Results
2005-24-03 R1: The FAA is revising an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, and -800 series airplanes. That AD currently requires inspecting/measuring the length of the attachment fasteners between the nacelle support fittings and the lower wing skin panels, and related investigative/corrective actions if necessary. That AD resulted from a report from the manufacturer that in production, during the installation of certain attachment fasteners for the nacelle support fittings, only one washer was installed instead of two. This new AD corrects errors found in the existing AD. We are issuing this AD to prevent inadequate fastener clamp-up, which could result in cracking of the fastener holes, cracking along the lower wing skin panels, fuel leaking from the wing fuel tanks onto the engines, and possible fire.
2021-15-08: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A350-941 and -1041 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that during an inspection of the flight deck escape hatches it was found that they were difficult to open from the inside, and several hatches were found impossible to open from the outside. Subsequent investigation revealed corrosion on the flight deck escape hatch mechanism due to condensation penetrating inside the mechanism. This AD requires replacing all affected flight deck escape hatches with serviceable hatches, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-15-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus SAS Model A330-200, -200 Freighter, -300, -800, and -900 series airplanes; and Model A340-200 and -300 series airplanes. This AD was \n\n((Page 42692)) \n\nprompted by reports of incorrect installation of the lower attachment parts of the trimmable horizontal stabilizer actuator (THSA). This AD requires doing a detailed inspection of the THSA lower attachment parts for discrepancies and corrective action if necessary, and prohibits using earlier versions of certain airplane maintenance manual (AMM) tasks, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2020-23-12:
2007-05-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as the finding of an improper geometry of some pulley brackets, which can offset the cable in the sheave. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-14-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Dassault Aviation Model FALCON 7X airplanes and Model FALCON 2000EX airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that non-certified ANCRA seat tracks were installed on some airplanes and that those seat tracks might not sustain required loads during an emergency landing. This AD requires replacement of certain ANCRA seat tracks with certified (Brownline) seat tracks, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-05-10: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Cessna Aircraft Company (Cessna) Models 172R, 172S, 182S, 182T, T182T, 206H, and T206H airplanes. This AD requires you to install Modification Kit MK172-25-10C or a steel lock rod/bar on both crew seat back cylinder lock assemblies. If a steel lock rod/bar has already been installed on the crew seat back cylinder lock assembly, no further action is required. If you have already installed Modification Kit MK172-25-10A or MK172-25-10B, this AD requires you to do an installation inspection and correct any discrepancies found. This AD results from reports of the crew seat back cylinder lock assembly failing at the aft end and other cylinder lock assemblies found cracked. We are issuing this AD to prevent the crew seat back cylinder lock assembly from bending, cracking, or failing. This failure could cause uncontrolled movement of the seat back, resulting in possible backward collapse during flight. Backward collapse ofeither crew seat back could result in an abrupt pitch-up if the affected crew member continues to hold on to the control yoke during this failure and could cause difficulty in exiting the airplane from an aft passenger seat after landing.
