Results
66-09-01: 66-09-01 DOWTY ROTOL: Amdt. 39-210 Part 39 Federal Register March 16, 1966. Applies to the following Dowty Rotol Propellers with Propeller Blade Serial Numbers Below A.105040: (c) R175/4-30-4/13E Installed on Fairchild F-27 and F-27B; (c) R193/4-30-4/50, Installed on Fairchild F-27A, F-27F, and F-27G; (c) R186/4-30-4/16, Installed on Armstrong Whitworth Argosy Type AW650 Series 101; (c) R184/4-30-4/50, Installed on Grumman G-159; (c) R148/4-20-4/21E, Installed on Viscount 744, (c) R130/4-20-4/12E, Installed on Viscount 745D; and (c) R179/4-20-4/33, Installed on Viscount 810. Compliance required at the next replacement of deicer boots after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent failures of the bond between the deicing boots and the propeller blade's surface, accomplish the following: Apply preprimer Cellon SL4853/4854, or on FAA-approved equivalent, to the surface of the propeller blades before the application of any other primers, inaccordance with Dowty Rotol Service Bulletin No. 61-157 (Modification No. (c) VP.1941) Revision 2 or later ARB-approved revision. This directive effective April 15, 1966. Revised September 13, 1966.
2021-22-20: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Austro Engine GmbH E4 and E4P model diesel piston engines. This AD was prompted by reports of failure of the high-pressure pump (HPP) driving gear and a subsequent determination that a batch of HPP driving gears may have been damaged during assembly. This AD requires, for engines with an affected cylinder head, inspection of the HPP driving gear and, depending on the results of the inspection, replacement of the HPP driving gear with a part eligible for installation. This AD also requires, for engines with an affected HPP driving gear, replacement of the HPP driving gear either before further flight or within a certain number of flight hours after the effective date of this AD. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
77-10-02: 77-10-02 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-2894. Applies to DC-3 and C-47 series airplanes, certificated in all categories, using Hamilton Standard propellers. \n\n\tCompliance required by the first engine change after the effective date of this AD or October 1, 1977, whichever occurs earlier, unless previously accomplished in accordance with AD 55-15-03 as amended by Amendment 55-24 to Part 507. \n\n\tTo increase fire resistance integrity of the propeller feathering system against damage by a powerplant fire, all flexible hose components of propeller feathering lines forward of the firewall must be replaced with lines and fittings which will meet the fire resistance requirements of the hose assemblies specified in (a) through (f) herein. However, if the feathering lines in Zone I include a section of steel tubing, flexible hose assemblies located forward of the cylinders and connecting to the governor are not affected by this directive. \n\n\tThe following flexible hose assemblies are acceptable for use in this application: \n\n\t(a)\tResistoflex SSFR-3800-10 hose assemblies. \n\n\t(b)\tAeroquip 680-10S hose assemblies with Aeroquip 304 protective sleeves over end fittings (Aeroquip Assembly P/N 304000). \n\n\t(c)\tAeroquip 309009 hose assemblies. \n\n\t(d)\tAeroquip 309009-8S hose assemblies (where feathering system requires this size). \n\n\t(e)\tAeroquip 634000-8 or -10, as applicable, hose assemblies. \n\n\t(f)\tHose assemblies that fully comply with FAR 37.140 (TSO-C42) and have a pressure rating equal to or greater than that of the propeller feathering system installed on the airplane. \n\n\t(g)\tEquivalent hose assemblies or other means of compliance may be used when approved by the Chief Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR's 21.97 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a base for the accomplishment of this AD. \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 55-15-03, as amended by Amendment 55-24 to Part 507. \n\n\tThis Amendment becomes effective June 16, 1977.
73-07-02: 73-07-02 GARRETT: Amdt. 39-1610. Applies to all Garrett Model Rescu/88 Emergency Locator Transmitters Part No. 627484-1 Series 1, Series 2, Series 1 with the letter "M" after the serial number, Series 1 and Series 2 with the designation "M1" after the serial number; Part No.627484-3 Series 1, Series 2; Part No. 627484-5 Series 1, Series 2. Compliance required as indicated: To prevent hazards with inadvertent activation of the Emergency Locator Transmitter interfering with the aircraft's navigation and communication, accomplish the following: (a) Before further flight, install on all aircraft incorporating an applicable Garrett Model Rescu/88 Emergency Locator Transmitter, a placard in full view of the pilot which reads: "VOR indications may be affected when the VHF radio is keyed". The placard may be removed when (b) has been accomplished. (b) Within the next 250 hours' aircraft time in service after the effective date of this A.D., remove all affected Garrett Model Rescu/88 Emergency Locator Transmitters from all aircraft so equipped. Replace with Garrett Rescu/88 part number in accordance with the following table or replace with another TSO-approved unit or an equivalent unit approved by Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, Eastern Region. Garrett Rescu/88 Part No. Replace with Garrett P/N 627484-1 Series 1 627484-1 Series 3 or Series 21 627484-1 Series 2 627484-1 Series 1 with the letter "M" after the serial number 627484-1 Series 1 with the designation "M1" after the serial number 627484-1 Series 2 with the designation "M1" after the serial number 627484-3 Series 1 or Series 2 627484-3 Series 3 or Series 21 627484-5 Series 1 or Series 2 627484-5 Series 3 or Series 21 (NOTE: For Piper aircraft see Piper Service Letter 617A which covers this same subject.) This AD Amendment 39-1610 revokes AD 72-22-03. This amendment is effective March 29, 1973.
