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92-07-02: 92-07-02 BOEING: Amendment 39-8198. Docket No. 91-NM-186-AD. Supersedes AD 90- 08-08, Amendment 39-6572. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 737-300 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-54- 1028, Revision 1, dated July 11, 1991, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\n\tTo ensure the integrity of the engines' nacelle strut firewall seal, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tFor airplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-54-1028, dated August 17, 1989: At the next scheduled engine removal, or within 8,000 flight hours after May 14, 1990 (the effective date of AD 90-08-08, Amendment 39-6572), which ever occurs sooner, inspect the engines' nacelle strut door assemblies for proper application of firewall sealant in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-54-1028, dated August 17, 1989, or Revision 1, dated July 11, 1991. The door assemblies are located between nacelle station 200.00 and 235.00 and attached to the underside of the strut and spar web at approximately nacelle waterline 132.00. If there are gaps, holes, or voids in the firewall sealant, apply sealant prior to further flight, in accordance with the service bulletin. \n\n\t(b)\tFor airplanes listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 737-54-1028, Revision 1, dated July 11, 1991, that are not subject to paragraph (a) of this AD: At next scheduled engine removal or within 8,000 flight hours after the effective date of this AD, which ever occurs sooner, inspect the engines' nacelle strut door assemblies for proper application of firewall sealant in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737-54-1028, Revision 1, dated July 11, 1991. The door assemblies are located between nacelle station 200.00 and 235.00 and attached to the underside of the strut and spar web at approximately nacelle waterline 132.00. If there are gaps, holes, or voids in the firewall sealant, apply sealant prior to further flight, in accordance with the previously described service bulletin. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be forwarded through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\t(e)\tThe inspections shall be done in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 737- 54-1028, Revision 1, dated July 11, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street NW., Room 8401, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective April 28, 1992.
2024-17-03: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2019-24- 16, which applied to certain Embraer S.A. Model ERJ 190-100 STD, -100 LR, -100 IGW, and -100 ECJ airplanes; and Model ERJ 190-200 STD, -200 LR, and -200 IGW airplanes. AD 2019-24-16 required revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. Since the FAA issued AD 2019-24-16, the FAA has determined that new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations are necessary. This AD requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations, as specified in an Ag[ecirc]ncia Nacional de Avia[ccedil][atilde]o Civil (ANAC) AD, which is incorporated by reference (IBR). The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
91-15-04: 91-15-04 MCCAULEY ACCESSORY DIVISION, CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY: Amendment 39-7067. Docket No. 91-ANE-22. Applicability: McCauley Model ( )2( )34C( )-( ) Series two bladed constant speed propellers with threaded retention hubs, including those with feathering capabilities listed as follows: Affected Propeller Hub Models CONSTANT SPEED FEATHERING 2D34C8-( ) D2AF34C30-( ) 2D34C9-( ) 2AF34C55-( ) 2D34C53-( ) D2AF34C56-( ) B2D34C53-( ) D2AF34C61-( ) D2A34C58-( ) D2AF34C65-( ) F2A34C58-( ) D2AF34C81-( ) 2A34C66-( ) E2A34C70-( ) E2A34C73-( ) D2A34C78-( ) D2A34C98-( ) The parentheses used in the above list indicate the presence or absence of an additional letter(s) which vary the basic hub model designation. These letter(s) define minor changes that do not affect interchangeability or eligibility, and therefore, this AD still applies regardless of whether these letters are present or absent on the hub model designation. The abovelisted McCauley propeller hubs are found on, but not limited to, the following aircraft certificated in any category: Beech A23-24, A24, A24R, 58, 58A; 95-55, -A55, -B55,-B55A, -B55B, -C55, -C55A; D55, D55A, E55, E55A. Bellanca 17-30, 17-30A Cessna 180, 182H, 185, 185A thru D, A185E, A185F, 188, 188A, 188B, A188, A188A, A188B, 206, P206, P206A thru E, TP206A thru E, TU206A thru G, U206, U206A thru G, 207, T207, 210, 210A thru H, 210J thru L, 210-5, 210-5A, T210F thru H, T210J thru L, 305B, 305E, 310J, E310J, 310K, 310L, 310N, 336, 337, 337A thru F, M337B, T337B thru F. Fuji FA-200-180 Interceptor (AeroCommander/Meyers) 200A thru C Mooney M20C, M20D, M20G Navion A, B, D thru H Procaer F15/C Reims F337E, F337F, FT337E, FT337F Transavia