Results
2022-09-09: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all CFM International, S.A. (CFM) LEAP-1A23, LEAP-1A24, LEAP-1A24E1, LEAP- 1A26, LEAP-1A26CJ, LEAP-1A26E1, LEAP-1A29, LEAP-1A29CJ, LEAP-1A30, LEAP-1A32, LEAP-1A33, LEAP-1A33B2, and LEAP-1A35A model turbofan engines. This AD was prompted by the detection of melt-related freckles in the billet, which may reduce the life of certain compressor rotor stages 6-10 spools, high pressure turbine (HPT) rotor interstage seals, HPT rotor stage 2 disks, low pressure turbine (LPT) stage 1 disks, LPT stage 2 disks, LPT stage 3 disks, and LPT stage 4 disks. This AD requires revising the airworthiness limitations section (ALS) of the applicable CFM LEAP-1A Engine Shop Manual (ESM) and the operator's existing approved continuous airworthiness maintenance program (CAMP) to incorporate reduced life limits for these parts. This AD also requires the removal of certain LPT stage 4 disks identified by serial number (S/N) prior to their new life limits. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
99-17-18: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to MD Helicopters, Inc. (MDHI) Model 600N helicopters, that requires applying serial numbers to several life-limited components related to pitch control and removing and replacing the components according to new life-limits. This amendment is prompted by fatigue tests that indicate a need for shorter service lives for these components. The actions specified by this AD are intended to prevent failure of the collective pitch control tubes, collective stick housings, and collective pitch tube assemblies, which can cause loss of collective pitch control, and subsequent loss of control of the helicopter.
50-38-01: 50-38-01\tNORTH AMERICAN: Applies to All Model AT-6 Series Aircraft. \n\n\tTo be accomplished at the next annual inspection and at each succeeding annual inspection thereafter.\n \n\tSeveral recent incidents have indicated that the inspections presently required are not sufficiently comprehensive to reveal all areas of the airplane which may have been adversely affected by intergranular corrosion, and that the required inspections should be repeated periodically. Accordingly, in order to minimize the possibility of structural failure due to such corrosion, the following must be accomplished: \n\n\tInspect all accessible structural aluminum alloy components for evidence of intergranular corrosion particularly in the following locations: At the upper and lower deck and the most forward and two aft bulkheads in the monocoque fuselage; frame around the baggage door; inboard end of horizontal stabilizer spars; fuel cell doors in the wing center section; wing attach angles; two inboard ribs oneach outer wing; trailing edge ribs above flaps; and the outboard rib of the wings, especially at the trailing edge. Full use should be made of all access provisions to accomplish as thorough an inspection as possible. \n\n\tIn conducting these inspections, full reliance cannot be placed on visual examination alone. A screwdriver or other instrument should be used to explore for dull sounding areas and for material which may be penetrated easily by pressure applied to the screwdriver tip or similar sharp point. Areas adjacent to joints and sheared edges should be examined thoroughly. \n\n\tFormed material in particular has been found to be subject to rapid intergranular corrosion, because of poor heat treatment of parts, which were formed in the annealed condition, and later heat treated. \n\n\tAll corroded parts must be replaced. \n\n\tThis supersedes AD 47-41-01.
2004-16-06: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD), applicable to all BAE Systems (Operations) Limited Model Avro 146-RJ series airplanes, that requires replacing the existing digital flight guidance computer(s) (DFGC) with a new or modified DFGC(s). This action is necessary to prevent a premature flare from occurring on approach due to erroneous data being provided to the DFGC(s); and also to prevent uncertainty about autopilot engagement status, which could cause the pilot to apply unneeded force to the control column and possibly result in a runaway condition of the autotrim. Either condition could lead to reduced controllability of the airplane. This action is intended to address the identified unsafe conditions.
2013-04-10: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Airbus Model A310-203, -204, -222, -304, -322, and -324 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a design review of the fuel tank access covers and analyses comparing compliance of the access covers to different tire burst models. `Type 21' panels located within the debris zone revealed that they could not sustain the impact of the tire debris. This AD requires modifying the wing manhole surrounds and replacing certain fuel access panels. We are issuing this AD to prevent a possibility of a fire due to tire debris impact on the fuel access panels.
2022-09-03: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2020-21- 06, which applied to certain Airbus SAS Model A350-941 and -1041 airplanes. AD 2020-21-06 required revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations. Since the FAA issued AD 2020-21- 06, the FAA has determined that new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations are necessary. This AD retains the requirements of AD 2020- 21-06 and requires revising the applicability by adding airplanes. This AD also requires revising the existing maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or more restrictive airworthiness limitations, as specified in a European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD, which is incorporated by reference. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
99-16-08: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes. This action requires repetitive inspections of the doubler on the upper rudder pedal cover to determine whether it is securely bonded to the upper rudder pedal cover, and corrective action, if necessary. For airplanes on which the doubler is securely attached to the upper rudder pedal cover, this AD also provides for installation of two rivets to retain the doubler, as an optional terminating action for the repetitive inspections. This amendment is prompted by reports that a disbonded doubler interfered with rudder pedal movement. The actions specified in this AD are intended to detect and correct disbonding of the doubler on the upper rudder pedal cover, which could result in restricted rudder pedal movement and reduced controllability of the airplane.
2013-04-02: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for Reims Aviation S.A. Model F406 airplanes. This AD results from mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI) issued by an aviation authority of another country to identify and correct an unsafe condition on an aviation product. The MCAI describes the unsafe condition as improper material used in nose landing gear (NLG) attachment brackets could lead to failure of the NLG bracket with consequent damage to the airplane while landing. We are issuing this AD to require actions to address the unsafe condition on these products.
99-16-11: This amendment adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) that is applicable to certain Boeing Model 737-600, -700, and -800 series airplanes. This action requires a test of the squib circuit ground studs of the engine fire extinguisher bottles to measure the resistance, and repair or replacement of the ground stud with a new ground stud, if necessary. This amendment is prompted by reports of improper grounding of the squib circuit. Such a condition would prevent the engine fire extinguisher bottle from discharging when commanded, which could result in the inability to extinguish an engine fire.
2022-09-02: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Bombardier, Inc., Model BD-100-1A10 airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report that the nose wheel steering selector valve (SSV) can be slow to deactivate under low temperature conditions. This AD requires replacing the affected nose wheel SSV with a redesigned nose wheel SSV, and performing an operational test of the nose wheel SSV and nose wheel steering control system. This AD also prohibits the installation of a certain nose wheel SSV. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.