Results
2007-05-17: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for Pratt & Whitney (PW) JT9D series turbofan engines. That AD currently requires revisions to the Airworthiness Limitations Section (ALS) of the manufacturer's Instructions for Continued Airworthiness (ICA) to include required enhanced inspection of selected critical life-limited parts at each piece-part opportunity. This AD modifies the JT9D series engines ALS sections of the manufacturer's manuals and an air carrier's approved continuous airworthiness maintenance program to incorporate additional inspection requirements. This AD results from the need to require enhanced inspection of selected critical life- limited parts of JT9D series turbofan engines. We are issuing this AD to prevent critical life-limited rotating engine part failure, which could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the airplane.
2000-20-20: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes, that requires removal of existing inertial reference units (IRU) and installation of modified IRU's. This amendment is prompted by a report of the failure of the left and center IRU's on a single flight. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of multiple IRU's in flight, which could result in the loss of navigation data during flight. This could compromise the ability of the flight crew to maintain the safe flight and landing of the airplane.
53-07-01: 53-07-01\tde HAVILLAND: Applies to Model DHC-2 (Beaver) Aircraft, Serial Numbers 1 to 483 Inclusive. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tThere have been instances of the elevator outboard hinge becoming loose in its attachments to the horizontal stabilizer rib. Rivet holes have becomes enlarged permitting the fitting to "work". The de Havilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd., in agreement with the Canadian Department of Transport, issued the following mandatory instructions in which the FAA concurs: \n\n\tInspection intervals: 50 hours, pending incorporation of the repair scheme described below. \n\n\tRepair scheme: The repair scheme described herein is not mandatory until a defect appears. (See Fig. 1.) \n\n\n\n\n\n\tThe following parts are required: \n\n\nC2-TP-179ND\nHinge plate\n2 required\n\nC2-TP-181ND\nAngle\n2 required\n1 each \nCR 162-6-8\nCherry rivet\n10 required\nend of\nCR 162-6-10\nCherry rivet\n12 required\nT/P.\nCR 163-6-8\nCherry rivet\n6 required\n\n\n\tProcedure.1.\tRemove tailcone. \n\t2.\tRemove elevator. \n\t3.\tLocate extreme outboard elevator hinges on tailplane. \n\t4.\tDrill out 4 rivets retaining hinge plates. \n\n\tImportant: Do not drill out rivet at point A until angle C2-TP-181ND has been riveted. (See Fig. 1.) \n\n\t5.\tRemove small tab at outboard ends of rear spar on tailplane. \n\t6.\tDrill out 3 rivets at point B securing angle C2-TP-139. (Angle must still remain in position secured by 1 rivet at point A.) \n\t7.\tLocate new angle C2-TP-181ND on spar rear face and flush with outer skin of end rib. \n\t8.\tRivet angles C2-TP-139 and -181ND to spar as shown at point B. \n\t9.\tDrill out rivet at point A. \n\t10.\tMake or secure new hinge plate C2-TP-179ND and assemble as shown. \n\t11.\tAssemble studs to new hinge plates. \n\t12.\tReplace elevator and tailcone. \n\n\t(de Havilland Technical News Sheet Series B, No. 60, dated February 10, 1953, Subject "Tailplane - Elevator Outboard Hinge - Mod. 2/901" covers this same subject.)
2019-03-30: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. (Embraer) Model EMB-135ER, - 135KE, -135KL, and -135LR airplanes and Model EMB-145, -145ER, -145MR, -145LR, -145XR, -145MP, and -145EP airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of internal corrosion of the stow/transit switches installed in the engine thrust reversers. This AD requires installation of new stow/ transit switches. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
98-13-23: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A300-600 series airplanes, that requires inspections to detect corrosion and cracking of the lower horizontal stabilizer cutout longeron, the corner fitting, the skin strap, and the outer skin; and repair, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by cracking found at the lower corner of the horizontal stabilizer cutout longeron during a full scale fatigue test. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such cracking, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the horizontal-stabilizer cutout longeron.
2007-05-19: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Glasflugel Models H 301 "Libelle,'' H 301B "Libelle,'' Standard "Libelle,'' and Standard Libelle-201B sailplanes. This AD requires you to replace the rudder actuator arm (manufactured according to drawing No. 301-45-10) with an improved design rudder actuator arm (manufactured following drawing No. 301-45-13). This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct damage to the rudder actuator arm, which could result in failure of the rudder actuator arm. This failure could result in reduced or loss of rudder control.