PL-12/T-300 Windecker AC-7 Compliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. To prevent possible blade separation, which could result in the loss of the engine and subsequent loss of aircraft control, accomplish the following in accordance with the compliance schedule as indicated: PRIOR PROPELLER UTILIZATION (Hours/calendar months given as time-in-service) COMPLIANCE SCHEDULE OF PROPELLER INSPECTION AND MODIFICATION Greater than 900 hours, or 59 calendar months since last overhaul/penetrant inspection or installed new, or prior time-in-service unknown. Within the next 100 hours, or at the next annual inspection, or within 12 calendar months after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs first. Less than or equal to both 900 hours and 59 calendar months since last overhaul/penetrant inspection or installed new. Prior to the accumulation of 1000 hours or 60 calendar months since last overhaul/penetrant inspection, or installed new, whichever occurs first. (a) For propellers which have incorporated a hub containing oil with red dye and have been designated at initial production as a hub model number listed in the Appendix to this AD, or prior manufactured propellers whose hubs have been modified to contain oil with a red dye and reidentified as a hub model number listed in the Appendix to this AD, compliance is required only with paragraphs (f) and (h) of this AD. (b) Perform propeller disassembly in accordance with the procedures specified for the affected hub model number listed in Paragraph 1 on page 4 of McCauley Service Bulletin (SB) 184, dated March 15, 1991. (c) Penetrant inspect the propeller assembly for cracks in the propeller blade threaded retention area, the hub blade socket threads, the retention nut threads, and the ferrule threads in accordance with the procedures specified for the affected hub model number listed in Paragraph 2 on page 5 of McCauley SB 184, dated March 15, 1991. (d) Remove from service, prior to further flight, propeller assemblies which exhibit cracks and replace with a serviceable unit, modified in accordance with paragraph (e) of this AD, or with an equivalent initial production propeller which has incorporated a hub with oil containing red dye. (e) Modify the affected propeller hub assembly to contain oil with a red dye and reidentify in accordance with the procedures specified for the affected hub model number listed in Paragraph 3 on page 6 of McCauley SB 184, dated March 15, 1991. NOTE: The modification of the propeller hub assembly to contain oil with a red dye provides an "on-condition" (in-service) means of early crack detection to prevent blade separation and also improves lubrication and corrosion protection. The oil will add approximately 2.8 lbs. to the weight of the propeller assembly. (f) If leakage of oil containing red dye is detected in service (whether during flight or while on the ground), determine prior to further flight, the source of leakage in accordance with the procedures specified for the affected hub model number listed in Paragraph 4 on page 7 of McCauley SB 184, dated March 15, 1991. If the inspection reveals a crack,compliance with Paragraph (d) of this AD is required. (g) The "calendar month" compliance times stated in this AD allow the performance of the required action prior to the last day of the month in which compliance is required. NOTE: For example, a required inspection and modification 60 months from last overhaul/penetrant inspection that was performed on December 15, 1986, would allow the penetrant inspection and modification to be performed no later than December 31, 1991. (h) Report in writing any cracks found during inspections accomplished in accordance with paragraphs (c) or (f) of this AD to the Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, within ten (10) days of the inspection. Information collection requirements contained in this regulation have been approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-511) and has been assigned OMB Control Number 2120-0056. (i) Aircraft may be ferried in accordance with the provisions of Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 21.197 and 21.199 to a base where the AD can be accomplished. (j) Upon submission of substantiating data by an owner or operator through an FAA Inspector (maintenance, avionics, or operations, as appropriate) an alternate method of compliance with the requirements of this AD or adjustments to the compliance times specified in this AD may be approved by the Manager, Chicago Aircraft Certification Office, Small Airplane Certification Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, FAA, 2300 East Devon Avenue, Des Plaines, Illinois 60018. The disassembly, inspection, and modification shall be done in accordance with the procedures listed in McCauley SB 184, dated March 15, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from McCauley Accessory Division, The Cessna Aircraft Company, 3535 McCauley Drive, Vandalia, Ohio 45377. