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2010-18-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Several in service events related to various electrical systems, have led to the discovery of a common root cause: A leakage failure mode of Transient Voltage Suppressor (TVS) diodes used on Power Distribution Control Units (PDCU) cards or Generator Control Unit (GCU) cards in the Primary Power Distribution Boxes (PPDB). Due to such TVS diode failure mode, operation of some electrical circuits is degraded and some control signals are set at unexpected levels. Further analysis indicated that combination of a TVS diode failure with other systems failures could significantly reduce flight safety. * * * * * The unsafe condition is a leakage failure mode of TVS diodes used on PDCU cards or GCU cards in the PPDB, which in combination with other system failures could lead to loss of controllability of the airplane. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.
71-06-09 R1: 71-06-09 R1 BRITISH AEROSPACE: Amendment 39-1177 as amended by Amendment 39- 4737. Applies to BAC 1-11 200 and 400 series airplanes, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required as indicated. To prevent malfunction of the auxiliary power unit (APU) air delivery duct nonreturn valve, accomplish the following: A. For airplanes having nonreturn valve P/N 525180 installed: 1. Within the next 100 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the previous 60 hours time in service and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 160 hours time in service, perform the actions specified by paragraphs 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 of Accomplishment Instructions, British Aerospace Alert Service Bulletin 49- A-PM3122, Issue 4, dated March 31, 1982. Incorporation of British Aerospace modification PM3254 or PM4912 terminates the requirements of paragraphs 2.3 and 2.4 of the service bulletin. 2. Prior to further flight, unless alreadyaccomplished, install a placard adjacent to the APU control panel in clear view of the pilot, or amend the Airplane Flight Manual limitations Section 2, to read as follows: "Close APU air delivery valve when starting engine from an external supply or by cross-feeding air from an operating engine. Close APU air delivery valve and shut down APU for takeoff and flight operations. Operational use of the APU in flight is prohibited." The placard may be removed or the amendment to the Airplane Flight Manual may be deleted upon replacement of APU air delivery duct nonreturn valve P/N 525180 with nonreturn valve P/N 1398B000 or 1398B000/1398B999 or 3031B000. B. For airplanes having nonreturn valve P/N 1398B000 or 1398B000/1398B999 installed, within the next 750 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the previous 1,500 hours time in service from the last inspection, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed those specified in the service bulletin, perform the actions described by paragraphs 2.4.1, 2.4.2, and 2.4.3 of the service bulletin. C. Incorporation of modifications PM3148, PM3177 and PM4912 constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by this AD. D. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. E. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. Amendment 39-1177 became effective April 16, 1971. This Amendment 39-4737 becomes effective November 3, 1983.
84-19-51 R1: 84-19-51 R1 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT: Amendment 39-5008. Applies to Model S-76A helicopters Serial Numbers 76006, 76007, 760001 through 760339 certificated in all categories. Compliance is required prior to further flight, unless already accomplished. To prevent operation with damaged, bent, or fractured center firewall support stiffeners or doublers which could cut into the tail rotor driveshaft and cause loss of directional control of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect the forward center firewall sections for missing fasteners and proper fit, as required in paragraphs E(1) through E(5)(C) of Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 76-53-25 or FAA approved equivalent. (b) If doubler, Part Number (P/N) 76070-20057-101, is cracked or fails to conform to the firewall contour or to the limits specified in ASB 76-53-25, paragraph E(5)(B), remove and replace as per paragraph E(5)(D) or FAA approved equivalent. (c) If the rivets are not installed as required in paragraph (a) above, comply with paragraph E(5)(E) of ASB 76-53-25 or FAA approved equivalent. (d) Remove the core section from the horizontal seal, P/N 76304-07003-127 or 76304-07003-137, on the aft engine cowl center section fixed or adjustable firewall assembly, P/N 76304-07003-041 or 76304-07003-044, respectively. (e) Inspect stiffeners and doublers used to support the center firewall installation for fractures, distortions, or damage. Assure that the forward edges of the removable center firewall are properly engaged in the slots. (f) Inspect the area between the number 1 section of the tail rotor driveshaft called out in Sikorsky Maintenance Manual (MM) SA 4047-76-2, Section 66-40-00, Figure 401, and the engine compartment center firewall for clearance in accordance with section 5-50-00 of the Airworthiness and Inspection Requirement Manual. If inadequate clearance is found, contact the Boston Aircraft Certification Office (617) 273-7113 or (617) 273-7001 prior to further flight. (g) Helicopters not modified in accordance with Sikorsky Customer Service Notice 76-111 are required to accomplish the inspection of paragraph If) of this AD only. (h) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR Sections 21.197 and 21.199 to operate helicopters to a base for accomplishment of this AD. (i) Alternate repairs, modifications, or other means of compliance with the AD which provide an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. This amendment becomes effective March 7, 1985, as to all persons except those persons to whom it was made immediately effective by telegraphic AD's T84-19-51 issued September 27, 1984, and T84-19-51 R1 issued October 15, 1984, which contained this amendment.