2000-20-03 R1: This amendment revises an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Bombardier Model CL-600-2B19 series airplanes, that currently requires installation of shields for the aileron quadrants in the wheel bay of the main landing gear (MLG). This amendment revises the compliance time for the requirements of that AD. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent accumulation of water, ice, or slush on the aileron quadrants and control cable pulleys in the wheel bay of the MLG, which could freeze and result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2019-03-27: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Dassault Aviation Model Falcon 10 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that certain wing anti-ice outboard flexible hoses were found damaged, likely resulting from the installation process. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections of certain wing anti- ice outboard flexible hoses, and replacement of certain wing anti-ice outboard flexible hoses, as specified in an European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Emergency AD, which is incorporated by reference. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
74-10-13: 74-10-13 BOEING: Amendment 39-1845. Applies to all Model 707 and 720 airplanes having 6,000 hrs., or more, time in service, certificated in all categories. \n\tCompliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. \n\tTo prevent excessive non-recoverable internal hydraulic leakage in the auxiliary hydraulic system and the possible loss of aircraft direction control at critical air speeds, accomplish the following: \n\tPART I \n\t(a)\tPART I of this AD applies to airplanes which will be used for flight crew training. \n\t(b)\tPrior to further flight for crew training, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 hours time in service from the last inspection, the airplane auxiliary hydraulic system must be inspected and replaced or reworked, as necessary, in accordance with the following: \n\t\t(1)\tInspect for evidence of internal leakage per the information contained in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 3154 dated April 12, 1974, or later FAA approved revisions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 3154 or by an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\t\t(2)\tAirplanes with an auxiliary hydraulic system having internal leakage equal to or greater than 1.0 GPM but less than 3.0 GPM may not be used in training or revenue service but may only be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a maintenance base for replacement or rework, as necessary, of the defective auxiliary hydraulic system components. \n\t\t(3)\tAirplanes with an auxiliary hydraulic system having 3.0 GPM, or more, internal leakage must have the defective auxiliary hydraulic system components replaced or overhauled, as necessary, prior to further flight. \n\tPART II \n\t(a)\tPART II of this AD applies to airplanes which have not been inspected and reworked, as necessary, in accordance with Amendment 39-1753 (F. R. Doc. 73-25927), AD-73-25-2. \n\t(b)\tWithin 300 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 hours time in service from the last inspection, accomplish the following: \n\t\t(1)\tInspect for evidence of internal leakage and replace or rework, as necessary, per the information contained in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 3154 dated April 12, 1974, or later FAA approved revisions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 3154 or by an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\t\t(2)\tAirplanes with an auxiliary hydraulic system having internal leakage equal to or greater than 1.0 GPM but less than 3.0 GPM may not be used in revenue service but may only be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a maintenance base for replacement or rework, as necessary, of the defective auxiliary hydraulic components. \n\t\t(3)\tAirplanes with an auxiliary hydraulic system having 3.0 GPM, or more, internal leakage must have the defective auxiliary hydraulic system components replaced or overhauled, as necessary, prior to further flight. \n\tPART III \n\t(a)\tPART III of this AD applies to airplanes which have been inspected and reworked, as necessary, in accordance with Amendment 39-1753 (F. R. Doc. 73-25927), AD-73-25-2. \n\t(b)\tWithin 600 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 hours time in service from the last inspection, accomplish the following: \n\t\t(1)\tInspect for evidence of internal leakage and replace or rework, as necessary, per the information contained in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 3154 dated April 12, 1974, or later FAA approved revisions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 3154, or by an equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\t\t(2)\tAirplanes with an auxiliary hydraulic system having internal leakage equal to or greater than 1.0 GPM but less than 3.0 GPM, may not be used in revenue service but may only be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a maintenance base for replacement or rework, as necessary, of the defective auxiliary hydraulic system components. \n\t\t(3)\tAirplanes with an auxiliary hydraulic system having 3.0 GPM, or more, internal leakage must have the defective auxiliary hydraulic system components replaced or overhauled, as necessary, prior to further flight. \n\tFor the purpose of complying with the repetitive periodic inspection requirement of this AD, the 2,000 hours time in service may be adjusted by submitting substantiating technical data through the FAA assigned maintenance inspector for the approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, FAA, Northwest Region. \n\n\tThis AD Amendment 39-1845 supersedes AD 73-25-2. \n\tThis Amendment becomes effective May 14, 1974.