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, New England Region, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, 12 New England Executive Park, Room 311, Burlington, Massachusetts, or at the Office of the Federal Register, 1100 L Street, NW, Room 8401, Washington, DC. Airworthiness Directive 91-15-04, Amendment 39-7067, supersedes, AD 77-17-09, Amendment 39-3020, AD 77-20-03, Amendment 39-3044, AD 77-23-01, Amendment 39-3073, AD 77-24-04, Amendment 39-3086, AD 78-20-01, Amendment 39-3304. This amendment (39-7067, AD 91-15-04) becomes effective on August 7, 1991. AD 91-15-04 APPENDIX OIL-FILLED PROPELLER HUB COMPLIANCE INDICATOR TABLE Propeller Hub Model Compliance Indicator Propeller Hub Model Compliance Indicator + 2D34C8 2D34C8-()P and/or oil-fill plug in side of hub F2A34C58 F2A34C58-()0 and/or oil-fill plug in side of hub 2D34C9 2D34C9-()P and/or oil-fill plug in side of hub D2AF34C61 D2AF34C61-()0 and/or oil-fill plug in side of hub D2AF34C30 D2AF34C30-()P and/or oil-fill plug in side of hub D2AF34C65 D2AF34C65-()0 and/or oil-fill plug in side of hub B2D34C53 B2D34C53-()0 and/or oil-fill plug in side of hub 2A34C66 2A34C66-()P and/or oil-fill plug in side of hub 2D34C53 2D34C53-()0 and/or oil-fill plug in side of hub E2A34C70 E2A34C70-()P and/or oil-fill plug in side of hub 2AF34C55 2AF34C55-()0 and/or oil-fill plug in side of hub E2A34C73 E2A34C73-()P and/or oil-fill plug in side of hub D2AF34C56 D2AF34C56-()0 and/or oil-fill plug in side of hub D2A34C78 D2A34C78-()P and/or oil-fill plug in side of hub D2A34C58 D2A34C58-()0 and/or oil-fill plug in side of hub D2AF34C81 D2AF34C81-()0 and/or oil-fill plug in side of hub D2A34C98 D2A34C98-()0 and/or oil-fill plug in side of hub +Propeller models are listed in numerical sequence following the letter C in the model designation.
71-07-04: 71-07-04 CESSNA: Amdt. 39-1185. Applies to Models 401 (Serial Numbers 401-0041 and up), 401A (all Serial Numbers), 401B (Serial Numbers 401B0001 thru 401B0052), 402 (Serial Numbers 402-0041 and up), 402A (all Serial Numbers), 402B (Serial Numbers 402B0001 thru 402B0030), 411 and 411A (Serial Numbers 411-0235 and up) airplanes. Compliance: Required as indicated, unless already accomplished. To assure safe operation of the emergency exit window, accomplish the following: Within 50 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, modify the emergency exit window in accordance with Cessna Service Letter No. ME70-30 dated August 21, 1970, and Cessna Service Kit SK402-23 dated June 15, 1970, or by any equivalent method approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA, Central Region. NOTE: The installation of Cessna Service Kit SK402-23 does not require pulling the emergency release handle. If handle is inadvertently pulled, assure that existing emergency exit window retention pins are properly installed. This amendment becomes effective April 6, 1971.
2024-17-01: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2021-11-17 and AD 2021-11-22, which applied to all Airbus Helicopters Deutschland GmbH (AHD) Model EC135P1, EC135P2, EC135P2+, EC135P3, EC135T1, EC135T2, EC135T2+, EC135T3 and EC635T2 helicopters. AD 2021-11-17 required a one-time visual inspection of certain part-numbered main rotor actuators (MRAs). AD 2021-11-22 required revising the life limits of certain parts and removing each part that had reached its life limit. Since the FAA issued those ADs, it was determined that repetitive inspections of the MRAs are necessary, new and more restrictive tasks and limitations have been issued, and that it is necessary to expand the applicability. This AD continues to require the actions required by AD 2021-11-17 and AD 2021-11-22, except this AD requires changing the one-time MRA inspection to a repetitive inspection and incorporating other new and more restrictive tasks and limitations by revising the airworthiness limitations section (ALS) of the existing helicopter maintenance manual or instructions for continued airworthiness and the existing approved maintenance or inspection program, as applicable. This AD also expands the applicability by adding Model EC635T2+ helicopters. These actions are specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2016-21-03: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Airbus Helicopters Model MBB-BK 117 C-2 helicopters with certain duplex trim actuators installed. This AD requires repetitively inspecting the lateral and longitudinal trim actuator output levers for correct torque of the nuts. This AD was prompted by a design review that indicated the attachment screws can become loose under certain circumstances. These actions are intended to prevent the loss of an attachment screw, which could result in movement of the output lever in an axial direction, contact of a bolt connecting the control rod to an output lever with the actuator housing, and subsequent loss of helicopter control.