2010-17-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A PW617F-E engine powered twin engined aircraft had recently experienced an uncommanded power reduction on one of its engines. Investigation showed that the Fuel Filter Bypass Valve poppet in the Fuel Oil Heat Exchanger (FOHE) on that engine had worn through the housing seat, allowing unfiltered fuel and debris to contaminate the Fuel Metering Unit (FMU), resulting in fuel flow drop and subsequent power reduction. P&WC has confirmed that this is a dormant failure that could result in an unsafe condition. The PW615F-A engine Fuel Filter Bypass Valve installation is very similar to that of PW617F-E, but so far there have been no operational abnormalities reported due to subject valve failure on PW615F-A engines. However, evaluation by P&WC has confirmed similar dormant failure of worn through poppets of the subject valve on some PW615F-A engine installations, which could affect both engines at the same time on an aircraft and may result in an unsafe condition. We are issuing this AD to prevent uncommanded power reduction, which could result in the inability to continue safe flight and safe landing.
93-01-18: 93-01-18 GULFSTREAM AEROSPACE CORPORATION: Amendment 39-8472. Docket 92-NM- 80-AD. Applicability: All Model G-1159 (GII), G-1159A (GIII), and G-1159B (GIIB) series airplanes; certificated in any category. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent progressive structural degradation at buttock line (BL) 145 wing spanwise splice and possible loss of fail-safe strength capability, accomplish the following: (a) Within 150 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, or within 90 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, inspect the forward and aft lower plank splice fail-safe channels and flanges and splice fittings between wing BL 135 and 156 to detect cracks, in accordance with Gulfstream Customer Bulletin No. 400A, dated April 27, 1992 (for Model GII series airplanes); Gulfstream Customer Service Bulletin No. 403A, dated April 27, 1992 (for Model GIIB series airplanes); or Gulfstream Customer Service Bulletin No. 114A, dated April 27, 1992 (for Model GIII series airplanes); as applicable. NOTE: Inspections of the same type as those required by paragraph (a) of this AD that were accomplished prior to the effective date of this AD in accordance with Gulfstream Customer Service Bulletin No. 400, dated March 16, 1992 (for Model GII series airplanes); Gulfstream Customer Service Bulletin No. 403, dated March 16, 1992 (for Model GIIB series airplanes); or Gulfstream Customer Service Bulletin No. 114, dated March 16, 1992 (for Model GIII series airplanes); are considered in compliance with the requirements of paragraph (a) of this AD. (1) If no cracks are found, no further action is required. (2) If cracks are found in the fail-safe channels or splice fittings, and the cracks meet the conditions and are within the limits specified in the applicable customer bulletin: (i) Flight is permitted provided that repetitive inspections of the same type as the inspections required by paragraph (a) of this AD are accomplished at intervals not to exceed 6 months, in accordance with the applicable customer bulletin. (ii) Repair cracked fail-safe channels and replace cracked splice fittings no later than the next regularly scheduled 18-month wing tank interior inspection, in accordance with the applicable customer bulletin. (iii) Accomplishment of the repair and replacement procedures required by paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this AD constitutes terminating action for the repetitive inspections required by paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this AD. (3) If cracks are found as a result of the initial or repetitive inspections required by paragraph (a) or (a)(2)(i) of this AD, and the cracks do not meet the conditions and are outside the limits specified in the applicable customer bulletin: Prior to further flight, repair cracked fail-safe channels and replace cracked splice fittings, in accordance with the applicable customer bulletin. (4)Within 10 days after the detection of cracks as a result of the initial and repetitive inspections required by paragraphs (a) and (a)(2)(i) of this AD, submit a report of crack damage to Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation, P.O. Box 2206, M/S D-10, Savannah, Georgia 31402-9980. Information collection requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) and have been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), ACE-115A, FAA, Small Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Atlanta ACO. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Atlanta ACO. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) The inspections, repair, and replacement shall be done in accordance with Gulfstream Customer Bulletin No. 400A, dated April 27, 1992 (for Model GII series airplanes); Gulfstream Customer Service Bulletin No. 403A, dated April 27, 1992 (for Model GIIB series airplanes); or Gulfstream Customer Service Bulletin No. 114A, dated April 27, 1992 (for Model GIII series airplanes). (NOTE: The issue dates of those service bulletins are indicated only on the first page of each service bulletin; no other pages of those documents are dated.) This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may beobtained from Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation, P.O. Box 2206, M/S D-10, Savannah, Georgia 31402-9980. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the FAA, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office, Suite 210C, 1669 Phoenix Parkway, Atlanta, Georgia 30349; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. (e) This amendment becomes effective on March 10, 1993.