2007-04-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as possible installation of undersize rivets in the fuselage roof at STN 180.85, BL 19.67, WL 86.2. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-05-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: This AD is issued following a nose landing gear collapse during takeoff roll. Several expertises proved that the locking device of the Nose Landing Gear (NLG) actuator rod was on several F406 airplanes not conforming with the installation approved by the manufacturer. There were two different landing gear actuator designs installed on the Model F406 airplanes (Teijin Seiki and Cessna). The actuators used different locking devices to retain the spherical rod-end to the actuator rod. Use of the incorrect locking device could allow the spherical rod-end to disconnect from the actuator rod. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2019-03-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A318-111, -112, -121, and -122 airplanes; Model A319- 111, -112, -113, -114, -115, -131, -132, and -133 airplanes; and Model A320-211, -212, -214, -216, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of cracks that were found after improperly performed magnetic particle inspections of the main landing gear (MLG) sliding tubes were done. This AD requires repetitive general visual inspections of the affected MLG sliding tubes for cracks and replacement if necessary. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
97-01-02: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Model 525 airplanes. This action requires repetitively inspecting the main landing gear (MLG) trunnion pins for proper installation, and either immediately or eventually replacing the existing dry-film lubricated MLG trunnion slot bearings with sealed and self-lubricating bearings. This AD results from an incident where the left MLG collapsed during the landing roll even though the cockpit indications showed that the MLG was in the normal down and locked position. Loss of dry-film lubricant on the MLG trunnion bearings caused this incident. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent MLG collapse caused by trunnion bearing failure, which could result in loss of control of the airplane during landing operations.
81-19-02: 81-19-02 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON (BHT): Amendment 39-4208. Applies to all Model 204 and 205 series helicopters certified in all categories (Airworthiness Docket No. 81-ASW-40). To prevent possible failure of main rotor yoke Part Number 204-011-102 (all dash numbers), accomplish the following: a. Unless Bell Helicopter Textron Alert Service Bulletin No. 204-81-11 or 205-81-16, as applicable, has previously been complied with, within 10 days after the effective date of this Airworthiness Directive: (1) Create a component history card for yoke Part Number 204-011-102 (all dash numbers). (2) Record the operating time accumulated on the yoke. If the previous operating time cannot be determined, enter 2,400 hours. (3) Retire yokes with more than 3,300 hours' time on the compliance date of this AD prior to obtaining an additional 300 hours. (4) Retire yokes with less than 3,300 hours' time on the compliance date of the AD on or before attaining 3,600 hours. b. The 3,600-hour life shall continue in effect on all Part Number 204-011-102 yokes. c. Any equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Flight Standards Division, Southwest Region, Federal Aviation Administration. d. In accordance with FAR 21.197, flight is permitted to a base where the requirements of this AD may be accomplished. This amendment becomes effective September 30, 1981.
2007-05-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Fokker Model F.28 Mark 0070 and 0100 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting the carbon-fiber reinforced plastic main landing gear (MLG) door to determine whether certain part numbers are installed. For airplanes having certain doors, this AD requires inspecting the MLG outboard door for cracks, play, and loose sealant/bolts/nuts, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires, for airplanes having certain doors, modifying the rod bracket attachment of the MLG outboard door. This AD results from a report of a rod bracket of the MLG door detaching during flight. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in the rod bracket attachment bolts, which could result in the rod brackets detaching from the MLG door and blocking the proper functioning of the MLG.
2000-20-15: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Airbus Model A300 and A300-600 series airplanes, that requires a high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspection to detect cracking of the rear fittings of fuselage frame FR40 at stringer 27, and repetitive inspections or repair, as applicable. In lieu of accomplishing the repetitive inspections, this amendment requires a modification that would allow the inspection to be deferred for a certain period of time. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the rear fittings of fuselage frame FR40 at stringer 27, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane.
