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2011-25-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Quest Aircraft Design, LLC (Quest) Model Kodiak 100 airplanes. This AD requires you to inspect the torque of the inertial particle separator (IPS) bolts; correct the torque, if necessary; replace the IPS bolts with new IPS bolts within a certain time; and install safety wire around the new IPS bolts. This AD was prompted by five instances where a loose IPS bolt was found on the right-hand side of the engine bypass door attachment. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to an inoperable bypass door, which could result in engine inlet icing with consequent loss of engine power and forced landing. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-10-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all Boeing Model 777 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive testing of the engine fire shutoff switch (EFSS) to determine that the override mechanism and the switch handle are operational, and replacement of the EFSS, if necessary. This action also requires, for certain airplanes, installation of a collar on a specific circuit breaker of the standby power management panel, and installation of placards to advise the flightcrew that the override mechanism must be pushed in order to pull the fire switch. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that a solenoid and an override mechanism of the EFSS were not operational due to overheating of the solenoid. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent damage to the EFSS solenoid and to the override mechanism, and consequent failure of the EFSS due to overheating of the solenoid; such failure of the EFSS could result in the inability of the flightcrew to discharge the fire extinguishing agent in the event of an engine fire.
93-05-20: 93-05-20 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8524. Docket 92-NM-169-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model MD-11 series airplanes equipped with Pratt & Whitney Model PW4460 engines; having airplane serial numbers 48407 through 48410 inclusive, 48443 through 48448 inclusive, 48452 through 48457 inclusive, 48461, 48472 through 48475 inclusive, 48484, 48485, 48495, and 48496; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent loss of a hydraulic system, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 60 days after the effective date of this AD, modify the wiring to the engine-driven hydraulic pump overtemperature switches, in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Service Bulletin 29-16, dated August 6, 1992. \n\n\t(b)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, TransportAirplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(d)\tThe modification shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Service Bulletin 29-16, dated August 6, 1992. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90846-1771, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Publications - Technical Administrative Support, C1-L5B. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(e)\tThis amendment becomes effective on April 30, 1993.
92-14-02: 92-14-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-8284. Docket No. 91-NM-226-AD.\n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes operated as freighters, certificated in any category.\n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.\n\n\tTo prevent damaged or unusable life rafts due to improper mooring line and inflation length on life rafts, accomplish the following:\n\n\t(a)\tWithin 12 months after the effective date of this AD, inspect the life raft mooring line and inflation length. The mooring line length is measured from attachment fitting on the end of the mooring line to the connecting point on the raft. The mooring line must be no less than 39 feet long and no more than 44 feet long. The inflation length is the distance the life raft must be from its mooring line attachment point for inflation of the life raft to be initiated. Inflation should begin at not less than 33 feet and not more than 38 feet, as defined by the mooring line length.\n\n\t\t(1)\tFor life rafts with mooring line length and inflation length that meet the measurements specified in paragraph (a) of this AD, no additional action is required.\n\n\t\t(2)\tFor life rafts with mooring line length and inflation length that do not meet the measurements specified in paragraph (a) of this AD, accomplish the following prior to further flight:\n\n\t\t\t(i)\tFor life rafts listed in Air Cruisers Service Bulletin 35-25-3, dated October 22, 1990: Modify the life raft in accordance with that service bulletin.\n\n\t\t\t(ii)\tFor life rafts listed in Air Cruisers Service Bulletin 35-25-2, dated October 30, 1990: Modify the life raft in accordance with that service bulletin.\n\n\t\t\t(iii)\tFor all other life rafts: Modify the life raft in accordance with BFGoodrich Alert Service Bulletin No. 100102-25A-244, dated December 13, 1991, or Eastern Aero Marine Service Bulletin T9-25-1, dated January 31, 1992, as applicable; or in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.\n\n\t(b)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO.\n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO.\n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.\n\n\t(d)\tThe modifications shall be done in accordance with Air Cruisers Service Bulletin 35-25-3, dated October 22, 1990; Air Cruisers Service Bulletin 35-25-2, dated October 30, 1990; BFGoodrich Alert Service Bulletin No. 100102-25A-244, dated December 13, 1991; or Eastern Aero Marine Service Bulletin T9-25-1, dated January 31, 1992; as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124; Air Cruisers Company P.O. Box 180, Belmar, New Jersey 07719-0180; or BFGoodrich Aerospace, Aircraft Evaluations Systems, 3414 South 5th Street, Phoenix, Arizona 85040; or Eastern Aero Marine, P.O. Box 593513, Miami, Florida 33159. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, DC.\n\n\t(e)\tThis amendment becomes effective on August 18, 1992.