2009-07-11: The FAA is superseding an existing airworthiness directive (AD), which applies to all Boeing Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. That AD currently requires repetitive inspections for discrepancies of the fuselage skin under the dorsal fin assembly, and repairing if necessary. This new AD requires an inspection for any chafing or crack in the fuselage skin and abrasion resistant coating at the dorsal fin landing, an inspection for damage to the dorsal fin seals, attach clip, and seal retainer, and other specified and corrective actions as necessary. The new requirements will end the need for the existing repetitive inspections. This AD results from a report of an 18-inch crack found in the fuselage skin area under the blade seals of the nose cap of the dorsal fin due to previous wear damage, and additional reports of fuselage skin wear. We are issuing this AD to prevent discrepancies of the fuselage skin, which could result in fatigue cracking due to cabin pressurization and consequent rapid in- flight decompression of the airplane fuselage.
85-20-03: 85-20-03 BOEING: Amendment 39-5142. Applies to Model 727-100, -100C, and -200 series airplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin Number 727-53A0173, dated July 12, 1985, certificated in any category. To detect cracks in the Body Station 1183 pressure bulkhead web and vertical beams, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tOn airplanes with less than 40,000 flight cycles on the effective date of this AD, visually inspect within the next 400 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD, or prior to the accumulation of 25,000 flight cycles, whichever occurs later after the effective date of this AD, the aft pressure bulkhead web for cracks in accordance with Figure 1 of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53A0173, dated July 12, 1985, or later FAA-approved revision: \n\n\t\t1.\tIf no cracks are detected, repeat the inspection in paragraph A., above, at intervals not to exceed 400 flight cycles until inspected in accordance with paragraph C., below. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf cracks are detected, inspect the vertical beams in accordance with Figures 2 and 3 of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53A0173, dated July 12, 1985, or later FAA-approved revisions. Repair all cracks prior to further flight in accordance with the applicable provisions of paragraphs III.C., III.D., III.E, and III.F. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53A0173, dated July 12, 1985, or later FAA-approved revision, and Boeing Drawing Number 65C31492, Revision N/C, or later FAA-approved revision; or in a manner approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. Repeat the visual inspection required by paragraph A., above, at intervals not to exceed 400 flight cycles until inspected in accordance with paragraph C., below. \n\n\tB.\tOn airplanes with 40,000 or more flight cycles, visually inspect within the next 200 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD, the Body Station 1183 pressure bulkhead web for cracks in accordance with Figure 1 of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53A0173, dated July 12, 1985, or later FAA-approved revision. \n\n\t\t1.\tIf no cracks are detected, repeat the inspection in paragraph A., above, at intervals not to exceed 200 flight cycles until inspected in accordance with paragraph C., below. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf cracks are detected, inspect in accordance with Figures 2 and 3 of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53A0173, dated July 12, 1985, or later FAA-approved revision. Repair all cracks prior to further flight in accordance with the applicable provisions of paragraphs III.C., III.D., III.E., and III.F. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53A0173, dated July 12, 1985, or later FAA-approved revision; and Boeing Drawing Number 65C31492, Revision N/C, or later FAA-approved revision; or in a manner approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. Repeat the visual inspection required by paragraph A., above, at intervals not to exceed 200 flight cycles until inspected in accordance with paragraph C., below. \n\n\tC.\tWithin 3800 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD or upon the accumulation of 25,000 flight cycles, whichever occurs later, visually inspect the Body Station 1183 pressure bulkhead vertical beams for cracks in accordance with Figure 2 of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53A0173, dated July 12, 1985, or later FAA- approved revision. If cracks longer than 2 inches are detected, inspect the vertical beams and web in accordance with Figures 1 and 3 of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53A0173, dated July 12, 1985, or later FAA-approved revision. Repair all cracks prior to further flight in accordance with the applicable provisions of paragraphs III.C., III.D., III.E., and III.F. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53A0173, dated July 12, 1985, or later FAA-approved revision; and Boeing Drawing Number 65C31492, Revision N/C, or later FAA-approved revision; or in a manner approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. Repeat the visual inspection of this paragraph at intervals notto exceed 3800 flight cycles. \n\n\tD.\tTo terminate the repetitive inspection requirements of this AD, incorporate the reinforcement of the Body Station 1183 bulkhead vertical beams in accordance with Paragraph II.D. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727- 53-55, Revisions N/C through 2; or Paragraph III.D. of Boeing Service Bulletin 727-53-55, Revision 3, or later FAA-approved revision; or in a manner approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this proposal who have not already received copies of the service bulletins may obtain copies upon request from the Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 PacificHighway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective October 15, 1985.