2004-09-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Boeing Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes, that requires performing, for both main landing gear (MLG), gap measurements of the upper and lower joint gaps; an ultrasonic inspection of the outer cylinder of the MLG for cracks between the downlock fitting attach lugs; and follow-on and corrective actions if necessary. This action is necessary to detect and correct cracks in the outer cylinder of the MLG, which could result in collapsed MLG and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane during takeoff and landing. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2004-09-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain Saab Model SAAB SF340A and SAAB 340B series airplanes, that requires relocating the most outboard latch in the right-hand leading edge of the refueling panel, and sealing of the original latch-mounting cutout. This action is necessary to prevent wear of the signal conditioner wiring harness behind the refueling panel, which could result in a short circuit and consequent smoke or fire behind the refueling panel. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2002-14-17: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to Eurocopter Deutschland GmbH (ECD) (Eurocopter) Model EC135 helicopters, that currently requires initial and repetitive visual inspections and a one-time dye-penetrant inspection of a certain main rotor hub shaft (shaft) for cracks, and replacement of any cracked shafts. This amendment requires the same actions as the existing AD, but corrects the shaft part number (P/N) in the current AD, includes additional P/N's, increases the area of inspection from a 40mm area to a 50mm area of the shaft, and provides an option for using either a visual or dye-penetrant inspection to satisfy the repetitive inspection requirement. This amendment is prompted by the need to correct the shaft part number and increase the area of inspection, as well as add additional affected shaft P/N's. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect fatigue cracks in the shaft that could lead to shaft failure and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
73-12-03 R1: 73-12-03 R1 ROLLS ROYCE LTD: Amendment 39-1652 as amended by Amendment 39-4277. Applies to Rolls-Royce DART engine models 542-10, 542-10J, and 542-10K which do not have Rolls-Royce, Ltd., Modification No. 1681 and Modification No. 1768 incorporated, as installed on, but not limited to, NAMC YS-11 airplanes. Compliance is required as indicated. To detect engine mounting foot cracks, and engine mounting foot stud fractures, looseness, and loose nuts, accomplish the following: (a) Within the next 400 hours time in service after the effective date of this AD, or within 400 hours time in service since the last inspection, whichever occurs sooner, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 400 hours time in service since the last inspection, inspect engine top mounting feet which do not incorporate Modification 1681 and side mounting feet which do not incorporate Modification 1768 for cracks and the mounting feet studs for fracture, looseness, and loose nuts, in accordancewith Rolls-Royce Service Bulletin Da72-384, Revision 2, dated September 1979. (b) If any engine mounting feet are found cracked or any engine mounting feet studs are found to have loose nuts, or to be loose or fractured during an inspection required by paragraph (a), before further flight, repair in accordance with Rolls Royce Service Bulletin Da72-384 Revision 2, dated September 1979 or an FAA- approved equivalent. NOTE: Rolls-Royce DART Service Bulletins Da72-411 and Da72-444 concern Modification No. 1681 and Modification No. 1768, respectively. Amendment 39-1652 became effective July 1, 1973. This amendment 39-4277 becomes effective December 10, 1981.
2016-20-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain The Boeing Company Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by an evaluation by the design approval holder (DAH) indicating that the aft pressure bulkhead is subject to widespread fatigue damage (WFD). This AD requires repetitive inspections of the aft pressure bulkhead web for any cracking, incorrectly drilled fastener holes, and elongated fastener holes; and related investigative and corrective actions, if necessary. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct fatigue cracking of the aft pressure bulkhead web at the ''Y''-chord, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane and rapid decompression of the fuselage.