79-24-01 R3: 79-24-01 R3 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-3618 as amended by Amendment 39-3741 and 39-3841 is further amended by Amendment 39-4191. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9 series airplanes, certificated in all categories, equipped with the non-ventral door aft pressure bulkhead P/N 5910163, and with more than 10,000 landings. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tTo detect fatigue cracks and prevent failure of the aft pressure bulkhead, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tFor aircraft not previously modified or repaired in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Service Bulletin 53-127 dated May 25, 1976, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t(1)\tWithin 10 landings after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished in accordance with telegraphic AD T79WE13 dated September 18, 1979 or telegraphic AD T79WE15 dated September 28, 1979, conduct an initial visual inspection per Step 1, Figure 1, of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-127, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1979. The visual inspection shall encompass the entire periphery of the emergency exit doorjamb structure. \n\n\t\t(2)\tWithin 100 landings after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished in accordance with telegraphic AD T79WE15 dated September 28, 1979, conduct both visual and X-ray inspections per Steps 3 through 10, Figure 1, of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-127, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1979. The visual portion of the inspection shall encompass the entire periphery of the doorjamb structure. \n\n\t\t(3)\tWithin 250 landings of the inspection required by paragraph (a)(2) of this AD and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 250 landings, conduct a visual inspection per Step 1, Figure 1, of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-127, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1979. The visual inspection shall encompass the entire periphery of the emergency exit doorjamb structure. \n\n\t\t(4)\tWithin 1,000 landings from the inspection required by paragraph (a)(2) and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 1,000 landings, conduct X-ray inspections per Steps 8 through 10 and a visual inspection per Step 1, Figure 1, of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-127, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1979. The visual inspection shall encompass the entire periphery of the emergency exit doorjamb structure. \n\n\t(b)\tFor aircraft previously modified or repaired per McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Service Bulletin 53-127 dated May 25, 1976, accomplish the following: \n\n\t\t(1)\tWithin 100 landings after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished subsequent to September 25, 1979, conduct X-ray inspections per Steps 8 through 10, Figure 1, of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-127, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1979, and a visual inspection of the entire periphery of the emergency exit doorjamb structure. \n\n\t\t(2)\tWithin 2,000 landings after inspection per paragraph (b)(1) of this AD and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings, conduct X-ray inspections of the jamb structure per Steps 8 through 10, Figure 1, of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-127, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1979, and a visual inspection of the entire periphery of the emergency exit doorjamb structure. \n\n\t(c)\tIf cracks are found during any of the inspections required by this AD, repair before further flight in accordance with the following: \n\n\t\t(1)\tFor cracks which are limited to the emergency exit doorjamb, repair as shown for Condition 2, Figure 2, of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-127, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1979. \n\n\t\t(2)\tFor cracks which extend through the emergency exit doorjamb and into the pressure bulkhead web, repair as shown for Condition 3, Figure 3, of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-127, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1979. \n\n\t\t(3)\tFor cracks for which no repair is prescribed in McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-127, Revision 1, dated September 26, 1979, repair in accordance with data approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(d)\tWithin 24 hours after the initial inspections per paragraph (a)(2) and paragraph (b)(1), report the results of the initial inspections by Telex to the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. Include in the reporting information the date and condition of modification or repair per DC-9 Service Bulletin 53-127 or A53-127, McDonnell Douglas fuselage number, factory serial number, and registration number. \n\n\t(e)\tWithin the next 500 landings after April 14, 1980 or at the next inspection required by paragraph (a)(4) or (b)(2), whichever occurs first, visually inspect the auxiliary emergency exit door jamb for repairs in accordance with paragraph (2)(C) of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A53-146, dated March 14, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as SB A53-146). Repairs not in accordance withSB A53-146 are to be modified as follows: \n\n\t\t(1)\tFor repairs to cracks which extend radially outboard, prior to further flight the repair must conform to the configuration defined by paragraph (2)(C) Condition III Type 3 of SB A53-146. \n\n\t\t(2)\tFor repairs to cracks which extend radially inboard, within the next 500 landings the repair must conform to the configuration defined by paragraph (2)(C) Condition III Type 2 of SB A53-146. \n\n\t\t(3)\tFor repairs to circumferentially oriented cracks, within the next 1,000 landings, the repair must conform to the configuration defined by paragraph (2)(C) Condition III Type 1 of SB A53-146. \n\n\t(f)\tIf a new replacement door jamb, P/N 5910163-9 or -255 is installed, within 10,000 landings after installation of the new door jamb, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 2,000 landings, inspect the door jamb in accordance with paragraph (b)(2). \n\n\t(g)\tAlternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(h)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplanes unpressurized to a base where the inspections or crack repair can be performed. \n\n\t(i)\tFor the purposes of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the DC-9 airplane. \n\n\t(j)\tThe inspections and modifications required by this AD need not be accomplished if, after the effective date of this AD, the aircraft is operated without cabin pressurization and a placard is installed in the cockpit, in full view of the pilots, stating: \n\n\t\t"Operation with Cabin Pressurization is Prohibited." \n\n\t(k)\tThe installation of a J060116-11 Jamb Assembly in accordance with McDonnell DouglasDC-9 Service Bulletin 53-145, Revision No. 1, dated January 29, 1981, or later revisions approved by the Chief, Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, Northwest Region, constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by paragraphs (a)(3), (a)(4) and (b)(2) of this AD. \n\n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). \n\n\tThese documents also may be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108 or Los Angeles Area Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California 90808. \n\n\tAmendment 39-3618 became effective December 24, 1979 and was effective upon receipt for all recipients of telegraphic AD T79WE13 dated September 18, 1979 and telegraphic AD T79WE15 dated September 28, 1979. \n\n\tAmendment 39-3741 became effective April 14, 1980. \n\n\tAmendment 39-3841 became effective July 17, 1980. \n\n\tThis Amendment 39-4191 becomes effective August 27, 1981.
