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2022-02-11: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-20- 10, which applied to certain Airbus SAS Model A318 series airplanes; Model A319-111, -112,-113, -114, -115, -131, -132, and -133 airplanes; Model A320-211, -212, -214, -216, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes; and Model A321-111, -112, -131, -211, -212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. AD 2019-20-10 required repetitive rototest inspections of the holes at the door stop fittings for any cracking, and corrective actions if necessary. Since the FAA issued AD 2019-20-10, a clarification of a certain compliance time for the rototest inspection was added. This AD clarifies a certain compliance time and continues to require repetitive rototest inspections of the holes at the door stop fittings for any cracking, and repair if necessary, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2011-18-07: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: An uncommanded engine in-flight shutdown of a PZL-10W has been recently reported. The investigation has shown that the uncommanded engine in-flight shutdown was due to excessive spline wear on the fuel metering pump shaft. This condition, if not identified and corrected, may lead to further uncommanded in-flight engine shutdowns and consequent emergency landings of the affected helicopters. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncommanded engine in-flight shutdown and risk to the helicopter.
97-03-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Pilatus Britten-Norman BN-2, BN-2A, and BN-2B series airplanes that do not have generator terminal diodes installed with Modification NB/M/1571. This action requires removing the terminal diodes that have a 70 amp direct current (DC) Generation System, which is referred to as Modification NB/M/1148, and installing Modification NB/M/1571, which consists of new terminal diodes with a higher amp rating. Reports from operators that one or both diodes were failing prompted this action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent loss of electrical power to the navigation, communications, and light systems, which could impair the pilot's ability to maintain control of the airplane.
81-14-10: 81-14-10 NORTH AMERICAN: Amendment 39-4159. Applies to all AT-6D 81-14-10 (SNJ-5), AT-6F (SNJ-6), SNJ-7, and T-6G aircraft equipped with single piece design horizontal stabilizer rear spar connector fittings (P/N 77-21021, 4 fittings per spar). This AD does not apply to those aircraft equipped with two piece design connector fittings (P/Ns 77-21021-3 and 77-21021-4, 8 fittings per spar). \n\nAccomplish the following: \na)\tWithin 20 flight hours after the effective date of this AD and every 20 flight hours thereafter until b) is accomplished: \n1.\tRemove the fuselage to vertical stabilizer fairing assembly and the rear fairing assemblies at the horizontal stabilizer. \n2.\tVisually check the spar connector fittings for cracks. If cracks are found, fitting must be replaced with an airworthy part before further flight. \n\nb)\tAt next annual inspection: \n1.\tRemove the fuselage to vertical stabilizer fairing assembly and the rear fairing assemblies at the horizontal stabilizer. \n2.\tRemove the 1/4-inch bolts which attach the upper and lower spar connection fittings (P/N 77-21021) of the rear spar assembly. \n3.\tRemove the 4 connection fittings from the spar, remove paint from the connection fittings, and check for cracks using standard dye penetrant inspection methods. Replace any cracked fittings with serviceable ones and repaint all others. (See note.) \n4.\tInspect for fit between the connection fittings and the spar with a feeler gage prior to installation of the bolts. If gaps greater than 0.010 inches exist, shims are necessary. \n5.\tFabricate aluminum shims 3-1/8 inches x 15/16 inch and of necessary thickness, and place on either side of spar flanges, maintaining a parallel overall dimension to fit inside the connection fitting with a maximum clearance of 0.010 inches. \n6.\tDrill holes through the shims to match those in the fitting. Remove all chips and reinstall the various parts, including fairings. \n\nNOTE: One source of replacement fittings is Banaire Enterprises, 962 E. Lincoln St., Banning, California 92220 (Tel. (714) 849-8323). \n\nThis amendment becomes effective July 13, 1981.