59-08-02: 59-08-02\tBOEING: Applies to all Model 707-100 Series Aircraft with Bendix Flux Gate Compass system. \n\tCompliance required as indicated. \n\tReports have indicated that excessive indicator errors can be introduced in the Bendix remote compass system when it is in the slaving mode and when the aircraft is exposed to wing oscillations resulting from rough air, spoiler operation, etc. As an interim safety measure pending further investigation and development by the manufacturer of an improved Bendix flux valve installation, the following aircraft operating limitation is required for all aircraft incorporating the Bendix system: \n\tWhenever heading information is required by the pilots, the two Bendix systems (two RMI and two CDI indicators) should be frequently checked against each other and against the magnetic standby compass to detect obvious errors in indication. This information must be included, within the next 10 hours' flight time, on a placard adjacent to the RMI and CDI indicators until an approved Airplane Flight Manual revision covering this subject is available. The foregoing limitation does not apply to aircraft in which the magnetic sensing device (flux gate) is installed in the fuselage body by the manufacturer or installed in accordance with Boeing 707 Service Bulletin No. 587 "Bendix Compass System Flux Gate Relocation," which describes a satisfactory and approved means of mounting the flux valves.
52-14-01: 52-14-01 DOUGLAS: Applies to All DC-6, DC-6A and DC-6B Airplanes With Hamilton Standard Propellers Except as Otherwise Indicated. \n\n\tItems I and II are to be accomplished by means of a progressive modification program to be submitted to and approved by the FAA. This program shall begin no later than August 1, 1952, and shall be completed no later than August 1, 1953. \n\n\tI.\tIn order to prevent inadvertent actuation of the propeller reversing solenoid valves, protect the reversing solenoid circuits from all other electrical circuits and protect the reversing solenoid circuits from each other. This is to be accomplished in accordance with attachment A and the following instructions which pertain to some of the specific features to be considered in isolation of the reversing circuits from other circuits. Other features which are not specifically referred to in this list shall be treated in an equivalent manner: \n\n\t\tA.\tModify the following multiple pin connector assemblies as specified in item 2 of attachment A (See AD 52-13-02 Lockheed for Attachment A): \n\n\t\t\t1.\tFirewall connector (if the reversing solenoid lead has not already been removed). \n\n\t\t\t2.\tConnector at the front of the control pedestal. \n\n\t\t\t3.\tConnector at Hamilton Standard relay box (if used). \n\n\t\tB.\tModify the following terminal strips as specified in item 1 of Attachment A: \n\n\t\t\t1.\tFirewall junction box terminal strip (if used). \n\n\t\t\t2.\tTerminal strip at synchronizer compartment (if used). \n\n\t\t\t3.\tTerminal strip within propeller control box located behind pilot's seat. \n\n\t\tC.\tProtect the following exposed terminals as specified in item 1(c) of Attachment A: \n\n\t\t\t1.\tExposed terminals at secondary throttle lock relays located behind pilot's seat. \n\n\t\t\t2.\tExternal A2 and A3 terminals on "C" relays in propeller control box behind pilot's seat. \n\n\t\tD.\tHamilton Standard reversing relay box (if used): Reversing solenoid circuit relay contacts, etc., to be shielded from all other circuits which are energized at any time except when reversing is desired. Reversing relay boxes which have separate pin connectors for the reversing solenoid wire and the remaining circuits shall be so installed that it will not be possible inadvertently to interchange any connectors on any two relay boxes. \n\n\t\tE.\tPressure seal disconnect: Modify in one of the following ways: \n\n\t\t\t1.\tBypass the pressure seal by using continuous wiring. \n\n\t\t\t2.\tProvide a separate connector for the reversing solenoid lead. \n\n\t\t\t3.\tPins adjacent to the reversing solenoid pins shall be deactivated or used only in circuits which cannot provide sufficient energy to activate the reversing solenoid or circuits which are energized only when reversing is desired. Also, provide an insulating shield for the reversing solenoid pins on both sides of the pressure seal. The reversing solenoid wire shall be secured to this shield or in some equivalent manner to prevent the wire from falling free in casethe terminal pin comes out of the socket. \n\n\t\t\t4.\tIsolate the solenoid valve lead insert on both sides of the seal by covering both the socket and the wire terminal with insulation which will cover all exposed metal parts when the wire is in place, when the wire terminal has come out of the socket, or when the wire is broken at any point up to the point at which it is secured in the bundle. The nature of the insulation or the provisions for securing it in place must be such that its installation will not be overlooked during maintenance. \n\n\t\tF.