Results
2007-04-16: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 767 airplanes. This AD requires an inspection of each main tank fuel boost pump for the presence of a pump shaft flame arrestor, and if the flame arrestor is missing, replacement of that pump with a pump having a pump shaft flame arrestor. This AD also requires repetitive measurements of the flame arrestor's position in the pump, and corrective actions if necessary. This AD also requires the replacement of the pump with a new or modified pump, which ends the repetitive measurements. This AD results from reports that certain fuel boost pumps may not have flame arrestors installed in the pump shaft and reports that the pin that holds the flame arrestor in place can break due to metal fatigue. We are issuing this AD to prevent the possible migration of a flame from a main tank fuel boost pump inlet to the vapor space of that fuel tank, and consequent ignition of fuel vapors, which could result in a fire or explosion.
2000-18-14: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Sikorsky Aircraft-manufactured Model CH-54A helicopters. That AD currently requires initial and recurring inspections and rework or replacement, if necessary, of the second stage lower planetary plate (plate). This AD requires the same actions as the existing AD but would add two additional type certificate (TC) holders to the applicability of the AD and change one TC holder who has transferred ownership of the affected helicopters since the issuance of the existing AD. This amendment is prompted by the discovery that the applicability section of the existing AD is incomplete. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the plate due to fatigue cracking, which could result in failure of the main gearbox, failure of the drive system, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
2019-01-01: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for The Boeing Company Model 787-8 airplanes powered by Rolls-Royce plc (RR) Trent 1000-A (including -A/01 and -A/01A), Trent 1000-AE (including - AE/01A), Trent 1000-C (including -C/01 and -C/01A), Trent 1000-CE (including -CE/01A), Trent 1000-D (including -D/01 and -D/01A), Trent 1000-E (including -E/01 and -E/01A), Trent 1000-G (including -G/01 and -G/01A), and Trent 1000-H (including -H/01 and H/01A) turbofan engines. This AD requires revising the airplane flight manual (AFM) to limit extended operations (ETOPS). This AD was prompted by a report from the engine manufacturer indicating that after an engine failure, prolonged operation at high thrust settings on the remaining engine during an ETOPS diversion may result in failure of the remaining engine before the diversion can be safely completed. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
97-10-04: 97-10-04 SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT CORPORATION: Priority Letter issued on April 30, 1997. Docket No. 97-SW-11-AD. Applicability: Model S-61A, D, E, L, N, NM, R, and V helicopters, certificated in any category, equipped with a main rotor blade assembly (blade), part number (P/N) S6115-20501 or P/N 61170-20201, having one of the following four-digit or eight-digit serial numbers: 1282-1554 2721 3016-2850 3305-3106 3517-3311 4787-4793 2183 2751 3019 3317-3115 3525-3310 4800-4794 2380-2498 2781-2644 3138 3343-3147 3637-3459 4835-4790 2495 2800-2671 3168-3585 3343-3648 3694-3481 5484-5363 2500 2817 3192-2999 3364-3180 3748-3543 5974-5816 2520 2819 3215-3012 3451-3239 3752-3527 5981-5813 2521 2839 3216-3023 3491-3278 3753-3528 7096-6583 2644 2883 3242-3044 3499-3936 3840-3620 7779-7083 2673 2919-2771 3249-3052 3511-3293 3966-3737 8099-8054 2716-2683 3008 3250-3043 3512-3292 4216-4392 NOTE 1: This AD applies to each helicopter identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For helicopters that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (b) to request approval from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition, or different actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repair remove any helicopter from the applicability of this AD. Compliance: Required before further flight, unless accomplished previously. To prevent disbonding and separation of portions ofthe blade, subsequent excessive vibrations, and loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following: (a) Inspect each blade having one of the affected serial numbers in accordance with Section 2A of the Accomplishment Instructions of Sikorsky Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) No. 61B15-29, dated April 25, 1997, to determine the anodizing date for all blade trailing edge pocket assemblies (pocket assemblies) installed on the blade in locations as specified in the Planning Information Section, paragraph 1D(3) of the ASB, that were anodized by Poly-Metal Company. Remove any blade having a pocket assembly anodized by Poly-Metal Company during the period from October 1, 1996 through December 31, 1996, and replace the blade with an airworthy blade. (b) An alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office, FAA. Operators shall submit theirrequests through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Boston Aircraft Certification Office. NOTE 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Boston Aircraft Certification Office. (c) A one-time only special flight permit may be issued to operate the helicopter to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished, after inspecting all pocket assemblies for disbonding. (d) Copies of the applicable service information may be obtained from Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation, Attn: Manager, Commercial Tech Support, 6900 Main Street, P.O. Box 9729, Stratford, Connecticut 06497-9129. This information may be examined at the FAA, Office of the Assistant Chief Counsel, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort Worth, Texas. (e) Priority Letter AD 97-10-04, issued April 30, 1997, becomes effective upon receipt.