91-09-06: 91-09-06 BOEING: Amendment 39-6977. Docket No. 90-NM-216-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 727 series airplanes equipped with forward and/or aft auxiliary fuel tank listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-28A0067, Revision 1, dated July 5, 1990, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo eliminate the potential for a fire due to rupture of the auxiliary fuel tanks, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 18 months after the effective date of this AD, accomplish either subparagraph A.1. or A.2., below: \n\n\t\t1.\tInstall a check valve and a pressure actuated shutoff valve in the center wing tank in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 727-28A0067, Revision 1, dated July 5, 1990. \n\n\t\t2.\tDeactivate the auxiliary fuel system and insert a placard in the cockpit to indicate that the auxiliary fuel tank is inoperative, in accordance with Boeing Service Alert Bulletin727-28A0067, Revision 1, dated July 5, 1990. \n\n\tB.\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.\n \n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6977, 91-09-06) becomes effective on May 28, 1991.
90-03-18: 90-03-18 BOEING: Amendment 39-6498. Docket No. 88-NM-158-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 727 and 737 series airplanes, not equipped with a system incorporating Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) logic for activation of the takeoff warning system, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required within the next 30 months following the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent the occurrence of takeoff configuration nuisance warnings when taxi operations are conducted with the flaps intentionally retracted, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA. For Boeing Model 727 series airplanes with Auto-Speedbrakes operative: Modify the logic which enables the Takeoff Configuration Warning Systems (TOCWS) in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 727- 31-29, January 26, 1979; 727-31-33, dated November 26, 1980; 727-31-35, dated January 26, 1979; or 727-31- 36, dated January 26, 1979, as appropriate. \n\n\tB. For Boeing Model 727 series airplanes not equipped with Auto-Speedbrakes or with the Auto-Speedbrakes deactivated: \n\n\t1. Modify the logic which enables the Takeoff Configuration Warning Systems (TOCWS) in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 727-31-29, January 26, 1979; 727-31-33, dated November 26, 1980; 727- 31-35, dated January 26, 1979; or 727-31-36, dated January 26, 1979, as appropriate; or \n\n\t2. Adjust the takeoff warning thrust lever actuated switches to operate at 19.5 degrees from the idle stop for takeoff configuration warning system arming in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 727-31-30, dated November 11, 1977. Install a circuit breaker guard (cover) on the TOCWS circuit breaker, and safety wire the guard. Operation of the airplane must be in accordance with the Limitations of the Takeoff Configuration Warning System specified in Appendix 39 or 51 (as appropriate) of the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). \n\n\tC. For Boeing Model 737 series airplanes: Modify the logic which enables the TOCWS in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-31-1033, Revision 1, dated January 14, 1983. \n\n\tD. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tE. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6498, AD 90-03-18) becomes effective on March 7, 1990.
69-12-06: 69-12-06\tBOEING: Amdt. 39-780 applies to Boeing Model 737-100, 737-200, and 737- 200C Series Airplanes. \n\tCompliance required as indicated, unless already accomplished. \n\tTo detect cracking in the lugs of the aileron tab mast fittings and flanges of the aileron tab hinge fittings of Boeing Model 737 Series airplanes, and provide for the installation of parts to correct this condition, accomplish the following, or an equivalent inspection procedure and parts installation approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\t(a)\tWithin 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, visually inspect the aileron tab mast fittings for cracks in the lugs and for an excessive gap between the fitting lugs and the tab control rod ends in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin No. 57-1040, dated May 26, 1969, (hereinafter referred to as Boeing ASB 57-1040) or later FAA approved revisions. \n\tNOTE: Designated 737 Series aircraft listed in Group II, Boeing ASB 57-1040, delivered after April 15, 1969, have had the gaps shimmed and nuts torqued by the manufacturer and may therefore be inspected within the time intervals listed in Step (4). \n\t\t(1)\tIf cracks are found, replace the mast fitting with a new part in accordance with Boeing ASB 57-1040 (or later FAA approved revision) before further flight. \n\t\t(2)\tIf no cracks are found, measure gap between mast fitting lugs and tab control rod end fitting, shim, and torque nut in accordance with instructions and limits specified in Boeing ASB 57-1040, or later FAA approved revisions. \n\t\t(3)\tIf gaps between the fitting lugs and the tab control rod ends exceed those limits specified in Boeing ASB No. 57-1040, or later FAA approved revision, perform either (A) or (B) as follows: \n\t\t\t(A)\tShim the gaps and torque the nuts to the limits specified in the Alert Service Bulletin. \n\t\t\t(B)\tRepeat the visual inspection for cracks at intervals not to exceed 25 hours' time in service, per (a)(1)and (a)(2), above. \n\t\t(4)\tAfter the mast fittings have been properly gapped, shimmed and nuts torqued, per (a)(2) and (a)(3) above, inspect for cracks at intervals not to exceed 160 hours time in service until at least two inspections have been accomplished, or the part has accumulated an additional 280 hours' time in service, whichever occurs later, and, thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 600 hours' time in service. \n\t\t(5)\tInspection requirements under (a) of this AD may be terminated when: (A) the magnesium mast fittings are replaced with aluminum mast fittings per Boeing ASB No. 57-1040, (FAA approved revision to be issued); and (B) the tab control rods are replaced with adjustable tab control rods, Boeing P/N 69-60081-1, installed per instructions in Boeing Service Bulletin 27- 1025, dated April 30, 1969, or later FAA approved revisions. \n\t(b)\tWithin 160 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, visually inspect the aileron tab hinge fitting flanges for cracks. \n\t\t(1)\tIf cracks are found, replace hinge fitting with a new Boeing P/N 6937805-6 before further flight. \n\t\t(2)\tIf no cracks are found, repeat inspection for cracks at intervals not to exceed 600 hours' time in service. \n\t\tNOTE: Designated 737 Series Aircraft listed in Group II, Boeing ASB 57-1040, delivered after April 15, 1969, have had the inspection of (b) performed by the manufacturer and may therefore be inspected at intervals not exceeding 600 hours' time in service. \n\t\t(3)\tInspection requirements under (b) of this AD may be terminated when magnesium tab hinge fittings are replaced with an aluminum tab hinge fitting per Boeing ASB 57-1040, (FAA approved revision to be issued). \n\t(c)\tUpon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for thatoperator. \n\t(d)\tAirplanes having cracked parts which require replacing under this AD may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 with the concurrence of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, to a base where the replacement of parts can be accomplished. \n\tThis amendment becomes effective on 18 June 1969.