\tReversing solenoid circuit wiring: Modify in accordance with item 4 of attachment A. \n\n\t\tG.\tOther circuit modifications: \n\n\t\t\t1.\tAll airplanes with fuselage numbers below 233 shall be modified to comply with Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin No. 221. \n\n\tII.\tReverse solenoid lock assembly: \n\n\t\tA.\tComply with Douglas Service Bulletin DC-6, NO. 356, dated March 9, 1949, to prevent excessive deflection of lock assembly components.B.\tThe "Reverse operable" warning device shall be clearly visible when the lock is open just a sufficient amount to permit pulling the throttles into the reverse regime. \n\n\tIII.\tMaintenance practices (to be instituted not later than August 1, 1952): \n\n\t\tA.\tAt each nearest scheduled service to 350 hours: \n\n\t\t\t1.\tInspect all points specified in items IB, IC, and IE. These inspections may be discontinued if the modifications made to the system are of the type described in item E1 or E2; item 1A or 1B of attachment A and item 2A or 2B of attachment A. \n\n\t\tB.\tAt any time that an electrical fault occurs in a circuit which is carried in the same bundles or the same conduits as the reversing solenoid circuit, representative terminal points in the faulty circuit are to be inspected to determine whether any damage may have occurred within the bundles or conduit. If there is evidence of possible damage, all the wiring involved is to be removed and inspected. Damaged wiring is to bereplaced as necessary. \n\n\t\tC.\tAt each nearest scheduled service to 350 hours, perform an electrical check of the reverse safety switches in the pedestal assembly to assure that the switch is open when the throttles are moved forward out of the reverse position, unless it is shown that failure of any of the reverse safety switches to open will be clearly apparent to the flight crew by reason of improper operations of the propeller control system. Because of the many technical considerations involved, analyses showing that the objective of this revision has been accomplished should be referred to the FAA for engineering evaluation and approval. \n\n\t\tD.\tConduct the mechanical functional test specified in AD 50-16-01 at each nearest scheduled service to 350 hours. \n\n\tIV.\tOperating instructions: Comply with item 5 of attachment A. \n\n\tV.\t(NOTE: Propeller governor design changes, which are under development and whose purpose is to provide a high pressure hydraulic circuit bypass tosafeguard against inadvertent reversing and ability to feather even when the reversing solenoid is energized, are still under consideration and may be the subject of a future directive.)
2024-17-06: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model BAe 146 and Avro 146-RJ series airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of cracking on the radius of the rib 0 forward longeron at a certain frame. This AD requires a one-time inspection for defects of the radius, and repair if necessary. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2024-16-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus SAS Model A330-243, -302, -343, and -941 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a determination that a certain aft bulkhead cover panel may have been made with a non-conforming material. This AD requires replacing the aft bulkhead cover panel and prohibits the installation of affected parts, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2016-21-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky) [[Page 71592]] Model S-92A helicopters. This AD requires altering the fire bottle inertia switch wiring and performing a cartridge functional test of the fire extinguishing system. This AD was prompted by the inadvertent tripping of inertia-switches that has led to unintentional discharging of the fire bottles, leaving the helicopter's auxiliary power unit and engines without fire protection. The actions are intended to prevent unintentional and undetected fire bottle discharges and subsequent unavailability of fire suppression in case of a fire.
53-03-01: 53-03-01 NAVION: Applies to All Model B Aircraft Equipped With Hartzell HC-12 X20-8C/9333C-0 Propellers. Compliance required not later than March 15, 1953. Vibration tests conducted subsequent to the initial tests of the Hartzell HC-12 X20- 8C/9333C-0 propeller installed on the Lycoming GO-435 engine revealed vibration characteristics of a hazardous nature. Therefore, to prevent possible blade cracks and/or failures, the existing r.p.m. restriction placard should be revised as follows: "Avoid continuous ground operation between 1675 and 2150 engine r.p.m."