93-08-12: 93-08-12 BOEING: Amendment 39-8559. Docket 92-NM-36-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes; as listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2349, dated June 27, 1991; certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously. \n\n\tTo prevent loss of the structural integrity of the fuselage, accomplish the following: \n\n\t(a)\tPrior to the accumulation of 22,000 total flight cycles, or within 1,000 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless previously accomplished within the last 2,000 flight cycles; and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 flight cycles: Perform a detailed visual internal inspection to detect cracks in the areas of the fuselage internal structure listed below, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2349, dated June 27, 1991; and prior to further flight, repair any cracks detected, in accordance with FAA- approved procedures. \n\n\t\t(1)\tSections 41 and 42 upper deck floor beams. \n\t\t(2)\tSection 42 upper lobe frames. \n\t\t(3)\tSection 46 lower lobe frames. \n\t\t(4)\tSection 42 lower lobe frames. \n\t\t(5)\tMain entry door cutouts. \n\t\t(6)\tSection 41 body station 260, 340, and 400 bulkheads. \n\t\t(7)\tMain entry doors. \n\n\t(b)\tPrior to the accumulation of 25,000 total flight cycles, or within 1,000 flight cycles after the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later, unless accomplished previously within the last 2,000 flight cycles; and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 3,000 flight cycles: Perform a detailed visual internal inspection to detect cracks in the Section 46 upper lobe frames, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2349, dated June 27, 1991; and prior to further flight, repair any cracks detected, in accordance with FAA-approved procedures. \n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. Operators shall submit their requests through an appropriate FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may add comments and then send it to the Manager, Seattle ACO. \n\n\tNOTE: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Seattle ACO. \n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate the airplane to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished. \n\n\t(e)\tThe inspections shall be done in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-53-2349, dated June 27, 1991. This incorporation by reference was approved by the Director of the Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR Part 51. Copies may be obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the Office of the Federal Register, 800 North Capitol Street, NW., suite 700, Washington, DC. \n\n\t(f)\tThis amendment becomes effective on June 11, 1993.
94-09-17: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to all McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10 series airplanes and KC-10A (military) airplanes. This action requires inspections to determine the serial numbers and to detect defects in the upper and lower lock links on the nose landing gear (NLG), and rework or replacement of any defective link found. This amendment is prompted by reports of cracking and subsequent failure of certain lock links on these airplanes, which have been attributed to forging defects in the lock links. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent collapse of the NLG.\n\n\tThe incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of May 20, 1994.\n\n\tComments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before July 5, 1994.
2007-04-15: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Sicma Aero Seat, passenger seat assemblies. This AD requires modifying the aft track fittings on these passenger seat assemblies by installing new tab locks, and then torquing the aft track fitting locking bolts. We are issuing this AD to prevent detachment of passenger seat assemblies, especially during emergency conditions, leading to occupant injury.
2007-04-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) to supersede AD 2004-11-04, which applies to all CTRM Aviation Sdn. Bhd. (Formerly Eagle Aircraft (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd.) Model Eagle 150B airplanes. AD 2004-11-04 currently requires you to inspect certain canard inboard flap hinge support brackets (initially before further flight and repetitively before the first flight of each day) and perform any necessary follow-up action. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by the airworthiness authority for Malaysia to require the installation of improved design inboard flap hinge brackets as terminating action for the repetitive inspections. Consequently, this AD retains the requirement that you inspect certain canard inboard flap hinge support brackets (initially before further flight and repetitively before the first flight of each day) and then requires that you replace the parts with new design inboard flap hinge brackets as terminating action for the repetitive inspections or if cracks are found. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct cracks in the canard inboard flap hinge support brackets, which could result in loss of retention of controls and consequently, loss of airplane control.