84-14-51 R1: 84-14-51 R1 BOEING: Amendment 39-5149. Applies to Model 757 airplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 757-32-0033 dated September 7, 1984, certificated in any category, on which incorporation of Boeing Service Bulletin 757-32-0033, dated September 7, 1984, or later FAA- approved revision, has not been accomplished. Compliance is required as indicated below, after the effective date of this airworthiness directive (AD). To assure landing gear extension following a jam of the landing gear handle in the up position, accomplish the following, unless already accomplished: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 24 hours: \n\n\t\t1.\tIncorporate the following information into the FAA-approved airplane flight manual and the flight operations manual as an emergency procedure and provide to flight crews: \n\n\tGEAR LEVER WILL NOT MOVE FROM UP POSITION \n\t\tAIRSPEED.........................................................................\tMAINTAIN 200-220 KTS \n\t\tUNTIL GEAR EXTENDED \n\tFLAP LEVER.....................................................................\t................1 \n\tPTU CONT CIRCUIT BREAKER (D31)....................................\tPULL \n\tLEFT AUTOPILOT (IF ENGAGED)............................................DISCONNECT \n\tLEFT ELECTRIC AND ENGINE \n\t\tHYDRAULIC PUMP SWITCHES................................OFF \n\tALTERNATE GEAR EXTENSION SWITCH..........................PUSH \n\t\tIf, after 60 seconds, any gear down \n\t\t(green) lights not illuminated: \n\t\tFLAP LEVER.....................................................................\t5/1 \n\t\tSelect flaps 5 then 1. \n\t\tRepeat until all gear down (green) \n\t\tlights illuminate. \n\t-\tUse flaps 20 and VREF 20 for landing. \n\t-\tL thrust reverser and nose wheel steering \n\t\tinoperative \n\tGROUND PROXIMITY FLAPS OVERRIDE SWITCH........\tOVRD \n\tALTERNATE FLAPS SELECTOR.............................................SET \n\t\tPosition to agree with flap lever. \n\tALTERNATE FLAPS SWITCHES \n\t\t(Leading and Trailing Edge)........................................\tALTN \n\tALTERNATE FLAPS SELECTOR.............................................SET \n\t\tExtend or Retract Flaps as required. \n\n\tCAUTION:\tDO NOT REPRESSURIZE LEFT \n\t\t\tHYDRAULIC SYSTEM OR RESET PTU \n\t\t\tCONT CIRCUIT BREAKER INFLIGHT \n\t\t\tOR ON THE GROUND, AS GEAR WILL \n\t\t\tRETRACT. \n\n\tNOTE: Compliance with this directive may be effected by including a copy of telegraphic AD T84-14-51, issued June 29, 1984, in the airplane flight manual and operating manual. \n\n\t\t2.\tFurther revenue flight following landing gear jam is prohibited until repairs are made. \n\n\t\t3.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\t\t4.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tB.\tPrior to September 1, 1986: \n\n\t\t1.\tModify the landing gear selector valve assembly, Boeing P/N 60B00216-7, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 757-32-0033, dated September 7, 1984, or later FAA- approved revision. \n\n\t\t2.\tFollowing modification of the selector valve, the special emergency procedure implemented by paragraph A., above, may be removed. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or at the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThe telegraphic AD issued June 29, 1984, became effective upon receipt. \n\tThis amendment becomes effective November 12, 1985.
97-02-09: This amendment supersedes two existing airworthiness directives (AD), applicable to all Boeing Model 727 series airplanes, that currently require inspections to detect cracking of the actuator rib fitting of the inboard door of the main landing gear (MLG); and rework or replacement of any cracked fitting. This amendment requires inspections to detect cracking in an expanded area of the actuator rib fitting, and various follow-on actions. This amendment is prompted by a report of a fractured rib fitting that had been reworked in accordance with one of the existing AD's. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent damage to the airplane caused by a failure of the landing gear to extend due to a fractured rib fitting.
87-12-01: 87-12-01 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-5636. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-81, -82, -83 (MD-81, -82, -83) series airplanes, Fuselage Numbers 909 through 1350, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo ensure the integrity of the main landing gear upper torque link attach bolts, P/N 3935363, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin 7 days after the effective date of this AD, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Douglas Aircraft Alert Service Bulletin A32-220, dated April 20, 1987, or later FAA-approved revision, perform a visual inspection to verify the installation of the left and right main landing gear upper torque arm attach bolt, washer, and nut. If a bolt is missing, prior to further flight replace with a new or serviceable bolt, washer, and nut. If the original bolt, washer, and nut are present, repeat visual inspections of the original bolt, washer, and nut at intervals not to exceed 7 days until the requirements of paragraph B. or C., below, are accomplished. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 90 days after the effective date of this AD, in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Douglas Aircraft Alert Service Bulletin A32-220, dated April 20, 1987, or later FAA-approved revision, perform an ultrasonic inspection of the attach bolt for defects. If no defects are found, loosen and retighten the original nut to a torque of 80 to 100 foot-pounds. Repeat the ultrasonic inspections at intervals not to exceed 180 days until the requirements of paragraph C., below, are accomplished. If a defect is found, prior to further flight replace with a new or serviceable bolt, washer, and nut. \n\n\tC.\tAccomplishment of the magnetic particle inspection of the bolt in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Douglas Aircraft Alert Service Bulletin A32-220, dated April 20, 1987, or later FAA-approved revision, constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by paragraphs A. and B., above, if no defects are found as a result of the magnetic particle inspection. If a defect is found, prior to further flight replace with a new or serviceable bolt, washer, and nut. \n\n\tD.\tInstallation of new or serviceable bolt, washer, and nut in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Douglas Aircraft Alert Service Bulletin A32-220, dated April 20, 1987, or later FAA-approved revision, constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by this AD. \n\n\tE.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tF.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information fromthe manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective June 22, 1987.
