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82-01-01: 82-01-01 CANADAIR: Amendment 39-4288. Applies to Model CL-600 airplanes with serial number 1002 to 1050 inclusive. To prevent asymmetric spoiler deployment, accomplish the following within ten days after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished: 1. Visually inspect and adjust, if necessary, the left and right controlex cables (parts numbers 600-91305-5 and 600-91305-7) for compliance with the revised rigging procedure specified in Canadair Alert Service Bulletin A600-0024, Revision 1, dated November 6, 1981, or in a manner approved by the Chief, Seattle Area Aircraft Certification Office, FAA Northwest Mountain Region. 2. Airplanes may be flown in accordance with FAR 21.197 to a maintenance base for accomplishment of the inspection required by this AD. The manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to the addresses listed above. These documents may also be examined at FAA Northwest Mountain Region, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington 98108. This amendment becomes effective January 4, 1982.
2008-11-20: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above that will supersede an existing AD. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: AD 2007-0315-E was issued to address a possible fuel leakage in the gear compartment in front of the engine and mandated inspections and replacement of fuel plastic-made connectors by connectors made of metal. Since its publication, another fuel leakage has been reported on a S10-VT which had implemented the STEMME Service Bulletin (SB) A31-10-082 as required by AD 2007-0315-E. It has been determined that the fuel leak may have been caused by the deformation that the originally installed clamps created on the fuel hoses and thus preventing the new clamps from being sufficiently pinched to perform a correct tightening.This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI. DATES: This AD becomes effective June 23, 2008. On June 23, 2008, the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of STEMME F & D Service Bulletin A31-10-083, Am-Index: 01.a, dated February 26, 2008, listed in this AD. As of February 20, 2008 (73 FR 5733, January 31, 2008), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of STEMME F & D Service Bulletin A31-10-082, AM.-Index: 01.a, dated November 30, 2007, listed in this AD. We must receive comments on this AD by July 2, 2008.
2008-11-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Cirrus Design Corporation (CDC) Model SR20 airplanes. This AD requires you to perform an inspection and replacement as necessary of the heat exchanger. This AD results from the discovery of engine exhaust fumes in the cabin of CDC Model SR20 airplanes. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct leaks in the exhaust system, which could result in exhaust gases leaking into the cabin heating system. This condition could lead to carbon monoxide in the cabin and incapacitation of the pilot.
86-12-01 L: 86-12-01 BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC.: Letter issued June 6, 1986. Applies to all Bell Model 214ST helicopters, certificated in all categories. Compliance is required prior to further flight after receipt of this AD, unless previously accomplished. To prevent loss of main rotor collective control, visually inspect locking plate, Part Number (P/N) 214-010-232-101, in accordance with Part I of Bell Helicopter, Textron, Inc., Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) 214ST-86-36, dated May 23, 1986. If the locking plate is defective, check the torque of the lower collective hub nut, Part Number 214-010-407-001, in accordance with Part IV of ASB 214ST-86-36. At the next "A" check, inspect the locking plate in accordance with Part II of ASB 214ST-86-36. At each subsequent "A" check, inspect the locking plate in accordance with Part III of ASB 214ST-86-36. At the next "B" check and each subsequent "B" check, check the torque of the lower collective hub nut, P/N 214-010-407-1, in accordance with Part IV of ASB 214ST-86-36. An alternate method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an equivalent level of safety, may be approved by the Manager, Helicopter Certification Branch, Aircraft Certification Division, FAA, Southwest Region. This airworthiness directive becomes effective upon receipt.
2008-11-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 727 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for any cracking of or damage to the left side and right side flight deck No. 2, No. 4, and No. 5 windows, as necessary, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of in-flight departure and separation of the flight deck windows. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracking in the vinyl interlayer or damage to the structural inner glass panes of the flight deck No. 2, No. 4, and No. 5 windows, which could result in loss of a window and rapid loss of cabin pressure. Loss of cabin pressure could cause crew communication difficulties or crew incapacitation.
2007-14-05: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Model A310 and A300-600 series airplanes. This AD requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness by incorporating new and revised certification maintenance requirements. This AD results from the manufacturer determining that additional and revised certification maintenance requirements are necessary in order to ensure continued operational safety of the affected airplanes. We are issuing this AD to prevent safety-significant latent failures that would, in combination with one or more other specific failures or events, result in a hazardous or catastrophic failure condition of avionics, hydraulic systems, fire detection systems, fuel systems, or other critical systems.