2019-03-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Gulfstream Aerospace LP Model Gulfstream G150 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of corrosion in the solder joints of the upper and lower front relay box connectors to the printed circuit board. This AD requires replacement of the existing relay boxes with modified boxes. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
77-13-08: 77-13-08 BEECH: Amendment 39-2933. Applies to Models 58P and 58PA (Serial Numbers TJ-2 thru TJ-117), 58TC and 58TCA (Serial Numbers TK-1 thru TK-63) airplanes certificated in all categories. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo assure structural integrity of the right and left truss tube assemblies in both the right and left engine nacelles, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA)\tOn Models 58P and 58PA (S/Ns TJ-2 thru TJ-99), 58TC and 58TCA (S/Ns TK-1 thru TK-54) airplanes that do not have Beech Kit No. 102-9001-1S installed, prior to the next flight (unless previously accomplished in accordance with Beechcraft mailgram dated February 17, 1977) and at each 50 hours' time in service interval thereafter, until Beech Kit No. 102-9001- 1S is installed: \n\n\t\t1.\tPursuant to Beechcraft Service Instructions No. 0903 or later approved revisions accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tReferring to Figure 1 of this AD dye penetrant inspect the right truss tubeassembly in both right and left engine nacelles for cracks which initiate from the two rivet holes attaching the turbocharger air intercooler mounting brackets; and \n\n\t\t\tb.\tReplace any cracked right truss tube assembly prior to the next flight. \n\n\t\t2.\tPursuant to Beechcraft Service Instructions No. 0903 or later approved revisions accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tReferring to Figure 1 of this AD visually inspect the left truss tube assembly in both right and left engine nacelles for chafing: \n\n\t\t\tb.\tDye penetrant said part for cracks; and \n\n\t\t\tc.\tReplace any cracked left truss tube assembly and repair or replace any chafed left truss tube assembly prior to the next flight. \n\n\tB)\tOn Models and serial numbers listed in Paragraph A of this AD that have Beech Kit No. 102-9001-1S installed and on Models 58P and 58PA (S/Ns TJ-100 thru TJ-117), 58TC and 58TCA (S/Ns TK-55 thru TK-63) airplanes, within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, or within 100 hours' time in service after the last similar inspection accomplished in accordance with Beechcraft Service Instructions No. 0903, whichever occurs first, and at each 100 hours' time in service interval thereafter: \n\n\t\t1.\tPursuant to Beechcraft Service Instructions No. 0903 or later approved revisions: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tRemove cowlings from right and left engines; \n\n\t\t\tb.\tReferring to Figure 1 of this AD visually inspect the right and left truss tube assemblies in both right and left nacelles for cracks, chafing or other signs of structural weakening. Dye penetrant inspect right and left truss tube assemblies for cracks if chafing or other signs of structural weakening are detected by the visual inspection. \n\n\t\t\tc.\tReplace any cracked truss tube assembly prior to the next flight. \n\n\tC)\tWhen Beech P/Ns 102-910026-113 and -115 truss tube assemblies which have .072 inch thick walls are installed in the right and left engine nacelles the requirements of this AD no longer apply. Truss tube assemblies used prior to these improved assemblies had .035 inch thick walls. \n\n\tNOTE: The manufacturer has advised that the P/N 102-910026-113 and -115 truss tube assemblies will not be available until approximately September 1, 1977. \n\n\tD)\tThe intervals for repetitive inspections set forth in this AD may be adjusted up as much as 10% where required to fit user's maintenance cycles. No adjustment is allowed for the initial "prior to the next flight" inspection. \n\n\tE)\tAircraft may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where this AD can be accomplished, after coordination with the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. \n\n\tF)\tAny equivalent method of compliance with this AD must be approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective July 1, 1977, to all persons except those to whom it has already been made effective by air mail letter from the FAA dated June 7, 1977.
95-24-13: This action makes a correction to Airworthiness Directive (AD) 95-24-13 concerning Jetstream Aircraft Limited (JAL) HP137 Mk1, Jetstream Series 200, and Jetstream Models 3101 and 3201 airplanes, which published in the Federal Register on December 22, 1995 (60 FR 246). That publication incorrectly references the number of aileron mounting spigot nut assemblies to be replaced on the wings of the airplanes. The AD currently requires "replacing the securing nut assemblies and split pins with new special nut assemblies (Part No. SL5022 (Qty. 2))". The intent of the AD is to require replacement of 2 special aileron mounting spigot nut assemblies on each wing, for a total of 4 nut assemblies. The Final Rule AD did not specify "each wing", and mentioned that only 2 nut assemblies are required, instead of 4 nut assemblies. This action corrects the AD to reflect this change.