2021-13-20: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500- 1A11 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of corrosion on the waste box, waste access doubler, and waste service door of the rear fuselage due to contamination from waste valve leakage. This AD requires an inspection for corrosion of the waste box, waste access doubler, and waste service door, and corrective actions if necessary, as specified in a Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
89-08-03 R1: 89-08-03 R1 BOEING: Amendment 39-6183 as revised by Amendment 39-6389. Docket No. 89-NM-104-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2297, dated June 30, 1988, certificated in any category, except line number 001 through 065. \n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo prevent depressurization as a result of failure of the crease beam and resultant adjacent frame failure, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tFor airplanes not modified in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2297, dated June 30, 1988, or Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2244, dated September 20, 1985. \n\n\t\t1.\tPerform detailed visual and dye penetrant inspections of the body crown crease beam for cracks, from BS 940 to BS 1000 and from stringers S-8L to S-8R, at the times specified in the table below, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2297, dated June 30, 1988. In addition, perform a detailed visual inspection for cracks in all adjacent intercostals, skins (internal and external), and stringers in the same area, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2297, dated June 30, 1988. \n\n\t\n\nFor Unmodified Airplanes: \n\nAccumulated landings as of effective date of AD\nInitial Compliance Period for Paragraph A. of this AD\n13,000 or more\t\nWithin 1,000 landings after the effective date of this AD.\nBetween 7,500 and 13,000\nWithin 2,500 landings after the effective date of this AD, but not to exceed 14,000 total landings on the airplane. \n7,500 or less\nPrior to accumulation of 10,000 landings. \n\n\t\t2.\tIf no cracks are found, repeat the detailed visual and penetrant inspections required by paragraph A.1., above, at intervals not to exceed 6,000 landings. \n\n\t\t3.\tIf cracks are found, repair in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2297, dated June 30, 1988, prior to further flight, except as noted in paragraph A.4, below. \n\n\t\t4.\tRepair of cracks less than 1.5 inches:If there are no more than three cracks in the web and no more than three cracks in any one flange of the outer tee chord, repair of the crease beam crack may be deferred for up to 1,500 landings by stop-drilling crack ends in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2297, dated June 30, 1988, and repeating the detailed visual and penetrant inspection required by paragraph A.1., above, at intervals not to exceed 250 landings until repair in accordance with paragraph A.3., above, is accomplished. \n\n\t\t5.\tPrior to the accumulation of 6,000 landings after a repair and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 6,000 landings, perform the detailed visual and penetrant inspections for cracks required by paragraph A., above, including any crease beam area where cracks were found. Before further flight, repair any additional cracks found, in accordance with a method approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tB.\tFor airplanes thathave been modified in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2297, dated June 30, 1988, or Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2244, dated September 20, 1985: Prior to the accumulation of 10,000 landings after the modification, or within the next 500 landings after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 6,000 landings, perform the body crown crease beam detailed visual and penetrant inspections for cracks as required by paragraph A., above. If cracks are found, prior to further flight, repair in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2297, dated June 30, 1988. \n\n\tC.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector (PMI), who may add any commentsand then send it to the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. These documents may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. \n\n\tThis AD revises AD 89-08-03 (Amendment 39-6183) which became effective on May 8, 1989. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6389, AD 89-08-03 R1) becomes effective on November 3, 1989.
2007-05-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain McDonnell Douglas Model 717-200 airplanes. This AD requires replacing certain attaching hardware of the bulkhead nipple assemblies of the left and right wing vent boxes with new electrical bonding attaching hardware, doing resistance testing of the new electrical bonds, and doing fuel leakage testing of the reworked nipple assemblies. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to provide a conductive path, from the bulkhead nipple assemblies of the left and right wing vent boxes to the airframe structure inside the wing fuel tanks, to dissipate high- amperage lightning-induced currents, which might otherwise create an ignition source for fuel vapors inside the wing vent boxes and lead to an explosion of the fuel tanks.