73-12-08: 73-12-08 GENERAL DYNAMICS: Amdt. 39-1659. Applies to Models 22 and 22M airplanes. Compliance, as indicated, required on all airplanes with 28,000 hours or more of total time in service, unless already accomplished. To prevent failures of the flap track support structure accomplish the following: a. Within the next 50 landings after the effective date of this A.D., unless already accomplished within the last 275 landings, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 325 landings from the last inspection, (1) Visually inspect the right and left inboard flap at wing station 180.504 for cracks in the flap track support rails 22-17463-57, -58, -59, -60, in the fitting 22-18994-1, -3 or -5 and in the track supporting structure general vicinity. (2) If cracks are found in any fitting, it must be replaced before further flight. If cracks are found in the rails or supporting structure other than fittings, parts must be replaced or repaired, before further flight, in amanner approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. Airplanes with minor cracks in fittings, rails or support structure may be flown per FAR 21.197 to a base where replacement or repair of parts can be accomplished. b. When parts are replaced or repaired per (a)(2) above, the repetitive inspections of (a) above, are no longer required for that part until it accumulates another 28000 hours' time in service from the last inspection. For the purpose of complying with this A.D., subject to acceptance by the assigned FAA maintenance inspector, the number of landings may be determined by dividing each airplanes hours' time in service by the operator's fleet average time from takeoff to landing for the airplane type. This amendment becomes effective June 12, 1973.
2008-10-12: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) to supersede AD 2007-13-17, which applies to certain Air Tractor, Inc. (Air Tractor) Models AT-602, AT-802, and AT-802A airplanes. AD 2007-13- 17 currently requires you to repetitively inspect the engine mount for any cracks, repair or replace any cracked engine mount, and report any cracks found to the FAA. Since we issued AD 2007-13-17, Air Tractor has learned of a Model AT-502B with a crack located where the lower engine mount tube is welded to the engine mount ring. In addition, Air Tractor has developed gussets that, when installed according to their service letter, terminate the repetitive inspection requirement. Consequently, this AD would retain the inspection actions of AD 2007-13-17 for Model AT-602, AT-802, and AT-802A airplanes, including the compliance times and effective dates; establish new inspection actions for the AT-400 and AT-500 series airplanes; incorporate a mandatory terminating action for all airplanes; and terminate the reporting requirement of AD 2007- 13-17. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in the engine mount, which could result in failure of the engine mount. Such failure could lead to separation of the engine from the airplane. DATES: This AD becomes effective on June 12, 2008. On June 12, 2008, the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Snow Engineering Co. Service Letter 253, Rev. C, dated April 17, 2008; Snow Engineering Co. Service Letter 253, Rev. B, dated November 30, 2007; and Snow Engineering Co. Service Letter 253 Rev. A, dated October 16, 2007, as listed in this AD. As of August 10, 2007 (72 FR 36863, July 6, 2007), the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of Snow Engineering Co. Service Letter 253, revised January 22, 2007, as listed in this AD.
2007-14-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: It was detected by the STC holder that in earlier installations of the ACASII system there were no isolation diodes installed in the Heading and Attitude Valid lines. The absence of an isolation diode in the valid lines can prevent the valid flag to come up even if a gyro fault exists. The problem has only been detected for Heading Valid lines but could equally affect the Attitude Valid lines. With installation of the ACASII, the heading and attitude valid lines have to be connected to the TPU67A. On valid state, the signals are +28VDC. On invalid, the signals are open. This condition of direct connection (without an isolation diode installed) of the valid lines to the TPU67A, if not corrected, could cause the TPU67A to feed current into the open stated valid lines. This prevents the flag to appear even if the gyro is invalid, providing the flight crew with erroneous navigation information. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
87-10-08: 87-10-08 CASA: Amendment 39-5622. Applies to CASA Model C-212 series airplanes, serial numbers as listed in CASA Service Bulletin 212-52-16, dated October 23, 1985, certificated in any category. Compliance is required within 9 months after the effective date of this AD. To prevent inadvertent opening of the crew door, accomplish the following, unless previously accomplished: A. Install a protective cover over the crew door internal handle in accordance with CASA Service Bulletin 212-52-16, dated October 23, 1985. B. An alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Standardization Branch, ANM-113, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of the modification required by this AD. All persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service document from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A., Getafe, Madrid, Spain. This document may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, Seattle, Washington, or the Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 9010 East Marginal Way South, Seattle, Washington. This amendment 39-5622 becomes effective June 19, 1987.