2011-17-05: We are superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: * * * [C]racks * * * in sections 13 to 18 of the fuselage between rivets of longitudinal lap joints between frames 18 and 80 which could affect the structural integrity of the fuselage if not corrected. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-03-01: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Raytheon Aircraft Company (Raytheon) Model 1900D airplanes (formerly referred to as Beech Model 1900D airplanes). This action requires replacing the right-hand exhaust stack for both the left and right engines. This action results from reports of wing skin damage (with associated fuel seepage) and cabin window damage caused by the heat of the right-hand exhaust stacks on the affected airplanes. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent wing skin de-bonding or warping of the cabin windows because of the heat generated by the engines' right-hand exhaust stacks.
92-16-10: 92-16-10 BOEING: Amendment 39-8319. Docket No. 91-NM-143-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 767 airplanes, as listed in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-29A0064, Revision 1, dated October 24, 1991, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent hydraulic fluid from entering the cabin, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 3,000 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, inspect the inboard leading edge slat power drive unit hydraulic pressure tube for clearance from the adjacent pneumatic duct and for signs of chafing, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-29A0064, Revision 1, dated October 24, 1991: \n\n\t\t(1)\tIf the clearance is more than 0.25 inch and there are no signs of chafing, no further action is necessary. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIf the clearance is 0.25 inch or less, or if signs of chafing are found on the hydraulic tube, prior to further flight, replace both the hydraulic pressure tube andthe hydraulic return tube, in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\t\t(3)\tIf chafing is found on the pneumatic duct, prior to further flight, repair the pneumatic duct in accordance with the service bulletin.\n\n\t(b)\tFor airplanes on which the hydraulic pressure tube has been replaced in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-29A0064 (original issue), dated June 13, 1991: Within 4,000 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, replace the hydraulic return tube in accordance with Paragraph III.D. of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-29A0064, Revision 1, dated October 24, 1991. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tThe inspection, repairs, and replacement shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-29A0064, Revision 1, dated October 24, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on September 28, 1992.
90-17-08: 90-17-08 BOEING: Amendment 39-6692. Docket No. 90-NM-30-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 767 series airplanes as listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 767- 30A0011, Revision 2, dated September 28, 1989, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo ensure the integrity of the wing and engine anti-ice system, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 300 hours time-in-service after July 21, 1988 (the effective date of Amendment 39-5970), and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 300 hours time-in-service, perform the wing and engine thermal anti-ice operational test described in Boeing Service Bulletin 767-30A0011, Revision 2, dated September 28, 1989. \n\n\tNOTE: This is the same as the operational test required by AD 88-04-04 R1.\n \n\tB.\tAny switch or circuit malfunction, identified by a negative verification during the functional test required by paragraph A., above, must be corrected prior to further flight, inaccordance with the Boeing Model 767 Maintenance Manual or Boeing Service Bulletin 767- 30A0011, Revision 2, dated September 28, 1989. \n\n\tC.\tWithin the next 6,000 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, modify the thermal anti-ice system in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-30A0011, Revision 2, dated September 28, 1989. This constitutes terminating action for repetitive operational testing required by paragraph A., above. \n\n\tD.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, S.W., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis AD supersedes AD 88-04-04 R1, Amendment 39-5970. \n\tThis amendment (39-6692, AD 90-17-08) becomes effective on September 17, 1990.
2011-21-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Diamond Aircraft Industries GmbH Model (Diamond) DA 40 airplanes equipped with cabin air conditioning vapor cycle system (VCS) installed per STC SA03674AT held by Premier Aircraft Services (originally held by DER Services, Inc.) following DER Services Master Document List MDL-2006- 020-1, Revision C, dated February 3, 2009; Revision D, dated April 22, 2009; Revision E, dated May 12, 2010; or Revision F, dated July 6, 2010. This AD was prompted by reports of damage around the VCS compressor mounting areas found during maintenance inspections. This AD requires deactivation of the VCS, removal of the compressor and bracket, and revision to the airplane weight and balance. We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-02-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9, DC-9-80, and C-9 (military) series airplanes, Model MD- 88 airplanes, and Model MD-90 airplanes. This action requires a visual check to determine the part and serial numbers of the upper lock link assembly of the nose landing gear (NLG); repetitive inspections of certain upper lock link assemblies to detect fatigue cracking; and modification of the NLG. This action also provides for terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that, due to fatigue cracking, the upper lock link assembly on an airplane fractured, and consequently prevented the NLG from extending fully. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent this assembly from fracturing due to fatigue cracking, and the NLG consequently failing to extend fully; this condition could result in injury to passengers and flight crew, and damage to the airplane.
97-01-12: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Airtell International, Inc., Centaurus Model C3-100 GPWS equipment that is installed on any type of airplane, that requires replacement of this equipment with a similar type of equipment that meets specific performance requirements. This amendment is prompted by results of an investigation, which revealed that, under certain circumstances, the Centaurus GPWS equipment does not provide the flight crew with aural warnings to indicate that the airplane is descending. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the GPWS equipment to provide such aural warnings. If the flight crew relies on receiving such warnings and the GPWS equipment fails to provide those warnings, the ability of the flight crew to prevent the airplane from impacting the ground may be inhibited.
