Results
2011-17-01: This amendment supersedes an existing emergency airworthiness directive (EAD) for the specified Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) model helicopters. That EAD currently requires inspecting the main rotor scissor fitting assembly to determine if there are 2 washers installed under the head of each main rotor scissor fitting assembly fixing bolt (fixing bolt). If there are not 2 washers installed under the head of each fixing bolt, that EAD requires replacing each fixing bolt and installing 2 washers under the head of each fixing bolt. This superseding airworthiness directive (AD) is prompted by the determination that a wrong part number (P/N) for the main rotor scissor fitting assembly was listed in the EAD. This AD retains the requirements of the EAD and corrects a P/N for the main rotor scissor fitting assembly. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent a crack in a fixing bolt, failure of a fixing bolt, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
94-21-05 R1: This amendment clarifies an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes, that currently requires modification, adjustments, and tests of the thrust reverser system; and repair, if necessary. This amendment clarifies a requirement specified in the AD concerning the performance of the operational test of the system. This amendment is prompted by an inquiry from an operator of the affected airplanes concerning that aspect of the existing AD. \n\n\tThe incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations was approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of November 25, 1994 (59 FR 53573, October 25, 1994).
2011-16-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) model helicopters. This action requires you to disconnect the high level fuel switches in the fuel tanks on the affected helicopters. In addition, for helicopters without a crossfeed between the fuel filler necks, you must install a placard on or near the center console fuel panel that specifies fuel transfer limitations. This amendment is prompted by a report that a high level fuel switch probe unit installed on a Model SA-365N helicopter in the rear (right-hand) auxiliary fuel tank group separated, causing damage to the insulation of the electrical wires which supply electrical power to the high level indicator light on the fuel control panel during a fuel transfer. This condition, if not corrected, could lead to exposure of the electrical wires, which could lead to a short circuit and activation of the indicator light without the high fuel level actually being reached.Additionally, a short circuit could become an ignition source inside the fuel tank, and result in a fuel tank explosion and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2011-17-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several cases have been reported of cracks in the joint extrusions securing the outer bondment to the acoustic panel of the nacelle transcowl assemblies. Although there is no effect on flight safety (thrust reverser stowed), thrust reverser deployment under rejected take-off or emergency landing load conditions could potentially result in acoustic panel failure and possible runway debris. * * * * * The loss of an acoustic panel during rejected take-off or emergency landing load conditions could leave debris on the runway. This debris, if not removed, creates an unsafe condition for other airplanes during take-off or landing, as those airplanes couldimpact debris on the runway and sustain damage. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-17-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: It has been found that moisture may accumulate and freeze, under certain conditions, in the gap between the AOA vane base assembly and the stationary ring of the sensor's body. If freezing occurs both AOA sensors may get stuck and the Stall Warning Protection System (SWPS) will be no longer effective without alerting. This may result in inadvertent aerodynamic stall and loss of controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-17-04: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Pratt & Whitney JT8D-200 series turbofan engines, that currently requires cleaning of front compressor front hubs (fan hubs); initial and repetitive eddy current (ECI) and fluorescent penetrant inspections (FPI) of tierod and counterweight holes for cracks; removal of bushings; the cleaning and ECI and FPI of bushed holes for cracks; and, if necessary, replacement with serviceable parts. In addition, the current AD requires reporting the findings of cracked fan hubs. This amendment does not change the current AD's inspection procedures, or the effectivity date that starts the cycle count for the initial inspection schedules. This AD does, however, add an additional inspection schedule that requires the initial inspection of certain fan hubs with standard drilled holes and coolant channel drilled (CCD) holes to occur earlier than the existing AD requires. Also, this AD requires reporting the results of the initial fan hub inspections. This amendment is prompted by additional investigation since publication of the current AD that reveals that certain fan hubs with standard drilled holes and CCD holes may be more susceptible to cracking. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent fan hub failure due to tierod, counterweight, or bushed hole cracking, which could result in an uncontained engine failure and damage to the aircraft.
