Results
95-17-03: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Lockheed Model L-1011 series airplanes, that currently requires a visual inspection to detect cracks of the forward or aft side of the aft pressure bulkhead, and repair, if necessary. This amendment requires various inspections to detect cracks or other discrepancies of the aft pressure bulkhead, and repair, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by a recent report of in-flight loss of cabin pressure on a Model L-1011-385 series airplane due to a rupture of the aft pressure bulkhead as a result of fatigue-related cracking. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent such fatigue cracking, which could result in rupture of the aft pressure bulkhead and subsequent depressurization of the cabin.
2008-12-04: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, and -900 series airplanes. This AD requires various repetitive inspections to detect cracks along the chemically milled steps of the fuselage skin or missing or loose fasteners in the area of the preventative modification or repairs, replacement of the time-limited repair with the permanent repair if applicable, and applicable corrective actions if necessary, which would end certain repetitive inspections. This AD results from a fatigue test that revealed numerous cracks in the upper skin panel at the chemically milled step above the lap joint. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct such fatigue-related cracks, which could result in the crack tips continuing to turn and grow to the point where the skin bay flaps open, causing decompression of the airplane.
2001-13-51: This document publishes in the Federal Register an amendment adopting Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2001-13-51, which was sent previously to all known U.S. owners and operators of Bell Helicopter Textron Canada (BHTC) Model 206L-4, 407, and 427 helicopters by individual letters. This AD requires visually inspecting certain driveshafts for a crack, a loose bolt or nut, or red powder residue. If a crack, a loose bolt or nut, or red powder residue is found, replacing the driveshaft before further flight and notifying the FAA within 10 days is also required. This amendment is prompted by a driveshaft failure on a BHTC Model 407 helicopter that resulted in an engine shutdown and an emergency landing. Failure of the driveshaft was due to cracking of the flexframe on the forward end of the driveshaft. In addition, three other incidents of a cracked flexframe on the forward end of the driveshaft on other Model 407 helicopters have been reported. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of a driveshaft, loss of drive to the main rotor system, and a subsequent emergency forced landing.
2020-19-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Leonardo S.p.a. Model AW169 helicopters. This AD requires modifying the weight on wheels (WoW) support installation on the main landing gear (MLG). This AD was prompted by a report that an inappropriately tightened WoW support could result in a rotation of the support and improper WoW switch performance. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
95-16-08: 95-16-08 AlliedSignal, Inc.: Amendment 39-9328. Docket 94-ANE-10. Applicability: AlliedSignal, Inc. (formerly Allied-Signal, Inc., Garrett Engine Division, Garrett Turbine Engine Company, and AiResearch Manufacturing Co. of Arizona), TPE331-25, -43, -1, -2, -3, -5, -6, -8, -10, -11, and -12 series, and -55B and -61A Model turboprop engines; and TSE331-3U Model turboshaft engines. These engines are installed on but not limited to Mitsubishi MU-2B series (MU-2 series); Construcciones Aeronauticas, S.A. (CASA) C-212 series; Jetstream 3101 and 3201 series; Fairchild SA226 and SA227 series; Prop-Jets, Inc. Model 400; Cessna Model 441; Twin Commander Aircraft Corp. 680, 690, and 695 series, and Model 681; Rockwell Commander or Ayres Corp. S-2R series; Short Brothers and Harland, Ltd. SC7; Dornier 228 Series; Beech Aircraft Corp. 18 and 45 series and Models JRB-6, 3N, 3NM, 3TM, and B100; Pilatus PC-6 series; DeHavilland DH 104 Dove series; Grumman Model TS-2A; Grumman American ModelG-164C; and Schweizer Aircraft Corp. Model G-164 series aircraft. NOTE: This AD applies to each engine identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For engines that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (c) to request approval from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition, or different actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any engine from the applicability of this AD. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. To prevent uncontained failure of turbine rotors, fire, or loss of aircraft control, accomplish the following: (a) Within 400 cycles in service (CIS) after the effective date of this AD, review engine life limited part logs, engine repair and maintenance records, maintenance purchase receipts, and aircraft maintenance records (collectively referred to as "records") to identify any engine repair, assembly, or modification that was performed by, or any life limited turbine components received from Fliteline Maintenance, located in Wharton, Texas, domestic repair station certificate number GR2R856K; or Mr. Eugene E. Shanks, mechanic certificate number 1914482; or Mr. Carl Ramirez, mechanic certificate number 466432551 (collectively referred to as "Fliteline"). (b) Within 400 CIS after the effective date of this AD, for engines or components identified in accordance with paragraph (a) of this AD, accomplish the following: (1) If records or other pertinent information indicate that the engine was disassembled beyond aft turbine mainshaft nut removal from the tie bolt by Fliteline, verify life limited turbine components and take appropriate action by the following methods: (i) Remove, disassemble the engine, compare, and match each component's part number (P/N) and serial number (S/N) against that engine's