2008-10-09: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 737-100, -200, -200C, -300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD requires revising the FAA-approved maintenance program to incorporate new airworthiness limitations (AWLs) for fuel tank systems to satisfy Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 requirements. This AD also requires the initial inspection of a certain repetitive AWL inspection to phase in that inspection, and repair if necessary. This AD results from a design review of the fuel tank system. We are issuing this AD to prevent the potential for ignition sources inside fuel tanks caused by latent failures, alterations, repairs, or maintenance actions, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
2008-10-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Bell Helicopter Textron (Bell) model helicopters. This action requires certain checks and inspections of each tail rotor blade assembly (T/R blade) at specified intervals and repairing or replacing, as applicable, any unairworthy T/R blade. This amendment is prompted by three failures of a T/R blade occurring during flight and a recent incident of a cracked T/R blade discovered during a scheduled visual inspection. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect damage to a T/R blade that could lead to cracking of a T/R blade and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
79-18-06: 79-18-06 BENDIX: Amendment 39-3546 as amended by Amendment 39-3606. Applies to Bendix D-2000 and D-2200 series magnetos installed on 4, 6, or 8 cylinder reciprocating engines. To preclude the loss of ignition, accomplish the following within the next ten hours after the effective date of this AD unless previously accomplished. (a) Housing Distortion For any of the following magnetos, accomplish Detailed Instructions, Part I of Bendix Service Bulletin No. 605 by means of any one of Methods, I, II or III and Information Parts I-C and I-D or FAA approved equivalent procedures. (1) Red nameplate magnetos, Serial Numbers below 25001. (2) Blue nameplate magnetos, Serial Numbers below 901001. (3) Dual Ignition Systems with broken torque seals or no torque seals on four middle cover screws. (4) Duel Ignition Systems not having the letter "K" stamped on the magneto nameplate following the serial number and without a caution decal on the magneto cover. (b) Coil Securing Kit For the following magnetos, accomplish Detailed Instructions of Part II of Bendix Service Bulletin No. 605 or FAA approved equivalent procedures. (1) Red nameplate magnetos, Serial Numbers below Serial Number 17815 not having the letter, "C", stamped approximately in the center of the magneto nameplate bottom line. (2) Blue nameplate magnetos, Serial Numbers below 806001 not having the letter, "C", stamped approximately in the center of the magneto nameplate bottom line. (Bendix Service Bulletin No. 584B incorporated by reference in Service Bulletin No. 605.) (c) Identification After accomplishing the instructions of the Airworthiness Directive, metal stamp the letter, "K", after the magneto serial number on the magneto nameplate, the letter, "C", approximately centered on the magneto nameplate bottom line, and make an engine log book entry of compliance including magneto serial number. Equivalent inspections and procedures must be approved by the Chief of the Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, AEA-210, Federal Aviation Administration, (FAA) Eastern Region. As permitted by FAR 21.197, aircraft may be flown to a base where maintenance required by this Airworthiness Directive can be accomplished. Upon request, with substantiating data submitted through an FAA Maintenance Inspector, the compliance time specified in this AD may be adjusted by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Eastern Region. Amendment 39-3546 was effective September 17, 1979. This Amendment 39-3606 is effective upon publication in the Federal Register.
2008-09-13: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD requires revising the FAA-approved maintenance inspection program to include inspections that will give no less than the required damage tolerance rating for each structural significant item (SSI), doing repetitive inspections to detect cracks of all SSIs, and repairing cracked structure. This AD results from a report of incidents involving fatigue cracking in transport category airplanes that are approaching or have exceeded their design service objective. We are issuing this AD to maintain the continued structural integrity of the entire fleet of Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes.
63-13-01: 63-13-01 BOEING: Amdt. 579 Part 507 Federal Register June 21, 1963. Applies to All Model 75 Series Aircraft Equipped With Pratt & Whitney R-985 or Wright R-975 Series Engines and Western Propeller Repair Model W2-1 Propellers, Including Those Certificated in the Restricted Category. Compliance required as indicated. As a result of several propeller blade failures the following inspections are required: Within 25 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished within the last 225 hours' time in service, and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 250 hours' time in service from the last inspection, remove propeller blades from hub, clean surface as necessary and inspect by dye penetrant or equivalent method for evidence of cracks within the hub area and for at least 6 inches of shank portion of the blade outside of the hub. If no cracks are found blades may be returned to service. Any blades showing evidence of cracks are not eligible for repair and shall not be used again in certificated aircraft. The repetitive inspections required on Pratt and Whitney R-985 engines in this AD are no longer necessary when the engine crankshaft flyweight and flyweight liners have been reworked or replaced at each overhaul period as detailed in AD 65-07-02. This directive effective June 21, 1963. Revised October 13, 1965.