2011-17-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: One in-service incident has been reported on [a] DHC-8 Series 400 aeroplane in which the right hand main landing gear (MLG) failed to extend using the alternate gear extension system. * * * Failure of [the] MLG to extend and lock could adversely affect the safe landing of the aeroplane. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
67-18-05: 67-18-05 TECO: Amdt. 39-429, Part 39, Federal Register May 30, 1967. Applies to TECO Model 603 aircraft seats. Compliance required as indicated. To preclude failure of TECO Model 603 aircraft seats installed in civil aircraft, within 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, remove these seats from service, and replace with FAA-approved seats. This amendment effective June 30, 1967.
95-01-08: This amendment supersedes AD 81-09-03 R1, which currently requires repetitively inspecting the rudder pedal adjusting mounting bracket for cracks on Jetstream Aircraft Limited (JAL) HP137 Mk1 and Jetstream series 200 airplanes, and replacing any cracked bracket. The Federal Aviation Administration's policy on aging commuter-class aircraft is to eliminate, or in certain instances, reduce the number of repetitions of certain short-interval inspections when improved parts or modifications are available. This action requires replacing the mounting bracket with a new mounting bracket of improved design as terminating action for the repetitive inspections that are currently required by AD 81-09-03 R1. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent inadvertent rudder movement caused by a cracked rudder pedal adjusting bracket, which, if not detected and corrected, could result in loss of rudder control.
2011-17-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for SOCATA Model TBM 700 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A TBM 700 operator reported a case of elevator trim tab actuator jamming once the trim tab arrived to stop. The investigations conducted by the trim tab actuator manufacturer have shown that there was a discrepancy with PRECILEC manufacturing process of elevator trim tab actuator which caused this event. It has been determined as well that this discrepancy is limited to a batch of Serial Numbers (S/N). If not detected and corrected, a jammed trim tab could lead to unusual control forces, resulting in lower controllability, particularly if combined with adverse flight conditions at landing. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correctthe unsafe condition on these products.
2011-16-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that would supersede an existing AD. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Recently, a Dassault Aviation Falcon 7X aeroplane experienced an uncontrolled pitch trim runaway during descent. The crew succeeded in recovering a stable situation and performed an uneventful landing. This condition, if occurring again, could lead to a loss of control of the aeroplane. * * * * * This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
67-06-03: 67-06-03 ERCOUPE: Amdt. 39-349 Part 39 Federal Register February 11, 1967. Applies to Models 415C, 415CD, 415D, E, G, and F1 Series Airplanes, Serial Numbers 1 through 5714 inclusive, Except Those Airplanes Modified in Accordance with Either Ercoupe Service Memorandum No. 63 or Air Products Document No. 110. Compliance required as indicated. To prevent loss of rudder control, accomplish the following: (a) Before further flight, after the effective date of this AD, with the nosegear raised off the ground, inspect the rudder control system by checking the rudder controls from the cockpit for freedom of movement through the entire range of rudder control travel. If any restriction or impediment on the normal freedom of movement of the rudder controls is apparent, the cause thereof must be determined prior to further flight. If it is determined that the restriction or impediment is caused by binding in the rudder bellcrank at the stabilizer, before further flight, modifythe rudder bellcrank assembly in a manner prescribed in (c) of this AD. (b) If the rudder bellcrank assembly is not modified as a result of findings made during the inspection provided in (a), then it must be modified in a manner prescribed in (c) of this AD within fifty (50) hours time in service after the effective date of this AD. (c) Modify the rudder bellcrank assembly in accordance with any one of the following - (1) One of the two methods contained in Alon Service Bulletin No. 14, dated February 3, 1967; or (2) The method contained in Ercoupe Service Memorandum No. 63 (available upon request from Alon, Inc., Municipal Airport, McPherson, Kansas); or, (3) Any other method approved as equivalent by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Federal Aviation Agency, Central Region. This directive effective February 11, 1967.