issued life limited part logs. Engine hot section inspection or overhaul normally requires comparing and matching of turbine components with the life limited part logs. An engine hot section inspection or overhaul, subsequent to maintenance by Fliteline, and performed by the engine manufacturer, an FAA certified repair station, or an FAA certified mechanic, other than Fliteline, constitutes compliance with paragraph (b)(1)(i) of this AD. (ii) Validate all Fliteline life limited part log entries by utilizing the component's hourly and cyclic life immediately before the Fliteline entry, as determined byrecords of the engine manufacturer or FAA certified repair stations other than Fliteline. A life limited part log entry is defined as a removal or installation record. Photocopied life limited part logs may be used provided component history can be established. NOTE: Engine manufacturer record and service information referred to in the AD can be attained by calling AlliedSignal Engines Customer Information Center, telephone (800) 338-3378 or (602) 231-5287. (iii) If the P/N, S/N, hourly and cyclic lives or the life limited part log of each life limited turbine component do not match or can not be validated, remove the component from service prior to further flight and replace with a serviceable component. (2) Verify that any requirements of AD's signed off by Fliteline were actually accomplished by visual examination or reinspection of the affected components in accordance with the applicable AD. A complete engine overhaul or other maintenance necessary to accomplishapplicable AD requirements, subsequent to maintenance by Fliteline, and performed by the engine manufacturer, an FAA certified repair station, or an FAA certified mechanic, other than Fliteline, constitutes compliance with paragraph (b)(2) of this AD. (c) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. The request should be forwarded through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. NOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this airworthiness directive, if any, may be obtained from the Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office. (d) Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the aircraft to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. (e) This amendment becomes effective on September 5, 1995.
2008-12-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Vortex inserts are used inside the heat exchanger of the carburettor heating system. Up to serial number (s/n) 0044 inclusive those inserts have been produced from aluminium alloy which has been found to be susceptible of cracks. As a consequence, if left uncorrected some loose parts could migrate in the induction system, reduce the air flow through the carburettor's venturi and lead to a loss of engine power. From s/n 0045 onwards vortex inserts have been produced from stainless steel. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2001-19-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 767-200 and -300 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive inspections to find discrepancies of the barrel nuts that attach the vertical fin to body section 48, and follow-on actions. For certain airplanes, this action requires replacement of certain bolts with new bolts. This action also provides for optional terminating actions for the repetitive inspections. This action is necessary to find and fix corroded, cracked or broken barrel nuts that attach the vertical fin to body section 48, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the vertical fin attachment joint, loss of the vertical fin, and consequent loss of controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2018-21-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A319-131, A319-132, A319-133, A320-231, A320-232, A320-233, A321-131, A321-231, and A321-232 airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of fan cowl door (FCD) losses during take-off. This AD requires modification and re-identification, or replacement, of certain FCDs, and installation of a placard in the flight deck. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-12-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: A failure mode has been identified following the examination of parts from another aircraft type (Jetstream 4100 series) that can lead to the loss of a nose-wheel. The Jetstream (HP.137) Mk1, 200, 3100 and 3200 series use a similar method for retaining the wheel assemblies on the landing gear axle and can therefore experience the same type of failure, i.e. a combination of excessive wear and/or adverse tolerances on the axle inner cone, outer cone or wheel hub splined sleeve cones resulting in the loss of the critical gap between the inner flange face of the wheel outer cone and the axle end face. If this gap is lost, it results in the wheel having free playalong the length of the axle. This condition, if not corrected, can cause the wheel nut lock plate to break, leading to the wheel retention nut unscrewing and subsequent separation of the nose wheel from the landing gear axle. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
95-16-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Model DC-9 series airplanes and C-9 (military) airplanes, that requires inspection of the driver links of the thrust reverser door to determine whether the driver links are chamfered, an inspection to detect damage of the overcenter links, and follow-on corrective actions, if necessary; and replacement or rework of the driver links. This amendment is prompted by reports of a thrust reverser door that failed to operate properly due to improperly manufactured (missing chamfers on the) driver links. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent damage to the overcenter links due to missing chamfers on the driver links, which may result in uncommanded opening of the thrust reverser door, and subsequently, adversely affecting controllability of the airplane.