2007-05-14: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for GE CF6-80C2 series turbofan engines. This AD requires replacing certain installed part number (P/N) and serial number (SN) cast titanium weld- repaired forward engine mount platforms and cast titanium forward mount yokes, with a forged titanium or a non-welded cast titanium part. This AD results from the discovery of cracks, in a weld-repaired area on a forward engine mount platform and a forward engine mount yoke, found during a fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI). These parts were weld- repaired during manufacture. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracks in the forward engine mount platform and forward engine mount yoke that could result in possible separation of the engine from the airplane.
2007-05-04: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Mooney Airplane Company, Inc., Models M20M and M20R airplanes. This AD requires you to remove the upper left and upper right engine mount attaching hardware, cut out and remove the upholstery and insulation between the fuselage tubular frame and the firewall, and replace the upper left and upper right engine mount attaching hardware with the new parts kit. This AD results from failure of the engine mount attaching hardware to maintain torque as a result of firewall insulation and upholstery being compressed between the fuselage tubular frame and the firewall at the upper left and upper right engine mount attach points. We are issuing this AD to prevent the upper right and upper left engine mounting hardware from losing torque, which could result in a reduction in engine mount load carrying capability and could lead to engine mount failure.
2019-03-17: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A318 series airplanes; Model A319 series airplanes; Model A320 series airplanes; and Model A321 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a revision of an airworthiness limitation item (ALI) document, which requires more restrictive maintenance requirements and airworthiness limitations. This AD requires revising the operator's maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new maintenance requirements and airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-05-11: The FAA is superseding two existing airworthiness directives (ADs), that apply to certain Bombardier Model CL-600-2B16 (CL-604) airplanes and Model CL-600-2B19 (Regional Jet Series 100 & 440) airplanes. These models may be referred to by their marketing designations as RJ100, RJ200, RJ440, CRJ100, CRJ200, CRJ440, and CL-65. One existing AD requires replacing the horizontal stabilizer trim control unit (HSTCU) with a new HSTCU. The other existing AD requires revising the airplane flight manual (AFM) to advise the flightcrew of procedures to follow in the event of stabilizer trim runaway, and in the event of MACH TRIM, STAB TRIM, and horizontal stabilizer trim malfunctions; and revising the AFM to require a review of the location of certain circuit breakers. That AD also requires doing a functional check of the stabilizer trim system and installing circuit breaker identification collars, and provides an optional terminating action. This new AD requires the previously optional terminating action and requires further revisions to the AFM. This AD also requires the removal of certain AFM revisions. This AD results from reports of trim problems including uncommanded trim, trim in the opposite direction to that selected, loss of trim position indication and, in one case, potential loss of trim disconnect capability. We are issuing this AD to prevent these events, which could result in conditions that vary from reduced controllability of the airplane to loss of control of the airplane.
2007-05-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as follows: On 23 November 2006, Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2006- 0351-E was published requiring an inspection to be performed on C- 212 aeroplanes having been used for Maritime Patrol or other similar low altitude operations, due to the fact that, after initial examination of the evidences of a recent C-212 Maritime Patrol aircraft accident, cracks had been found in the centre wing lower skin at STA Y=1030. At the time of the accident, the aircraft had accumulated 17,000 flight hours and 7,300 flight cycles. The cracks were suspected to be caused by fatigue. After a more detailed examination in the laboratory, it has been determined that the initiation of the cracks was produced by fretting. * * * * * The above mentioned cracks, if not timely detected, could lead to reduced structural integrity of the aircraft. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition.
99-15-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all The New Piper Aircraft, Inc. (Piper) Models PA-46-310P and PA-46-350P airplanes. This AD requires calibrating the turbine inlet temperature system to assure the accuracy of the existing turbine inlet temperature indicator and wiring for all of the applicable airplanes, and repairing or replacing any turbine inlet temperature system that fails the calibration test. This AD also requires repetitively replacing the turbine inlet temperature probe on the Model PA-46-350P airplanes, and inserting a copy of this AD into the Pilot s Operating Handbook of certain airplanes. This AD is the result of field reports that indicate service accuracy problems with the existing turbine inlet temperature system. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent improper engine operation caused by improperly calibrated turbine inlet temperature indicators or defective turbine inlet temperature probes, whichcould result in engine damage/failure with consequent loss of control of the airplane.