2008-09-05: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747 airplanes. This AD requires inspecting the trunnion fork assembly of the wing landing gears to determine the part number and serial number and to determine the category of the trunnion fork assemblies. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires, if necessary, various inspections to detect discrepancies of the trunnion fork assemblies, related investigative/corrective actions, and a terminating action. This AD results from a report of a fractured trunnion fork assembly. We are issuing this AD to prevent a fractured trunnion fork assembly, which could result in the collapse of a wing landing gear on the ground and possible damage to hydraulic equipment and the aileron and spoiler cables. Such damage could result in reduced controllability of the airplane.
80-02-08: 80-02-08 VARGA AIRCRAFT CORPORATION (Morrisey): Amendment 39-3664. Applies to Varga Model 2150 and 2150A series airplanes certificated in all categories. Compliance required within the next ten (10) hours' time in service from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. To prevent jamming of the rudder cables on the rudder balance weight attach bolts, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tRemove the two bolts attaching the rudder balance weight to the static balance arm and reinstall these bolts head downward, as shown in Figure 1 of this AD. \n\n\n\n\n\t(b)\tAlternative inspections, modifications or other actions which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Chief, Aircraft Engineering Division, FAA Western Region. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective January 21, 1980.
2008-08-20: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) originated by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: Wing anti ice telescopic tubes (P/N [part number] 5035-400 and 5035-500) ball joints were originally designed with high temperature polymer (Kynel\TM\) sealing rings. Temperature induced cracking of these rings associated with long term wear has been encountered in a small number of cases. This degradation may lead to binding of the ball joint and high swiveling forces which may result in improper operation of the leading edge slats and also in failure of the ball joint mounting bracket with possible friction on the aileron control rod, which could lead, if combined with a failure of the aileron emergency actuator, to an aileron jamming. The unsafe condition is a jammed aileron, which results in reduced controllability of the airplane. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2008-06-22: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the specified Eurocopter France (Eurocopter) Model EC 130 B4 helicopters, with certain twist grip assemblies installed, that requires inspecting the pilot and co-pilot collective levers for proper bonding between the twist grip drive tubes and the control pinions and if debonding is present, replacing the collective levers before further flight. This amendment is prompted by one incident in which the engine remained at idle speed although the twist grip had been turned to the flight position. The actions specified by this AD are intended to detect debonding between the twist grip drive tubes and the control pinions on the pilot and co-pilot collective levers to prevent loss of cockpit throttle control of the engine, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
82-24-04: 82-24-04 MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: Amendment 39-4500. Applies to McDonnell Douglas Model DC-9-30, -50, and -80 series airplanes including C-9B airplanes, with manufacturer's serial numbers 48002 through 48020, 48024 through 48059, 48062, 48063, 48066 through 48074, 48079, 48080, 48083, 48086, 48087, 48092 through 48151, 48154 through 48159, 49100, 49101, 49112, 49113, and 49116 through 49119. \n\n\tCompliance required within 30 days from the effective date of this AD, unless already accomplished. \n\n\tTo assure proper functioning of the horizontal stabilizer leading edge de-icing system, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tAccomplish the inspection, and if necessary, take the corrective action specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of McDonnell Douglas DC-9 Alert Service Bulletin A30-50, dated October 5, 1982, or later revisions approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tB.\tAffected DC-9 airplanes may be operated after 30 days following the effective date of this AD, and prior to the accomplishment of Paragraph (A), above, under the following conditions: \n\n\t\t1)\tThey are not operated into known icing conditions; and \n\n\t\t2)\tA placard is installed in full view of the pilots which reads: "Flight into known icing conditions is prohibited." \n\n\tC.\tAlternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. \n\n\tD.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tThe manufacturer's specifications and procedures identified and described in this directive are incorporated herein and made a part hereof pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(a)(1). All persons affected by this directive who have not already received these documents from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to McDonnell Douglas Corporation, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Director, Publications and Training, C1-750 (54-60). These documents also may be examined at FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, 17900 Pacific Highway South, C-68966, Seattle, Washington 98168, or Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 4344 Donald Douglas Drive, Long Beach, California 90808. \n\n\tThis amendment becomes effective November 23, 1982.