93-15-11: 93-15-11 ALLIED-SIGNAL INC., GARRETT ENGINE DIVISION: Amendment 39-8656. Docket No. 93-ANE-02. Applicability: Allied-Signal Inc., Garrett Engine Division, Model TPE331-47A, -55B, and -61A turboprop engines; and TPE331-1, -2, -3, -5, -6, -8, -10, -11, -12, -14A, -14B, -15AW, -25, and -43 series turboprop engines installed on but not limited to Mitsubishi MU-2B Series (MU-2 series) Solitaire/Marquise; Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A. (CASA) C-212 series; British Aerospace (BAe) Jetstream 3101 and 3201 (31 and 32) series; Fairchild SA226 and SA227 series (Swearingen Merlin and Metro series); Prop-Jets, Inc. Model 400; Cessna Model 441 (Conquest); Twin Commander 680, 690, 695 (Jetprop Commander); Rockwell Commander S-2R; Shorts Brothers and Harland, Ltd. SC7 (Skyvan); Dornier 228 series; Beech 18 and 45 series and Models JRB-6, 3N, 3NM, 3TM, and B100; Pilatus PC-6 series (Fairchild Porter, Peacemaker); Piper Model PA-42-1000 (Cheyenne 400 LS); De Havilland Model DH 104 Dove series; Grumman Model TS-2A; Grumman American Model G-164C; and Schweitzer Model G-164 series aircraft. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent a sudden loss of propeller control during application of thrust reverse that may cause asymmetric thrust and loss of aircraft control, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 10 hours time in service (TIS) after the effective date of this AD, for Allied-Signal Inc., Garrett Engine Division, Model TPE331-47A, -55B, and -61A turboprop engines; and Model TPE331-1, -2, -3, -5, -6, -8, -10, -11, -12, -25, and -43 series turboprop engines that have had a new propeller pitch control (PPC) gasket, Part Number (P/N) 865664-4, installed after May 10, 1992, accomplish the following: (1) Inspect PPC gaskets in accordance with the applicable Allied-Signal Aerospace Company, Garrett Engine Division, Alert Service Bulletin (ASB): No. TPE331-A72-0857, dated October 29, 1992; or ASB No. TPE331-A72-0858, dated October 29, 1992, to determine if the gaskets incorporate internal metal reinforcement. (2) Prior to further flight, replace unreinforced gaskets with serviceable metal reinforced gaskets in accordance with the applicable Allied-Signal Aerospace Company, Garrett Engine Division, Light Maintenance Manual. (b) Within the next 10 hours TIS after the effective date of this AD, for Allied-Signal Inc., Garrett Engine Division, TPE331-14A, -14B, and -15AW turboprop engines that have had a new PPC gasket, P/N 3105685-1, installed after June 26, 1992, accomplish the following: (1) Inspect PPC gaskets in accordance with the applicable Allied-Signal Aerospace Company, Garrett Engine Division, ASB: No. TPE331-A72-7092, dated October 29, 1992; ASB No. TPE331-A72-7093, dated October 29, 1992; or ASB No. TPE331-A72-7519, dated October 30, 1992, to determine if the gaskets incorporate internal metal reinforcement. (2) Prior to further flight, replace unreinforced gaskets with serviceable metal reinforced gaskets in accordance with the applicable Allied-Signal Aerospace Company, Garrett Engine Division, Light Maintenance Manual. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. The request should be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this airworthiness directive, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. (d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (e) The inspection, and replacement, if necessary, shall be done in accordance with the following Allied-Signal Aerospace Company, Garrett Engine Division, alert service bulletins: DOCUMENT NO. PAGE REVISION DATE TPE331-A72-7092 Total Pages: 6. 1-6 Original October 29, 1992 TPE331-A72-0857 Total Pages: 12. 1-12 Original October 29, 1992 TPE331-A72-0858 Total Pages: 6. 1-6 Original October 29, 1992 TPE331-A72-7093 Total Pages: 6. 1-6 Original October 29, 1992 TPE331-A72-7519 Total Pages: 6. 1-6 Original October 30, 1992 This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be obtained from Allied Signal Propulsion Engines, Aviation Services Division, Data Distribution, Dept. 64-3/2102-1M, P.O. Box 29003, Phoenix, AZ 85038-9003; telephone (602) 365-2548. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, New England Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, MA; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (f) This amendment supersedes priority letter AD 92-26-07, issued December 16, 1992. (g) This amendment becomes effective on September 7, 1993.
