Results
2003-19-13: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all GROB-WERKE (GROB) Model G120A airplanes. This AD requires you to modify the flight control system operating levers. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of a ball bearing in the flight control system operating levers. Such failure could lead to reduced control or loss of control of the airplane.
89-18-11: 89-18-11 LOCKHEED AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS COMPANY: Amendment 39-6303. (Docket No. 89-NM-33-AD) Applicability: Lockheed Model L-1011-385-1, L-1011-385-1-14, L-1011-385-1-15, and L-1011-385-3 series airplanes, as listed in Lockheed TriStar L-1011 Service Bulletin 093-49-062, dated September 19, 1988, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent a fire from arcing due to loose APU starter ground cables falling off the ground studs and onto the APU fuel shutoff valves, accomplish the following: A. Within 6 months after the effective date of this airworthiness directive (AD), inspect the APU starter ground stud/bracket for proper installation and proper ground stud torque, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Lockheed TriStar Service Bulletin 093-49- 062, dated September 19, 1988. Any discrepancies identified must be corrected prior to further flight, in accordance with the service bulletin. B. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company, P.O. Box 551, Burbank, California 91520, Attention: Commercial Order Administration, Dept. 65-33, Unit 20, Plant A-1. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California. This amendment (39-6303, AD 89-18-11) becomes effective on September 25, 1989.
2020-15-21: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A330-200, -200 Freighter, and -300 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that certain inspection procedures specified an incorrect inspection area. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections of a certain stringer location, and applicable corrective actions if necessary, as specified in European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2019-0315, dated December 23, 2019, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2020-15-18: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Leonardo S.p.A. (Leonardo) Model AB139, AW139, AW169, and AW189 helicopters. This AD was prompted by reports of uncommanded deployment of the emergency flotation system (EFS) due to improper accomplishment of the reset procedure of the shape memory alloy (SMA) inflation system actuation device. This AD requires removal of affected SMA inflation systems and installation of serviceable SMA inflation systems. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
60-05-02: 60-05-02 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 110 Part 507 Federal Register March 4, 1960. Applies to All Models 1049C, D, E, G and H Airplanes. Compliance required by August 1, 1961, for items (a)(1) or (a)(2); July 1, 1961, for item (a)(3); and by September 30, 1960, for item (b). An accident occurred in which fire originating in the engine section burned underneath the nacelle and entered the wheel well area rupturing flammable fluid lines and causing extensive damage. An incident also occurred in which fire originating in the power section blistered the paint on the landing gear wheel well doors. An examination of the burn pattern on the landing gear doors indicated that the circumstances surrounding this incident were quite similar to those of the accident but with less severity due to the lower exposure time. To correct fire protection deficiencies in the wheel well area, the following modifications are considered necessary: (a) To prevent fire from entering the wheel well area, accomplish one of the following: (1) Replace the present aluminum skin on the forward landing gear doors with fireproof material. (2) Cover the present aluminum skin on the forward landing gear doors with fireproof material. (3) Coat both inside and outside of the present aluminum skin on the forward landing gear doors with a material that will withstand a flame of 2,000 degrees F. for 15 minutes. Product Techniques Inc. Coating PT-209, 0.015-inch thick on each side of the door is considered satisfactory when applied in accordance with PTI Process Specifications PTP 40-22. (b) Install fire sleeves over all flammable fluid-carrying flexible hose lines in zones 3 and 3A in the inboard engine nacelles. Revised May 4, 1960. Revised July 29, 1960. Revised September 10, 1960.