2009-13-06 R1: We are revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Piper Aircraft, Inc. Models PA-23, PA-23-160, PA-23-235, PA-23- 250, PA-23-250 (Navy UO-1), PA-E23-250, PA-31, PA-31-300, PA-31-325, PA-31-350, PA-31P, PA-31P-350, PA-31T, PA-31T1, PA-31T2, PA-31T3, PA- 42, PA-42-720, and PA-42-1000 airplanes that are equipped with a baggage door in the fuselage nose section (a nose baggage door). That AD currently establishes life limits and replacement requirements for safety-critical nose baggage door components and repetitive inspections and lubrication of the nose baggage door latching mechanism and lock assembly. This new AD removes the requirement for the nose baggage door compartment interior light inspection and retains the other requirements from AD 2009-13-06, Amendment 39-15944. This AD was prompted by further investigation and a request for an alternative method of compliance (AMOC). We are issuing this AD to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
85-16-01: 85-16-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-5114. Applies to Boeing Model 767 series airplanes certificated in any category. Compliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo preclude failure of the Pneumatic System Pressure Regulating and Shutoff Valve (PRSOV), and to assure its integrity when commanded closed by a crew procedure, accomplish either paragraph A. or B., below, (1) within the next 200 hours time-in-service on the PRSOV, or prior to the accumulation of 1500 hours time-in-service on the PRSOV, whichever occurs later, on airplanes equipped with General Electric CF6-80 series engines, or (2) within the next 500 hours time-in-service on the PRSOV, or prior to accumulation of 3000 hours time-in-service on the PRSOV, whichever occurs later, on airplanes equipped with Pratt & Whitney JT9D series engines: \n\n\tA.\tReplace the PRSOV, Hamilton Standard P/N 773288, with a serviceable valve. Repeat this procedure for replacement valves not modified in accordance with paragraph B. below, (1) prior to the accumulation of 1500 hours time-in-service on the valve, on airplanes equipped with General Electric CF6-80 series engines, or (2) prior to the accumulation of 3000 hours time-in-service on the valve, on airplanes equipped with Pratt & Whitney JT9D series engines. \n\n\tB.\tAccomplish PRSOV modification in accordance with Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin 36-2030, dated March 8, 1985, or later FAA-approved revisions. Valves modified in accordance with this bulletin are not subject to a repetitive replacement, and constitute terminating action for this AD. \n\n\tNOTE: In the event an operator is unable to establish the accumulated hours time-in- service on a given PRSOV installed on an airplane, the total hours accumulated on the airplane must be used in the determination of replacement or modification times for the PRSOV. \n\n\tC.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, SeattleAircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124, or to Hamilton Standard, Bradley Field Road, Windsor Locks, Connecticut 06096. These documents also may be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective August 19, 1985.
90-25-01: 90-25-01 BOEING: Amendment 39-6789. Docket No. 89-NM-270-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: All Model 737 series airplanes, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tNOTE: This AD references Boeing Document Number D6-38528, "Aging Airplane Corrosion Prevention and Control Program, Model 737," Revision A, dated July 28, 1989, for inspection procedures, compliance times, and reporting requirements. In addition, this AD specifies inspection and reporting requirements beyond those included in the Document. Where there are differences between the AD and the Document, the AD prevails. \n\n\tTo control corrosion, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin one year after the effective date of this AD, revise the FAA-approved maintenance program to include the corrosion control program specified in Boeing Document Number D6-38528, "Aging Airplane Corrosion Prevention and Control Program, Model 737," Revision A, dated July 28, 1989, (hereinafter referred to as "the Document"). \n\n\tNOTE: All structure found corroded or cracked as a result of an inspection conducted in accordance with this paragraph must be addressed in accordance with FAR Part 43. \n\n\tNOTE: Where non-destructive inspection (NDI) methods are employed, in accordance with Section 4.1 of the Document, the standards and procedures used must be acceptable to the Administrator in accordance with FAR 43.13. \n\n\tNOTE: Procedures identified in the Document as "optional" are not required to be accomplished by this AD. \n\n\tB.\t1.\tIf, as a result of any inspection conducted in accordance with the program required by paragraph A., above, Level 3 corrosion is determined to exist in any area, accomplish one of the following within 7 days after such determination: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tSubmit a report of any findings of Level 3 corrosion to the Manager of the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO) and inspect the affected area on all Model 737 aircraft in the operator's fleet; or \n\n\t\t\tb.