2011-16-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. For Model A310 and A300-600 series airplanes, the MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Hamilton Sundstrand (HS), the manufacturer of the RAT [ram air turbine], reported the failure during a wind tunnel test of a balance weight fastening screw on the RAT turbine cover. After investigation, it has been discovered that a batch of screws, which are used to attach the balance washers of the HS RAT Turbine Assembly, has not been subject to the correct heat treatment and are consequently exposed to potential fracture. This condition, if not corrected, might lead to the ejection of screw heads and consequently to the detachment of the associated balance washers. The loss of balance washers could increase RAT vibrations, which might lead to a possible detachment of RAT parts and consequent loss of RAT functionality. The loss of the RAT, in combination with a total engine flame out, could result in loss of control of the aeroplane. * * * * * For Model A318, A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes, the MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Hamilton Sundstrand (HS) reported the failure of a balance weight fastening screw on the RAT turbine cover during a wind tunnel test. After investigation, it has been discovered that a batch of screws, used to attach the balance washers of the RAT Turbine assembly, has not received the correct heat treatment, making them more subject to a potential failure. This condition, if left uncorrected, could lead to the ejection of screw heads and detachment of the associated balance washers. The loss of balance washers would increase RAT vibrations, which could lead to a possible detachment of RAT parts and loss of RAT functionality. Theloss of the RAT, in combination with a double engine failure, or a total loss of normal electrical power generation, could result in loss of control of the aeroplane. * * * * * For Model A330 and A340 series airplanes, the MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Hamilton Sundstrand (HS), the manufacturer of the RAT, reported the failure of a balance weight fastening screw on the RAT cover during a wind tunnel test. After investigation, it has been discovered that a batch of screws, which are used to attach the balance washers of the HS RAT turbine lower gear box assembly, has not been subject to the correct heat treatment and the screws are consequently exposed to potential fracture. This condition, if not corrected, might lead to the ejection of screw heads and consequently to the detachment of the associated balance washers. The loss of balance washers could increase RAT vibrations, which might lead to a possible detachment of RAT parts, and thus to damage to the aeroplane and risk of injury to persons on the ground. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
66-30-07: 66-30-07 PIPER: Amdt. 39-217 Part 39 Federal Register December 13, 1966. Applies to Model PA-24-400 Airplanes, Serial Numbers 26-1 through 26-148, Equipped with Fuel Purge Valve Installation in Accordance with Piper Service Letter No. 451 Dated May 14, 1965, and Piper Service Bulletin No. 228 Dated January 7, 1966. Compliance required within 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD. To prevent further incidents of deterioration and leakage occurring inside the asbestos covered fuel purge valve hose, disconnect the fuel purge line P/N 25551-04 at the fuel injector outlet fitting and remove the fuel purge line from the airplane. Cap the outlet fitting with an AN929-4 cap unless a fuel purge hose replacement Kit No. 757099 is installed. NOTE: Piper telegram dated October 14, 1966, to all Piper distributors covers this subject. This supersedes AD 66-08-06. This directive effective December 23, 1966.
80-11-06: 80-11-06 PIPER: Amendment 39-3776. Applies to Piper PA-31T1 and PA-31T Model airplanes, Serial Nos. 31T-78O4001 thru 31T-7904053, 31T-7904056, and 31T-7904057 certificated in all categories. To correct an error on the data plate, within the next 100 hours in service unless already accomplished, accomplish the following: a. Locate the aircraft data plate (Part No. 79644-4), on the left side of the fuselage belly, just below the forward part of the cabin door. b. Using an acceptable method of permanent marking (metal stamp, engraver, electric pencil, etc.), inscribe the numeral "1" behind "PA-31T" in the gold block in which "Model" is designated. Before Modification: "Model PA-31T" After Modification: "Model PA-31T1" This amendment is effective May 28, 1980.
2011-14-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD requires removing the 15th stage HPC disk within 12,000 cycles since new (CSN) or, for any disks that exceed 12,000 CSN after the effective date of this AD using a drawdown plan that includes a borescope inspection (BSI) or eddy current inspection (ECI) of the rim for cracks. This AD was prompted by multiple shop findings of cracked 15th stage HPC disks. We are issuing this AD to prevent cracks from propagating into the disk bolt holes, which could result in a failure of the 15th stage HPC disk, uncontained engine failure, and damage to the airplane.