68-04-04 R2: 68-04-04 R2 BRANTLY: Amendment 39-557 as amended by Amendment 39-3568 is further amended by Amendment 39-4552. Applies to Model B-2, B-2A, and B-2B helicopters, certificated in all categories. \n\n\tFor tail rotor blades, P/N 111-11, with 100 or more hours' time in service after February 27, 1968, compliance required prior to further flight, unless already accomplished, and, thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 100 hours' time in service from the last inspection. For tail rotor blades, P/N 111-11A, with 300 or more hours' time in service after August 15, 1979, compliance required prior to further flight, unless already accomplished, and, thereafter, at intervals not to exceed 300 hours' time in service from the last inspection. \n\n\tTo prevent failures of the tail rotor blade at the spar retention areas, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tRemove, clean, and mark the tail rotor blades in accordance with Brantly Service Bulletin, SB No. B2B-68-1, dated February 14, 1968, and accomplish the following inspections: \n\n\t\t(1)\tVisually inspect the inside and outside of the spars of the tail rotor blades particularly at the inside bearing boss radius for evidence of pitting corrosion. If corrosion is detected, replace the blade assembly before further flight with an airworthy part. \n\n\t\t(2)\tInspect the inside and outside of the spars of the tail rotor blades particularly at the inside bearing boss radius for evidence of cracks using dye penetrant procedures as indicated in Figure 1 of Brantly Service Bulletin, SB No. B2B-68-1, dated February 14, 1968, or use an equivalent method approved by the Manager, Aircraft Certification Division, FAA, Southwest Region, Fort Worth, Texas 76101. If a crack is detected, replace the blade assembly before further flight with an airworthy part. \n\n\t(b)\tAfter the tail rotor blades have been inspected or replaced with an airworthy part as provided in paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this Airworthiness Directive, assemble them in accordance with Brantly Service Bulletin, SB No. B2B-68-1, dated February 14, 1968. \n\n\t(c)\tTo prevent confusion during subsequent inspections of tail rotor blades due to similarity between tail rotor blade assembly, PN 111-11, and assembly, PN 111-11A, use a permanent marking ink or equivalent acceptable for aluminum aircraft components to mark the tail rotor blade assembly with the proper part number identification (see Fig. 1 for dimensions that determine the part configuration). \n\n\t(d)\tIn order to facilitate inspection of the tail rotor blade spar retention area, do not repaint the spar retention area. \n\n\t(e)\tThe requirements of paragraphs (c) and (d) above must be implemented no later than the next compliance with paragraph (a) of this AD after February 14, 1983. \n\n\tAmendment 39-557 became effective February 27, 1968, to all persons except those to whom it was made effective on receipt of airmail letter dated February 14, 1968. \n\n\tAmendment 39-3568 became effective October 28, 1979. \n\n\tThis Amendment 39-4552 becomes effective February 14, 1983.
85-10-03: 85-10-03 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-5065. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10 and KC-10A series airplanes, fuselage numbers 1 through 370, certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent the speedbrake lever from latching into either the 2/3 or full speedbrake detent position during lever retraction after landing, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin two years after the effective date of this AD, replace the existing MS20470AD6 gate rivet in the speedbrake module assembly with a 4932183-3F034 corrosion-resistant steel rivet in accordance with the instructions in Chapter 27-62-01, Item 6, of the DC-10 Component Maintenance Manual, dated August 1, 1982, or later revisions. \n\n\tB.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). These documents also may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective June 24, 1985.