\tSubmit for approval to the Manager of the Seattle ACO one of the following: \n\n\t\t\t\t(1)\tProposed adjustments to the schedule for performing the tasks in that area on remaining airplanes in the operator's fleet, which are adequate to ensure that any other Level 3 corrosion is detected in a timely manner, along with substantiating data for those adjustments; or \n\n\t\t\t\t(2)\tData substantiating that the Level 3 corrosion found is an isolated occurrence and that no such adjustments are necessary. \n\n\tNOTE: Notwithstanding the provision of Section 1.1. of the Document that would permit corrosion that otherwise meets the definition of Level 3 corrosion (i.e., which is determined to be a potentially urgent airworthiness concern requiring expeditious action) to be treated as Level 1 if the operator finds that it "can be attributed to an event not typical of the operator's usage of other airplanes in the same fleet," this paragraph requires that data substantiating anysuch finding be submitted to the FAA for approval. \n\n\tNOTE: As used throughout this AD, where documents are to be submitted to the Manager of the Seattle ACO, the document should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. The Seattle ACO will not respond to the operator without the PI's comments or concurrence. \n\n\t\t2.\tThe FAA may impose adjustments other than those proposed, upon a finding that such adjustments are necessary to ensure that any other Level 3 corrosion is detected in a timely manner. \n\n\t\t3.\tPrior to the compliance time specified for the first task required in the adjusted schedule approved under paragraph B.1. or B.2. of this AD, revise the FAA-approved maintenance program to include those adjustments. \n\n\tNOTE: The reporting requirements of this paragraph and of paragraph D., below, do not relieve operators from reportingcorrosion as required by FAR Section 121.703. \n\n\tC.\tTo accommodate unanticipated scheduling requirements, it is acceptable for a repeat inspection interval to be increased by up to 10 percent but not to exceed 6 months. The cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI) must be informed, in writing, of any extension.\n \n\tNOTE: Except as provided in this paragraph, notwithstanding Section 3.1., paragraph 4, of the Document, all extensions to any compliance time must be approved by the Manager of the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tD.\tReport forms for Level 2 corrosion and a follow-up report for Level 3 corrosion must be submitted at least quarterly in accordance with Section 5.0 of the Document. \n\n\tE.\tIf the repeat inspection or task intervals of an operator's existing corrosion inspection program are shorter than the corresponding intervals in Section 4.3 of the Document, they may not be increased without specific approval of the Manager of the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tF.\tBefore any airplane that is subject to this AD can be added to an air carrier's operations specifications, a program for the accomplishment of tasks required by this AD must be established in accordance with the following: \n\n\t\t1.\tFor airplanes that have previously been operated under an FAA-approved maintenance program, the initial task on each area to be accomplished by the new operator must be accomplished in accordance with the previous operator's schedule or with the new operator's schedule, whichever would result in the earlier accomplishment date for that task. After each task has been performed once, each subsequent task must be performed in accordance with the new operator's schedule. \n\n\t\t2.\tFor airplanes that have not previously been operated under an FAA-approved maintenance program, each initial task required by this AD must be accomplished either prior to the airplane's being added to the air carrier's operations specifications, or in accordance with a schedule approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO.G.\tIf corrosion is found to exceed Level 1 on any inspection after the initial inspection, the corrosion control program for the affected area must be reviewed and means implemented to reduce corrosion to Level 1 or better. \n\n\t\t1.\tWithin 60 days after such a finding, if corrective action is necessary to reduce future findings of corrosion to Level 1 or better, such proposed corrective action must be submitted for approval to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\t\t2.\tWithin 30 days after the corrective action is approved, revise the FAA-approved maintenance program to include the approved corrective action. \n\n\tH.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tI.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tThe requirements shall be done in accordance with Boeing Document Number D6-38528, "Aging Airplane Corrosion Prevention and Control Program, Model 737," Revision A, dated July 28, 1989. This incorporation by reference was approved by approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, Northwest Mountain Region, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., 5th Floor, Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street N.W., Room 8301, Washington, D.C. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6789, AD 90-25-01) becomes effective on December 31, 1990.