66-20-02: 66-20-02 HAWKER SIDDELEY: Amdt. 39-273, Part 39, Federal Register August 13, 1966. Applies to de Havilland Model 104 Dove Series Airplanes Equipped With an Engine Fire Extinguisher System. Compliance required within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. (a) Inspect the engine air intake fire extinguishing system nozzle assembly to determine that 0.25 inch diameter radial holes are present in nozzle jet, P/N P.117. Replace each nozzle jet without 0.25 inch diameter radial holes with jet, P/N P.117e, with 0.25 inch diameter radial holes. (b) Inspect the engine fire extinguishing system to determine that proper fire extinguisher bottle and flexible hoses from the fire extinguisher bottle to the firewall and from the firewall to the distributor are installed in accordance with Hawker Siddeley Aviation Ltd. Technical News Sheet CT (104) No. 196, Issue 1, or later ARB-approved issue or an FAA- approved equivalent. Replace improper fire extinguisher bottles and flexible hoses. Hawker Siddeley Aviation Limited Technical News Sheet Dove (104) Series CT (104) No. 195, Issue 1, pertains to this subject.) This directive effective August 13, 1966.
2003-03-07: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain EMBRAER Model EMB-145 series airplanes, that requires the installation of reinforcements in the lower portion of wing rib 15 on the left-hand and right-hand sides of the airplane. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent reduced structural integrity of the wing flap support structure.
97-14-05: This amendment supersedes Airworthiness Directive AD 95-20-06, which applies to certain Air Tractor Incorporated (Air Tractor) Models AT-301, AT-302, AT-400, AT-400A, AT-401, AT-402, AT-501, and AT-502 airplanes and currently requires repetitively inspecting the front spar attachment lugs and the rear spar for fatigue cracks, and modifying the vertical fin if cracks are found. The modification terminates the repetitive inspection requirement of AD 95-20-06 and may be incorporated at any time, if cracks are not found. The FAA has determined that the Air Tractor Models mentioned above with a 1/4-inch fin front spar fitting installed should be exempt from the AD. The AD will retain the requirements of AD 95-20-06 for all Air Tractor airplanes that have a 3/16-inch fin front spar fitting. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent in-flight vertical fin cracking, which, if not detected and corrected, could result in structural failure of the front spar attachments and eventually the rear spar attachment and cause loss of directional control of the airplane.
2003-03-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 777 series airplanes. This action requires revising the Airplane Flight Manual to specify that the engine anti-ice must be "on" during all ground and flight operations when icing conditions exist or are anticipated. This action is necessary to prevent ingestion of ice that could cause shutdown of both engines during operation in icing conditions, and result in a forced landing of the airplane.
93-08-15: 93-08-15 AIRBUS INDUSTRIE: Amendment 39-8563. Docket 92-NM-215-AD. Applicability: Model A320 series airplanes, manufacturer's serial numbers (MSN) 003 through 008, inclusive, and 010 through 021, inclusive; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent fatigue cracking, which may lead to reduced structural integrity of the main landing gear, accomplish the following: (a) Prior to the accumulation of 12,000 landings, or within 500 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, modify the inner rear spar web in accordance with Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A320-57-1004, Revision 1, dated September 24, 1992. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Standardization Branch, ANM-113. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) The modification shall be done in accordance with Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A320-57-1004, Revision 1, dated September 24, 1992, which includes the following list of effective pages: Page Number Revision Level Shown on Page Date Shown on Page 1, 4, 12, 14-15, 17-18, 20 1 September 24, 1992 2-3, 5-11, 13, 16, 19, 21-30 Original July 9, 1991 This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Airbus Industrie, 1 Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (e) This amendment becomes effective on June 11, 1993.