2021-13-14: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (AHD) Model BO-105A, BO- 105C, BO-105S, and BO-105LS A-3 helicopters. This AD was prompted by an uncommanded activation of the hoist cable cutter function on an MBB- BK117 C-1 helicopter, which prompted a design review of the BO105 hoist control grip with coiled cable. This AD requires inspections of the hoist control grip with coiled cable and deactivation of the hoist cutter function, as specified in a European Aviation Safety Agency (now European Union Aviation Safety Agency) (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-05-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: An occurrence of inadvertent manipulation of the fuel shut-off control has been reported. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-14-06: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-21-11 and AD 2020-07-02. AD 2019-21-11 applied to all Pratt & Whitney (PW) PW1519G, PW1521G, PW1521G-3, PW1521GA, PW1524G, PW1524G-3, PW1525G, PW1525G-3, PW1919G, PW1921G, PW1922G, PW1923G, and PW1923G-A model turbofan engines. AD 2020-07-02 applied to all PW PW1519G, PW1521G, PW1521G-3, PW1521GA, PW1524G, PW1524G-3, PW1525G, and PW1525G-3 model turbofan engines. AD 2019-21-11 required initial and repetitive borescope inspections (BSIs) of the low-pressure compressor (LPC) rotor 1 (R1) and, depending on the results of the inspections, replacement of the LPC. AD 2020-07-02 required the removal from service of certain electronic engine control (EEC) full authority digital electronic control (FADEC) software and the installation of a software version eligible for installation. This AD continues to require repetitive BSIs of certain LPC R1s until replacement of EEC FADEC software with the updated software. This AD also requires a BSI after installation of the updated EEC FADEC software if certain Onboard Maintenance Message fault codes are displayed and meet specified criteria. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2021-13-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (Airbus Helicopters) Model EC135P1, EC135P2, EC135P2+, EC135P3, EC135T1, EC135T2, EC135T2+, and EC135T3 helicopters. This AD requires modifying the tail rotor (T/R) control installation, a functional test, and corrective actions as necessary. This AD was prompted by cases of insufficient clearance between a certain T/R control bearing connection and the helicopter structure, which were detected on the production line. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-05-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all EMBRAER Model ERJ 170 and ERJ 190 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections for blockage of the pitot drain holes of certain air data smart probes (ADSPs), removing accumulated moisture from the pneumatic passages of the ADSPs, related investigative actions, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of erroneous air speed indications caused by blockage of the pitot sensors due to freezing of accumulated moisture in the ADSP pneumatic passages. We are issuing this AD to prevent an erroneous air speed indication, which could reduce the flightcrew's ability to control the airplane.
2021-11-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain General Electric Company (GE) GEnx-1B64, 1B64/P1, -1B64/P2, - 1B67, -1B67/P1, -1B67/P2, -1B70, -1B70/75/P1, -1B70/75/P2, -1B70/P1, - 1B70/P2, -1B70C/P1, -1B70C/P2, -1B74/75/P1, -1B74/75/P2, -1B76/P2, - 1B76A/P2, -2B67, -2B67/P, and -2B67B model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by a finding during an inspection by the manufacturer that two stages 6-10 compressor rotor spools in the high-pressure compressor (HPC) assembly were damaged at similar locations. Additionally, the manufacturer reported that certain stages 6-10 compressor rotor spool webs did not undergo a required fluorescent penetrant inspection (FPI) during production. This AD requires inspection of the stages 6-10 compressor rotor spool and, depending on the results of the inspection, replacement of the stages 6-10 compressor rotor spool. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-04-22: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier Model DHC-8-100 (as described above), DHC-8-200, and DHC-8-300 series airplanes. This AD requires doing a one-time inspection for damage of the electrical cable harness assembly located on the left and right wing root-to-fuselage aft seal, and repair if necessary; and reworking the fuselage aft seal assembly (left and right) to create a clearance between the electrical cable assemblies and the edge of the fairing panel. This AD results from a report that an airplane encountered an uncommanded propeller feathering during climb, which resulted in an emergency landing. We are issuing this AD to prevent chafing or grounding of the wiring against the aft seal assemblies, which, if not corrected, could interrupt the operation of various systems, including the propeller feather control, alternating current (AC) electrical power, and standby hydraulic power, and result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
2021-12-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Fokker Services B.V. Model F28 Mark 0070 and 0100 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that corrosion was found on the horizontal flange on the front spar lower boom, between the rebate strap and the lower boom, and \n\n((Page 33106)) \n\nresulted in bulging. This AD requires doing a detailed visual inspection to detect any bulging, loose, and missing countersunk fastener heads at the left-(LH) and right-hand (RH) outer wing lower skin of the front spar between certain wing stations, and applicable on-condition actions, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-04-20: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain EMBRAER Model ERJ 170-100 LR, -100 STD, -100 SE, -100 SU, -200 LR, -200 STD, and -200 SU airplanes and Model ERJ 190 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting to determine the part number and serial number of the deployment actuator of the ram air turbine (RAT) and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports that the RAT may not fully deploy due to galling between the piston rod and gland housing of the RAT deployment actuator. We are issuing this AD to prevent the RAT from failing to deploy, which could result in loss of control of the airplane during in-flight emergencies.