2020-18-08: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-12-18 for Robinson Helicopter Company (Robinson) Model R44 II helicopters. AD 2019-12-18 required inspecting certain engine air induction hoses (hoses) and replacing any hose that was not airworthy. AD 2019-12-18 also prohibited the installation of certain hoses. This AD continues to require inspecting those previously affected hoses and amends the applicability, clarifies an inspection requirement, adds a requirement to repeat the inspection, and expands the installation prohibition. This AD was prompted by an additional report of separation between the outer and inner hose layers. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-19-11: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Learjet Model 60 airplanes, that currently requires inspection to detect bends in or damage to the fuel crossflow tube; inspection to determine clearance between the fuel crossflow tube and the flight control cables; and replacement or repair of the tube, if necessary. This amendment requires a review of airplane maintenance records or an inspection to determine if a fuel crossflow tube having a certain part number is installed; and follow-on/corrective actions, as applicable. This amendment also expands the applicability of the existing AD to include additional airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent chafing and consequent failure of the fuel crossflow tube due to inadequate clearance between the tube and the flight control cables, which could result in loss of fuel from one fuel tank during normal operating conditions or loss of fuel from both main fuel tanksduring fuel cross-feeding operations. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
83-12-04: 83-12-04 PARTENAVIA S.p.A.: Amendment 39-4666. Applies to Models P68, P68B, P68C, P68C-TC, and P68 Observer (Serial Numbers 1 through 277) airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of the flap bellcrank attachment mounting brackets, accomplish the following: a) Within the next 100 hours time-in-service from the effective date of this AD, or upon the accumulation of 500 hours time-in-service, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 100 hours time-in-service from the last inspection, visually inspect the flap bellcrank attachment mounting brackets (P/N 68-1.5035-1 and 68-1.5035-2) on both wings as described in Partenavia Service Bulletin (SB) No. 56, dated October 7, 1982 (herein referred to as the SB). Inspect for cracks in the area surrounding the pivot bolt hole by looking through the inspection door on the inboard side of the engine nacelles and by using a mirror to look at the upper bracket. b) If any cracks are found, prior to further flight stop drill the crack and install reinforcement kit (P/N 025) in accordance with Drawing R-0059 of the SB. c) Within the next 100 hours time-in-service from the effective date of this AD or upon accumulating 1,000 hours time-in-service whichever occurs later unless already accomplished per paragraph b) of this AD, install the reinforcement kit (P/N 025) in accordance with Drawing R-0059 of the SB. d) The repetitive inspections of paragraph a) of this AD are no longer required when the reinforcement kit (P/N 025) is installed. e) The intervals between the repetitive inspections required by this AD may be adjusted up to 10 percent of the specified interval to allow accomplishing these inspections concurrent with other scheduled maintenance of the airplane. f) Aircraft may be flown in accordance with Federal Aviation Regulation 21.197 to a location where this AD can be accomplished. g) An equivalent method of compliance with this AD, if used, must be approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, Europe, Africa and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, 1000 Brussels, Belgium. This amendment becomes effective on June 23, 1983.
2020-17-04: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-03- 06, which applied to certain The Boeing Company Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. AD 2019-03-06 required installing lanyard assemblies on the passenger service units (PSUs) and, for certain airplanes, on the life vest panels. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that the PSUs became separated from their attachments during several survivable accident sequences, and by the determination that additional actions are necessary for five airplanes. This AD retains the requirements of AD 2019-03-06 and also requires installation of lanyard assemblies on the life vest panels on those five airplanes. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
83-03-05: 83-03-05 BRITTEN-NORMAN LTD: Amendment 39-4565. Applies to Model BN-2A MK III Trislander (all serial numbers) airplanes certificated in any category. COMPLIANCE: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent the main undercarriage shock absorber support ring from separating from the inside of the undercarriage extension tube, accomplish the following: a) Within the next 50 landings on airplanes which have accumulated 3,000 landings or more on the effective date of this AD, or prior to the accumulation of 3,050 landings on airplanes that have less than 3,000 landings on the effective date of this AD, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,000 landings: 1) Visually inspect the rivets retaining the main undercarriage shock absorber internal support ring to the main undercarriage leg extension tube in accordance with Steps 1 through 4 of the "Inspection" Section of Britten-Norman Service Bulletin BN-2/SB.139, Issue 1, dated January 29, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Service Bulletin). 2) If one or more loose rivets are found during the above inspection, before further flight, replace all three rivets in accordance with Steps 1 through 3 of the "Rectification" Section of the Service Bulletin. b) Within the next 50 landings on airplanes which have accumulated 15,000 landings or more on the effective date of this AD or prior to the accumulation of 15,050 landings on airplanes which have less than 15,000 landings on the effective date of this AD, replace all three rivets in accordance with Steps 1 through 3 of the "Rectification" Section of the Service Bulletin. c) In the event that landings have not been recorded, 1,000 hours time-in-service may be used in place of 3,000 landings for purposes of complying with this AD. d) The airplane may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished. e) An equivalent means of compliance with this AD may be used if approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Staff, AEU-100, Europe, Africa, and Middle East Office, FAA, c/o American Embassy, Brussels, Belgium. This amendment becomes effective on February 22, 1983.