2019-01-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Aspen Avionics, Inc. (Aspen), Evolution Flight Display (EFD) EFD1000 Primary Flight Display (PFD), EFD1000 Multi-Function Display (MFD), EFD1000 Emergency Backup Display (EBD), and EFD500 MFD units installed on various aircraft. This AD requires disabling the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) In function and revising the Airplane Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS). This AD was prompted by reports of flight displays repetitively resetting. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2003-17-15: This amendment supersedes an existing airworthiness directive (AD) that applies to Rolls-Royce plc. (RR) models RB211-535E4-37, RB211- 535E4-B-37, and RB211-535E4-B-75 turbofan engines, with certain part number (P/N) low pressure (LP) turbine stage 2 discs installed. That AD currently requires establishing new reduced LP turbine stage 2 disc cyclic limits. That AD also requires removing from service affected discs that already exceed the new reduced cyclic limits, and removing other affected discs before exceeding their cyclic limits, using a drawdown schedule. This amendment requires changing certain cyclic limits, changing the effective date of certain disc cyclic lives, and would allow intermix of Flight Plan A and Flight Plan B intermix calculations. This amendment is prompted by a reassessment of the thermal and stress data from recent operational experience and comments received from operators on the current AD. We are issuing this AD to prevent LP turbine stage 2 disc failure, which could result in uncontained engine failure and possible loss of the airplane.
2004-09-32: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 757-200 series airplanes. This action requires initial and repetitive inspections of the fuselage skin and bear strap at the forward, upper corner of the L1 entry door cutout for cracking, and repair if necessary. This action also provides an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This action is necessary to detect and correct cracking of the fuselage skin and bear strap at the forward, upper corner of the L1 entry door cutout, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the L1 entry door and consequent rapid decompression of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.
2021-19-07: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain \n\n((Page 54040)) \n\nHelicopteres Guimbal Model CABRI G2 helicopters. This AD was prompted by a report that, during scheduled maintenance on two helicopters, cracks were found on a certain main rotor (MR) non- rotating scissor link. This AD requires replacing an affected MR non- rotating scissor link with a serviceable part. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-18-05: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Aerospatiale Model ATR42 and ATR72 series airplanes, that requires modification of the alerting capability of the anti-icing advisory system to improve crew awareness of icing conditions, replacement of the median wing de-icing boots with extended de-icing boots, and installation of de-icing boots on the metallic wing leading edge. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to reduce the degradation of lift and drag characteristics in prolonged severe icing exposure, which could result in loss of lift and consequent reduced controllability of the airplane.
95-04-07 R2: This amendment revises an existing airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model DC-10-10, -15, and -30 airplanes, and KC-10A (military) airplanes, that currently requires inspections to determine the condition of the lockwires on the forward engine mount bolts and correction of any discrepancies found. That amendment also provides for termination of the inspections for some airplanes by installing retainers on the bolts. That AD was prompted by reports of stretched or broken lockwires on the forward engine mount bolts. The actions specified by that AD are intended to prevent broken lockwires, which could result in loosening of the engine mount bolts, and subsequent separation of the engine from the airplane. This amendment provides an additional optional terminating modification and clarification of the requirements of the previous optional terminating modification, and removes the reporting requirements for the repetitive inspections.
2000-15-14: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive inspections to verify operation of the remote control circuit breakers (RCCB) of the alternating current (AC) cabin bus switch, and replacement of any discrepant RCCB with a new RCCB. This action is necessary to prevent propagation of smoke and fumes in the cockpit and passenger cabin due to an inoperable RCCB of the AC cabin bus switch during smoke and fume isolation procedures. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe condition.\n\n\tThe incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulations is approved by the Director of the Federal Register as of August 23, 2000.\n\n\tComments for inclusion in the Rules Docket must be received on or before October 10, 2000.