2021-11-22: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2016-11-21 for Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (Airbus Helicopters) Model EC135P1, EC135P2, EC135P2+, EC135T1, EC135T2, and EC135T2+ helicopters. AD 2016-11-21 required revising the life limit of certain parts and removing each part that has reached its life limit. This AD continues to require revising the life limits for certain parts and removing each part that has reached or exceeded its life limit and expands the applicability to include Model EC135P3 and EC135T3 helicopters. This AD was prompted by the certification of new helicopter models since AD 2016-11-21 was issued. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-04-19: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain SAP cast cylinder assemblies installed in Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) 470, 520, and 550 series reciprocating engines, Lycoming Engines (LE) 320, 360, and 540 series reciprocating engines, Avco Lycoming (AL) 540 series reciprocating engines, and Superior Air Parts, Inc. (SAP) 360 series reciprocating engines. This AD requires removing from service certain SAP part numbered (P/N) cast cylinder assemblies installed in TCM, LE, and AL reciprocating engines. This AD also requires removing from service certain cast cylinder assemblies installed as original equipment in SAP reciprocating engines, or in certain overhauled or repaired SAP reciprocating engines. This AD results from nine separated SAP cylinder assemblies in TCM reciprocating engines and one in LE reciprocating engines. We are issuing this AD to prevent cylinder separation that can lead to engine failure, a possible engine compartment fire, and damage to the airplane.
2021-11-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH Model MBB-BK 117 A-1, MBB-BK 117 A- 3, MBB-BK 117 A-4, MBB-BK 117 B-1, MBB-BK 117 B-2, and MBB-BK 117 C-1 helicopters. This AD was prompted by an analysis of the main rotor (M/ R) blade loop area. This AD requires repetitive inspections of certain M/R blade thimble areas and corrective actions if necessary, as specified in a European Aviation Safety Agency (now European Union Aviation Safety Agency) (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference (IBR). The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2004-23-02: The FAA supersedes Airworthiness Directive (AD) 87-22-01 R1, which applies to certain Raytheon Aircraft Company (Raytheon) 65, 90, 99, 100, 200, and 1900 series airplanes, and Models 70 and 300 airplanes. AD 87-22-01 R1 currently requires you to repetitively inspect the nose landing gear (NLG) fork for cracks. If cracks are found that exceed certain limits, AD 87-22-01 R1 requires you to replace the NLG fork with a serviceable part or an improved NLG fork (Kit No. 101-8030-1 S or Kit No. 114-8015-1 S, as applicable). Incorporating an improved NLG fork kit terminates the repetitive inspection requirements. This AD is the result of FAA's policy (since 1996) to disallow airplane operation when known cracks exist in primary structure. This AD retains the inspection requirements of AD 87-22-01 R1, requires you to incorporate an improved NLG fork kit anytime a crack is found, and adds additional airplanes to the applicability section of this AD. We are issuing this AD to detect andcorrect cracks in the NLG fork, which could result in reduced structural integrity and inability of the NLG fork to carry design limit and ultimate loads. The reduced residual strength may cause separation failure of the NLG fork, which could result in loss of control of the airplane during take off, landing, and taxi operations.
2021-10-25: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Helicopters Model EC130B4 and EC130T2 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report of cracks and geometrical non-conformities of the tail rotor blades (TRBs); all cracks initiated in the drain hole area at the blade root section. This AD requires cleaning affected parts, visual and dye penetrant inspections for cracks of affected parts, a dimensional inspection to verify conformity of affected parts, and corrective actions if necessary, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-04-17: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the McDonnell Douglas airplanes previously described. This AD requires replacing the control modules of the fire detection systems of the propulsion engines with new, improved control modules. This AD results from a report of broken or severed wiring between engine fire detectors and the fire detection system control module, which caused the fire detection system to become non-functional without flightcrew awareness. We are issuing this AD to prevent unannunciated fire in a propulsion engine, which could cause injury to flightcrew and passengers or loss of the airplane.