76-26-02: 76-26-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-2795 as amended by Amendment 39-2836. Applies to all Model 737 series airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance required as indicated. \n\tTo detect cracks in the forward and aft cargo door lower stop fittings, (4 total) accomplish the following: \n\tA.\tUpon accumulation of 15,000 flights or within the next 500 flights from the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, inspect the aft cargo door lowest side stop fittings per paragraph C. \n\tB.\tUpon accumulation of 20,000 flights or within the next 500 flights from the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, inspect the forward cargo door lowest side stop fittings per paragraph C. \n\tC.\tVisually or eddy current inspect the lowest side stop fittings in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 737-52-1065, or later FAA approved revisions, or in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. Repeat the inspections at intervals not to exceed 500 flights from the last inspection for the visual method and 2,500 flights from the last inspection for the eddy current method. \n\tD.\tIf a cracked fitting is detected: \n\t\t1.\treplace the fitting and visually or eddy current inspect the adjacent fitting prior to further flight in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 737-52-1065, or later FAA approved revisions, or in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region; or, \n\t\t2.\tcontinue service with no more than one cracked fitting for up to 50 flights under the following conditions: \n\t\t\ta.\tassure the stop fittings adjacent to the cracked fitting are crack-free by visual or eddy current inspection specified in the service bulletin. \n\t\t\tb.\twithin 25 flights repeat the visual or eddy current inspection of the adjacent fitting. \n\t\t\tc.\twithin 50 flights replace the fitting in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\tE.\tReplacement fittings which are not terminating actionparts per paragraph F of this AD must be inspected per paragraphs A, B, and C of this AD as appropriate, except that the initial inspection threshold may be increased to 30,000 flights on the forward cargo door stop fittings and 25,000 flights on the aft cargo door stop fittings, if the fittings are shot peened prior to initial installation per Figure 3 of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 737-52-1065, or later FAA approved revisions, or in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\tF.\tInstallation of a new improved fitting listed in Boeing Service Bulletin No. 737-52-1065, Revision 1, or later FAA approved revisions or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region, constitutes terminating action for this AD at that fitting. \n\tG.\tFor the purpose of this AD, when conclusive records are not available to show the number of flights accumulated by a particular fitting, the number of flights maybe computed by dividing the airplane time-in-service since the fitting was installed in the airplane by the operator's fleet average time per flight for his Model 737 airplanes. \n\tH.\tUpon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals in this AD, if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. \n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). \n\tAll persons affected by this directive, who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer, may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, P. O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. The documents may also be examined at FAA Northwest Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington.Amendment 39-2795 became effective January 14, 1977. \n\tThis amendment 39-2836 becomes effective March 2, 1977.
71-13-02: 71-13-02 HAWKER SIDDELEY AVIATION: Amdt. 39-1229 as amended by Amendment 39-1258. Applies to Model DH-104 "Dove" airplanes. Compliance is required on or before August 31, 1971, unless already accomplished. To prevent possible failure of the Dunlop compressed air bottles used in the emergency landing gear extension systems, inspect the compressed air bottle (P/N AH.7360 or AC.11038) installed in the air bottle assembly (P/N AH.8512) located under the pilot's seat. If the air bottle was manufactured before January 1, 1959, replace the air bottle assembly with a serviceable assembly of the same part number which incorporates an air bottle (P/N AH.7360 or AC.11038) manufactured on or after January 1, 1959. The date of manufacture is etched on the collar of the bottle. (Hawker Siddeley Technical News Sheet, Series CT(104), No. 214, Issue 2, covers this subject.) Amendment 39-1229 became effective July 30, 1971. This Amendment 39-1258 becomes effective July 31, 1971.
90-21-21: 90-21-21 BOEING: Amendment 39-6766. Docket No. 90-NM-108-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes, equipped with General Electric CF6-45 and CF6-50 engines, as listed in Boeing Service Letter 747-SL-54-32, dated December 4, 1989, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished.\n \n\tTo eliminate the potential for an engine fire due to a fuel leak, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tWithin the next 60 days or 450 hours time-in-service after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, replace the aluminum pneumatic duct brackets, P/N 69B94023- 1, in the outboard struts, with steel brackets, P/N 69B94023-2, in accordance with Boeing Service Letter 747-SL-54-32, dated December 4, 1989. \n\n\tB.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tC.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6766, AD 90-21-21) becomes effective on November 16, 1990.
85-06-02: 85-06-02 BF GOODRICH: Amendment 39-5015. Applies to BF Goodrich Main Landing Gear Wheel Assemblies, P/N's 3-1311-3, 3-1365, 3-1365-1, 3-1365-2, 3-1375, 3-1375-1, 3-1375-2, and 3-1375-3 installed on Lockheed L-1011 airplanes; and P/N's 3-1287, 3-1306, 3-1306-1, and 3-1414 installed on Boeing Model 727 airplanes. \n\n\tCompliance is required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To prevent failure of certain BF Goodrich wheel assemblies, due to tie bolt nut cracks, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tAs of the effective date of this AD, no P/N 63-347B RX3 tie bolt nuts shall be used in wheel build up. \n\n\tNOTE: It is recommended that tie bolt nuts marked as above must be destroyed or returned to BF Goodrich. Refer to procedures outlined in Paragraph 2A, BF Goodrich Service Bulletin 439 (for L-1011 airplanes) or Service Bulletin 440 (for Boeing Model 727 airplanes), both issued February 5, 1985. \n\n\tB.\tWithin 50 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, inspect the applicable main wheel assemblies for cracked tie bolt nuts. Adhere to the procedures outlined in Paragraphs 2D and 2E of BF Goodrich Service Bulletin 439 or Service Bulletin 440, as applicable. Any tie bolt nuts found to be cracked must be replaced before further flight. \n\n\tC.\tWithin 60 days following the effective date of this AD, remove all -RX3 tie bolt nuts from service and replace with serviceable parts. \n\n\tD.\tAlternate means of compliance with this AD which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Central Region. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to BF Goodrich Company, Attn: Mr. C. F. Wintrow,P.O. Box 340, Troy, Ohio 45373; telephone (513) 339-3811. These documents also may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective March 19, 1985.