2018-26-06: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of loose, worn, or missing attachment bolts for the main landing gear (MLG) center door assemblies. This AD requires repetitive detailed inspections of the forward and aft MLG center door assembly attachments for loose, missing, damaged, or bottomed-out attachment bolts, and any wear to the retention clip assemblies as applicable; and applicable on-condition actions. This AD also provides an \n\n((Page 67044)) \n\noptional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
2007-03-20: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as: The back-up mode can be activated by an electrostatic discharge or by a malfunction of the collective pitch signal. The two engines fitted on the same helicopter can therefore be frozen in this back- up position at 85% N1. Freezing both engines in the back-up mode can lead to an inability to continue safe flight and forced landing. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
2000-18-03: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to Rolls-Royce plc models RB211-524D4-19, -524D4-B-19, -524D4-B-39, -524D4X-19, and 524D4X-B-19 turbofan engines with a cold stream nozzle assembly Part Number (PN) LJ32826 installed. This action requires inspection for cracks and repair of the cold stream nozzle assembly longitudinal flange. This amendment is prompted by a report of the loss of a large section of cold stream nozzle assembly in flight. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect cracks that could result in failure of the cold stream nozzle assembly, possible release of cold stream nozzle debris from the engine, and possible damage to airplane control surfaces.
90-24-09: 90-24-09 BOEING: Amendment 39-6815. Docket No. 90-NM-231-AD. \n\n\tApplicability: Model 747 series airplanes, listed in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57- 2231, Revision 2, dated September 27, 1990, certificated in any category. \n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless previously accomplished. \n\tTo prevent failure of the flap tracks, accomplish the following: \n\n\tA.\tVisually inspect the forward end clevis lugs of flap tracks for evidence of cracking, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2231, Revision 2, dated September 27, 1990, and in accordance with the following schedule: \n\n\t\t1.\tFor Group 1 airplanes: Perform the inspection at flap track positions 1 through 8 within the next 30 days after the effective date of this AD. \n\n\t\t2.\tFor Group 2 airplanes: Perform inspection at flap track positions 1, 2, 7, and 8 prior to the later of the following: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tPrior to the accumulation of 30,000 flight hours or 8 years after airplane delivery, whichever occursfirst; or \n\n\t\t\tb.\tWithin 120 days after the effective date of this AD. \n\n\t\t3.\tFor Group 3 airplanes: Perform the inspection at flap track positions 1 through 8 prior to the later of the following: \n\n\t\t\ta.\tPrior to the accumulation of 30,000 flight hours or 8 years after airplane delivery, whichever occurs first; or \n\n\t\t\tb.\tWithin 120 days after the effective date of this AD. \n\n\tB.\tIf cracking is found, replace the flap track prior to further flight, in accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2231, Revision 2, dated September 27, 1990. \n\n\tC.\tIf no cracking is found, repeat the inspection required by paragraph A. of this AD, at intervals not to exceed 300 flight cycles for Group 1 airplanes, and 1,200 flight cycles for Group 2 and Group 3 airplanes. \n\n\tD.\tAccomplishment of the modification of the forward end clevis lugs of flap tracks as specified in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-57-2231, Revision 2, dated September 27, 1990, constitutes terminating action for the inspections required by paragraphs A. and C. of this AD. \n\n\tE.\tAn alternate means of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time, which provides an acceptable level of safety, may be used when approved by the Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate. \n\n\tNOTE: The request should be submitted directly to the Manager, Seattle ACO, and a copy sent to the cognizant FAA Principal Inspector (PI). The PI will then forward comments or concurrence to the Seattle ACO. \n\n\tF.\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with FAR 21.197 and 21.199 to operate airplanes to a base in order to comply with the requirements of this AD. \n\n\tAll persons affected by this directive who have not already received the appropriate service information from the manufacturer may obtain copies upon request to Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124. This information may be examined at the FAA, Northwest Mountain Region, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue S.W., Renton, Washington. \n\n\tThis amendment (39-6815, AD 90-24-09) becomes effective on December 5, 1990.