2024-19-12: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain DG Aviation GmbH (type certificate previously held by DG Flugzeugbau GmbH) Model DG-400 gliders and all Model DG-500 Elan Orion, DG-500 Elan Trainer, DG-500/20 Elan, DG-500/22 Elan, DG-500M, DG-500MB, DG-800A, DG-800B, DG-808C, DG-1000M, DG-1000S, and DG-1000T gliders. This AD was prompted by a report of a broken rod end at the upper end of the elevator pushrod in the fin (vertical tail) of a DG Aviation GmbH Model DG-300 glider. Depending on the glider model, this AD requires revising your existing glider maintenance manual to incorporate new procedures for elevator control circuit free play adjustment, performing an operational check of the free play adjustment of the automatic elevator hook-up, accomplishing corrective actions as required, and replacing the elevator pushrod end with a new part. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2016-20-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A330-200 Freighter, -200, and -300 series airplanes; and Airbus Model A340-200, -300, -500, and -600 series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of fuel leaking through fuel pump electrical connectors and of fuel pump electrical connector damage caused by the build-up of moisture behind the electrical connectors. This AD requires an inspection of the fuel pumps to identify their part numbers and replacement of affected pumps. We are issuing this AD to prevent a potential ignition source and a fuel leak through damaged fuel pump electrical connectors, which creates a flammability risk in an area adjacent to the fuel tank.
2016-20-15: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all General Electric Company (GE) GEnx-1B64/P2, -1B67/P2, -1B70/P2, -1B70C/ P2, -1B70/75/P2, and -1B74/75/P2 turbofan engines with engine assembly, part number (P/N) 2447M10G01 or P/N 2447M10G02, installed. This AD was prompted by a report of a significant fan rub event. This AD requires rework of the engine fan stator module assembly. We are issuing this AD to prevent failure of the fan blades and the load reduction device, loss of power to one or more engines, loss of thrust control, and loss of the airplane.
65-17-02: 65-17-02 CURTISS-WRIGHT: Amdt. 39-112 Part 39 Federal Register August 3, 1965. Applies to Model C-46 Series Airplanes. Compliance required within the next 300 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD unless already accomplished. To prevent further erroneous indication by the landing gear position warning light that the landing gear is down and locked, accomplish the following: Modify the gear position warning light system by providing a separate position indication circuit and separate green light or other equivalent indicator for the "down and locked" position for each of the three landing gears in a manner approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Southern Region. This directive effective September 2, 1965.
2004-05-01 R1: The FAA is revising Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2004-05-01, which applies to certain Bombardier Inc. (formerly deHavilland Inc.) Model Otter DHC-3 airplanes that have turbine engines installed per one of three supplemental type certificates (STC). AD 2004-05-01 currently prohibits you from operating any affected airplane with these engine and propeller configurations unless a new STC for an elevator servo-tab with a redundant control linkage is installed. The FAA has since evaluated concerns, comments, and technical information related to all three STC configurations. Based on that evaluation, we have determined that further evaluation is necessary for the STCs owned by Texas Turbines Conversions, Inc., and Canada Turbine Conversions, Inc. Therefore, we are removing reference to these STCs from the AD, and the AD will only apply to those Bombardier Inc. airplanes that incorporate STC No. SA3777NM (A.M. Luton installation of Pratt and Whitney PT6A-34/ -135 engine). After further evaluation, we may initiate rulemaking action regarding airplanes with the Texas Turbines Conversions, Inc., and Canada Turbine Conversions, Inc., STC configurations. DATES: This AD becomes effective on May 25, 2004. On April 20, 2004 (69 FR 9523, March 1, 2004), the Director of the Federal Register previously approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulation. We must receive any comments on this AD by June 29, 2004.
2009-05-04: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier Model CL-215-6B11 (CL-215T variant) and CL-215-6B11 (CL-415 variant) airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for contamination of grease, bearing wear checks, grease applications of the rudder lower torque tube upper bearing, and a rudder upper hinge gap check; and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from a report of corrosion on the rudder lower torque tube upper bearing. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct corroded bearings which could lead to hinge deformation, and could result in a rudder jam and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
2004-08-14: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Glasflugel Models Mosquito and Club Libelle 205 sailplanes. This AD requires you to replace the rudder actuator arm with an improved design rudder actuator arm. This AD is the result of mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Germany. We are issuing this AD to prevent the rudder attachment actuator arm from failing due to ground handling damage. This failure could eventually result in reduced or loss of sailplane control.
2004-08-04: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 and MD-11F airplanes, that requires repetitive inspections of the transfer pipe assembly installation for the tail tank for damage and cracks, and corrective action, if necessary. This action is necessary to detect and correct damage and cracks to the transfer pipe assembly installation for the tail tank, which could result in fuel leakage and possible ignition. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.