88-10-07: 88-10-07 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-5912. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-8 series airplanes, equipped with P/N(s) 5644642 or 5751152, LH and RH wing flap drive link assembly installed at wing station XW=97.906, certificated in any category. Compliance required as indicated. \n\n\tTo prevent the loss of airplane control in a critical flight regime due to metal fatigue failure of the flap drive link assembly, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tPrior to the accumulation of 6,250 landings on the inboard flap drive link assembly, P/N 5644642 or 5751152, or within the next 375 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless already accomplished within the last 375 landings, conduct inspections for fatigue cracking of specific areas of the link assembly in accordance with Figure 2. of McDonnell Douglas DC-8 Alert Service Bulletin A27-269, dated March 25, 1988 (hereafter referred to as SB A27-269). \n\n\tB.\tIf no cracks are found, repeat inspections in accordance with Figure 2. of SB A27-269, at intervals not to exceed 750 landings. \n\n\tC.\tIf cracks are found, accomplish the following before further flight: \n\n\t\t1.\tIf cracks are within the blend limits of Figure 3. of SB A27-269, rework in accordance with Figure 3. of SB A27-269 and repeat inspections in accordance with Figure 2. of SB A27-269, prior to the accumulation of 750 landings and at intervals thereafter not to exceed 300 landings. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf cracks exceed the blend limits of Figure 3. of SB A27-269, replace with new part of the same part number, in accordance with Figure 4. of SB A27-269. \n\n\tD.\tAlternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tE.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director of Publications, C1-L00 (54-60). This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington or the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California. \n\n\tThis Amendment becomes effective May 25, 1988.
2009-07-10: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for General Electric Company (GE) CF6-80A series turbofan engines with a high-pressure turbine rotor (HPTR) stage 1 disk, part number (P/N) 9367M45G06, installed. This AD requires removing any HPTR stage 1 disk, P/N 9367M45G06, before exceeding 2,075 cycles-since-new (CSN). This AD results from an error by GE that incorrectly cited a cyclic life of 12,600 CSN for the HPTR stage 1 disk, P/N 9367M45G06. We are issuing this AD to prevent the HPTR stage 1 disk from exceeding its part life, which could cause fatigue cracks to start and grow. These cracks could result in a possible uncontained disk failure and damage to the airplane.
70-15-19: 70-15-19 BOEING: Amdt. 39-1051. Applies to 747-100 series airplanes which incorporate 60B00210-1 nose gear steering metering valve assembly. \n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\tTo prevent unsafe conditions resulting from malfunction of the ground steering system and to eliminate causes for such malfunction, accomplish the following: \n\ta.\tWithin 10 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, either (1) establish and maintain pilot surveillance over landing gear steering inputs through an FAA-approved training program established by an operator which follows the recommendations in Boeing Flight Crew Training Bulletin No. 70-20, dated 14 July 1970, or (2) follow an equivalent pilot surveillance procedures approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, or (3) install a placard with the following wording in clear view of the captain and first officer: \n\tBe alert for any unscheduled steering inputs during take-off and landing as indicated by unusual directional control problems or a chattering nose gear due to tire scrubbing. Take immediate positive action with the steering tiller to correct any suspected steering problems. Under no circumstances are circuit breakers to be pulled to deactivate steering or aural warning systems. \n\tb.\tRetain the placard or continue to employ the equivalent pilot surveillance procedure per a., above, until the airplane is modified per g., below. \n\tc.\tWithin the next 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished: \n\t\t(1)\tTest the inherent centering capability of the nose gear steering metering valve in the manner described by Boeing Alert Service Bulletin No. 32-2041. \t \n\t\t(2)\tTest the inherent nose gear centering capability provided by the tiller system, in the manner also described by Boeing Alert Service Bulletin No. 32-2041. \n\td.\tReplace any nose gear steering metering valve prior to further flight if both of the test requirements of c(1) and c(2), above, are not passed, with valve P/N 60B00210-2 or with another valve P/N 60B00210-1 which has been tested and found to pass those test requirements. \n\te.\tInspect and correct any tiller steering system prior to further flight when the nose gear steering metering valve passes the test requirement of c(1), above, but does not pass the test requirements of c(2), above, in accordance with established B-747 maintenance procedures. \n\tf.\tA nose gear steering metering valve which does not pass the test requirements of c(1) but passes the test requirements of c(2) may be continued in service for a period not to exceed 300 hours after the effective date of this AD, provided the test prescribed by c(2) is repeated at intervals not to exceed 25 hours' time in service and the tiller system is corrected as necessary to assure continued satisfactory tiller centering action. \n\tg.\tWithin the next 600 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, replace the nose gear steering metering valve, P/N 60B00210-1, with nose gear steering metering valve, P/N 60B00210-2, or with another valve approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\tThis amendment becomes effective July 30, 1970.