48-11-01: 48-11-01 DOUGLAS: Applies to DC-6 Aircraft. \n\n\tTo be accomplished prior to return to service in class B operation-with cabin heating and thermal deicing, including windshield, operative, but with cabin supercharging inoperative. \n\n\tRework must be accomplished in accordance with the following Douglas Co. data: \n\n\t1.\tAccomplish all rework covered by data listed in Note 48-10-01 for class A operation with the exception of the rework outlined in Service Bulletins No. 258, No. 225 and No. 230. Also accomplish paragraphs 1 and 2 but do not accomplish 3 of Note 48-10-01. \n\n\t2.\tRework in accordance with the following must also be accomplished: \n\n\tService Bulletin DC-6 No. 223, Stainless Steel Heater Discharge Ducts and Windshield Anti-Icing Ducts, as revised February 24, 1948. \n\n\tService Bulletin DC-6 No. 38, Heater Fire Warning Switch-Installation of, dated October 6, 1947. \n\n\tService Bulletin DC-6 No. 250, Cabin Heater Shut-Off Control, dated February 19, 1948. \n\n\tService Bulletin DC-6 No. 211, Main Cabin Heater Exhaust-Revision of, as revised February 23, 1948. \n\n\tService Bulletin DC-6 No. 227, Cabin Heater Scoop Segregation, as revised February 24, 1948. \n\n\tService Bulletin DC-6 No. 243, Revise Cabin Heater Ignition Conduit in Boiler Room and Hell-Hole Area, as revised January 26, 1948. \n\n\tService Bulletin DC-6 No. 245, Heater and Buffet Power Cable Conduit, as revised February 24, 1948. \n\n\tThe rework outlined in the data listed above is based upon an airplane which incorporates certain production changes. Therefore, in order to satisfactorily complete the rework required, some aircraft* must also be revised in accordance with the following: \n\n\tService Bulletin DC-6 No. 40, Heater Exhaust Fire Detector-Replacement of, dated September 3, 1947. (Accomplish partially*). \n\n\tService Bulletin DC-6 No. 71, Installation-Oil Trap and Drain, Cabin Heater Combustion Air Duct, dated September 3, 1947. (Accomplish Electrical Phase of Service Bulletin only.) \n\n\tService Bulletin DC-6 No. 96, Windshield De-icing Air Discharge Revision, dated December 22, 1947. \n\n\tService Bulletin DC-6 No. 141, Improvements in DC-6 Cabin Pressure and Cabin Air Conditioning Systems, dated February 19, 1948. \n\n\tService Bulletin DC-6 No. 150, Revision-Cockpit and Windshield Heat Control System and Windshield Air Exhaust, dated December 11, 1947. \n\n\tService Bulletin DC-6 No. 160, Cabin Air Mixing Valve Actuator, dated February 2, 1948. \n\n\tService Bulletin DC-6 No. 179, Ground Blower Electrical Wiring Revision, dated December 29, 1947. \n\n\tService Bulletin DC-6 No. 28, Installation of Ammeter and Selector Switch for Functional Check of Pitot and Air Scoop Anti-Icing Heaters, dated August 20, 1947. (Must be accomplished completely except that P/N 3320167-516 nameplate, 1 required, shall be deleted.) \n\n\tIn addition to the above, the following must also be accomplished in all aircraft: \n\n\t(a)\tDisconnect the superchargers and drain and flushsupercharger oil system. \n\n\t*Serial numbers of airplanes affected by this rework are listed on the pertinent Service Bulletin(s). Also, additional information may be obtained from the "Supplement" to "Cross Reference List-Service Changes and Modification Items" which has been prepared and revised by the Douglas Co. as of February 11, 1948.
96-26-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 747 series airplanes. This action requires a one-time inspection to detect fatigue cracking of the vertical beam webs and chords of the nose wheel well (NWW) at body station (BS) 300 and BS 320, and repair, if necessary. This action also requires inspections to detect fatigue cracking of the inner chord and web of the fuselage frames at BS 300 and BS 320, and repair, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by a report indicating that the fuselage frames at BS 300 and BS 320 severed approximately 10 inches outboard of the NWW side panel and resulted in accelerated fatigue cracking and subsequent failure of the adjacent NWW vertical beams. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect and correct such fatigue cracking, which could result in collapse of the NWW pressure bulkhead and subsequent rapid decompression of the airplane.
96-25-17: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes, that requires inspections to detect bent or damaged tie links and washers of the elevator feel and centering unit, and replacement of the centering unit with a new or serviceable unit, if necessary. This amendment also provides an optional replacement of the centering unit, which, if accomplished with the installation of supports and a stop bolt, constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This amendment is prompted by a report of high control column forces that occurred during takeoff and landing. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such high forces, which could result in restriction of elevator control during takeoff, climbout, and landing.