2008-08-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 727 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections for cracking or corrosion of the threaded end of the lower segment of the main landing gear (MLG) side strut, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires prior or concurrent inspection for cracking or corrosion of the threads and thread relief area of the lower segment, corrective action if necessary, and re-assembly using corrosion inhibiting compound. This AD results from reports of the threads cracking on the MLG side strut lower segment. We are issuing this AD to \nprevent a fractured side strut, which could result in collapse of the MLG.
84-02-02: 84-02-02 AVIONS MARCEL DASSAULT - BREQUET AVIATION: Amendment 39-4796. Applies to all Falcon 10 series airplanes certificated in all categories. To prevent failure of the wing leading edge slat anti-icing system, accomplish the following within the next 50 hours time in service or 30 days after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless already accomplished. A. Inspect, repair, and modify the wing leading edge slat anti-icing system in accordance with Avions Marcel Dassault-Brequet Aviation Service Bulletin F10/0239, dated September 14, 1983. B. Alternate means of compliance which provide an equivalent level of safety may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA, Northwest Mountain Region. C. Special flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base for the accomplishment of inspections and/or modifications required by this AD. This supersedes Amendment39-4423 (47 FR 32699, July 29, 1982), AD 82-16-01. This amendment becomes effective January 31, 1984.
79-25-09: 79-25-09 HAMILTON STANDARD: Amendment 39-3637. Applies to all Hamilton Standard 24PF propellers, P/N 764995-1, 764996-2, 764996-3, 767600-2, and 767600-3, incorporating P/N 738410-1 bell cranks and P/N 738405-1 pivots. Compliance required as indicated. To preclude fracture of the P/N 738410-1 bell crank and P/N 738405-1 pivot due to cyclic loading, replace the bell cranks and the pivots in accordance with the following schedule: 1. Bell cranks and pivots with less than 2,600 hours time in service as of the effective date of this AD shall be removed from service prior to the accumulation of 3,000 hours time in service. 2. Bell cranks and pivots with 2,600 hours or more time in service as of the effective date of this AD shall be removed from service prior to the accumulation of 400 additional hours time in service. This AD establishes a 3,000 hour life limit for bell crank P/N 738410-1 and pivot P/N 738405-1. NOTE: Hamilton Standard Service Bulletin HSCode 24PF, No. 13, "Propellers - Extension Dome Assembly - Replacement of Bell Crank and Bell Crank Pivots," dated August 15, 1979, pertains to this subject. Upon request of the operator, an FAA maintenance inspector, subject to prior approval of the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, New England Region, may adjust the replacement interval specified in this AD to permit compliance at an established inspection period of the operator if the request contains substantiating data to justify the increase for that operator. This amendment becomes effective December 24, 1979.
2008-06-29: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 737-300, -400, and -500 series airplanes. This AD requires repetitive inspections of the downstop assemblies on the main tracks of the No. 2, 3, 4, and 5 slats and the inboard track of the No. 1 and 6 slats to verify if any parts are missing, damaged, or in the wrong order. This AD also requires other specified actions, and related investigative and corrective actions if necessary. This AD results from reports of fuel leaking from a puncture in the slat track housing (referred to as the "slat can''). We are issuing this AD to detect and correct loose or missing parts from the main slat track downstop assemblies, which could puncture the slat can and result in a fuel leak and consequent fire.
64-07-04: 64-07-04 LOCKHEED: Amdt. 705 Part 507 Federal Register March 14, 1964. Applies to All Models 49, 149, 649, 649A, 749, 749A, 1049-54, 1049C, 1049D, 1049E, 1049G and 1049H Series Aircraft. Compliance required as indicated. (a) To insure that the bolts in the parallelogram linkages of the primary flight control boost systems remain secured and safetied, accomplish the following within 400 hours' time in service after the effective date of this AD, unless previously accomplished. (1) Replace the five castellated nuts in each of the four parallelogram linkages between the boost valve and boost mechanism of each of the boost systems with self-locking castellated nuts and cotter pins using MS-17825(WEP) in lieu of AN 310 nuts and MS- 17826(WEP) in lieu of AN 320 nuts or an equivalent approved by the Chief, Engineering and Manufacturing Branch, FAA Western Region. (2) All torque requirements that applied to the AN 310 and 320 castellated nuts also apply to the MS-17825(WEP) and MS-17826(WEP) self-locking castellated nuts, respectively. (b) Replace the self-locking castellated nuts with new self-locking castellated nuts prior to exceeding the reusability limits specified by the nut manufacturer. (Lockheed Service Information Letter 514, dated November 27, 1963, covers this same subject.) This directive effective April 14, 1964.