2007-03-17: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as loose rivets on frames C18 BIS and C19, which could result in a reduced structural integrity of the tail area. We are issuing this AD to require actions to correct the unsafe condition on these products.
97-20-09 PL: 97-20-09 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FORESTRY; FIREFLY AVIATION HELICOPTER SERVICES (PREVIOUSLY ERICKSON AIR CRANE CO.); GARLICK HELICOPTERS, INC.; HAWKINS AND POWERS AVIATION INC.; INTERNATIONAL HELICOPTERS, INC.; RANGER HELICOPTER SERVICES; ROBINSON AIRCRANE; SCOTT PAPER CO.; SMITH HELICOPTERS; SOUTHERN HELICOPTER; SOUTHWEST FLORIDA AVIATION; WESTERN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, INC.; UNC HELICOPTERS; AND U.S. HELICOPTER, INC.: Priority Letter issued on September 17, 1997. Docket No. 97-SW-35-AD.\n\n\tApplicability: Model HH-1K (Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) H5NM), TH-lF (TCDS H12NM, and R00008AT), TH-1L (TCDS H5NM, H7SO, and H4NM), UH-1A (TCDS H3SO), UH-1B (TCDS H1RM, H3NM, H13WE, H3SO, H5SO, and R00012AT), UH-1E (TCDS H5NM, H7SO, H8NM, and H4NM), UH-1F (TCDS H2NM, H7NE, H11SW, H12NM, and R00008AT), UH-1H (TCDS H13WE, H3SO, and H15NM), UH-lL (TCDS H5NM, H7SO, and H4NM), UH-1P (TCDS H12NM, and R00008AT), and SW204 (TCDS H6SO), SW204HP (TCDS H6SO), SW205 (TCDS H6SO), helicopters, with tailboom vertical fin spar, part number (P/N) 205-032-899, 205-030-846, or 205-032-851, all dash numbers, installed, certificated in any category.\n\n\tNOTE 1: This AD applies to each helicopter identified in the preceding applicability provision, regardless of whether it has been modified, altered, or repaired in the area subject to the requirements of this AD. For helicopters that have been modified, altered, or repaired so that the performance of the requirements of this AD is affected, the owner/operator must use the authority provided in paragraph (c) to request approval from the FAA. This approval may address either no action, if the current configuration eliminates the unsafe condition, or different actions necessary to address the unsafe condition described in this AD. Such a request should include an assessment of the effect of the changed configuration on the unsafe condition addressed by this AD. In no case does the presence of any modification, alteration, or repairremove any helicopter from the applicability of this AD.\n\n\tCompliance: Required as indicated, unless accomplished previously.\n\n\tTo prevent in-flight failure of the tailboom vertical fin spar (vertical fin spar) and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter, accomplish the following:\n\n\t(a)\tWithin 8 hours time-in-service (TIS) after the effective date of this AD, modify the vertical fin spar as follows:\n\n\t\t(1)\tRemove the 42 gearbox cover and open the drive shaft cover on the vertical fin spar assembly (see Figure 1).\n\n\t\t(2)\tRemove the first four rivets from the fin spar located at the bottom of the vertical fin spar left-hand side at the tailboom and vertical fin spar junction, and the first four rivets aft of the junction along the lower edge of the vertical fin spar side-skin as shown (see Figure 2).\nCAUTION: Extreme care must be taken when drilling and removing rivets from the side of vertical fin spar to ensure the vertical fin spar assembly is not damaged.\n\n\t\t(3)\tTrim the vertical fin spar left-hand side-skin using extreme care to not damage the vertical fin spar assembly (see Figure 3).\n\n\t\t(4)\tDeburr the rivet holes and trimmed side-skin edges. Remove all debris. In a ventilated work area, remove any surface contaminants with a cloth that has been dampened with aliphatic naphtha or an equivalent cleaning solvent.\n\n\t\t(5)\tReattach the side-skin to the vertical fin spar using MS 20470AD rivets. DO NOT install the bottom two rivets into the vertical fin spar where the side-skin was trimmed.\n\n\t\t(6)\tAttach the vertical fin spar side-skin lower edge using the rivets specified in Figure 2.\n\n\t\t(7)\tRefinish all reworked areas.\n\n\t(b)\tAfter modifying the vertical fin spar assembly, immediately inspect the vertical fin spar, and thereafter, inspect at intervals not to exceed 8 hours TIS, for cracks as follows:\n\n\t\t(1)\tRemove the lower aft tailboom inspection door, located at tailboom station 180 (see Figure 4).\n\n\t\t(2)\tRemove the 42 gearbox cover and open the drive shaft cover on the vertical fin (see Figure 1).