55-11-01: 55-11-01 DOUGLAS: Applies to All DC-6 Aircraft; DC-6A Through Fuselage No. 543; DC-6B Through Fuselage No. 590; DC-7 Through Fuselage No. 566 (Except Fuselage No. 486); and C-18A Airplane Serial Number 42881 (Fuselage No. 29). \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tAs a result of recent landing accidents in which the nose landing gear collapsed due to failure at the end fitting of yoke P/N 5488450 on a DC-7 and yoke P/N 524570 on a DC-6, and as a result of fatigue cracks being found on subsequent inspections of DC-6 Series as well as DC-7 aircraft, the following inspections must be accomplished at intervals not to exceed 500 hours of operation and should be included as part of any major inspection necessitated by overweight or hard landing. \n\n\t1.\tRemove the bolts from the two upper spot-faced holes in the L.H. and R.H. flanges of the nose gear yoke. P/N 5245790 is used on DC-6 Series aircraft and P/N 5488450 is used on DC-6 Series and DC-7 aircraft. \n\n\t2.\tInspect the bolt holes and radius of the spot face for signs of cracks by means of dye penetrant or equivalent. To obtain good results with dye penetrant inspection, it may be necessary to heat the parts being inspected to 90-100 degrees F. To facilitate the dye to penetrate the cracks. Also inspect the surface at the end of the 1/2-inch radius where the end flange blends into the cylindrical portion of the yoke. \n\n\t3.\t(a)\tIf cracks are found the part must be replaced with P/N 5488450-503 or with new parts P/N 5538558 for DC-6 Series and P/N 5538557-1 for DC-7 and DC-7B aircraft. \n\n\t\t(b)\tIf no cracks are found, and as an interim measure, the old nose gear yoke assemblies P/N 5235790 and 5488450 may be reworked by remachining the spot faces to incorporate a 0.125-inch radius and reworking the 1/2-inch radius of the yoke, when necessary, in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of DC-6 Service Bulletin No. 607 or DC-7 Service Bulletin No. 56 mentioned below. After remachining, shotpeen the spot face radii, the flange and radius where flange blends into the cylindrical portion of the yoke, then clean and apply protective finish. When parts are reworked, as described above, they should be reinstalled using special large washers in accordance with the pertinent Service Bulletin. The inspections outlined in paragraph 2 must be continued on these reworked parts until they are replaced with parts listed in paragraph 3(a). \n\n\t4.\tWhen cracked or reworked parts have been replaced with new parts mentioned in paragraph 3(a) the special inspections required in paragraph 2 may be discontinued. \n\n\t(Douglas Service Bulletin No. 607 dated July 22, 1955, for DC-6 Series and Service Bulletin No. 56 dated July 22, 1955, for DC-7 cover the above.) \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 55-07-01 and those portions of AD 55-10-01 which cover this same subject.
2011-20-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Empresa Brasileira de Aeron(aacute)utica S.A. (EMBRAER) Model EMB-505 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: \n\n\n\tIt has been found the possibility of free-play between the mass balance weight and the elevator structure. This condition if not corrected could lead to elevator flutter and possible loss of airplane control. \n\nWe are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2006-22-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus airplane models identified above. This AD requires inspecting to determine if a certain actuator is installed in the pilot's or co-pilot's seat, and doing applicable corrective actions. For certain actuators, the AD also requires replacing rotors on both vertical and horizontal movements with new rotors, and replacing the clutch cap with a new cap. This AD results from a report of heavy wear at the driving gear of the rotor shaft end of the electrical driven motor on certain actuators of the pilot's and co-pilot's seats. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncommanded movement of the pilot's or co- pilot's seat during takeoff or landing, which could result in interference with the operation of the airplane and consequent temporary loss of airplane control.
2011-18-17: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several reports have been received on failures of the main landing gear (MLG) stabilizer extension springs. A landing gear audit has confirmed that the MLG may not lock in the down-lock position with the absence of both MLG stabilizer extension springs. The loss of the locking mechanism could result in the collapse of the main landing gear. * * * * * We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
63-11-01: 63-11-01 BOEING: Amdt. 568 Part 507 Federal Register May 23, 1963. Applies to All Models 707 and 720 Aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required within the next 100 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD and thereafter at intervals not exceeding 100 hours' time in service and as indicated in paragraphs (d) and (e). \n\n\tAs a result of failures of the landing gear truck beam and related components, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a) Clean the truck beams in accordance with the following: \n\n\t\t(1) Prerinse the area using Stoddard Solvent P-S-661 type 1 or water. \n\n\t\t(2) Using a soft bristle or fiber brush, apply one of the following cleansing agents, or equivalent approved by FAA Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Western Region to the soiled areas: \n\n\t\t\t(i) Oakite 204, full strength; \n\n\t\t\t(ii) Oakite 74L, one part with five parts water; \n\n\t\t\t(iii) Wyandotte Aerowash A, full strength; \n\n\t\t\t(iv) Kelite Formula 29, full strength; \n\n\t\t\t(v) An emulsion cleaner listed in Chapter 13 of Boeing Overhaul Manual; and \n\n\t\t\t(vi) An emulsion cleaner tested in accordance with Boeing Document D6- 17487, dated August 24, 1965, or later revision. \n\n\t\t(3) Allow cleansing agent to remain on the parts for 5 minutes. Do not permit the area to dry. Agitate the cleaner applied to beam and allow to remain on the parts an additional 5 minutes. Agitate again with the brush and thoroughly pressure rinse with water, preferably warm, but