97-09-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Raytheon Model DH 125-1A, -3A, and -400A series airplanes, that requires a one-time inspection to detect scoring of the upper fuselage skin around the periphery of the cockpit canopy blister interface, and repair, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports indicating that scoring of the upper fuselage skin had been detected in that area. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct scoring of the upper fuselage skin around the periphery of the cockpit canopy blister interface, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the fuselage, and consequent cabin depressurization.
2011-24-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Bombardier, Inc. Model DHC-8-201 and -202 airplanes with FAA Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) ST00753NY (Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) STC SA97-106) installed. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: It has been determined that modifications by DECA Aviation Engineering Limited on Bombardier Inc. DHC-8 Series * * * 200 aeroplanes with their Cargo Conversion and Abrasion Protection Systems, Supplemental Type Certificates (STCs) * * * SA97-106, provide inadequate fire protection and decompression venting means. This can lead to an uncontrolled cargo fire and structural damage. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
93-07-09: 93-07-09 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8541. Docket 92-NM-129-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: All Model DC-10-10, -10F, -15, -30, -30F, -40 and -40F series airplanes; and KC-10A (military) airplanes; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent failure of the fuselage station Y=595.000 pressure bulkhead, which could reduce the structural integrity of the airplane, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tUnless accomplished within the last 4,350 landings prior to the effective date of this AD: Prior to the accumulation of 10,000 total landings, or within 1,000 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later; conduct a visual and eddy current inspection of the fuselage station Y=595.000 pressure bulkhead web and conduct an eddy current inspection of the fuselage station Y=595.000 pressure bulkhead tee cap, PSE 53.10.037 (left side) and 53.10.038 (right side), in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A53-158, dated May 29, 1992, or Revision 1, dated January 22, 1993. \n\n\t\t(1)\tIf any crack is detected that is within the limits specified in either service bulletin, prior to further flight, repair the crack in accordance with that service bulletin. After repair, repeat the inspections at intervals not to exceed 4,350 landings, in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIf any crack is detected that exceeds the limits specified in either service bulletin, prior to further flight, repair the crack in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\t\t(3)\tIf no cracking is detected, repeat the inspections at intervals not to exceed 4,350 landings. \n\n\tNOTE: The McDonnell Douglas service bulletins specified in this paragraph include references to inspection procedures contained in McDonnell Douglas Report No. L26-012, "DC-10 Supplemental Inspection Document (SID)," dated May 1990. \n\n\t(b)\tCompliance with the inspection and repair requirements of paragraph (a) of this AD are considered to constitute compliance with the inspection, repair, and reporting requirements of paragraphs (b) and (c) of AD 92-02-08, Amendment 39-8144, for Principal Structural Element (PSE) numbers 53.10.037 and 53.10.038. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles ACO, FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tThe inspections and repairs shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A53-158, dated May 29, 1992; or McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A53-158, Revision 1, dated January 22, 1993. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, P.O. Box 1771, Long Beach, California 90846-1771, Attention: Business Unit Manager, Technical Publications - Technical Administrative Support, C1-L5B. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Los Angeles ACO, 3229 E. Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC.(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on June 1, 1993.
88-11-03: 88-11-03 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-5922. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8-70 series airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated below. \n\n\tTo prevent the possibility of a fire that can be attributed to chafed generator feeder cable in a fuel contaminated pylon, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 30 days after the effective date of this airworthiness directive (AD), unless previously accomplished within the last 3,500 flight hours, inspect the generator power feeder cables, support brackets, and clamps between bulkhead feed-through at Station YN = 278.500 and Terminal Strip S3-7000 at engine pylons 1, 2, 3, and 4, for evidence of arcing, burning, chafing, or damage and cable droop, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of McDonnell Douglas Service Bulletin A24-72, dated April 6, 1988. \n\n\t\t1.\tIf no evidence of arcing, burning, chafing, damage, or drooping exists, proceed to paragraph A.3., below. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf evidence of arcing, burning, chafing, damage or drooping exists, repair or replace parts, as required, in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t3.\tVerify that nuts securing cable terminals to Terminal Strip S3-7000 are tightened to a torque of 120 to 130 inch-pounds. \n\n\tB.\tRepeat the procedures specified in paragraph A., above, at intervals not to exceed 3,500 flight hours. \n\n\tC.\tAlternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provide an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\t\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any comments and then send it to the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director of Publications, C1-L00 (54-60). This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis Amendment becomes effective June 3, 1988.