93-05-13: 93-05-13 BOEING: Amendment 39-8517. Docket 92-NM-223-AD. Supersedes AD 92-27-02, Amendment 39-8435. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747-400 series airplanes having line positions up to and including 958, inclusive, equipped with Rolls Royce engines and electrical power feeder connectors at engine firewalls; and Model 767 series airplanes having variable numbers VN111 through VN124, inclusive, and variable numbers VN130 through VN132, inclusive, equipped with Rolls Royce engines and electrical power feeder connectors at engine firewalls; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent undetected fires in the engine strut, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tWithin 30 days after December 30, 1992 (the effective date of AD 92-27-02, Amendment 39-8435), perform a visual inspection of the power feeder connector at each engine firewall to detect signs of arcing, deterioration, unusual hardness or softness, and cracking ofthe elastomer insert, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-24A2190, dated November 16, 1992 (for Model 747-400 series airplanes); or Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767- 24A0088, dated November 16, 1992 (for Model 767 series airplanes); as applicable. \n\n\t\t(1)\tIf any damaged connector is found, prior to further flight, replace it in accordance with the applicable service bulletin. Prior to the accumulation of 1,200 flight hours on the new connector, perform the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD. Thereafter, repeat that inspection at intervals not to exceed 800 flight hours until the connector is replaced again. \n\n\t\t(2)\tIf no damage is found and no connector is replaced, repeat the inspection required by paragraph (a) of this AD at intervals not to exceed 800 flight hours. \n\n\t(b)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle AircraftCertification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(c)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(d)\tThe inspections and replacement shall be done in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 747-24A2190, dated November 16, 1992; or Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767- 24A0088, dated November 16, 1992; as applicable. This incorporation by reference was approved previously by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51, as of December 30, 1992 (57 FR 59285, December 15, 1992). Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(e)\tThis amendment becomes effective on March 18, 1993.
47-42-02: 47-42-02 DOUGLAS: (Was Mandatory Note 21 of AD-762-7.) Applies to C-54 and DC-4 Aircraft. \n\nTo be accomplished as soon as possible but in any case not later than the first engine change after November 15, 1947. \n\nIt has been found that on some airplanes certain rework has been accomplished on the fire seal between the accessories section and the nacelle at the upper cowling former at the point where the carburetor airscoop skin rests on top of the firewall. This rework creates a hazardous condition by providing an opening from the accessories section into the nacelle, through the access hole under the non-ram air intake fairing. \n\nInspect all airplanes to ascertain that a fire seal is provided in this area. If the cowling fire seal has been cut away it must be replaced either with the original type seal or with a new type seal. \n\n(Douglas Service Bulletin DC-4 No. 19 covers a new type fire seal.)
2009-20-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Honeywell International, the manufacturer of the SPZ200 autopilot system installed on the EADS-CASA C-212 series aircraft, has identified a series of servo-motors * * * designed for use in the SPZ200 autopilot system, whose failure can lead to a potential unsafe flight condition. * * * * * * * * The unsafe condition is failure of the servo-motors, which could result in roll oscillations or possible hard-over failures when the autopilot is engaged. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
64-19-01: 64-19-01\tBOEING: Amdt. 787 Part 507 Federal Register August 7, 1964. Applies to Models 707 and 720 Series Aircraft. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tAs a result of several incidents involving loss of air conditioning bay access doors, accomplish the following:\n \n\t(a)\tWithin 550 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless accomplished within the last 2,500 hours' time in service, and at intervals thereafter not to exceed 3,050 hours' time in service from the last inspection: \n\n\t\t(1)\tOn all Models 707 and 720 Series aircraft, inspect for lobe wear the five hinges on the left and right-hand air conditioning bay access doors and the mating hinges located on the bottom of the fuselage between fuselage Station 620 and 820.\n \n\t\t(2)\tRemove any hinges that have lobe wall thicknesses less than 0.030 inches and replace with new hinges of the same part number or an FAA approved equivalent hinge, before further flight.\n \n\t\t(3)\tOn aircraft Serial Numbers17586 through 17619, 17623 through 17626, 17628 through 17652, 17658 through 17673, 17675 through 17684, 17692 through 17706, 17718 through 17720, 17722 through 17724, 17903 through 17905, 17907 through 17909, 17925 through 17927 and 18013, visually inspect the air conditioning bay access doorframes and the hinges thereon for cracks around the rivets attaching the hinges to the door. Before further flight, replace cracked hinges with hinges of the same part number or an FAA-approved hinge, and if the doorframes are cracked, either replace the doors with new doors or repair them in accordance with the applicable Boeing Structural Repair Manual, or repair data approved by a Boeing Structural Designated Engineering Representative (DER). \n\n\t(b)\tThe inspections specified in (a)(3) may be discontinued when reinforcement plates and bolts are added to the access doors in accordance with Paragraph 3, Modification Data, of Boeing Service Bulletin No. 879, dated July 8, 1960, or an FAA Western Region, Aircraft Engineering Division, approved equivalent. \n\n\t(c)\tUpon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region, may adjust the repetitive inspection intervals specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for such operator. \n\n\t(Boeing Service Bulletin No. 879 pertains to this same subject.) \n\n\tThis directive effective September 7, 1964.