52-13-01: 52-13-01 COLLINS RADIO: Applies to All Models 51R-1 and 51R-2 Radio Receivers. Compliance required by November 1, 1952. To eliminate failures of 90/150 cycle tone localizer filters due to electrodeposition of copper from the coil windings to the laminated iron core, modify the receiver in accordance with Collins 51R-1 and -2 Service Bulletin No. 21, dated May 7, 1952, by removing the B plus voltage from the 90 and 150 cycle filter input circuits.
90-19-08: 90-19-08 GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY: Amendment 39-6720. Docket No. 90-ANE-09-AD. Applicability: General Electric Company (GE) CF6-6 turbofan engines installed on, but not limited to, McDonnell Douglas DC-10-10 aircraft. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent low cycle fatigue (LCF) failure of the low pressure turbine rotor (LPTR) stage one disk, LPTR stage two disk, and LPTR forward shaft, which could result in uncontained engine failure, accomplish the following: (a) Remove from service, LPTR stage one disks, Part Numbers (P/N) 9690M76P02, 9690M76P03, 9690M76P08, and 9079M51P01, in accordance with the following schedule based upon disk cycles since new (CSN) on the effective date of this AD: (1) Remove within 400 cycles in service (CIS) after the effective date of this AD, disks with greater than or equal to 19,600 CSN. (2) Remove at the next LPTR overhaul after the effective date of this AD, but no later than 4,500 CIS afterthe effective date of this AD or prior to accumulating 20,000 CSN, whichever occurs first, disks with greater than or equal to 10,700 CSN, but less than 19,600 CSN. (3) Remove within 4,500 CIS after the effective date of this AD, disks with greater than or equal to 6,200 CSN, but less than 10,700 CSN. (4) Remove prior to exceeding 10,700 CSN, disks with less than 6,200 CSN. (5) Thereafter, remove disks from service and replace with a serviceable disk prior to exceeding 10,700 CSN. (b) Remove from service, LPTR forward shafts, P/N 9690M90P04, 9690M90P05, 9690M90P07, 9174M87P02 and 9174M87P04, in accordance with the following schedule based upon shaft CSN on the effective date of this AD: (1) Remove within 400 CIS after the effective date of this AD, shafts with greater than or equal to 19,600 CSN. (2) Remove at the next LPTR overhaul after the effective date of this AD, but no later than 4,500 CIS after the effective date of this AD or prior to accumulating 20,000CSN, whichever occurs first, shafts with greater than or equal to 15,000 CSN but less than 19,600 CSN. (3) Remove within 4,500 CIS after the effective date of this AD, shafts with greater than or equal to 10,500 CSN, but less than 15,000 CSN. (4) Remove prior to exceeding 15,000 CSN, shafts with less than 10,500 CSN. (5) Thereafter, remove shafts from service and replace with a serviceable shaft prior to exceeding 15,000 CSN. (c) Replace LPTR stage two disks, P/N 9690M77P03, 9690M77P04, 9690M77P09, 9690M77P11, 9249M40P01, 9249M40P02, 9249M40P03, 9249M40P04 and 9249M40P05, with LPTR stage two disk, P/N 9690M77P14, or later FAA-approved replacement stage two disk, at the next LPTR overhaul after the effective date of this AD, but no later than 4,500 CIS after the effective date of this AD or prior to exceeding the published LCF retirement life, whichever occurs first. NOTES: (1) For the purpose of this AD, an LPTR overhaul is defined as the induction of the engine intoa shop where the subsequent maintenance entails LPTR disassembly. (2) This action establishes the following new LCF retirement lives which are published in Chapter 5 of the CF6-6 Maintenance and Shop manuals: (a) 10,700 cycles for LPTR stage one disks, P/N 9690M76P02, 9690M76P03, 9690M76P08 and 9079M51P01. (b) 15,000 cycles for LPTR forward shafts, P/N 9690M90P04, 9690M90P05, 9690M90P07, 9174M87P02 and 9174M87P04. (3) CF6-6 Series Service Bulletin (SB) 72-944 introduces a new LPTR stage one disk, P/N 9079M51P03, which has an FAA approved LCF retirement life of 20,000 CSN. (4) CF6-6 Series SB 72-945 introduces an FAA approved rework procedure for the affected LPTR forward shafts to increase the FAA approved LCF retirement life to 20,000 CSN. (d) Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. (e) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Airworthiness Inspector, an alternate method of compliance with the requirements of this AD or adjustments to the compliance (schedule) times specified in this AD may be approved by the Manager, Engine Certification Office, Engine and Propeller Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, Federal Aviation Administration, 12 New England Executive Park, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to General Electric Aircraft Engines, CF6 Distribution Clerk, Room 132, 111 Merchant Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45246. These documents may be examined at the Regional Rules Docket, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, New England Region, 12 New England Executive Park, Room 311, Burlington, Massachusetts 01803. This amendment (39-6720, AD 90-19-08) becomes effective on October 15, 1990.