2018-03-20: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A330-300 series airplanes. This AD requires contacting the FAA to obtain instructions for addressing the unsafe condition on these products, and doing the actions specified in those instructions. This AD was prompted by a report indicating that a pipe of the fire extinguishing system in the forward cargo compartment was too long, and therefore could be installed only under stress, which applies pressure to the pipe clamp. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
78-17-02 R3: 78-17-02 R3 PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT: Amendment 39-3281 as amended by Amendment 39-4334 and 39-4407 is further amended by Amendment 39-4818. Applies to Pratt & Whitney Aircraft models JT8D-9, - 9A, -11, -15, -15A, -17, -17A, -17R, and -17AR turbofan engines. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To detect cracks in compressor front hubs, P/Ns 594301, 791801, 640601, 743301, 750101, and 749801, except those excluded by serial number in Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Alert Service Bulletin No. 4841, Revision 6, dated July 15, 1983, which could result in fracture of the retention lugs and release of first stage fan blades, accomplish the following: (A) Inspect front compressor front hubs for cracks in the blade slots in accordance with Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Alert Service Bulletin No. 4841, Revision 6, dated July 15, 1983, or equivalent means approved by the Manager, Engine Certification Branch, New England Region, and in accordance with limits specified in Paragraphs (B) and (C) of this AD. Remove cracked compressor front hubs prior to further flight. (B) Hubs not previously inspected shall be inspected within 1,000 cycles from the effective date of this AD or before reaching the initial inspection limits specified in Column I of Paragraph (D), whichever occurs later, except do not exceed 13,000 total cycles. Repeat inspections at intervals listed in Column II, or Column III, Paragraph (D), thereafter. (C) Hubs which have been previously inspected shall be reinspected within 1,000 cycles after the effective date of this AD or before reaching the initial inspection limit specified in Column I, Paragraph (D), or before reaching the repetitive inspection limits specified in Column II or Column III of Paragraph (D), whichever comes later. Repeat inspections at intervals listed in Column II or Column III, Paragraph (D), thereafter. (D) Model Column I, initial inspection limit (cycles) Column II, Eddy current repetitive inspection limit (cycles) Column III, on-wing ultrasonic repetitive repetitive inspection limit (cycles) JT8D-9, -9A 13,000 6,000 2,000 JT8D-11 10,500 6,000 2,000 JT8D-15, -15A 9,500 5,000 1,500 JT8D-17, -17A 8,500 5,000 1,500 JT8D-17R, -17AR 8,000 5,000 1,500 NOTE: If the initial inspection or repetitive inspection is in paragraph (D) apply. If, however, the initial inspection or repetitive inspection is achieved by an eddy current inspection on an uninstalled engine, the Column II inspection limits of paragraph (D) would apply. (E) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to the approval of the Manager, Engine Certification Branch, FAA, New England Region, may adjust the inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. (F) For hubs that have been installed in more than one engine model, the inspection schedule for the engine model with the highest thrust rating in which it has operated is applicable. The manufacturer's Alert Service Bulletin identified and described in this directive is incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the service bulletin from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, Commercial Products Division, 400 Main Street, East Hartford, Connecticut 06108. The service bulletin may also be examined at Federal Aviation Administration, New England Region, Office of the Regional Counsel, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. Amendment 39-3281 became effective September 20, 1978. Amendment 39-4334 became effective March 4, 1982. Amendment 39-4407 became effective June 28, 1982. This Amendment 39-4818 becomes effective March 30, 1984.
66-18-04: 66-18-04 PIPER: Amdt. 39-266 Part 39 Federal Register July 26, 1966. Applies to Model PA-24-260 and PA-30 Airplanes, Serial Numbers 24-4247, 24-4300 through 24-4443, 24- 4445 through 24-4448, 24-4450 through 24-4452, 24-4454 through 24-4456, 24-4461, 24-4465, 24-4467, 24-4474, 24-4475, 30-853, 30-902 through 30-1087, 30-1089 through 30-1093, 30- 1095, 30-1096, 30-1098 through 30-1106, 30-1109, 30-1112, 30-1113, 30-1117, 30-1120, 30- 1127, and 30-1129 through 30-1137. Compliance required within the next 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent inadvertent unlatching of the baggage door, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect the baggage door latch to ensure that the latch extends through the latch striker plate 1/4 inch +0, -1/16 inch, measured from the top of the striker plate. (b) If the latch does not extend 1/4 inch +0, -1/16 inch through the latch striker plate, before further flight accomplish the following, or an FAA-approved equivalent: Replace the present latch striker plate retaining screws with AN 526-1032R14 screws and insert AN 960-10 washers between the door jamb and the latch striker plate, to obtain the 1/4 inch +0, -1/16 inch dimension. However, if more than three washers would be required, rework the door jamb to obtain the 1/4 inch +0, -1/16 inch dimension in an FAA-approved manner. (Piper Service Letter No. 478, dated June 13, 1966, pertains to this subject). This directive effective August 10, 1966.