85-09-02: 85-09-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-5057. Applies to all Model 767-200 airplanes, certificated in all categories, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 767-55-0005, dated March 29, 1985. This AD is required to detect or avert cracked horizontal stabilizer pivot pins which could fail during flight, resulting in a reduction in the controllability of the airplane. \n\n\tUnless already accomplished, accomplish the following prior to the accumulation of 6,000 total landings, or within 200 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-55-0005, dated March 29, 1985, or later FAA approved revision: \n\n\tA.\tRemove the horizontal stabilizer inner pivot pins and ultrasonically inspect the outer pins for cracks. \n\n\tB.\tIf an outer pivot pin is found cracked, replace it with an improved outer pivot pin before further flight. \n\n\tC.\tReplace the inner pivot pins with improved inner pivot pins, whether or not cracks are found in the outer pin. \n\n\tD.\tIf no cracks are found in the outer pivot pin, the joint must be reassembled with a new inner pivot pin and the existing outer pivot pin must thereafter be reinspected at intervals not to exceed 12,000 landings. \n\n\tTerminating action for the repeat inspections of the outer pivot pin consists of replacing the existing outer pivot pin with an improved outer pivot pin, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-55-0005 dated March 29, 1985, or later FAA approved revision. \n\n\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an acceptable level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective May 20, 1985.
2009-19-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) O-470, IO-470, TSIO-470, IO-520, TSIO-520, IO-550, and IOF-550 series reciprocating engines with TCM EQ3 cylinders installed. This AD requires initial and repetitive visual inspections of TCM EQ3 cylinders for cracks. This AD also requires removal of all EQ3 cylinders as terminating action to the repetitive visual inspections. This AD results from reports of 35 EQ3 cylinders found cracked. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss of engine power due to cracks in the cylinder head, possible engine failure, and fire in the engine compartment.
62-12-01: 62-12-01\tBOEING: Amdt. 441 Part 507 Federal Register May 23, 1962. Applies to All Models 707 and 720 Series Aircraft With DC Type Toilet Flushing Motor Installed. \n\n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\n\tThere have been several cases of fires originating in the electrical system of the d.c. type toilet flushing motor. To eliminate this unsafe condition, rework of the toilet motor electrical circuit and added protection against moisture entering the circuit components in the toilet area are required. Within the next 360 hours' time in service for paragraph (a) and 1,000 hours' time in service for paragraphs (b), (c), and (d) after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished, the following shall be accomplished in accordance with Modification Instructions of Monogram Precision Industries' Service Bulletin No. 35 BAC, dated February 22, 1962, or an FAA approved equivalent. \n\n\t(a)\tReduce the exposure of the system to d.c. voltage by changing the wiring inside the timer so that voltage is applied to the flushing motor during the flushing operation only. \n\n\t(b)\tIncrease the protection from moisture of the connector attached to the pigtail of the flushing motor by moving the connector from the bracket on the flushing motor to a bracket mounted behind the vertical shroud support. \n\n\t(c)\tProvide an improved moisture seal where the wires enter the flushing motor by trimming back the shielding and installing thermo fit sleeving over the wires, and repotting. \n\n\t(d)\tReduce the susceptibility of moisture entering connectors by replacing the potting compound of the connectors attached to the harness and to the motor pigtail with resilient inserts and grommets and supporting the wires with cable clamps attached to the connectors. \n\n\t(Monogram Precision Industries' Service Bulletin No. 35 BAC, covers this same subject.) \n\n\tThis directive effective May 23, 1962.