not exceeding 120 degrees F. In lieu of, or as a supplement to the pressure rinse with water, the cleaners may be removed by use of solvents listed in Chapter 13 of Boeing Overhaul Manual. \n\n\t(b) After cleaning, make a thorough visual inspection of the truck beam using mirrors as necessary and a strong light to detect any evidence of jack marks, scratches, gouges, corrosion or impact dents. Remove any straps around the beam which show evidence of damage. Particular attention shall be given to: \n\n\t\t(1) The lower section of the beam for evidence of jack marks caused by jack slippage or improperly placed jacks; \n\n\t\t(2) The forward area of the beam where contact is possible with the torsion link pivot pin retaining bolt (on the lower torque link lug on the Model 720); and, \n\n\t\t(3) To the aft area of the beam where contact is possible with the shock strut inner cylinder upon snubber failure. \n\n\t(c) Truck beams exhibiting evidence of corrosion, scratches, jack marks, dents or gouges shall be replaced before further flight unless repaired in accordance with FAA approved Boeing Service Bulletin No. 142(R-2) or later FAA approved revisions. Evidence of jack marks or dents shall be inspected with a dial indicator or FAA approved equivalent to determine the depth of such damage. No repair is permitted if the depth exceeds 0.005 inch. \n\n\t(d) Before further flight after any jacking operations and after main landing gear snubber failure, clean and inspect the truck beam as follows: \n\n\t\t(1) Clean truck beam with one of the approved Boeing solvents for cleaning of high heat-treated steel listed in Chapter 13 of the Boeing Overhaul Manual. \n\n\t\t(2) Inspect and, as necessary, rework or replace the truck beam in accordance with paragraphs (b) and (c). \n\n\t\t(3) If a truck beam shield is fabricated and installed in accordance with American Airlines Engineering Change Order No. B1743, dated October 8, 1962, or FAA Western Region Engineering approved equivalent is installed, the following inspection procedure for the truck beam area protected by the shield may be followed in lieu of that required by (d)(1) and (2): \n\n\t\t\t(i) Clean the truck beam shield with Navee 427 or FAA approved equivalent, and inspect it for evidence of dents, gouges, cracks, pressure marks, or other damage. \n\n\t\t\t(ii) If no evidence of dents, gouges, cracks, pressure marks or other damage is found, further inspection of the truck beam area protected by the shield is not required at this inspection period. \n\n\t\t\t(iii) If evidence of dents, gouges, cracks, pressure marks, or other damage is found, remove the shield and clean and inspect the truck beam in accordance with (d)(1) and (2). If the shield is still serviceable, it may be reinstalled provided that any dents, gouges, cracks, pressure marks, or other damage is painted over with yellow paint to indicate old damage. \n\n\tNOTE: When a shield is installed on the truck beam in compliance with paragraph (d)(3) compliance with the remaining provisions of the AD is still required. \n\n\t\t(4) If a Boeing truck beam shield is fabricated and installed in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 1780 or FAA Western Region Engineering approved equivalent, the following inspection procedure for the truck beam area protected by the shield may be followed in lieu of that required by (d)(1) and (2): \n\n\tNOTE: The British Overseas Airways Corporation truck beam shield manufactured and installed in accordance with BOAC Drawing No. BOA-B61138 is an approved equivalent to the Boeing truck beam shield. \n\n\t\t\t(i) Clean and inspect the truck beam shield for any evidence of impact damage such as dents. \n\n\t\t\t(ii) If no evidence of impact damage is found, further inspection of the truck beam area protected by the shield is not required at this inspection period. \n\n\t\t\t(iii) If the shield is distorted to the extent that contact with the beam is obvious or suspected, remove the shield and clean and inspect the truck beam in accordance with (d)(1) and (2). If the shield is still serviceable, it may be reinstalled provided that any impact damage is painted over with yellow paint to indicate old damage. \n\n\t\t\t(iv) At intervals not to exceed 600 hours' time in service after original installation of the shield, visually inspect the truck beam for evidence of foreign matter between the truck beam and the shield, or corrosion on the truck beam. If foreign matter is present, clean the truck beam and shield as necessary.If corrosion is present, remove the corrosion in accordance with Boeing FAA approved Service Bulletin No. 142 (R-2) or later FAA approved revision. \n\n\t\t\t(v) At intervals not to exceed 5,550 hours' time in service after original installation of the shield, remove the shield and inspect for corrosion. Remove any corrosion present in accordance with Boeing FAA approved Service Bulletin No. 142(R-2) or later FAA approved revisions. \n\n\t(e) The 100-hours repetitive inspection interval may be increased to 600 hours' time in service when the automatic brake cylinder and the piston in the main landing gear metering valve are replaced with new Boeing actuator assembly 69-10763, and the landing gear snubber assembly and main landing gear centering cylinders have been reworked in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletins Nos. 535 and 535B. Concurrently with the increase to 600 hour repetitive inspection interval, the cleaning procedures of paragraph (d) may be used in lieu of those of paragraph (a). \n\n\tNOTE: Some aircraft have been modified prior to delivery to incorporate the work required by Boeing Service Bulletins No. 535 and 535B. \n\n\t(f) The main landing gear shall not be jacked and/or supported at points other than the forward and aft truck beam jack pads, unless the aircraft is otherwise supported in accordance with Section 32 of the Boeing Maintenance Manual. \n\n\t(g) Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. \n\n\t(Boeing Service Bulletin No. 142(R-2) covers this same subject.) \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 62-17-02. \n\n\tThis directive effective May 23, 1963. \n\n\tRevised August 13, 1964. \n\n\tRevised May 17, 1966.