78-01-15: 78-01-15 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-3118 as amended by Amendment 39-3198. Applies to Model DC-8 Series airplanes, certificated in all categories. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tTo prevent failure of the elevator geared tab crank arms and to provide a means of detecting jamming of the elevator surface, comply with the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 12 months after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, increase the elevator geared tab crank assembly clearance by modifying the elevator leading edge cutouts and covers, and modify and reidentify the elevator geared tab links, modify rod ends as required, and chamfer the horizontal stabilizer box fittings in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Service Bulletin 27-262 dated July 15, 1977 or later FAA approved revisions. \n\n\tNOTE: Compliance with the following requirements of Service Bulletin 27-262 is optional: \n\n\t\t(i)\tThe installation of steel geared-tab links to replace the existing links. \n\n\t\t\t3802767-1 (new) for 4710541 \n\n\t\t\t3802768-1 (new) for 4710542 \n\n\t\t(ii)\tThe provision of additional clearance between the elevator hinge support fitting Part No. 3619433 and the elevator leading edge spar (view D-D, page 8 of DC-8 Service Bulletin 27-262). \n\n\t(b)\tWithin the next 18 months after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, install an elevator position indicator system in accordance with McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Service Bulletin 27-254 dated March 5, 1975 or later FAA approved revision. \n\n\t(c)\tEquivalent modifications or operational procedures may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR's 21.197 and 21.199 to authorize operation of an airplane to a base for the accomplishment of the modifications required by this AD. \n\n\t(e)\tAircraft which have been modified in accordance with Paragraph (b) may be operated with the elevatorposition indicator system inoperative provided: \n\n\t\t(i)\tPrior to each takeoff verify proper elevator operation by a ground observer, and by utilizing the elevator flight control check procedure of McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Alert Service Bulletin A27-264 dated May 14, 1977 or later FAA approved revision. \n\n\t\t(ii)\tThe aircraft is not dispatched from a station where repairs or replacements on the elevator position indicator system can be made. \n\n\t(f)\tWithin 30 days after the effective date of this AD as amended, unless already accomplished, and until Paragraph (b) of this AD is accomplished, either: \n\n\t\t(i)\tInstall the following placard in full view of both pilots \n\n\t\t\tPRIOR TO EACH TAKEOFF, PERFORM AN ELEVATOR CONTROL \n\t\t\tSYSTEM CHECK IN ACCORDANCE WITH DC-8 SERVICE \n\t\t\tBULLETIN A27-264. \n\n\t\t(ii)\tor, include an instruction in the DC-8 Operations Manual and a check list item which specifies those control checks identified in SB A27-264. \n\n\tAmendment 39-3118 became effectiveFebruary 13, 1978. \n\n\tThis Amendment 39-3198 becomes effective June 1, 1978.
90-02-17: 90-02-17 BELLANCA, INCORPORATED: Amendment 39-6446. \n\n\tApplicability: Models 14-19-3, 14-19-3A, 17-30, 17-31 and 17-31TC (all serial numbers (S/N)), 17-30A (S/N 30263 through 89-301007), 17-31A (S/N 32-15 through 78-32-172) and 17-31ATC (S/N 31004 through 79-31155) airplanes certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated in the body of the AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent the collapse of the main landing gear which could result in substantial airframe damage, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tUpon the accumulation of 500 hours total time-in-service (TIS), or within the next 100 hours TIS after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, and each 100 hours TIS thereafter, inspect the left and right drag strut landing gear fitting assemblies, Part Number (P/N) 194153-10, for cracks, deformations, or failures as follows: \n\n\tNOTE 1: This information is also contained in Bellanca Service Letter B-106, dated September 26, 1989. Penetrant inspection techniques are described in FAA Advisory Circular (AC) 43-3, "Nondestructive Testing in Aircraft." These inspections can be conducted with the fitting assemblies installed on the airplane. Do not apply loads to the landing gear components, particularly the drag strut, as it is possible to move the drag strut to overcenter and cause the landing gear to collapse. \n\n\t\t(1)\tPlace jacks or other workstands under the airplane at locations specified in the Bellanca Service Manual to prevent accidental landing gear collapse during this inspection. \n\n\t\t(2)\tFigure 1 to this AD describes the 194153-10 fitting assembly. Clean the aft face of the -1 fitting with Stoddart solvent and a brush. \n\n\t\t(3)\tInspect for cracks adjacent to the welds which join the -1 fitting to the -2 fitting and -3 brace near the lower aft attachment bolt holes using liquid penetrant inspection techniques and a magnifying glass. If any crack is found, prior to further flight replace the assembly with a new fitting assembly, P/N 194153-30 or P/N 194153-40, as applicable. \n\n\t\t(4)\tLay a straight-edge along side the lower aft attachment bolts, in accordance with Figure 2 and, using a feeler gage or wire gage of .030 inch thickness, look for any evidence of local deformation (dimpling) in the -1 fitting. If any deformation greater than .030 