in severe icing conditions, and provide the flight crew with recognition cues for, and procedures for exiting from, severe icing conditions. The proposed AD is prompted by the results of a review of the requirements for certification of these airplanes in icing conditions, new information on the icing environment, and icing data provided currently to the flight crew. The actions specified by this AD are intended to minimize the potential hazards associated with operating these airplanes in severe icing conditions by providing more clearly defined procedures and limitations associated with such conditions.
2003-04-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all SOCATA--Groupe AEROSPATIALE (Socata) Models TB 9, TB 10, TB 20, TB 21, and TB 200 airplanes. This AD requires you to repetitively inspect the aileron control gimbal joint for correct alignment and correct operation, and replace any misaligned or defective gimbal joint. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for France. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the aileron control gimbal joint. Such failure could lead to loss of control of the airplane.
2003-04-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Robinson Helicopter Company (RHC) Model R44 helicopters that requires inspecting the tail rotor pitch control assembly for roughness or binding of the pitch control bearings (bearings) by hand-rotating the pitch control bearing housing (housing). If the housing does not rotate freely, the AD requires replacing the unairworthy pitch control assembly with an airworthy unit. This amendment is prompted by reports of failure of the tail rotor pitch control assembly due to improperly lubricated bearings on the RHC Model R22 helicopters. Although there have been no reported failures on the RHC Model R44 helicopters, the design of the tail rotor pitch control assembly makes it susceptible to the same failures as have occurred on the Model R22 helicopters. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect corrosion of the bearings and to prevent bearing failure and subsequent loss of directional control of the helicopter.
52-18-01: 52-18-01 CURTISS-WRIGHT: Applies to all Model C-46 aircraft equipped with Curtiss Drawing P/N S20-480-1101-2 Carburetor Adapter Gasket. Compliance required not later than December 1, 1952. Several instances of splitting and tearing of the neoprene carburetor adapter gasket, P/N S20-480-1101-2, permitting portions of gasket material to block the carburetor air passage has resulted in abrupt engine cutout. To eliminate the occurrence of this hazardous condition, either of the following changes or an approved equivalent shall be accomplished: (a) Install new gasket and clamping assembly per USAF T.O. 01-25LA-79. (b) Install carburetor adapter flange, Slick Airways P/N 00391-2. As a precautionary measure, the subject gaskets shall be inspected for signs of looseness and splitting during each periodic inspection until accomplishment of the above.
98-04-19: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Harbin Aircraft Manufacturing Corporation (HMAC) Model Y12 IV airplanes. This action requires revising the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) to specify procedures that would prohibit flight in severe icing conditions (as determined by certain visual cues), limit or prohibit the use of various flight control devices while in severe icing conditions, and provide the flight crew with recognition cues for, and procedures for exiting from, severe icing conditions. This AD is prompted by the results of a review of the requirements for certification of these airplanes in icing conditions, new information on the icing environment, and icing data provided currently to the flight crew. The actions specified by this AD are intended to minimize the potential hazards associated with operating these airplanes in severe icing conditions by providing more clearly defined procedures and limitations associated with such conditions.