55-18-02: 55-18-02 DOUGLAS: Applies to All Model DC-6 Series Aircraft That Are Not Equipped With the New Douglas Type Propeller Reverse Thrust Mechanical Throttle Lockgate. \n\n\tCompliance required as soon as practicable but not later than January 1, 1957. \n\n\t1.\tBecause of instances of inadvertent propeller reversing due to malfunctioning of the solenoid operated throttle locks and improper operation of throttles at time of touchdown on landing, a more positive means of preventing inadvertent movement of the throttles into the reverse segment of the throttle quadrant must be installed. \n\n\t2.\tThis modification consists of the installation of a protective device which will require a separate and distinct motion by the flight crew member accomplishing the reversing, in order to place the throttles in reverse pitch range. It must also provide safeguards against disarming or unlocking of this protective device when the throttle levers are further forward than idle setting or, if it is possible to unlock at a forward power setting, movement of the throttles toward idle from slow cruise or landing gear warning positions shall reengage the lock prior to reaching the idle position. \n\n\t3.\tDouglas Service Bulletin DC-6 No. 557 revised October 15, 1954, covering this modification is an acceptable method of compliance. This bulletin also provides for the continuous operation of the feathering motors during reverse thrust, installs timers to control feathering pump operation during feathering, and deletes the propeller governor pressure cutout switch from the holding circuit. These latter changes, although desirable, are not mandatory. \n\n\t4.\tIt is possible that some aircraft have already been modified by installation of a protective device which differs in arrangement and detail from the provisions of the Douglas Bulletin. Such alternate designs may be acceptable if the objectives of this directive, as expressed in paragraph 2, have been met. However, because of the many technical considerations involved, all alternate methods of accomplishing this modification should be referred to FAA for engineering evaluation and approval.
72-25-03: 72-25-03 BOEING: Amdt. 39-1560 as amended by Amendment 39-1575 is further amended by Amendment 39-1596. Applies to main landing gear beams made from 7079-T6 material on all Model 727 Series Airplanes certificated in all categories. \n\tCompliance required as indicated: \n\tTo detect cracks in the main landing gear trunnion support beam, accomplish the following: \n\t(a)\tInspect all beams in accordance with (c) below within 600 hours time in service or 90 days from the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first, and at intervals thereafter not to exceed 600 hours time in service or 90 days, whichever occurs first. \n\t(b)\tInspect all beams in accordance with (d) below within 1200 hours time service or 180 days, whichever occurs first, except parts nos. 65-16230-23, -24, -25 and -26, and those beams sleeved in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 57-122 dated October 15, 1971, or later FAA approved revisions. \n\t(c)\tUltrasonically inspect the bearing bore in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 57-119, Revision 2, dated 14 November 1972 or later FAA approved revision, or an equivalent inspection approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\t(d)\tEddy-current inspect inside the trunnion bore in accordance with Boeing nondestructive test document No. D6-7170, Part 6, 57-10-27 Figure 1, or an equivalent inspection approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. Reinstall the bearing in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 57-120, Revision 1, dated 9 July 1971 or later FAA approved revisions. \n\t(e)\tAny beam in which evidence of a crack in the bearing bore is found must, prior to further flight, be replaced with a beam inspected per this AD and found to be uncracked, or reworked in accordance with instructions in Boeing Service Bulletin No. 57-120, Revision 1, dated 9 July 1971 or later FAA approved revisions, or in accordance with instructions approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Northwest Region. \n\t(f)\t(1)\tLanding gear beams, part numbers 65-16230-23, -24, -25 and -26, and those beams sleeved in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin No. 57-122 dated 15 October 1971 or later FAA approved revisions, must be replaced with the redesigned beam (P/N 65-62335) no later than 1 July 1974. \n\t\t(2)\tAll other beams must be replaced with the redesigned beam (P/N 65-62335) no later than 1 January 1974. \n\t(g)\tAirplanes having cracked landing gear beams which require replacement under this AD may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a base where the replacement of parts can be accomplished. \n\t(h)\tAs an alternative to the inspection required in paragraph (b) above, those beams which will be replaced prior to July 1, 1973 need not be inspected in accordance with paragraph (d) above. Those beams allowed to remain in service beyond the time intervals specified in paragraph (b) must be replaced by July 1, 1973. Operators must assurethemselves of parts availability prior to electing this alternative.\n\tThis supersedes Amendment 39-1162 as amended by 39-1306 (AD 71-5-4). \n\tAmendment 39-1560 became effective upon publication in the Federal Register for all persons except those to whom it was made effective immediately by telegram dated 10 November 1972. \n\tAmendment 39-1575 became effective 26 December 1972. \n\tThis Amendment 39-1596 becomes effective March 2, 1973.
2009-20-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for fatigue cracking and corrosion of the upper link fuse pin of the nacelle struts, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also provides terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This AD results from two reports of cracked upper link fuse pins. We are issuing this AD to prevent fatigue cracking or corrosion of the upper link fuse pin, which could result in failure of the fuse pin and consequent reduced structural integrity of the nacelle strut and possible separation of the strut and engine from the airplane during flight.