inches is found, prior to further flight replace the assembly with a new fitting assembly, P/N 194153-30 or P/N 194153-40, as applicable. \n\n\tNOTE 2: The -30, -40 assemblies can be distinguished from a -10 assembly by measuring the -1, -2, fitting and -3 brace part thickness: -10 part thickness is 0.062 inches, -30, -40 parts thickness is 0.100 inches. A 0.040 Shim (P/N 194167-2 Shim Spar Bracket) is available to provide proper fit between the 194153 fitting assembly and the forward spar. \n\n\t\t(5)\tCheck and adjust, as required, the drag strut for correct overcenter using the appropriate procedures in the Bellanca Service Manual. \n\n\t\t(6)If the inspections specified above do not indicate any evidence of cracks or local deformation in the -1 fitting, apply zinc chromate or Epibond primer, as necessary, to protect the part and repeat these inspections as specified above. \n\n\t\t(7)\tThe repetitive inspections specified above are not required on the P/N 194153-30 or P/N 194153-40 assemblies. \n\n\t(b)\tAirplanes with cracked or deformed fittings may be flown with a special flight permit in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a location where this AD may be accomplished providing that no crack is found during the inspection of paragraph (a)(3) that exceeds 3/8 in. length, or no deformation is found during the inspection of paragraph (a)(4) that is great enough to cause the overcenter of the drag strut to be out of tolerance. In these cases, no special flight permit is allowed. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternate method of compliance or adjustment of the initial and repetitive compliance times, which provides an equivalent level of safety, may be approved by the Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, 2300 E. Devon Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois 60018. \n\n\tNOTE 3: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and send it to the Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive may obtain copies of the documents referred to herein upon request to Bellanca, Inc.; P.O. Box 964, Alexandria, Minnesota 56308; Telephone (612) 762-1501; or may examine these documents at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri 64106. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6446, AD 90-02-17) becomes effective on February 5, 1990. \n\n\nFIGURE 1\n\n\n\nAD 90-02-17\n\nFIGURE 2\n\nEXAMPLES OF MEASURING DEPTH OF DIMPLED AREAS
79-19-10: 79-19-10 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-3566. Applies to the McDonnell Douglas DC-8-62, -62F and DC-8-63, -63F Series airplanes certificated in all categories, incorporating 7079-T6 aluminum wing front spar pylon support fittings, (P/N) 5753054-1/-2 and 5753055-1/-2. \n\n\tNOTE: This AD is not applicable to 7075-T73 aluminum fittings (P/N) 5753054-501/-502 and 5753055-501/-502. Operators who are unable to verify part numbers visually, may ascertain the fitting material by NDT methods presented in the McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Alert Service Bulletin A57-87, Revision 1, dated September 10, 1979. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tTo detect cracks and prevent failure of the wing front spar pylon support fittings, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin the next 300 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 2,700 hours' time in service in an approved equivalent manner: \n\n\t\t(1)\tBefore inspection, thoroughly cleaneach wing front spar pylon support fitting in accordance with the procedures outlined in McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Alert Service Bulletin A57-87 Revision 1, dated September 10, 1979, \n\n\t\t(2)\tConduct a visual inspection of all four wing front spar pylon support fittings in accordance with the procedures outlined in McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Alert Service Bulletin A57-87, Revision 1, dated September 10, 1979. \n\n\t(b)\tIf no cracks are found during the inspections per paragraph (a), conduct repetitive inspections in accordance with paragraph (a) at intervals not to exceed 3,000 hours' time in service or one (1) year, whichever comes first. \n\n\t(c)\tIf cracks are found which are repairable as defined in McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Alert Service Bulletin A57-87, Revision 1, dated September 10, 1979, make repairs per DC-8 Structural Repair Manual, Chapter 54 or McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Alert Service Bulletin A57-87, Revision 1, as applicable prior to further flight, and revert to the repetitive inspection requirements of paragraph (b). \n\n\t(d)\tIf cracks are found which are defined as non-repairable in McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Alert Service Bulletin A57-87, Revision 1, dated September 10, 1979, remove and replace the fitting prior to further flight. \n\n\t(e)\tIf a cracked fitting is replaced with a 7079-T6 aluminum fitting, inspect the replacement fitting in accordance with the repetitive inspection requirements of paragraph (b). \n\n\t(f)\tWithin 24 hours after the inspection, report the results of the inspection per paragraph (a) to the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, through the principal maintenance inspector for the operator. \n\n\t(g)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections required by this AD. \n\n\t(h)\tAlternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective September 27, 1979.