\n\n\t\t(3)\tThrough the lower aft tailboom inspection door, using a bright light and an inspection mirror, inspect the vertical fin spar assembly adjacent to the tailboom top skin on the forward side, paying special attention to the left-hand edge and the adjacent surfaces (see Figure 2).\n\n\t\t(4)\tIn a ventilated work area, clean all surfaces to be inspected with a cloth dampened with aliphatic naphtha or an equivalent cleaning solvent. Using a bright light and a 10x magnifying glass, inspect the vertical fin spar assembly adjacent to the tailboom top-skin on the in-board and out-board sides, the vertical edge, and the two open rivet holes. Using a bright light and a mirror, inspect the aft side of the vertical fin spar in the same area. Special attention must be given to the left-hand edge of the vertical fin spar and any adjacent surfaces between fin station 66.31 and 71.31 (see Figure 2).\n\n\t\t(5)\tIf any crack is discovered on the vertical fin spar, replace the vertical fin spar assembly with an airworthy vertical fin spar assembly before further flight.\n\n\t(c)\tAn alternative method of compliance or adjustment of the compliance time that provides an acceptable level of safety may be used if approved by the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office, FAA. Operators shall submit their requests through an FAA Principal Maintenance Inspector, who may concur or comment and then send it to the Manager, Rotorcraft Certification Office.\n\n\tNOTE 2: Information concerning the existence of approved alternative methods of compliance with this AD, if any, may be obtained from the Rotorcraft Certification Office.\n\n\t(d)\tSpecial flight permits may be issued in accordance with sections 21.197 and 21.199 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 21.197 and 21.199) to operate the helicopter to a location where the requirements of this AD can be accomplished.\n\n\t(e)\tPriority Letter AD 97-20-09, issued September 17, 1997, becomes effective upon receipt.
2018-26-02: We are superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2016-25-19 for Airbus Helicopters (previously Eurocopter France) Model AS350B3 and EC130B4 helicopters. AD 2016-25-19 required inspecting the pilot's and co-pilot's throttle twist for proper operation. This new AD retains the requirements of AD 2016-25-19 and adds certain model helicopters to the applicability. The actions of this AD are intended to address an unsafe condition on these products.
2000-17-09: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Aerospatiale Model ATR42-200, -300, and -320 series airplanes, that requires revising the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the Instructions for Continued Airworthiness to incorporate life limits for certain items and inspections to detect fatigue cracking in certain structures. This amendment is prompted by issuance of mandatory continuing airworthiness information by a foreign civil airworthiness authority. The actions specified by this AD are intended to ensure that fatigue cracking of certain structural elements is detected and corrected; such fatigue cracking could adversely affect the structural integrity of these airplanes.
2000-17-10: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all Lockheed Model L-1011-385 series airplanes, that requires modifications of the engine turbine cooling air panel at the flight engineer/second officer's console, pilot s caution and warning light panel on the main instrument panel, and monitoring system for the engine turbine air temperature. This amendment is prompted by reports of an undetected fire breaching the high speed gearbox (HSGB) case on certain Rolls Royce engines installed on in-service airplanes due to lack of an internal fire detection system within the HSGB. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent undetected fires originating within the HSGB from breaching the HSGB case, which could result in engine damage and increased difficulty in extinguishing a fire.
2007-03-18: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for the products listed above. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as cracking in the wing main landing gear (MLG) rib 5 aft bearing forward lug, which could affect the structural integrity of the MLG attachment. This AD requires actions that are intended to address the unsafe condition described in the MCAI.