92-08-08: 92-08-08 DE HAVILLAND: Amendment 39-8219; Docket No. 91-CE-73-AD. Applicability: Model DHC-3 Otter airplanes (all serial numbers) that have a Servo-Aero Engineering 20000 Series Kit installed on a Pratt & Whitney PT6A-135/135A engine, certificated in any category. Compliance: Required within the next 100 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent loss of control of the airplane caused by inadvertent engine shutoff, accomplish the following: (a) Visually inspect the Pratt & Whitney PT6A-135/135A engine to ensure that a fuel condition lever lock, part number (P/N) 20037-18, is installed and ensure that it is correctly assembled in accordance with the instructions in Servo-Aero Service Bulletin SB001, dated July 24, 1990. (b) If a fuel condition lever lock is not installed or is not assembled in accordance with the instructions in Servo-Aero Service Bulletin SB001, dated July 24, 1990, prior to further flight, install a fuel condition lever position lock, (P/N) 20037-18, in accordance with the instructions in Servo-Aero Service Bulletin SB001, dated July 24, 1990. (c) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (d) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an equivalent level of safety may be approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3229 E. Spring Street, Long Beach, California 90806-2425. The request should be forwarded through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. (e) The installation required by this AD shall be done in accordance with Servo-Aero Service Bulletin SB001, dated July 24, 1990. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Servo-Aero Engineering Inc., 37 Mortensen Avenue, Salinas, California 93905. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Central Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, Room 1558, 601 E. 12th Street, Kansas City, Missouri, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, NW, Room 8401, Washington, DC. (f) This amendment (39-8219) becomes effective on May 18, 1992.
95-02-19: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Jetstream Aircraft Limited (JAL) HP137 Mk1, Jetstream series 200, and Jetstream Models 3101 and 3201 airplanes. This action requires repetitively inspecting the left and right pilot windscreens for poly vinyl butyrate (PVB) interlayer cracks, and replacing any windscreen that has a crack exceeding certain limits. Several reports of PVB interlayer cracking of pilot windscreens on the affected airplanes prompted this action. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent such windscreen cracking, which, if not detected and corrected, could result in decompression injuries.
2010-15-51: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2010-15-51, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Agusta S.p.A. (Agusta) Model A119 and AW119 MKII helicopters by individual letters. This AD requires, within 5 hours time-in-service (TIS), and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 50 hours TIS, removing the cover of each pilot and co-pilot control box assembly (control box) and inspecting each rotary variable differential transformer (RVDT) control gear locking pin (locking pin) for proper position. If a locking pin is recessed, extended, or missing, this AD requires replacing the control box before further flight. This amendment is prompted by a report that an RVDT locking pin that was installed on a Model AW119 MKII helicopter moved from its proper position, resulting in loss of connectivity of the pilot and co-pilot throttle controls. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent the RVDT locking pin from moving from its proper position, which could lead to loss of manual engine throttle control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.