83-08-02: 83-08-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-4634. Applies to Model 747 series airplanes certificated in all categories listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2206, Revision 1, and Service Bulletin 747-57-2217, Revision 1, or later FAA approved revisions. The effectivity is divided into eight groups for Service Bulletin 747-57-2206-R1 and three groups for Service Bulletin 747-57-2217- R1, listed in the service bulletins. To prevent trailing edge flap track fuse bolt failures, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 400 landings after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished within the last 1600 landings, and at intervals thereafter not to exceed 2000 landings until the replacement called for in paragraphs B. or C. is accomplished, visually inspect the bolts listed in Table I, below, for deformation and failure. Bolts found deformed or failed must be replaced in accordance with paragraph B. or C., as applicable, prior to further flight. Bolts found acceptable for service are to beretorqued in accordance with Table I prior to further flight. \n\n\tB.\tUnless previously accomplished, replace forward fuse bolts on flap tracks No. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, and 8 with redesigned bolts in accordance with Figures 1, 3, and 5 of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2206-R1, or later FAA approved revision, within 200 landings after the effective date of this AD, or prior to the accumulation of the thresholds listed in Table 1, 3, and 4, Section III, of the above Boeing Service Bulletin whichever is later. Installation of these bolts constitutes terminating action for these tracks. \n\n\tC.\tUnless previously accomplished, replace on flap tracks No. 2, 4, 5, and 7, forward fuse bolts listed in Table I & II of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2217-R1 or later FAA approved revisions, in accordance with Figures 2 and 3 of the bulletin within 200 landings after the effective date of this AD, or prior to the accumulation of 25,000 landings, whichever is later. Installation of these bolts constitutes terminating action for these tracks. \n\n\tD.\tFor purposes of complying with this AD, subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA Maintenance Inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplane's hours time in service by the operator's fleet average from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. \n\n\tE.\tAlternate means of compliance with the AD which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tF.\tAircraft may be ferried to a base for maintenance in accordance with Sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations. \n\n\tG.\tThis AD supersedes AD 78-25-06. \n\n\n\t\t\t\t\tTABLE I \n\n\nFlap\nInspect & Retorque \nIn Accordance\nAirplane\n\n1 & 8\nFig. 2 S/B 57-2206-R1\nSee Table I Section III\nof S/B 57-2206-R1\nI-IV, VII, & VIII \nAs defined by S/B 57-2206-R1\n2 & 7\nFig. 1 S/B 57-2217-R1\nSee Table I of\nS/B 57-2217-R1\nIII\nAs defined by S/B57-2217-R1\n4 & 5\nFig. 4 S/B 57-2217-R1\nSee Table II of S/B 57-2217-R1\t\t\nI, II, & III\nAs defined by S/B 57-2217-R1 \n\n\tNOTE: Later FAA approved revisions of the above service bulletins may be used. \n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may also be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective May 31, 1983.
91-24-08: 91-24-08 McDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-8094. Docket No. 91-NM-221-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model MD-11 series airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent fatigue cracking and possible structural failure of the outboard flaps, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tPrior to the accumulation of 400 landings, or within 30 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, perform a borescope inspection to detect cracks in the left and right outboard flap inboard and outboard closure rib spindle support fittings, in accordance with Paragraph 2, "Accomplishment Instructions," of McDonnell Douglas Alert Service Bulletin A57-15, Revision 2, dated October 28, 1991 (hereinafter referred to as the Service Bulletin). \n\n\t(b)\tWithin 30 days after the effective date of this AD, perform a visual inspection for cracks and delamination of the upper skin of the outboard flaps in accordance with the Service Bulletin. \n\n\t(c)\tIf no cracking or delamination is found as a result of the inspections required by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this AD, accomplish either subparagraph (c)(1) or (c)(2) of this AD: \n\n\t\t(1)\tRepeat the borescope inspections of the spindle support fittings required by paragraph (a) of this AD at intervals not to exceed 400 landings; and repeat the visual inspections of the upper skin required by paragraph (b) of this AD at intervals not to exceed 60 days. In cases where no cracking is found, the accomplishment of the modification shown in Figures 3 and 4 and described in Tables I and II of the Service Bulletin constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by this paragraph. Or \n\n\t\t(2)\tPrior to further flight, accomplish the modification shown in Figures 3 and 4 and described in Tables I and II of the Service Bulletin. \n\n\t(d)\tIf a crack with a length of less than 1 inch is found in the spindle support fitting as a result of the borescope inspections required by paragraphs (a) or (c)(1) of this AD, accomplish either subparagraph (d)(1) or (d)(2) of this AD: \n\n\t\t(1)\tPrior to further flight, accomplish the modification shown in Figures 3 and 4 and described in Tables I and II of the Service Bulletin. In cases where such cracking is found, this modification is considered to be an interim (temporary) action only. Or \n\n\tNOTE: The FAA is considering further rulemaking to require the accomplishment of a permanent repair. \n\n\t\t(2)\tPrior to further flight, incorporate a permanent repair in a manner approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. The accomplishment of this permanent repair constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by paragraph (c)(1) of this AD. \n\n\t(e)\tIf a crack with a length of greater than 1 inch is found in the spindle support fitting as a result of the borescope inspections required by paragraph (a) or (c)(1) of this AD, prior to further flight, accomplish a permanent repair in a manner approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Accomplishment of this permanent repair constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by paragraph (c)(1) of this AD. \n\n\t(f)\tIf cracks or delamination are found in the skin as a result of the inspections required by paragraph (b) of this AD, prior to further flight, accomplish the modification shown in Figures 3 and 4 and described in Tables I and II of the Service Bulletin. Accomplishment of this modification constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by paragraph (c)(1) of this AD. \n\n\t(g)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate.NOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles ACO. \n\n\t(h)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the inspection requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(i)\tThe inspection and modification requirements shall be done in accordance with McDonnell Douglas MD-11 Alert Service Bulletin A57-15, revision 2, dated October 28, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Technical Publications-Technical Administrative Support, C1-L5B, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington; or at theLos Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 East Spring Street, Long Beach, California; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8401, Washington, D.C. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-8094, AD 91-24-08) becomes effective on December 12, 1991.
2011-24-06: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to all BAE SYSTEMS (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146- 100A, -200A, and -300A airplanes; and Model Avro 146-RJ70A, 146-RJ85A, and 146-RJ100A airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing [[Page 73478]] airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * * * * * * BAE Systems (Operations) Limited amended Chapter 05-10-15 of the AMM [aircraft maintenance manual] to introduce a new hydraulic filter assembly life limit and to remove the tables containing the Mandatory Life Limitations (Landings) on the Bolts and Pins as the information is now included in the SSID [supplemental structural inspection document] which is already mandated by the same AD. In addition, BAE Systems amended Chapter 05-10-15 of the AMM to enable the use of RJ85 MLG [main landing gear] main fittings for lighter weight 146-200 aircraft using the same safe life of 50,000 Flight Cycles (FC) and the use of RJ100 MLG main fittings for lighter weight RJ85, 146-200 and 146-300 aircraft using the same safe life of 40,000 FC. * * * * * The unsafe condition is fatigue cracking of certain structural elements which could adversely affect the structural integrity of these airplanes. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-08-51: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) T97-08-51 that was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Boeing Model 767 series airplanes by individual telegrams. This AD requires an inspection to ensure that all bolts of the hinge fitting assembly support beam on both the left- and right-hand outboard trailing edge flaps are the correct length and type, and correction of any discrepancy found. This action is prompted by a report indicating that a 20-foot section of the right-hand outboard trailing edge flap separated from the airplane due to failure of four bolts of the most inboard hinge fitting. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct such failed bolts, which could result in loss of an outboard trailing edge flap, and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
90-04-01: 90-04-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-6502. Docket No. 89-NM-173-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747-400 series airplanes, as listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747- 26-2135, Revision 1, dated December 21, 1989, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo preclude operation of the APU without fire detection, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next ten days after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished, add the following to the Limitations Section of the FAA-approved Airplane Flight Manual (AFM). This may be accomplished be inserting a copy of this AD in the AFM: \n\n\tAUXILIARY POWER UNIT: "The DC power main battery switch must remain in the ON position during all APU operation including the 60 second cool down cycle following APU shutdown." \n\n\tB.\tWithin the next 90 days after the effective date of this AD, modify the APU electrical power circuit in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-26-2135, Revision 1, dated December 21, 1989. \n\n\tC.\tThe Airplane Flight Manual limitation required by paragraph A., above, may be removed following incorporation of the modification required by paragraph B., above. \n\n\tD.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment, and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6502, AD 90-04-01) becomes effective on March 19, 1990.
2022-03-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Model S-76D helicopters. This AD was prompted by reports that certain Thales global positioning system (GPS) satellite based augmentation system (SBAS) receivers provided, under certain conditions, erroneous outputs on aircraft positions. This AD requires replacing affected GPS receivers and prohibits installing those GPS receivers. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
90-11-06: 90-11-06 BOEING: Amendment 39-6606. Docket No. 90-NM-77-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747-400 series airplanes, equipped with Pratt and Whitney PW4000 series engines or Rolls Royce RB211-524 series engines, identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-28A2143, dated April 19, 1990, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent inability to fully open and close the outboard engine fuel shutoff valve, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 30 days after the effective date of this AD, replace the outboard engine fuel shutoff valve actuator bonding wire in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-28A2143, dated April 19, 1990. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 10 days after the completion of the modification required by paragraph A., above, report all findings of wires longer than six inches to the Manager, Seattle Manufacturing Inspection District Office, 7300 Perimeter Road South, Seattle, Washington 98108. Reports shall include the serial number of the affected airplanes and identify positions of valves found with long straps. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who will either concur or comment, and then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6606, AD 90-11-06) becomes effective on June 6, 1990.
2022-02-13: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model EC120B helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of corrosion found on the external tail boom skin, under the Very High Frequency (VHF) antenna. This AD requires inspecting the tail boom at the VHF antenna attachments and depending on the results, repairing or modifying the tail boom skin, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-24-05: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Airbus Model A330-201, -202, -203, -223, -243, -301, -302, -303, -321, -322, -323, -341, -342, and -343 airplanes; and Model A340-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: During A330 and A340 aeroplanes fatigue tests, cracks appeared on the right (RH) and left (LH) sides between the crossing area of the keel beam fitting and the front spar of the Centre Wing Box (CWB). This condition, if not corrected, could lead to keel beam rupture which would affect the area structural integrity. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-09-13: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes, that requires a one-time inspection to detect corrosion and cracking of the upper deck floor beam at station 980, and repair, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports of extensive corrosion found at station 980. Analysis of the corrosion indicated that fatigue cracking of the floor beam at this area could occur and cause the beam to break. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect and correct such corrosion and/or cracking, which could cause the floor beam to break and result in extensive damage to adjacent structure and possible rapid decompression of the airplane.